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This dissertation investigates how conflicts of mid-twentieth-century Indian 
wardship and citizenship manifested in political debates and public opinion. By 
considering Indian termination policies in conjunction with welfare policies of the 
same era, Citizens with Reservations explores how Native people challenged broad 
definitions of American citizenship undergirded by racialized and gendered notions of 
dependency and opportunity. This dissertation defines what Indian wardship and 
	 xvi 
citizenship meant for both non-Native and Native people in ideological terms, and 
explores how Native people experienced wardship and citizenship in their day-to-day 
lives. While non-Native politicians, state agents, and the public defined wardship as 
Indians’ perpetual dependency on the federal government, Native people saw it as the 
United States’ legal obligation to fulfill the terms of historical agreements and treaties 
negotiated with Indian tribes. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, state 
agents employed “ward” a racialized and gendered term positioned in opposition to 
“proper” American citizenship.  
Citizens with Reservations is a history of Native peoples’ pursuit of welfare 
benefits, and a history of how the racialized construct of “Indian wardship” shaped 
larger political debates over welfare dependency within the United States. To explore 
the complex intersections between wardship and welfare, this dissertation examines 
the “quotidian structures of wardship”—the daily decisions, conversations, and 
correspondence between Native people and BIA agents. After situating wardship 
within a longer history of Indian racialization, Citizens with Reservations examines 
how wardship impacted Native peoples’ efforts to obtain welfare benefits under the 
Social Security Act, Servicemen’s Dependents Allowance Act, and the GI Bill; and 
explores eleven unsuccessful termination bills proposed by conservative congressmen 
between 1944-1954 which would have “emancipated” “competent Indians from 
wardship. It analyzes how and why Native people claimed rights to welfare benefits as 
citizens, while retaining their right to wardship as they defined it. By interrogating the 
racialized and gendered constructions of “proper” citizenship in the mid-twentieth 
	 xvii 
century, this dissertation puts debates and battles over Indian access to welfare into a 
longer history of assimilation and settler colonialism in the United States.  
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 1 
Introduction  
 
“If the judgment of the ward is to prevail over the judgment of the trustee-guardian, 
then the special relationship should be terminated.” – Roger Ernst, Assistant Secretary 
to the Interior, 19571 
 
“The BIA is a great resource, if you know how to use ’em. And we know how to use 
’em.” – Larry Calica, Secretary-Treasurer, Warm Springs Tribe2 
 
 
 In 2014, Shawn Regan, research fellow at the Property and Environment 
Research Center, a think tank devoted to free-market environmentalism, published an 
opinion piece in Forbes. In his first paragraph, Regan set a bleak scene for the reader: 
“Imagine if the government were looking after your best interests. All of your assets 
must be managed by bureaucrats on your behalf. A special bureau is even set up to 
oversee your affairs. Every important decision you make comes with a mountain of 
regulations.”3 Regan argued that this dark depiction of governmental control over 
individual choice was Native peoples’ actual experience in the United States. “How 
well would this work?” Regan asked. “Just ask Native Americans.” He asserted that 
extensive government administration had made Indian reservations “the poorest 
communities in the United States.”4 Overall, Regan proclaimed, the extensive reach of 
                                                            
1 Ernst to Murray, 1957, Folder 22 - Public Law 280 and Amendments 1948-57, Box 16, William 
Zimmerman Papers, Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico.  
2 Quoted in Valerie Lambert, “The Big Black Box of Indian Country: The Bureau of Indian Affairs and 
the Federal-Indian Relationship,” American Indian Quarterly 40, no. 4 (Fall 2016), 339.  
3 Shawn Regan, “5 Ways the Government Keeps Native Americans in Poverty,” Forbes, March 13, 
2014, https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/03/13/5-ways-the-government-keeps-native-
americans-in-poverty/#97c85122c274.  
4 Ibid.  
  
2 
the federal government into Native peoples’ lives had deprived them of economic 
success and left them “locked in poverty and dependence.”5 
 This contemporary view of Native poverty and dependence is based upon 
decades of historical ambivalence and uncertainty about where Indian people fit within 
the American polity. Regan’s described Native people as “wards” of a federal 
government charged with complete responsibility for their financial and social 
welfare. He claimed that the government had failed in that responsibility. 
Recapitulating longstanding racialized stereotypes about Native peoples’ relationship 
with the state, Regan argued that the government exercised ultimate authority over 
Indians, keeping them in perpetual dependence. Native poverty could not be solved by 
increased funding for social welfare programs or historical recognition of the colonial 
relationship between the United States and tribal groups. Rather, Regan claimed, 
Native people needed freedom from government regulation of their land, natural 
resources, and assets.  
 This is a familiar refrain. Regan’s assertions echo the concerns of non-Native 
politicians in the mid-twentieth century who advocated for the abolition of the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs (BIA), and the “emancipation” of Native people from wardship. 
Underneath these calls for Indian freedom lay politicians’ and policymakers’ 
racialized and gendered conceptions of what it meant to be a successful citizen and the 
danger of dependency on government resources.  
                                                            
5 Ibid.  
  
3 
 Native activists and tribes in the mid-twentieth century contended that wardship 
did not connote Indian dependence. Rather, they claimed that the term should be 
understood as the United States’ legal obligation to fulfill the terms of historical 
agreements and treaties. In exchange for land, Native people were entitled to certain 
protections and services. As sovereign nations within the United States, they expected 
the state to make good on its promises. Native people were also citizens of the United 
States. Their wardship and citizenship statuses tenuously coexisted, especially as they 
navigated through the expansion of the federal welfare state in the mid-twentieth 
century. They were not only a group of racialized citizens or solely members of tribes. 
They were both.  
 This dissertation investigates the specific ways in which conflicts over Native 
wardship and citizenship manifested in political debates and public opinion in the mid-
twentieth century. My goal is to define what Indian wardship and citizenship meant 
for both non-Native and Native people in ideological terms, and to explore how Native 
people experienced wardship and citizenship in their day-to-day lives. To do so, I 
examine the ways in which wardship—the distinct relationship between tribes and the 
United States—impacted Native peoples’ access to the mid-century expansion of the 
American welfare state. The New Deal and World War II led to an expansion of the 
federal state in the 1930s-1950s. Expanded welfare programs caused Americans to 
reassess how citizenship functioned as a “reciprocal relationship” between the federal 
government and individual citizens.6 Citizens who fulfilled their increased obligations 
                                                            
6 Paul Rosier, Serving Their Country: American Indian Politics and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 70. 
  
4 
to the state began to understand themselves as entitled to state social welfare benefits 
as “rights.”7 This understanding of a “right” to welfare was not one-sided. New Deal 
policymakers and administrators also “spread rights language throughout the nation,” 
changing the way Americans thought about relief and aid to the poor.8 In this era, 
Native people, BIA agents, politicians, and other members of the public asked, could 
Indians claim the same right to welfare benefits?  
 In a legal sense, the answer is simple. Having been universally declared to be 
American citizens in 1924, Native people were entitled to welfare benefits just like 
other citizens. However, in the mid-twentieth century, Native people were not only 
considered citizens, but wards. This dissertation shows that “ward” functioned as a 
racialized and gendered signifier which not only limited Indians’ access to welfare 
benefits, but shaped the ways in which they interacted with the state in general. Thus, 
welfare benefits serve as a lens through which to view persistent ambiguities within 
Native peoples’ “reciprocal relationships” with the US state.  
  
Wards, Citizens, and the State  
 Historians of American Indians often pit the goals and policies of the state 
against the wishes and worldviews of Native tribes. Federal Indian policies have 
imposed non-Native systems of governance, family structure, religion, culture, and 
                                                            
7 Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 285. See also James T. Sparrow, Warfare State: World War II 
Americans and the Age of Big Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 4, 14; and Meg 
Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics: Economic Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton; Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), 220. 
  
5 
violence onto Native people. However, the “official” documents of the state archive 
expose a cacophony of negotiations, conflicts, and exchanges between Native people 
and the state. At the conjunction of Indian policy and welfare policy, historians can 
find that Native men and women have directly inserted their voices into the official 
record, speaking in the “language” of the state, to interject their opinions on Indian 
policies, demand recognition from federal and state governments, and engage with 
state agents. Linda Tuhiwai Smith argues that history is “mostly about power. It is the 
story of the powerful and how they became powerful.”9 However, Smith also claims 
that research must encompass “dialogue across the boundaries of oppositions,” as 
indigenous peoples are “struggling to make sense of [their] own world while also 
attempting to transform what counts as important in the world of the powerful.”10 
Historians can certainly find many stories of the powerful within state archives, but we 
can also find many of these “dialogues across the boundaries of oppositions,” 
indigenous peoples’ alternative interpretations of and challenges to policy. Thus, 
policy documents should not be read solely as transcripts of state control and influence 
over Indian peoples’ lives, but rather, read as ambiguous dialogues across oppositional 
boundaries.  
 Citizens with Reservations explores how Indian policy and social welfare 
legislation unfolded within Native peoples’ lives. It is an analysis of Native peoples’ 
engagement with state action, and also, to use Margot Canaday’s phrase, a study of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
8 Karen Tani, States of Dependency: Welfare, Rights, and American Governance, 1935-1972 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 8. 
9 Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (Dunedin, NZ: 
University of Otago Press, 1999), 34. 
  
6 
“state-building from the bottom up,” an examination of state formation as “what 
officials do.”11 I explore the motivations and actions of those officials who shaped 
both Indian and welfare policy, including those who worked for the BIA, the 
Department of the Interior, state boards of public welfare, the Office of Dependency 
Benefits, the Veterans’ Administration, and members of Congress. Based on their 
assumptions about Indian wardship and citizenship, these officials made specific 
choices about how and where Native people would be able to access welfare 
resources. They chose whether to disseminate certain information, whether to 
cooperate with other agencies, to intervene when they saw something “improper,” and 
to implement administrative processes which significantly impacted Native families, 
communities, and land.12 Native peoples’ attempts to access welfare benefits reveal 
what “wardship,” an ambiguous racial and legal category, actually meant for both 
Indians and government agents. In examining Indians’ lived experiences of wardship, 
I seek to further open what Choctaw anthropologist Valerie Lambert calls, “the BIA as 
the big black box of Indian Country.”13 In examining the “quotidian structures of 
wardship,”—daily decisions, conversations, and correspondence between Native 
people and BIA agents—I demonstrate that Native claims to welfare rights were 
undergirded by theories of Indians’ racialized dependency. However, to expand upon 
Lambert’s argument, I also aim to complicate these relationships between Native 
                                                                                                                                                                           
10 Ibid., 39.  
11 Margot Canaday, The Straight State: Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 5. 
12 For more on the men and women who worked for the BIA, see Lambert, “Black Box of Indian 
Country;” and Cathleen D. Cahill, Federal Fathers and Mothers: A Social History of the United States 
Indian Service, 1869-1933 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011).  
  
7 
people and the BIA, to expose the “multidimensional and contradictory nature of these 
relations.”14  
 State officials defined wardship as a perpetual state of Native dependency, 
historically rooted in the federal government’s “self-proclaimed plenary power in 
Indian affairs.”15 However, in the mid-twentieth century, some BIA agents, non-
Native policymakers, and politicians also argued that eventually, under governmental 
guidance, Native people were supposed to become “full” citizens independent from 
government oversight. Proponents of this ideology proposed “termination” policies, 
which would integrate Indians into the polity, abolish the BIA, and “emancipate” 
Native people from wardship. This dissertation elucidates the dynamics of state-Indian 
interactions within the uneasy reconciliation of Indians’ perpetual wardship and their 
linear path to “full” citizenship through assimilation.  
  Native people were familiar with the rhetoric of “full citizenship” because 
“emancipation” had been policymakers’ goal since the late nineteenth century. 
Therefore, Indian emancipation should be considered part and parcel of ongoing 
process of American settler colonialism, “through which American Indians become 
invisibilized and minoritized within the United States.”16 As Patrick Wolfe claims, 
“settler colonialism destroys to replace.”17 Terminationists designed policies to 
destroy Native land rights and claims to BIA protections and resources, replacing the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
13 Lambert, “Black Box of Indian Country,” 343. 
14 Ibid., 357.  
15 N. Bruce Duthu, Shadow Nations: Tribal Sovereignty and the Limits of Legal Pluralism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 150. 
16 Jodi A. Byrd, The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2011), 137. 
  
8 
relationship Native people maintained with the federal government as wards, solely 
with racialized American citizenship. By rejecting efforts to “free” them from 
wardship, Native people articulated a different definition of “ward”—one that sat 
outside of the ideology of perpetual Indian dependency and Native need for guidance 
towards assimilation. Native people understood wardship to be a legal relationship, 
one based upon the US’ historical obligations to tribes. This dissertation explores and 
analyzes clashes between non-Natives’ and Natives’ dissonant conceptualizations of 
wardship.  
 Citizens with Reservations also examines competing conceptions of citizenship. 
While advocates of termination policy and members of the non-Native public assumed 
that wardship barred Native people from “full” citizenship, Indian activists and tribal 
groups argued that wardship should not prevent them from accessing their rights as 
citizens. In an era of expanding welfare policy, reformers and policymakers argued 
that “dependency” was antithetical to productive citizenship. Welfare recipients, 
mostly poor women and people of color, were “drains” on public resources. Those 
opposed to the expansion of the welfare state leveled the same types of racialized 
critiques at Native people. To these critics, Indian wardship and welfare dependency 
were two sides of the same coin—a group of (racialized and gendered) citizens 
completely dependent upon the federal government for guidance and assistance in 
their lives. However, Native people were adamant that “wardship” was not “welfare.” 
Within their pursuit of welfare benefits, Indians spoke of their rights as citizens, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
17 Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” Journal of Genocide 
Research 8, no. 4 (December 2006), 388.  
  
9 
taxpayers, veterans, and humans. They also maintained their demand that the federal 
government provide resources and protections to tribes under the terms of wardship.  
 
Citizens, with Reservations  
 This dissertation examines conversations and debates between tribal 
representatives, Native welfare applicants, agents of the BIA and other federal 
agencies, state lawmakers, social workers, and organizations devoted to Indian affairs 
through analysis of correspondence, legal cases, proposed legislation, Congressional 
hearings, minutes of tribal councils and congressional subcommittees, organizational 
newsletters, and media coverage. My geographical focus is the American Southwest, 
specifically the states of Arizona, New Mexico, and Nevada. The dissertation centers 
on these states for three main reasons. First, these states’ large Native populations and 
outspoken non-Native citizens resulted in battles over Indian eligibility for welfare 
benefits. Politicians and public welfare officials in Arizona and New Mexico 
adamantly denied that their states were responsible for providing benefits to Indians 
under the 1935 Social Security Act. Nevada politicians, including Pat McCarran and 
George Malone, consistently refused to recognize tribal land rights and were vocal 
supporters of termination policies. Second, Native tribes and organizations in this 
region actively inserted themselves into conversations about wardship, citizenship, 
and welfare. Many of the Native voices in this dissertation are from the Pyramid Lake 
Paiute, Navajo, Apache, Pueblo, and Tohono O’odham tribes, the Pima-Maricopa 
Indian Community of the Gila River Reservation, the Chemeheuvi and Mohave 
  
10 
communities of the Colorado River Reservation and other tribes in the Southwest. In 
addition to issuing resolutions, petitioning their state and federal governments, and 
corresponding with agents of the BIA, representatives from these groups frequently 
communicated with representatives from the National Congress of American Indians 
(NCAI) and sought legal advice from noted specialists in Indian law, including Felix 
Cohen, James Curry, and Normal Littell. Third, in the mid-twentieth century, intense 
media attention and public scrutiny was directed at Navajos in Arizona and New 
Mexico. Magazine and newspaper articles highlighted widespread poverty, hunger, 
and illiteracy on the Navajo reservation in the years following World War II. This 
coverage catalyzed public concern about the place Native people occupied within the 
American polity. Non-Native citizens roundly criticized the relationship between 
Navajos—and by extension, all Native people—and the federal government, arguing 
for the inclusion of Native people, as the “first Americans,” into the American body 
politic as full and equal citizens. This swirl of political tension, vocal Native 
resistance, and public perception makes the Southwest a fruitful site for examining the 
nature and scope of Indian dependency, entitlement, and need in the mid-twentieth 
century.  
 However, though battles over wardship and welfare were concentrated in the 
Southwest, this is also a national story. Critics of the welfare state looked to Indian 
wards as examples of what could go wrong if federal power continued to grow 
unchecked. Politicians proposed legislation to “emancipate” Indians on a national 
scale, rather than state by state. Media coverage of Native poverty and struggle 
  
11 
prompted outcry from non-Native citizens throughout the United States. Native people 
maintained two different “reciprocal relationships” with the federal government—one 
as citizens of the United States, and one as members of tribal nations. Citizenship and 
wardship were national constructs.  
As a study of Native peoples’ relationship with the federal government, this 
project also engages with tribal sovereignty. When Native people applied for welfare 
benefits, whether based on need or in return for service, they did so as citizens. But 
they also did so with an awareness of their relationship with the federal government, 
and, in many cases, with the help and/or oversight of BIA agents. Although separate, 
wardship and welfare were messily entangled. Therefore, Native peoples’ political 
rights to both welfare benefits (as citizens) and to certain resources and trust protection 
on their land (as wards) were, in Kevin Bruyneel’s words, “not really about issues of 
exclusion and inclusion” within the United States polity.18 Rather, in their claims to 
both distinct sets of rights, Native people challenged assimilationist ideologies and 
articulated a unique political autonomy—what Bruyneel terms the “third space of 
sovereignty.” Bruyneel argues that Native people exist on the “boundaries,” “neither 
inside nor outside the American political system.”19 Citizens with Reservations utilizes 
Bruyneel’s conceptualization of the third space of sovereignty to explore sites of 
tension on the ideological boundaries of what constituted “proper” citizenship and 
“true” wardship.  
                                                            
18 Kevin Bruyneel, The Third Space of Sovereignty: The Postcolonial Politics of US-Indigenous 
Relations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 6.  
19 Ibid., xvii.  
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To do so, I examine how Indians were racialized in mid-twentieth-century 
conversations about welfare eligibility, military service, and competency. “Ward” 
itself was a racial term, which became attached to Indianness to the extent that some 
politicians and government bureaucrats wanted to develop a process to purge 
“competent” Native people from the BIA’s purview. “Real” Indians were wards, 
dependent on BIA guidance. Joanne Barker has demonstrated that notions of 
“authenticity” reinforce racist ideologies—in this case, equating Indianness with 
dependency.20 Citizenship is constituted by a relationship between the state and the 
individual based on a system of obligations and rights. “Dependency” on the 
government thus falls outside of the construct of “proper” citizenship. Native peoples’ 
expressions of political and cultural autonomy and persistent claims to the rights and 
protections due them under wardship crystallized into popular misconceptions that 
they were not “real” citizens. The title of this project, Citizens with Reservations, 
alludes to the ambiguous space Native people occupied within the polity. 
Simultaneously viewed by non-Natives as prisons and/or (tax-free) privileges, 
reservations seemed to hold Native people back from assimilation into the polity. 
However, reservations are protected Indian homelands. Because reservation land 
exists outside the jurisdiction of state power and is restricted from sale, reservations 
symbolize Native peoples’ “special” relationship with the federal government. 
Reservations represent tribes’ relationships with land and histories of resistance. 
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Therefore, reservations are imbued with power. Reservations thus qualified Native 
citizenship, for both Indians and non-Indians. This dissertation explains why.  
 
Historiography 
Citizenship: Imposed, Restricted, Demanded  
 Scholars have examined American citizenship as a racialized and gendered 
category which has functioned in a range of capacities—as a beacon of hope and 
freedom, gatekeeper of American values, and tool for assimilation and colonialism. 
This project explores these multiple conceptualizations of American citizenship, 
examining how Native people demanded rights within and outside of the traditional 
confines of citizenship in the mid-twentieth century. As such, the project engages a 
vast literature of citizenship, race, and gender.  
 Historians have considered how the imposition of American citizenship on 
Native families significantly undermined Indian cultural and family structures. Non-
Native agents and reformers contrasted Indian “savagery” with racialized ideals of 
civilization. Campaigns to “civilize” Native people were made up of, in Robert 
Porter’s words, “a four-pronged attack that served as a kind of Four Horsemen of the 
Indian Apocalypse,” which included conversion to Christianity, coerced Western 
education for Indian children, allotment of tribal lands, and the extension of 
citizenship to Indians.21 Driven by the desire to assimilate Indians into Americanized 
ideals of property ownership, gendered labor, language, and religion, reformers and 
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state officials forcibly attempted to educate Native people to become “proper” 
citizens.22 For example, in the late-nineteenth to early-twentieth centuries, state agents 
and reformers divided Native communities into patriarchal nuclear family units to 
allot tribal land, disrupting existing systems of community and family governance.23 
Citizenship was involuntarily “granted” to Indians who conformed to assimilationist 
ideals—that is, it did not require Indian consent.24 As Tuscarora chief Clinton Rickard 
asserted in his autobiography, “United States citizenship was just another way of 
absorbing us and destroying our customs and our government.”25 
However, as Frederick Hoxie argues, assimilationist policymakers and 
reformers did not envision citizenship to elevate Native people to the status of whites. 
Rather, by 1920, “a new, more pessimistic spirit governed federal action.”26 Native 
people were to be incorporated into the nation, but “their new status bore a greater 
resemblance to the position of the United States’ other nonwhite peoples” than it did to 
                                                                                                                                                                           
21 Robert Porter, “The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing 
the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship Upon Indigenous Peoples” Harvard BlackLetter 
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22 See Jane Simonsen, Making Home Work: Domesticity and Native American Assimilation in the 
American West, 1860-1919 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Margaret 
Jacobs, White Mother to a Dark Race: Settler Colonialism, Maternalism, and the Removal of 
Indigenous Children in the American West and Australia, 1880-1940 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2009); Pablo Mitchell, Coyote Nation: Sexuality, Race, and Conquest in Modernizing New 
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Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880-1920 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
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23 Rose Stremlau, Sustaining the Cherokee Family: Kinship and the Allotment of an Indigenous Nation 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 128.  
24 Frank Pommersheim, Broken Landscape: Indians, Indian Tribes, and the Constitution (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 163.  
25 Quoted in Bruyneel, Third Space of Sovereignty, 113.  
26 Hoxie, A Final Promise, x.  
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idealized notions of “full” citizenship.27 As nonwhite members of the American polity, 
Native people were restricted from “full” citizenship, a space defined not only by 
Americanized cultural, political, and social behavior, but also by race. Scholars have 
shown that throughout the early twentieth century, whiteness remained the prerequisite 
for full and equal citizenship.28 This dissertation will examine the extent to which 
wardship restricted Native people from full citizenship within the American polity due 
to its racial connotations. Ideologically, non-Native politicians and members of the 
public viewed wardship as a racialized category which set Native people apart from 
the rest of the nation.  
The history of American citizenship is shaped by dynamic exchanges between 
“second-class” citizens and the state. Marginalized peoples have demanded inclusion 
into the body politic, and challenged definitions and benefits of such inclusion. For 
example, African American civil rights and black power activists argued that despite 
growing twentieth-century discourses of pluralism and democracy, racialized peoples 
faced impediments to full citizenship. African American and Chicano/a activists 
connected the global struggle for decolonization in Asia and Africa with the struggle 
for “internal decolonization” within the United States.29 In addition to demands for 
                                                            
27 Hoxie, A Final Promise, xi.  
28 See Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton: 
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29 See Nikhil Pal Singh, Black Is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy 
(Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press, 2004); Lorena Oropeza, Raza Si! Guerra No! Chicano 
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recognition and “full” citizenship, activists in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
reimagined categories of citizenship and belonging to “open the circle of common 
humanity.”30 Scholars such as Daniel Cobb and Alyosha Goldstein have examined 
how Native people utilized federal welfare systems, including the War on Poverty’s 
Community Action Program, in order to combat Native poverty. As they participated 
in these governmental programs, Native people conceptualized their issues with the 
federal government in the language of international politics and development, drawing 
connections between their needs and the anticolonial struggles of indigenous peoples 
abroad.31 As Native people “translated the politics of ‘cold war civil rights’ into the 
language of tribal sovereignty,”32 they fashioned American citizenship from a tool of 
racialized gatekeeping into a means of claiming recognition of specific tribal histories 
within the United States.  
Citizens with Reservations expands upon this scholarly work by examining 
sites of the explicit and messy confluence of race, sovereignty, and citizenship. Rather 
than focusing on the activism of the 1960s and 1970s, I draw the discussion back in 
time to examine how Native people experienced the largescale changes to citizenship 
which occurred because of New Deal and World War II-era welfare programs. When 
needy elderly Native people applied for Old Age Assistance, Native wives of 
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servicemen claimed dependency benefits, or Indian veterans applied for business loans 
under the GI Bill, they attempted to access the benefits due to American citizens. 
However, in so doing, they were often assisted and/or controlled by BIA agents, and 
state welfare agencies and lenders often denied their claims. Thus, the subjects of this 
dissertation actively defined their identities as citizens from within the administrative 
exchanges, political assumptions, and long-lasting relationships which constituted 
wardship. Sharon Romeo has asserted, “as an identity, citizenship is constructed 
through daily contests for greater control over one’s life.”33 This project delves into 
those daily contests, exploring how Native people made use of both the concepts of 
rights and sovereignty to support themselves, their families, and their communities.  
 
Welfare Dependency and Welfare Rights  
 Historians of welfare have emphasized how the structure of the American 
welfare system has been split into two categories: “rights-based” and “needs-based.” 
Rights-based welfare provisions are more respected, less intrusive, and masculine; 
while needs-based provisions are more intrusive, less stable, and feminine.34 
Therefore, men have been more likely viewed as “entitled” to benefits like Old Age 
Insurance, Unemployment Insurance, and GI Bill loans, and women and racialized 
people have been viewed as “dependent” on government programs like Aid to 
Dependent Children or Old Age Assistance. Rights-based welfare programs have been 
                                                            
33 Sharon Romeo, Gender and the Jubilee: Black Freedom and the Reconstruction of Citizenship in 
Civil War Missouri (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2016), 6.  
34 Linda Gordon, Pitied but Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare, 1890-1935 (New 
York: The Free Press, 1994), 11.  
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more safely enshrined within material structures and popular ideologies, while needs-
based welfare programs have been subject to frequent criticism and cited as dangerous 
to the financial well-being of the nation. As Suzanne Mettler demonstrates, the 
structure of welfare itself perpetuated these divisions. Mettler notes that “white men 
were incorporated into the uniform domain of the national government and women 
and nonwhite men were left under the auspices of the states,” leaving women and 
racialized men more vulnerable to local prejudices and attempts to preserve a 
gendered and racialized social order.35 Karen Tani has further argued that although 
welfare administrators themselves proliferated the language of “welfare rights,” and 
the state “recognized all citizens, even the poorest, as rights-bearing members of the 
national polity,” the rights of the poor were subject to the “ebb and flow of politics,” 
and “continued to turn on exercises of local discretion.”36  
Scholars have shown that citizens who accessed needs-based welfare benefits 
under programs highly susceptible to changing public opinion and local norms, were 
also more likely to be scrutinized and policed, in case they were “undeserving” of such 
benefits.37 Welfare policymakers and caseworkers subscribed to a framework of 
gendered economic citizenship wherein male breadwinners should earn enough 
outside of the home to support their dependents. In return for certain types of wage 
work, the federal government disseminated entitlement benefits: “tangible, publicly 
                                                            
35 Suzanne Mettler, Dividing Citizens: Gender and Federalism in New Deal Public Policy (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1998), 5-6.  
36 Tani, States of Dependency, 19.  
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provided rewards.”38 Thus, as Alice Kessler-Harris notes, “employment emerged as a 
boundary line demarcating different kinds of citizenship.”39 Welfare policymakers 
clung to the idea of the “family wage,” even as it failed to sustain many poor working 
families, including single mothers and their children who turned to Aid to Dependent 
Children.40 In the mid-1940s, welfare reformers and social workers incorporated work 
as part of their policies to “rehabilitate” welfare recipients. Welfare reformers 
understood the psychological benefits of work to be the “value of not being 
dependent.”41 Essentially, welfare reformers viewed welfare recipients’ poverty not as 
a symptom of larger structural inequalities, but the result of individual failings.42 
Because they were more likely to be eligible for “needs-based” aid, women and 
racialized men who applied for welfare benefits were stigmatized as lazy and unable to 
participate in the idealized economic structure of the American family.  
Historians have shown how women welfare recipients actively challenged the 
widespread belief that they were “unworthy of support,” by recasting themselves as 
mothers, consumers, citizens, and feminists.43 In their efforts to defy racialized 
stereotypes of their laziness and immorality, these women, many of them black, called 
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attention to racism within the welfare system and demanded a “share in the economic 
abundance that had come to define American society.”44 Thus, they challenged popular 
notions of gendered economic citizenship and citizens’ relationship with the state, by 
asserting that their chance at economic opportunity in the United States should also be 
safeguarded by governmental protection. These kinds of claims on the state echoed 
those of workers and consumers in the 1930s and 1940s, who saw government 
protection as “something they deserved.”45  
This dissertation does not argue that wardship was a federal welfare program. 
Native people demanded that the United States fulfill its obligations to tribes under 
existing treaties and agreements—but they did so from the position of members of 
sovereign nations, not as citizens. However, they did make claims on the state for 
welfare benefits—both “rights-based” and “needs-based.” These claims have 
heretofore been under-examined in the historiography.46 Beyond their direct welfare 
claims, Native people factor into the history of how welfare itself was conceived. 
Wardship was conservative welfare critics’ biggest fear—if the welfare state continued 
to expand, all Americans could someday end up on reservations, completely dependent 
on the federal government. This dissertation unpacks these worries, examining how 
anxiety about racialized dependency ultimately prevented Native people from 
accessing the benefits they needed and deserved. Moreover, historians have not yet 
fully excavated how policymakers and politicians who championed “freeing” Native 
people from wardship drew upon their own racialized and gendered conceptions of 
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welfare dependency. This dissertation examines how gendered understandings of 
dependency and entitlement translated into political and public opinions about Indians’ 
eligibility for welfare. Policymakers and members of the public believed all Native 
people were dependent, not just Native women. However, the quotidian structures of 
wardship were gendered. BIA agents exercised more oversight and control over Native 
women’s receipt of federal welfare benefits than Native men’s, reiterating the common 
gendered divisions of welfare discussed above. Additionally, non-Native desires to 
“emancipate” Indians from wardship were based on goals to integrate Native families 
into Americanized models of economic citizenship, where a male breadwinner would 
provide all needed resources to his dependents. Native men, particularly veterans, 
were understood to be especially restricted by their wardship status, because military 
service signaled readiness to assimilate. Therefore, my goal in Citizens with 
Reservations is to unpack the gendered and racialized intersections between wardship 
and welfare and examine how Native people navigated through the quotidian 
structures of wardship to demand their right to welfare benefits.  
 
Termination  
 The “termination era” in Indian affairs stretched roughly from the mid-1940s 
through the early 1960s. Historians of termination have noted that the policies 
proposed within this era are both familiar and different than those which came before. 
In many ways, termination policies echoed legislators’ efforts behind the Dawes 
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Allotment Act of 1887, especially in their desires to assimilate Native people into the 
American polity, remove trust restrictions from Indian property, and “emancipate” 
Indians from federal wardship.47 However, termination policies arose out of World 
War II. The war constituted a specific moment in the history of United States state-
building, characterized by increased nationalism and a spirit of “unity and consensus” 
throughout the country.48 Conservative Republican politicians, many from western 
states, viewed the trust restrictions on Indian property and other BIA services as 
“violations of a social and economic system based on property rights and private 
enterprise.”49 Exploiting language of civil rights and equality, terminationist 
policymakers and politicians working under Presidents Harry Truman and Dwight 
Eisenhower spoke of “creating an America of one people,” but proposed to strip 
Native people of their sovereignty and heritage by assimilating them into the 
American polity.50 Termination policies such as House Concurrent Resolution 108 and 
Public Law 280 (both passed in 1953), revoked federal recognition of certain tribes 
and authorized select states to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction over reservations 
without tribal consent.51 Vine Deloria and Clifford Lytle describe the mid-twentieth-
century as “the barren years,” because Native people became “subject to new forms of 
social engineering, which conceived of them as a domestic racial minority, not as 
distinct political entities with a long history of specific legal claims against the United 
                                                            
47 Donald L. Fixico, Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945-1960 (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1986), xii.  
48 Larry W. Burt, Tribalism in Crisis: Federal Indian Policy, 1953-1961 (Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 1982), 4.  
49 Ibid., 20.  
50 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 77. See also Cobb, Native Activism, 11.  
  
23 
States.”52 During the mid-1940s through the mid-1960s, terminationists argued that 
abolishing the BIA, and ending Native peoples’ relationship with the federal 
government would solve all Indian problems.53 
 Historians and scholars have also pointed to how Indian people pushed back 
against termination policies, speaking out against the removal of trust restrictions on 
Indian property and urging the United States to resolve its outstanding claims to 
Native tribes.54 Notably, the NCAI, a pan-Indian organization which represented 
Native interests before Congress, was formed in late 1944.55 Additionally, Native 
people rejected the erosion of tribal sovereignty perpetuated through specific policies 
which were design to “eras[e] Indian nations from the national landscape,” including 
the “relocation” programs of the mid-1950s.56 Through relocation, Native people were 
offered job training opportunities in urban areas away from reservations. Scholars like 
Mishuana Goeman, Nicolas Rosenthal, and Renya Ramirez have emphasized how 
“relocated” Indians managed to not only keep close ties to their tribal communities, 
but also formed connections with Native people from other tribes in their urban 
locations.57 Therefore, despite Congressional efforts to “de-Indianize” Native people 
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in this era, they continued to resist assimilation and articulate ideologies of self-
determination.58 
 Scholars of termination policy have alluded to how conservative politicians 
connected wardship and welfare. For example, Larry Burt has stated that 
“conservatives gave the term ‘ward’ a welfare connotation in describing native 
dependence on material aid and services from the federal government,”59 and Daniel 
Cobb has noted that by the end of WWII, a number of policymakers compared the 
trust relationship between tribes and the federal government to “a socialistic welfare 
system that not only fostered dependency but betrayed American values of liberty, 
democracy, and individualism.”60 However, to date, no scholarly account of 
termination has analyzed the ways in which these comparisons actually translated into 
Indian policy. Moreover, historians have not examined the ways in which termination 
policies affected Indians’ eligibility for welfare benefits.  
 This dissertation expands upon the historical literature on termination in two 
ways. First, by adding welfare to the discussion of mid-century Indian policies, it 
further develops the historical considerations of racialized hostility leveled at Indians 
by state and local officials who feared that if reservations were incorporated into their 
jurisdictions, Native people would be a drain on their resources. Thus, by considering 
anti-Indian racial discrimination, the racial structures embedded in wardship, and the 
institutionalized racism of the welfare state, it complicates the understanding of a 
postwar popular “consensus” that Indians deserved the same rights as other citizens. 
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Second, this project adds to historical understandings of Native resistance to 
termination policies by examining how Indians’ persistent claims upon the federal 
government under both wardship and citizenship intersected with one another. In their 
interactions with BIA agents over access to welfare benefits, Native people worked 
within the quotidian structures of wardship, in many cases utilizing the BIA as a 
resource to gain access to their rights as citizens. This dissertation examines the work 
of Native activists and tribal groups who did not necessarily reject wardship outright, 
but rather interpreted it in ways which served the economic stability and opportunity 
of tribal communities.  
 
Chapter Organization  
Chapter 1: Indians as a “Minority with a Difference”: Racial Definitions of Wardship 
in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries  
Chapter 1 contextualizes and defines how non-Native policymakers, 
politicians, and members of the public understood wardship as a racialized construct. 
The chapter situates wardship within a historical consideration of Indian racialization. 
I explore how non-Natives’ assumptions about Indian race have positioned wardship 
in opposition to American citizenship. Non-Natives conceived of wardship as a 
temporary category, within a linear framework where it would eventually be replaced 
by full citizenship. If Native people adopted the social, cultural, and economic 
characteristics of whiteness, they would no longer be dependent on federal 
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government benefits, and could be converted into responsible and self-sufficient 
individual citizens. I examine the legal and historical trajectory of wardship, starting 
with Chief Justice John Marshall’s introduction of the term into the lexicon of Indian 
law in 1831. The chapter then examines non-Natives’ conflation of wardship with 
dependency during late-nineteenth-century allotment and assimilation policies. Next, I 
trace the persistent use of the term during three major changes in Indian policy in the 
first half of the twentieth century: the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934, and finally the termination policies of the mid-1940s 
through the early-1960s. Policymakers, state agents, and others consistently used 
“ward” to describe Native people throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I 
argue that although the term was distinctly racialized, its definition remained 
ambiguous. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the impact of intensifying mid-
century rhetoric of civil rights and integration on the definition of “ward.” As non-
Native state agents, policymakers, and members of the public began to understand 
Native people as one “minority” group of many in the United States, they conflated 
Indians’ experiences of racial discrimination with the “disabilities” they believed 
wardship caused, which further complicated mid-twentieth-century understandings of 
Native citizenship.  
 
Chapter 2: A Heritage of Guilt and an Honest Debt: Wardship, Race, and the Mid-
Twentieth Century Welfare State 
Chapter 2 examines mid-twentieth century conflations of wardship and 
welfare. To fully unpack the intersections between wardship and welfare, the chapter 
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analyzes two differing conceptualizations of wardship—that of non-Native members 
of the American polity (including legislators, judges, state agents, and members of the 
public) and that of Indian activists and tribal governments. Fundamental ideological 
differences between non-Natives and Indians resulted in a clash of conflicting 
definitions of wardship. The chapter discusses how “reservation” served as a 
euphemism for “ward.” Non-Natives simultaneously perceived reservations as prisons 
for Indians, forcefully segregating them from the rest of the citizenry, and as 
“privileges,” untaxed land that signaled the “special treatment” Indians received from 
the federal government. These conflicting perceptions were wrapped up in the notion 
that the United States had a moral responsibility to care for Indian citizens, and 
fulfillment of the ward/guardian relationship was a matter of “conscience.” Although 
some non-Native citizens argued that the federal government had a moral 
responsibility to continue to protect Native people, conservatives argued that the 
ambiguous sense of “guilt” that the American people felt towards Indians supposedly 
clouded the judgment of federal officials, causing them to overspend and coddle the 
“dependent” Indian population. To vocal Indian tribes and organizations, wardship 
was a legal relationship between the US and tribal nations, and the resources they 
received from the federal government were fulfillment of stipulations from legally 
binding treaties. For Indians, “wardship” served as a construct that preceded 
articulations of tribal sovereignty and self-determination which became more common 
in the 1960s and 1970s. They argued that conflating wardship with either civil rights 
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violations or welfare dependency misconstrued their specific historical relationship 
with the United States.  
 
Chapter 3: Indian Entitlement and the State’s Responsibility: The Denial of Social 
Security Benefits to Indians in Arizona and New Mexico 
Chapter 3 focuses on a particularly contentious example of the conflicts 
between the federal government, individual states, and Native people over wardship’s 
effect on Indian eligibility for welfare benefits. In this chapter, I explore Arizona and 
New Mexico’s refusal to grant Indians access to Old Age Assistance, Aid to 
Dependent Children, and Aid to the Blind under the 1935 Social Security Act. State 
officials and the public in Arizona and New Mexico argued that as wards, Native 
people were the federal government’s responsibility, and therefore ineligible for 
welfare benefits administered by the states. Welfare officials, politicians, and the 
public pushed Native people into a liminal space of non-citizenship, arguing that 
because reservation land was exempt from state property taxes, Native people were 
not entitled to benefits. The denial of Social Security benefits was driven by Arizona 
and New Mexico’s insistence that Indian citizens of their states were outside of 
welfare jurisdictions, but also by racial discrimination. Native people pushed back 
against these efforts, petitioning the government, repeatedly filing applications with 
county welfare offices, and taking the states of Arizona and New Mexico to court. The 
chapter examines both the relationships and negotiations between Native people and 
BIA agents, but also between the BIA and public welfare workers, and between state 
politicians and federal agencies. Though they understood themselves to be entitled to 
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Social Security benefits as needy citizens, Indians were not motivated by a desire to 
simply integrate into the American polity and achieve illusive “first class citizenship.” 
Native people also demanded acknowledgment of their legal relationship with the 
United States, and, more broadly, recognition of their humanity. 
 
Chapter 4: Gendered Dependency and the Quotidian Structures of Wardship: Monthly 
Dependency Allowances and Wives and Parents of Native Servicemen During World 
War II 
While Chapter 3 assesses how Indians clashed with state governments over the 
concepts of wardship and citizenship, Chapter 4 explores the impact of wardship on 
Indians who needed to access benefits from the federal government. Under the 
Servicemen’s Dependents Allowance Act of 1942, wives, children, and other 
dependent relatives of men in the lower grades of the military were eligible for a 
monthly allowance from the soldier's paycheck and the federal government. Native 
American wives and many elderly parents often faced difficulties in complying with 
regulations necessary to claim benefits because as wards, their claims were funneled 
through the BIA. Government officials in charge of disbursing benefits preferred to 
communicate directly with the BIA rather than Native recipients. In this chapter, I 
explore the “quotidian structures of wardship,” the daily assumptions and interactions 
between state agents and Native people which demonstrated governmental control and 
oversight over a “dependent” population. Agents with the Office of Dependency 
Benefits and Red Cross asked BIA agents and social workers to verify Native 
women’s claims for benefits, clarify uncertainty surrounding tribal custom marriage 
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and divorce, and judge whether Native women were spending their benefits 
appropriately. As a result, BIA agents wielded a certain amount of power over how 
Native women could utilize these welfare benefits. Although the term “ward” implied 
to many that Indians were helpless and needed guidance from the federal government, 
Native women worked within the quotidian structures of wardship as well. They used 
their years of experience with governmental red tape to capitalize on the financial 
benefits they were promised from their husbands’ military service. As they 
maneuvered through the bureaucratic process to access the benefits they were due, 
they asserted their rights as American citizens. However, in that process, they did not 
accept an assimilationist narrative or downplay how wardship had affected their lives. 
Rather, they challenged the racialized and colonial lens through which they were 
viewed by state agents and the public. As they asserted their right to welfare, they 
negotiated and challenged the definitions of American citizenship itself. 
 
Chapter 5: Military Service, Opportunity, and Assimilation: Native Veterans’ 
Experiences of Wardship and the GI Bill 
Chapter 5 interrogates both historiographical and historical narratives of the 
impact of Native men’s military service on Indian assimilation. Terminationists placed 
Indian veterans at the crux of their political rhetoric about wardship’s limitations on 
Indian citizenship. In other words, policymakers argued, if Native men could fight 
overseas for the United States, they should be able to live “free” of the “disabilities” of 
Indian wardship. However, although non-Natives saw Native veterans as “ready” for 
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full citizenship, Indian veterans experienced difficulties accessing benefits of the post-
war welfare state due to wardship. This chapter probes the extent to which Native 
people benefited from postwar political efforts to provide opportunity for those who 
had served the US in war by examining Native veterans’ experiences accessing the 
benefits of the GI Bill. Lending institutions denied loans for homes and business to 
returned Native servicemen based on misperceptions about BIA provision of all 
necessary credit and resources, unfamiliarity with the trust restrictions on Indian land, 
and racialized assumptions about Indian poverty. In addition, I explore how the 
quotidian structures of wardshp impacted Native veterans’ use of the educational 
provisions of the GI Bill. I investigate how GI Bill educational loans enhanced 
existing BIA training programs, particularly in agriculture. The chapter explores the 
dynamics and exchanges between individual Indian veterans, tribal councils, BIA 
agents, and members of other federal agencies to complicate common narratives 
which pit the “reservation” against the “white world.”  
 
Chapter 6: First-Class Citizenship for Competent Indians: Race and Gender in Indian 
Emancipation Bills, 1944-1954 
Chapter 6 explores a set of bills which have not been fully examined in the 
historiography of termination policies. These were the eleven bills proposed between 
1944 and 1954 which would have implemented a bureaucratic system to “emancipate” 
individual Indians from wardship, if they were deemed “competent” to manage their 
own affairs. Proposed by Republican congressmen from South Dakota, Nebraska, and 
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Montana, the bills represented non-Native efforts to impose Americanized definitions 
of “proper” citizenship onto Native people, terminate the trust relationship between 
tribes and the federal government, and free Indian land from trust restrictions. The 
chapter analyzes racialized language embedded in the bills which mandated that to 
receive “decrees” of competency, Native applicants must have demonstrated that they 
possessed the “moral and intellectual qualifications” necessary to live as responsible 
citizens who did not receive any public assistance from the state. Additionally, I 
utilize gender analysis to demonstrate that competency bills represented efforts to 
“exterminate” Indians and undermine tribal sovereignty. Proponents of competency 
legislation assumed that applicants would be men, and that decrees of competency 
should be involuntarily imposed on spouses and children of Native applicants. 
Therefore, the bills reveal political efforts to compel Native communities to divide 
into self-sufficient, patriarchal, nuclear family units who would no longer benefit from 
the BIA’s “gratuitous” services. Although the bills were never passed into law, they 
generated copious documentation, including Congressional correspondence, hearings, 
and meeting minutes. Native groups vocally opposed such legislation, through 
petitions, resolutions, and letters. Thus, this chapter’s analysis of competency 
legislation unearths new historical understandings of termination policies rooted in 
racialized and gendered assumptions about responsibility and dependency within 
individual families.  
*** 
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Citizens with Reservations explores the enduring terminology and ideology of 
Indian wardship, assessing its impact on Native peoples’ experiences well into the 
mid-twentieth century. As American citizens transformed their relationship with the 
state due to the mid-century expansion of welfare programs, they reimagined notions 
of dependency and entitlement. Non-Natives understood Indian wards to be 
completely dependent on the federal government. The relationship between tribes and 
the state was cast simultaneously as an example of racial discrimination and special 
privilege. Therefore, debates and conflicts over Native citizenship and wardship in this 
era provide a heretofore unexamined avenue through which to explore larger political 
responses to the concept of “welfare dependency.” Native people actively challenged 
non-Native definitions of wardship as dependency, asserting that the United States 
was obliged to fulfill its promises to tribes under historical agreements and treaties. 
Wardship was not welfare. However, Native people claimed welfare benefits, 
maintaining their right to needs-based programs as poor citizens and to rights-based 
programs as citizens who had performed service for the nation. Citizens with 
Reservations expands historical understandings of wardship to consider the daily 
exchanges between Indians and the state—the quotidian structures of wardship—and 
how these structures impacted Native peoples’ ability to access welfare benefits. By 
placing termination policies and welfare policies in conversation with one another, this 
dissertation demonstrates how political refrains of racialized dependency and gendered 
citizenship served to “exterminate” Indians through assimilation. However, utilizing 
both citizenship and wardship, Native people agitated for their right to welfare 
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benefits, tribal sovereignty, and recognition of their unique historical experiences 
within the American polity.  
 35 
Chapter 1 
Indians as a “Minority with a Difference”: Racial Definitions of Wardship in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 
 
Introduction 
 
 During a 2014 community meeting in Flagstaff, Arizona, Republican 
congressman Paul Gosar caused an outcry. While addressing concerns about 
construction of a copper mine on the land of the San Carlos Apache Tribe, Gosar 
dismissed White Mountain Apache tribal member Paul Stago’s apprehensions about 
the mine’s impact on tribal sovereignty, claiming that Indians were “still wards of the 
federal government.”1 Stago asserted that Gosar’s use of the “antiquated” term “ward” 
revealed “the true deep feeling of the federal government: ‘Tribes, you can call 
yourselves sovereign nations, but when it comes down to the final test, you’re not 
really sovereign because we still have plenary authority over you.’”2 Former US 
Attorney Troy Eid spoke out against Gosar’s use of the term, deeming it inappropriate 
and outdated, and accused Gosar of “race baiting.”3 Indeed, Eid asserted that the 1924 
Indian Citizenship Act had made Indians citizens, not wards, and the 1934 Indian 
Reorganization Act had “pushed the concept of tribal sovereignty and self-
                                                            
1 Gale Courey Toensing, “Are American Indian Nations ‘Wards of the Federal Government?’,” Indian 
Country Media Network, December 19, 2014, 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2014/12/19/are-american-indian-nations-wards-federal-
government-158375?page=0%2C0. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Felicia Fonseca, “Rep. Gosar’s Native American Remark Causes Outcry,” AZ Central, December 11, 
2014, http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/arizona/politics/2014/12/11/congressmans-native-
american-remark-causes-outcry/20258071/. 
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determination.”4 Paul Gosar insisted that his comments revealed the hidden truth about 
the relationship between Indian tribes and the US state. He clarified his comments 
further to the Indian Country Media Network, arguing that “The federal government’s 
dirty little secret is that Native American tribes are not fully sovereign nations in 
today’s society as many people are led to believe.”5  
  “Ward” is a term with a long history and many racialized connotations. The 
legal and social construction of wardship has a convoluted and controversial 
relationship with the concepts of sovereignty, citizenship, and self-determination. 
Ultimately, whatever Gosar’s rationale, the media response to his comments 
simplified and generalized the historicity of wardship. “Ward” is not an antiquated 
term which has been banished to the corners of early American history. Gosar’s use of 
the term to clear a path for the utilization of Indian land in 2014 demonstrates that it is 
still alive and well. The outrage over the racial overtones of Gosar’s comments reveal 
a historical understanding of wardship as a marker of racial discrimination against 
Indians. The media coverage of this incident downplayed the living history of 
wardship’s continued impact on tribal sovereignty, racial identity, and Indians’ place 
within the American citizenry. Although it is commonly associated with the nineteenth 
century, “ward” is not a term that politicians, state agents, members of the American 
public, or Indian people can leave in the past. Wardship significantly contributed to 
the evolution of non-Natives’ understanding of Indians as a group of racial minority 
citizens of the United States. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
                                                            
4 Fonseca, “Remark Causes Outcry.” 
5 Toensing, “Are American Indian Nations ‘Wards’?” 
 37 
wardship intersected and conflicted with definitions of Indian citizenship, ultimately 
revealing the history of how Indian racialization developed in the United States.  
 This chapter provides a historical trajectory of wardship, how the American 
state has racially and legally conceptualized Native people. State agents defined 
wardship’s as a dependent relationship between individual Indian people and the 
American federal government by the end of the nineteenth century. This definition 
was shaped by three important factors. First, the Supreme Court established that 
Congress held plenary power over Indian tribes. Congress’ ultimate power to alter 
existing treaties undermined tribal sovereignty and weakened the “government-to-
government” relationship between the US and Native nations. Second, the federal 
government constructed a sense of its “responsibility” to protect Indians (both from 
internal and external threats) for two reasons: Native societal and cultural practices 
were deemed deleterious to their civilization; and the American state “owed” Native 
people some form of protection as a remedy for past injustices it committed against 
Indian tribes. Third, the federal government understood its responsibility to protect 
Native “wards” as a necessary effort to effectively eradicate Indian savagery through 
Native assimilation into the American polity by adoption of the “white man's ways.” 
Those “white man's ways” included ownership of individual plots of land, rejection of 
idleness in favor living a strenuous life, and severance of one’s relationship with the 
tribe to live as an individual person within a non-Native community. Ultimately, the 
goal of the American state was to dissolve Native nations as sovereign entities, one 
“ward” at a time. Under this framework, state agents and politicians understood 
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wardship to be a temporary category—one that would eventually disappear. By 
adopting the social, cultural, and economic characteristics of whiteness, Indians would 
no longer be deemed to be dependent on federal government benefits, and could be 
converted into responsible and self-sufficient individual citizens. 
 In the late nineteenth century, “wardship” and “citizenship” were considered 
separate categories. Through various processes, Indian “wards” could and did become 
“citizens.” However, state officials’ construction of a neat ideological trajectory from 
“ward” to “citizen” was not as simple in practice. Crucially, “full” citizenship was 
synonymous with whiteness. Was it Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) personnel, 
reformers, and other state agents’ goal to transform Indians into whites? By adopting 
“the white man’s ways” could Indians become white and cease to be racially “Indian”? 
This linear path to “progress” was not easily achieved, because Indians were not a 
blank slate which could be completely transformed through assimilation policies. In 
their negotiations and clashes with state agents over the interplay between wardship, 
citizenship, and membership in Native nations, Indians employed their own 
epistemological and ontological conceptions of both American citizenship and the 
extent of the United States’ “responsibility” for Native people. These conflicts and 
Indians’ conceptualizations of wardship are the focus of this dissertation’s second 
chapter. First, I will examine how race defined Indians’ place in the American polity 
as “wards” rather than “citizens.” Ultimately, state officials, members of the media, 
and non-Native members of the public did not see Indians as white. Thus, to non-
Natives, “wardship” was not simply a legal category which epitomized Native 
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dependency upon the federal government. Indian “wardship” signified a certain non-
whiteness, a tribal identity that was far removed from the idea of a “proper” American 
citizen. Thus, historians need to analyze “ward” as a racial signifier.  
 Historically, wardship was associated with racialized assumptions about 
civilization, savagery, dependency, and protection. The term creates a unique 
opportunity for historical inquiry into the extent to which the relationship between 
Indians and the American state has been structured by racial categories and how easy 
it was for Indians to transcend racial boundaries. Scholars have shown that the policies 
and programs which constituted the mid-twentieth century expansion of the American 
welfare state were structured by political, social, and cultural assumptions about race, 
gender, and class.6 Within this context, wardship took on added significance and 
incited heated debates about the place for Indians in the American polity. As will be 
demonstrated in subsequent chapters, “wardship” was presented as a “race-neutral” 
term borne of benign policy directives, but ultimately contributed to the denial of 
federal and state welfare benefits to Indians based on race. It is also useful to consider 
“wardship” a racialized category in the mid-twentieth century because the era was 
                                                            
6 For example, see Michael K. Brown, Race, Money, and the American Welfare State (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1999); Marisa Chappell, The War on Welfare: Family, Poverty, and Politics 
in Modern America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010); Linda Gordon, Pitied But 
Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare, 1890-1935 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1994); Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial 
Inequality in Twentieth-Century America (New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005); 
Robert C. Lieberman, Shifting the Color Line: Race and the American Welfare State (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1998); Suzanne Mettler, Dividing Citizens: Gender and Federalism in New 
Deal Public Policy (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1998); Jennifer Mittelstadt, From 
Welfare to Workfare: The Unintended Consequences of Liberal Reform, 1945-1965 (Chapel Hill; 
London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005); and Jill Quadagno, The Color of Welfare: How 
Racism Undermined the War on Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
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marked by increased rhetoric and policies surrounding civil rights. As the United 
States constructed and utilized a new racial language of multiculturalism, Indians were 
increasingly viewed as a racial minority within the American polity. However, when it 
was conflated with racial discrimination, wardship complicated the perception of 
Indians as a racial minority.   
 To trace wardship’s development as a racial term in the context of the 
expansion of the American welfare state, this chapter contextualizes both the 
racialization of Indians and the history of wardship. First, I explore citizenship’s 
association with whiteness, calling attention to the disparities and contradictions 
between legal citizenship and experiences of full citizenship for people of color. 
Second, I address the ways in which Indians have been racialized in American history, 
through three specific conceptualizations: Indians as the “inheritance” of white 
Americans; Indians as a “race” instead of members of sovereign nations; and lastly, 
Indians as “wards.” Third, I historicize how nineteenth-century Indian policies 
employed “wardship” in conjunction with and opposition to citizenship. And fourth, I 
unpack the racialization of Indian wardship by tracing three key twentieth century 
Indian policies and laws: the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934, and the termination policies of the mid-1940s through the 
mid-1960s. Ultimately, wardship precluded Indian people from accessing resources 
and benefits associated with US citizenship, because of its racial limitations. Ward 
Indians were not white. Crucially, this racialized disconnect between “ward” and 
“citizen” persisted even after all Indians were declared to be US citizens in 1924. This 
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chapter demonstrates that wardship’s racialized definitions shifted and expanded 
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, providing an opportunity for 
slippage in three distinct ways. In terms of terminology, the rhetoric of wardship 
intersected with that of civil rights. In terms of ideology, wardship exposed conflicts 
over the impact of dependency on definitions of ideal citizenship. In terms of identity, 
wardship ambiguously placed Indians as members of the American polity, sovereign 
Native nations, and citizens of individual states. Thus, wardship’s history reveals 
essential conflicts about the historical relationship between Indian tribes and the US 
state, and about the limitations inherent in the association of whiteness with full 
American citizenship.    
 
Whiteness and Citizenship  
 
 Scholars have demonstrated that from the mid-nineteenth century on, people of 
color experienced discrimination, economic exploitation, and severe limitations on 
their citizenship status in their daily lives, despite their entitlement to equal treatment 
under the law. Put another way, although legally full citizens, racialized Americans 
have been defined as “second-class citizens.” Full citizenship had been extended to 
many non-white people by the middle of the nineteenth century. The 1848 Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo extended citizenship to Mexicans living in the ceded territories of 
the Southwest. After the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, citizenship was 
extended to freed black slaves and their descendants. After the 1898 Supreme Court 
decision Wong Kim Ark v. United States, children of Asian immigrants born in the 
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United States were guaranteed citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
However, blacks, Mexican Americans, and Asian Americans continued to face 
segregation, harassment, and racial violence throughout the twentieth century. 
Citizenship, or at least the understanding of citizenship that was spelled out in the 
Constitution, was synonymous with whiteness.  
Whiteness as the prerequisite for American citizenship dates to the founding of 
the American republic. The 1790 Naturalization Act had specified that only “free 
white persons” were able to naturalize. Although the law was amended in 1870 to 
include people of African descent to reflect the changes brought about by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, whiteness was the threshold through which most immigrants 
attempted to enter the American citizenry.7 Naturalization law quite literally put racial 
requirements for citizenship in black and white.8 Immigrants and residents of US 
territories who were not black and not white faced increasing difficulty in their efforts 
to obtain American citizenship specifically because they were viewed as “in between.” 
For example, Supreme Court cases from the 1920s explicitly rejected both Japanese 
and Asian Indian claims to citizenship via whiteness.9 Though both Japanese and 
Asian Indian plaintiffs claimed that they should be viewed as “white” due to cultural 
and societal standards and/or scientific rationalization, ultimately the Court ruled that 
it was the “common man’s” opinion which would ultimately decide whether an 
                                                            
7 Natalia Molina, “‘In a Race All Their Own’: The Quest to Make Mexicans Ineligible for US 
Citizenship,” Pacific Historical Review 79, no. 2 (May 2010), 173. See also Ian Haney Lopez, White by 
Law: The Legal Construction of Race (New York: New York University Press, 2006). 
8 Molina, “In a Race All Their Own,” 168. 
9 See Mai Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton; 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 37-50; Haney-Lopez, White by Law, 56-77. 
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immigrant was “white,” and thus, eligible for citizenship. In the 1923 case, United 
States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, the Court asserted, “What we now hold is that the words 
‘free white persons’ are words of common speech, to be interpreted with the 
understanding of the common man.”10 With this ruling, the Court imbued the 
American public with the power to judge who should be eligible for US citizenship by 
whether they could be seen as “white.”  
During the early twentieth century, an immigrant's degree of “Indian blood” 
could prevent them from obtaining American citizenship. As Natalia Molina has 
shown, officials working for the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization 
rationalized their decisions to refuse naturalization to Mexicans on the basis of early 
twentieth century Supreme Court cases which had ruled that Indians were not citizens 
and more importantly, not white.11 Molina demonstrates that ironically, this rationale 
was applied even after 1924, when all Native people universally received American 
citizenship as a result of the Indian Citizenship Act.12 In 1935, Timoteo Andrade 
applied for American citizenship and was denied by Judge John Knight of the US 
District Court in Buffalo, New York because Andrade had claimed that he had at least 
“fifty percent” “Indian blood” in his naturalization interview. Judge Knight reversed 
his ruling when Andrade appealed the decision and reframed his percentage of “Indian 
blood,” from fifty percent to “2 percent.”13 Eleven years after Indians had been 
universally declared American citizens, the presence of too much “Indian blood” 
                                                            
10 Ngai, Impossible Subjects, 46. 
11 Molina, “In a Race All Their Own,” 178-179. 
12 Ibid., 179. 
13 Ibid., 195. 
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could prevent Mexicans’ naturalization. Too much “Indianness” meant that Mexicans 
were not white enough for full citizenship. 
Thus, as Ian Haney-Lopez asserts, “citizenship easily serves as a proxy for 
race.”14 Indian “wards” were encouraged and coerced into adopting cultural, 
economic, and social signifiers of whiteness to access US citizenship. Nineteenth and 
early twentieth-century assimilation policies followed the logic of the Supreme Court's 
definition of whiteness to determine Native peoples’ “readiness” for citizenship. 
However, Haney-Lopez argues that whiteness was defined primarily as the “superior 
opposite” of non-whiteness—a purposefully vague definition, but understood to be 
salient to the “common man.”15 Despite the racial connotations of assimilation policies 
designed to make Indians act and think like white men and women, “wardship” was 
not removed with the acquisition of citizenship. Thus, Indians’ “first-class citizenship” 
was not secured. In other words, Indians were not able to achieve either full 
citizenship or whiteness through the twentieth century because they were wards, and 
wardship was incompatible with whiteness. 
 
The Racialization of Indians in American History 
 
It is necessary to fully explore how Native people have been racialized in 
American history to understand why they were denied the assumption of “full” 
citizenship and access to the benefits of whiteness. Indians have been understood as a 
racial group in three distinct ways: 1) Indian culture and property has been viewed as 
                                                            
14 Haney-Lopez, White By Law, 26. 
15 Ibid., 20. 
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the inheritance of white America; 2) Native people are not viewed as members of 
individual, distinct, sovereign tribal nations, but as members of one ambiguous 
“Indian race;” and 3) Indians’ “racial status” has been defined by specific cultural 
stereotypes surrounding Native authenticity, which, I argue, have been intrinsically 
linked to Native people’s legal and political status as “wards” of the government. This 
section demonstrates that due to these three conceptualizations of Indians’ racial 
identity, the legal and political signifier of “ward” has been manipulated and 
extrapolated by politicians, state officials, and the public to become a racial signifier.  
 
Indian Culture and Property as White America’s Inheritance 
Throughout American history, non-Native appropriation of Indian culture and 
land has been one of the most significant ways Indians have been racialized. Cultural 
and property appropriation is fundamental to the process of settler colonialism. Patrick 
Wolfe has described settler colonial societies as “premised on the elimination of native 
societies.”16 In the United States, racialization played a large role in carrying out the 
actions required to “eliminate” Indian people. For settler colonialism to function 
effectively and Indian land to be possessed by non-Native people, whites needed to 
reduce Indians to a nonthreatening population which could be “eliminated” through 
assimilation or adoption into the American polity. Of course, by viewing Indians and 
their land as property to be possessed by white settlers, whites rationalized violent 
actions as necessary for the perpetuation and evolution of American civilization. Thus, 
                                                            
16 Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics 
of an Ethnographic Event (London; New York: Cassell, 1999), 2. 
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Indians could be violently disposed of through murder, removal, or war, leaving their 
property and elements of their culture to be enveloped into American society as part of 
whites’ rightful “inheritance.”17  
White settlers in the early republic believed that indigenous definitions of 
property rights were invalid. Authorities deemed Indian epistemologies of land 
possession “too ambiguous and unclear.”18 As Cheryl Harris has shown, when the 
Supreme Court ruled in Johnson v. M’Intosh in 1823, they instituted whiteness as “a 
prerequisite to the exercise of enforceable property rights.”19 Indian land could be 
acquired by white settlers “either by purchase or by conquest.”20 In Johnson, Chief 
Justice John Marshall reasoned that because the courts could not undo the fact that 
white colonizers had taken possession of Indian land, they were obligated to legally 
sanction that possession. Johnson also stated that to possess a title enforceable in the 
Supreme Court, that title had to flow from the government directly.21 This decision 
declared that the only legitimate way to possess property was to obtain a title from the 
government. As only whites were eligible to do so, the Court essentially discounted 
Indian forms of property ownership and possession. The rationale and ideology behind 
the Johnson ruling was pushed even further by the end of the nineteenth century. 
                                                            
17 See Yael Ben-Zvi, “Where Did Red Go?: Lewis Henry Morgan’s Evolutionary Inheritance and U.S. 
Racial Imagination,” CR: The New Centennial Review 7, no. 2 (Fall 2007): 201-229. Ben-Zvi describes 
Lewis Henry Morgan’s use of the term “inheritance” as a scientific theory of US nation-building—as 
the United States evolved, US culture was nourished by “consuming” Native American cultures, and 
perfecting them, resulting in the pinnacle of civilization. 
18 Cheryl I. Harris, “Whiteness as Property,” Harvard Law Review 106, no. 8 (June 1993), 1722. 
19 Harris, “Whiteness as Property,” 1724. 
20 Philip P. Frickey, “Marshalling the Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and 
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law,” Harvard Law Review 107, no. 2 (December 1993), 386. 
21 Frickey, “Marshalling the Past,” 386-387. 
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Frederick Jackson Turner argued that for Europeans to fully transform into 
“Americans,” Indians needed to be cleared from the “frontier” permanently.22 Taken 
together, the Johnson ruling and Turner’s thesis revealed a racialized understanding of 
legitimate and “rightful” land ownership predicated upon whiteness. 
The way that Indians have been racialized was fundamentally different from 
the ways in which African Americans were racialized in American history. While 
whites and blacks have historically been kept “separate,” at least in legal and political 
terms (although certainly not in terms of personal, economic, and intimate 
relationships), Indians have been conceptualized as “predestined” to be incorporated 
into white American society.23 Because Indian land and culture was defined by 
scientists, legislators, and academics in the nineteenth century as the “property of a 
white national community,” it was deemed less necessary to keep them completely 
separate from the rest of the American polity.24 However, this in no way implied that 
Indians were equal to whites in a racial sense. Rather, as legal scholar Bethany Berger 
has shown, Americans in the early republic and nineteenth century intended to “use 
tribes as a flattering foil for American society and culture.” Thus, “It was therefore 
necessary to theorize tribal societies as fatally and racially inferior while emphasizing 
the ability of Indian individuals to leave their societies and join non-Indian ones.”25 
For whites to claim their rightful inheritance of Indian land, they needed individual 
                                                            
22 Steven Conn, History’s Shadow: Native Americans and Historical Consciousness in the Nineteenth 
Century (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 222. 
23 Ben-Zvi, “Where Did Red Go?,” 203. 
24 Ben-Zvi, “Where Did Red Go?,” 225. 
25 Bethany R. Berger, “Red: Racism and the American Indian,” UCLA Law Review 56 (2009), 593. 
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Indians to be able to leave racially inferior tribes characterized by fundamentally 
flawed systems of land ownership.  
The conception of Indian property as the inheritance of whites has led to 
further appropriation of Indian culture, leading to the contemporary belief that is easy 
for “anyone” to be Indian. Indeed, scholars have shown how throughout modern US 
history, it was “popular” to be Indian. As Robert Berkhofer and Philip Deloria have 
shown, Native images served as a cultural and racial foil or mask for white Americans 
to grapple with their own issues of identity.26 As “Indianness” has become more and 
more of a “costume” that non-Native people can put on and take off at will, critics 
have charged that those claiming Indianness have benefited from special resources and 
benefits reserved for Indians by the government.27 This understanding of Indianness as 
a racial and cultural category which non-Natives were entitled to appropriate greatly 
diminished indigenous peoples’ legitimate claims to resources and benefits from the 
federal government. Furthermore, the appropriation of Indian culture undermined the 
“government-to-government” relationship tribes have with the US government. In this 
sense, Indian identities became malleable to serve non-Native populations’ need for 
self-expression or the construction of specific historical narratives.  
                                                            
26 See Robert F. Berkhofer, The White Man’s Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to 
the Present (New York: Vintage Books, 1978); and Philip J. Deloria, Playing Indian (New Haven; 
London: Yale University Press, 1998). 
27 See Renne Ann Cramer, “The Common Sense of Anti-Indian Racism: Reactions to Mashantucket 
Pequot Success in Gaming and Acknowledgment,” Law and Social Inquiry 31, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 
313-341; and Joanne Barker, Native Acts: Law, Recognition, and Cultural Authenticity (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2011), 4. 
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Scholars who have explored the history of anthropology and ethnology in the 
United States have delved further into white America’s “inheritance” of Indian 
property to examine the effect of this ideology on Indian bodies and culture. For 
example, Yael Ben-Zvi has demonstrated that the holding, cataloging, and displaying 
of indigenous human remains in the nation’s museums meant that Native people were 
“considered primarily as property.”28 Ben-Zvi argues that anthropologists’ and 
ethnologists’ understanding of the historical and cultural significance of Native 
remains for American posterity developed as a direct result of the logic of 
“inheritance.”29 Scientists considered Native people as elements of American cultural 
property, essentially as “heirlooms of the US national public.”30 This view “logically” 
descends from the conception that Indian land was the rightful inheritance of white 
American settlers, and Indian culture could be adopted for the purpose of defining and 
constructing white American identity. This ideology has been discussed at length by 
scholars who have analyzed Native peoples’ roles in World’s Fairs, Wild West shows, 
living history exhibits, and other touristic events.31 Thus, Indians’ racial identity is 
predicated upon a non-Native sense of ownership of indigenous land, culture, and 
bodies. 
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Members of an “Indian Race,” Not Sovereign Nations 
Historically, American racial hierarchies have built upon the consolidation of 
many diverse groups of people into one crudely defined racial category. As theorists 
Michael Omi and Howard Winant have explained, the construction of racialized 
groups functioned to combat “oppositional racial consciousness and organization.” 
Thus, instead of a multitude of African and indigenous tribal groups, those who 
exercised power in the United States spoke of “black” people or “native” people.32 
Collapsing a diverse array of indigenous sovereign nations into one “Indian race” 
made it much easier for state agents to carry out their goals of assimilation. If tribes 
were not individual legitimate governments but rather one group of people held 
together by racial characteristics, state agents could encourage individual Indians to 
separate from a nebulously defined “tribal way of life” in order to be absorbed into the 
nation’s citizenry.33 In the early twentieth century, reformers and state agents 
embarked on similar missions with ethnic immigrant groups.34 In order to create better 
American citizens, reformers attempted to replace specific ethnic cultural practices 
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with practices that matched up with a white, middle-class American ideal. Captain 
Richard Henry Pratt famously articulated this philosophy in relation to Native people 
as “Kill the Indian, save the man.”35 In Pratt’s mind, “Indianness” could be eradicated 
if Native people were removed from their tribes. In the late nineteenth century, state 
officials and Indian agents professed that separating individuals from tribal religious, 
cultural, and most importantly, land would speed up the process of Indian 
assimilation.36 State officials considered this a two-step process—first, collapsing all 
indigenous nations into one “Indian race,” and second, squeezing the racial or tribal 
“Indianness” out of the individuals who made up that “race,”—a rational “step” on the 
United States’ predestined colonial path. After all, if the United States was the rightful 
“heir” to tribal land, tribes should not exist.  
The amalgamation of hundreds of tribal groups into one “Indian race” was 
spurred on by the conceptualization of racialized blood. “Full-blood” Indians, or 
people with two Indian parents, were deemed “more” Indian than those with “mixed-
blood.” Blood quantum became symbolic of Indian culture and authenticity.37 The 
relationship between blood quantum and indigeneity was fundamentally different from 
common ideologies about blackness and blood. Whereas “one drop” of black blood 
automatically made a person black, the amount of “Indian blood” could be “bred” out 
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as generations progressed.38 More importantly, blood quantum provided a threshold 
for government agents, as when an Indian individual reached a small enough fraction, 
they would no longer be considered Indian for the purposes of federal recognition 
and/or federal guardianship.39 Joanne Barker draws attention to how this process of 
racializing individual Native legal status by blood effectively undermines tribal 
sovereignty. Instead of dealing with the “collective rights Native peoples possess to 
sovereignty and self-determination” and respecting ways in which various tribes 
define their own membership, the state imposed racial qualifications for individual 
Native people to gain rights and recognition as Indians.40  
Supposedly, “levels” of Indian blood could be diluted over generations, so that 
eventually individuals would no longer be “Indian enough” for governmental 
protection or recognition. Because of this perception, historically it has been easy for 
state agents, researchers, scientists, and the public to imagine “full blood” Indians on a 
precipice, ready to drop into extinction.41 Thus, non-Natives viewed Indians as 
members of an “endangered” racial group, and not of distinct sovereign nations. 
Indians’ limited longevity was also been associated with their lack of “civilization,” 
and their occupancy of a fixed “spot” on the evolutionary chain of human 
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development.42 Since before the founding of the American republic, Indians have been 
conceptualized as “prehistoric,” outside the boundaries of progressive human 
history.43 Instead, Native people have been relegated to archeology or “natural 
history,” which has separated them far apart from the rest of the American polity.44 
Indeed, Vine Deloria has argued that contemporary citizens have become so 
accustomed to thinking of indigenous people as prehistorical archeological subjects, 
they are surprised to find that Indians are offended by “racial slurs and insults.”45  To 
Indian reformers and state agents, the less “Indian blood” one had, the more 
“civilized” one could potentially become. Moreover, Indian culture, society, and 
politics were understood to be so uncivilized and close to “prehistory” that their 
ultimate demise was preordained. Because of the perception that tribal societies and 
“full blood” Indians were predestined for extinction, reformers and agents understood 
assimilation to be a logical policy goal—Indians could not survive as Indians.  
Theorizing the assimilability of indigenous people was one thing, but carrying 
out the process of incorporation was another. Marriage served as one tool for 
Americanizing individual Indians. This process was directly related both to Native 
peoples’ racialization as potentially assimilable, and to the property rights inherent in 
whiteness. Notably, marriage between whites and Indians was almost always 
conceptualized in the same gendered structure: white men married Indian women, as 
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opposed to Indian men marrying white women.46 Thus, marriage functioned as a legal, 
cultural, and societal tool to carry out the sentiment behind, “Kill the Indian, save the 
man.” After 1888, if a Native woman married a white male citizen and lived apart 
from her tribe, she could obtain US citizenship.47 However, in these cases, this process 
can be more accurately described as “Kill the Indian, save the white man's property 
rights.” As Peggy Pascoe asserts, when marriages between white men and Indian 
women were recognized by state governments, indigenous epistemologies and 
methodologies of land ownership were usurped by American patriarchal systems of 
governance and power. Property rights and inheritance were filtered through the rights 
of the white male citizen. Thus, marriage was used “to confirm the land and property 
rights of white husbands.”48 Furthermore, by marrying white men, it was understood 
that Native women would acculturate into Americanized standards of domesticity. 
Nineteenth and twentieth century Indian reformers viewed proper domestic roles for 
men and women as an essential part of the path to “civilization.”49 Thus, Indians’ 
“racial” characteristics were inherently tied to cultural assumptions about proper 
gender roles and the superiority of a patriarchal system of land ownership which 
privileged white men.  
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Racial Conceptions of Wardship  
Assimilation policies were rooted in racialized conceptions of Indian identity 
as oppositional and inferior to American societal, cultural, and political norms. 
American state agents and reformers constructed an image of Indians as people in 
need of guidance, protection, and regulation to better prepare them for assimilation 
into the American polity. Racialized stereotypes of Indians’ lack of valid property 
rights, cultural and political inferiority, and existence outside of the American 
mainstream were inextricably intertwined with the historical and legal categorization 
of wardship. To unpack how wardship itself became a racial stereotype, it is necessary 
to further analyze common racial stereotypes associated with Indians, from the 
nineteenth century to the present day.   
Indians are often represented in popular culture, literature, and state documents 
as “lazy, unwilling to properly work the land, drunken, and lacking productivity as 
measured on Western standards.”50 This damaging and prevalent racial stereotype 
stems from consistent historical comparisons of Indians to white citizens’ “standards” 
of property rights, work ethic, and accumulation of wealth. Negative racial stereotypes 
about laziness and incompetency in property ownership have consistently been tied to 
“wardship.” These negative characteristics became so ingrained in non-Native 
perceptions of Indians that any Native person who did not outwardly possess them was 
deemed inauthentic—not really “Indian.”51 Thus, racially and culturally “authentic” 
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Indians were perpetual wards, unable to attain “ideal” citizenship. An excerpt from the 
1932 Board of Indian Commissioners’ Annual Report illustrates the conflation of 
racial stereotypes, authenticity, and wardship quite clearly. The Board wanted to 
officially “define” who an Indian was, based on the “degree” of Indian blood 
individuals possessed. This, they reasoned, would “eliminate from all future rolls 
persons of a small degree of Indian blood who desire to become identified with a tribe 
simply to be able to share in its property.” Instead, “It will enable the Government to 
better direct its attention to the welfare of the real Indians who still need its assistance 
and supervision.”52 “Real Indians” were those with a “large degree” of Indian blood, 
and those who still needed government assistance. Wardship signified Indian racial 
authenticity.  
However, “blood” is not a simple way to regulate and structure tribal 
membership. Many Native tribes have retained the use of blood quantum requirements 
to determine tribal membership. This decision has been controversial in some cases, 
mainly because it seems to conflict with American notions of free and equal 
citizenship.53 However, Kimberly Tallbear has noted that indigenous conceptions of 
blood contain other “symbolic meanings,” connecting an individual to numerous 
“tribal relations and ancestors.”54 The notion of “shared blood” provides an important 
                                                            
52 United States Department of the Interior, Annual Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners 1932; 
Definition of an Indian; Box 16: Isolated Indian Allotments to Indian Policy, SEN 83A-F9 (1928-1953), 
Records of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Indian Affairs Investigating Subcommittee, 
Records of the US Senate, Record Group 46 (RG 46), National Archives Building, Washington DC 
(NAB). 
53 For example, see Jodi A. Byrd, “‘Been to the Nation, Lord, But I Couldn’t Stay There’: American 
Indian Sovereignty, Cherokee Freedmen and the Incommensurability of the Internal,” interventions 13, 
no. 1 (2011): 31-52. 
54 Tallbear, Native American DNA, 64. 
 57 
and distinct sense of tribal identity. Indeed, Tallbear asserts, “blood is identity.”55 
Thus, disparate notions of what constitutes tribal membership and Indian identity 
present conflicts and opportunities for collision between Native people and non-Native 
members of the American polity who hold tight to a racialized construction of who an 
Indian person is.  
Wardship’s history as a legal category and policy directive has engendered 
frequent collisions over Indian identity. In the section below, I offer a brief history of 
the legal trajectory of the term “ward,” from the early nineteenth century through the 
early twentieth century. Although the ways in which state agents deployed wardship 
shifted over time, wardship was always a racialized term.  
 
What is a “Ward”? Wardship’s Historical and Legal Trajectory, from Marshall 
to Allotment 
In his 1831 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia decision, Chief Justice John Marshall 
ruled that the Cherokee Nation was not a “foreign state” under the terms of the 
Constitution. Rather, Marshall reasoned, the Cherokees, and by implication, all 
Indians, should be considered “domestic dependent nations,” and “in a state of 
pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his 
guardian.”56 Cherokee Nation marks the first application of the term “ward” to 
describe Native people within the United States. The Chief Justice’s words were quite 
vague. He defined neither “ward” nor “guardian,” and did not describe the relationship 
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between Indians and the United States in concrete language—it only “resembled” that 
of a ward to his guardian. As “domestic dependent nations,” Native tribes were 
situated in an area of “colonial ambivalence,” where sovereignty was both codified 
and restricted.57 However, state agents, historians, and members of the court have used 
Marshall’s terminology to interpret the relationship between Indian tribes and the US 
government ever since. As legal scholar Frank Pommersheim notes, the notion of 
tribes’ statuses as “domestic dependent nations,” sovereign entities also reliant on the 
federal government, continues to exist in the present day, although “its particulars, its 
contours, and its borders remain elusive.”58 The ambiguous definitions of this 
relationship between “ward” and “guardian” drastically affected all subsequent 
exchanges between Indians and the government (both federal and state). This section 
outlines the discursive history of “wardship,” establishing its roots in nineteenth-
century legal history.  
The development of Indian policy and law over the course of the nineteenth 
century has been characterized as “almost uniformly hostile to Indians.”59 Significant 
court cases and policies undermined tribal sovereignty and emphasized the 
dependence of Indians upon the good will and guiding hand of the federal 
government. Those who wanted to extend the federal government’s reach over tribes 
employed wardship to do so. As lawyer and activist Felix Cohen argued in 1953, 
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wardship was deployed as a “magic word,” used to justify “any order or command or 
sale or lease for which no justification could be found in any treaty or act of 
Congress.” “Wardship,” Cohen asserted, “always made up for any lack of statutory 
authority.”60 Throughout the nineteenth century, this use of wardship was linked with 
a racialized understanding of Indians as uncivilized and savage, needing “protection” 
from the government not only from unscrupulous whites, but also from each other.61 
This racial and colonial ideology is clearly exemplified in the 1886 Supreme Court 
case, United States v. Kagama. In Kagama, the Court ruled that the Major Crimes Act 
of 1885 was constitutional. This act made it a federal offense for Indians to commit 
any of seven specific crimes against another Native person on a reservation.62  The 
Court removed jurisdiction for these offenses from Indian tribes and placed it squarely 
under the purview of the federal government. Kagama challenged the Major Crimes 
Act because, since the federal government was exerting the power to regulate law and 
order and adjudicate disputes between Indians on sovereign Indian land, it undermined 
tribal sovereignty. This sovereignty argument was overruled by the Court, which 
determined that since Indians were “remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and 
diminished in numbers,” the federal government had the responsibility to exert their 
power over Indians living on reservations. Chief Justice Samuel Miller wrote that this 
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was “necessary for their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they 
dwell.”63 The Kagama decision cemented wardship deep into the structure of the 
relationship between Indians and the federal government with legitimate legal and 
practical consequences. After Kagama, the state had the right to intervene to punish 
individual Indians as they saw fit—to safeguard Indians from themselves.  
Cases like Kagama and later Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock (to be discussed below), 
utilized wardship to formally solidify Congress’ power over Indian tribes in matters of 
law and order and treaty enforcement. In the late nineteenth century, individual Indian 
people living in the United States also sought to define the parameters of their identity 
and status as “wards.” For example, in 1884 a Winnebago named John Elk brought a 
suit in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska against an 
Omaha registrar who had refused to register Elk as a voter in a city election. In the 
case, Elk v. Wilkins, Elk challenged that under the Fourteenth Amendment, he was 
legally a citizen of the United States and therefore entitled to vote in the election. Elk 
had severed his relationship with his tribe and was living off-reservation when he 
attempted to register to vote. He argued that the only reason he was denied registration 
was because he was an Indian.64 The Court disagreed with Elk’s assertion of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and argued that although technically Indians were born 
within United States territory, they were no more subject to US jurisdiction than 
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children of ambassadors or other officials of foreign nations born on US soil.65 The 
Court ruled that an individual Indian, even one like John Elk who had severed his or 
her relationship with his or her tribe, could not claim US citizenship. Rather, Indians’ 
status could only be altered “by the nation whose wards they are and whose citizens 
they seek to become.”66 Thus, Elk v. Wilkins more clearly defined wardship as the 
opposite of citizenship. Following the Court’s logic in Elk v. Wilkins, individual 
Indians could not renounce their own wardship and wardship was viewed as “an 
impediment to citizenship.”67  
Kagama and Elk v. Wilkins represented the limitations wardship placed on 
Indian tribes. However, throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
policymakers, reformers, and politicians argued that wardship was not Indian peoples’ 
permanent status. In contrast to common legal and social practice governing the 
separation of whites and African Americans, Indians were subject to concentrated 
efforts of assimilation and “civilization.” Beginning in earnest in late 1880s, state 
agents argued that by separating from his or her tribe, individual Indian “wards” like 
John Elk should and could attain citizenship. Thus, although they would still likely 
face racial discrimination on an individual basis, policymakers and reformers believed 
that individual Indians had the potential to be incorporated into the white American 
polity.68 The most significant piece of legislation designed to accomplish this goal was 
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the General Allotment Act of 1887, commonly known as the Dawes Act. The Dawes 
Act set into place a policy of allotting reservation land into individual plots, to be held 
in trust by the federal government for a period of 25 years, after which the trust 
restriction would be lifted and individual Indian allottees would assume ownership of 
the plot. Any “surplus” reservation land could be sold to white settlers after allotment 
was complete. By the policy’s official end in 1934, two-thirds of all Indian lands held 
in 1887 were lost to white settlers.69 The ideology behind allotment was built upon the 
Jeffersonian model of private land ownership. At the turn of the twentieth century, 
ownership of land by individual nuclear families conformed to American social and 
economic ideals.70 Policymakers and reformers reasoned that if Indians were forced to 
give up communal land ownership and assume individual property rights, they would 
become “civilized” and easily assimilated into the American citizenry.  
Assumptions about the negative impacts of wardship, both for individual 
Indians and the nation, were woven into the fabric of the Dawes Act. Most clearly, in 
his agitation for the passage of the bill, Senator Henry Dawes of Massachusetts 
insisted that if allotment policy was not applied, the United States would continue to 
be responsible for Indian “paupers.” Dawes viewed allotment as the method through 
which Indians could assume ownership of land and individual well-being, and cease to 
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be a burden on the government. However, Dawes also pitched allotment policy as a 
method by which the United States government could “pay back” indigenous people. 
In 1885 he told the Mohonk Conference, “…every dollar of money, and every hour of 
effort that can be applied to each individual Indian, day and night…is not only due 
him in atonement for what we have inflicted upon him in the past, but is our own 
obligation towards him in order that we may not have him a vagabond and a pauper, 
without home or occupation among us in this land.”71 Thus, Dawes and other 
politicians and reformers envisioned allotment as a program which would 
simultaneously benefit the country and individual Indian people by creating self-
sufficient citizens who did not require assistance or policing from the state. Reformers 
and state agents who endeavored to increase Indians’ roles as “productive” citizens 
believed that allotment was “inspired by the highest motives.” Allotment would wipe 
the United States’ slate clean, as the policy would “make restitution to the Indian for 
all that the white man had done to him in the past.”72 Thus, the Dawes Act revealed 
how goals of protecting Indians from undue hardship (or “pauperism”) and guiding 
Indians towards “civilization” were explicitly tied to denigration of indigenous social 
and cultural structures of land ownership and family formation. Allotment policy 
resulted in the opposite of “restitution”—the massive decrease of Indian-owned land.  
Allotment provided a direct path to citizenship. In exchange for moving onto 
allotted land and adopting the “habits of civilized life,” an individual Indian would be 
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“declared to be a citizen of the United States, and is entitled to all the rights, 
privileges, and immunities of such citizens, whether said Indian has been or not, by 
birth or otherwise, a member of any tribe of Indians within the territorial limits of the 
United States…”73 Because the Dawes Act led Indians to citizenship, it was referred to 
by many politicians as the “Indian Emancipation Act.”74 Just as Dawes argued that 
allotment would lead to the nation’s freedom from Indian paupers and vagabonds, 
supposedly allotment signified Indian peoples’ freedom from the interference and 
watchful eye of the federal government. However, “emancipation” proved to be a 
misnomer. The Dawes Act ushered in what is known by scholars as the “Allotment 
and Assimilation Era” in Indian affairs, which is marked by increased government 
surveillance, education, and supervision of Native people, all for the goal of creating 
acceptable racialized American citizens out of supposedly uncivilized tribal Indians.  
In his 1887 annual report, Commissioner of Indian Affairs J.D.C. Atkins 
proclaimed that “The Government has entered upon the great work of educating and 
citizenizing the Indians and establishing them upon homesteads.”75 “Citizenizing” 
indigenous people was a complex and multivalent task, requiring the deconstruction of 
Indian languages, religions, cultures, and family structures. This process of 
“citizenizing” was undergirded by a threat of violence if Indian people did not comply. 
In 1889, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Thomas J. Morgan clearly articulated the 
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ideology behind governmental efforts to “civilize” Indian people: “The Indians must 
conform to ‘the white man’s ways,’ peaceably if they will, forcibly if they must. They 
must adjust themselves to their environment, and conform their mode of living 
substantially to our civilization. This civilization may not be the best possible, but it is 
the best the Indians can get. They can not escape it, and must either conform to it or be 
crushed by it.”76 According to Morgan and other Indian Service officials, Native 
peoples’ only alternative to assimilation was death. Morgan’s policy guidelines 
removed any sense of paternalistic governmental “protection” or “guidance” from the 
goal of civilization, revealing the power dynamics at play in the conception of 
wardship. Wardship was predicated upon an expectation that Indians would eventually 
conform to the “white man’s ways,” even if that meant they would do so because of 
violent force.  
The goal of assimilation, whether it was through allotment of reservation land, 
education of Indian children, prohibition of Indian cultures and religious traditions, or 
eradication of Indian languages, was to remake a Native person from a member of a 
tribe into an individual member of the American polity. Morgan emphasized, “…the 
relations of the Indians to the Government must rest solely upon the full recognition of 
their individuality. Each Indian must be treated as a man, be allowed a man's rights 
and privileges, and be held to the performance of a man’s obligations.”77 Morgan’s 
choice of the word “man” is significant here. Not only did it represent a gendered 
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understanding of who the “ideal” American citizen was (male, not female), it also 
signified that to assume the obligations and privileges of citizenship, one needed to 
advance to a certain level of age or maturity. A “ward” was not a “man.” A “ward” 
was incapable of fulfilling obligations to the state, and in turn, a “ward” could not 
expect rights and privileges from the state. However, a “ward,” like a child, would 
eventually become a man. As a man, each Indian, Morgan argued, would be “entitled 
to his proper share of the inherited wealth of the tribe, and to the protection of the 
courts in his ‘life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.’”78 As American citizens, Indians 
would still be able to access and use the resources they were entitled to as tribal 
members. However, Morgan purposefully used the term “proper share,” indicating that 
the tribe’s wealth would be split up among individual Native people (or, more 
accurately, individual Native men). Morgan envisioned the culmination of Native 
people's progression to citizenship as individual Native men owning individual plots 
of land. Furthermore, as citizens (and men), individual Indians were entitled to the 
protection of the courts. Morgan’s goal was for individual Indians to be protected by 
the same documents as other Americans, the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution. This seemingly egalitarian goal rested upon the assumption that the 
existing relationship between the US government and sovereign Indian nations needed 
to be fully eradicated.  
Lastly, and perhaps most significantly, Morgan stressed that as a man, an 
Indian was “not entitled to be supported in idleness.”79 Supposedly, as wards of the 
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government, Indians had no incentive to become self-sufficient. Idleness was also 
viewed as the opposite of “manliness.” To transform Indians from an “uncivilized” 
people to members of the American citizenry, they had to adopt the characteristics of 
the “American race,” which, as public figures like Theodore Roosevelt argued, was 
built upon both “racial superiority and virile manhood.”80 As Gail Bederman has 
shown, Roosevelt’s ideology of the ideal American was based upon a strong sense of a 
racialized, strenuous work ethic. To uphold American civilization, American men 
could not fall victim to “unmanly racial sloth,” or “overcivilized decadence.”81 Indian 
men were far removed from Roosevelt’s conception of ideal American manhood, 
because their economic and social status was firmly entwined with the federal 
government. Wardship was incompatible with manhood, and therefore, was something 
to be “outgrown,” if Indian men were to achieve citizenship status. Furthermore, as 
conceptualized by Senator Dawes, Indian policy was designed to remove the threat 
and burden of Indian “pauperism.” If an Indian man could overcome his “idleness,” 
through the US government’s practices and policies of “citizenization,” he would be 
one step closer to being considered as an individual racialized American citizen. 
Education was a critical component in the campaign to assimilate individual 
Indians into American citizens. The state’s responsibility to educate Native children 
was predicated upon the idea that Indians were “destined to become absorbed into the 
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national life, not as Indians, but as Americans.”82 In Indian schools, Native students 
learned about the dimensions of wardship. Teachers were instructed to “point out to 
their pupils the provisions which the Government has made for their education,” 
which would demonstrate their future opportunities and would engender feelings of 
“reverence for the nation’s power, gratitude for its beneficence, pride in its history, 
and a laudable ambition to contribute to its prosperity.”83 Not unlike the relationship 
between a minor “ward” and his or her guardian, as wards of the government, Indian 
students would be provided with an education and in turn, were expected to show their 
gratitude, respect, and loyalty to the state for such services. In this case, actual Indian 
minor “wards” were entrusted to the state for their protection and guidance. Although 
the state’s mission was “disintegration of the tribes,” school officials did not 
completely ignore their students’ indigeneity.84 Teachers were instructed to 
acknowledge “the wrongs of their [Indian students’] ancestors,” and emphasize that, 
“the injustice which their race has suffered can be contrasted with the larger future 
open to them, and their duties and opportunities rather than their wrongs will most 
profitably engage their attention.”85 This instruction to teachers to use the history of 
injustice perpetrated against Indians perfectly characterizes the dimensions of state 
officials’ understanding of wardship. Yes, Native people had faced hardship and had 
been treated unjustly, due to their ancestors’ “wrongs” (though interestingly, not the 
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“wrongs” committed against their ancestors). However, by fulfilling their duties as 
citizens and under the government’s guidance, they had the potential to access future 
opportunities which would overshadow these past injustices. Wardship was based 
upon both an acknowledgement of the past, and governmental officials’ “good 
intentions” for the future. 
Although pitched as a lofty, idealized goal to create loyal, hard-working 
“citizens” from poor Indian wards, assimilation efforts and allotment further restricted 
Indians from the property benefits that whiteness could bring in American society.86 
Essentially, allotment functioned as an organized, bureaucratic methodology to 
deprive indigenous people of land. Allotment did not release Indians from wardship. 
Rather, under the guise of “civilizing” Indians through allotment, Congress established 
its absolute power over Indian tribes. This plenary power was solidified in the 1903 
Supreme Court case, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock. Lone Wolf, principal chief of the 
Kiowa, sued the government for implementing an agreement to allot the Kiowa and 
Comanche reservation. While Congress had approved the agreement, the Kiowas and 
Comanches had not, citing the provisions of the 1868 Treaty of Medicine Lodge 
Creek, which “stipulated that all land cessions must be approved by the tribe.”87 The 
Court ruled that Congress had the right to abrogate existing treaties with Indian tribes, 
and that allotment could be carried out without tribal approval.88 The Court used 
wardship to support the decision. Justice Edward Douglas White asserted that “The 
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Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the 
United States.”89 The Court recognized the role of the federal government in creating 
this “dependent” population, but reinforced wardship and reemphasized the 
responsibility of the government to protect Indian people. Chief Justice White wrote, 
“From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of 
the Federal government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there 
arises the duty of protection, and, with it, the power.”90 Essentially, wardship was a 
foil for divesting Indians of land. Because Congress had plenary power over Indian 
wards, allotment could be carried out without tribal consent.  
Because of these court cases and federal policies in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, lawmakers, the courts, and American state officials had a rough 
working definition of wardship. Wardship was predicated upon the power of Congress 
over Indian tribes. This power was motivated by a sense of responsibility to “protect” 
Indians from harmful aspects of society, including their own judicial systems. 
Therefore, wardship disempowered tribal systems of order and justice. Furthermore, 
wardship was used as a justification for giving Congress the ability to adjust existing 
treaty agreements, undermining tribal sovereignty. Individual Indians who wished to 
become US citizens were stuck within the confines of wardship. Furthermore, Indians 
who had no interest in becoming US citizens were also limited by wardship’s 
implications, since Congress exerted plenary power over Indian “wards.” These 
characteristics of wardship evolved and shifted throughout the twentieth century, 
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especially in the context of heightened concerns over “non-white” immigration, the 
United States involvement in global racial conflicts, and changing rhetoric 
surrounding the place for “minorities” within the American polity.  
 
Manifestations of Race and Wardship in Twentieth-Century Indian Policies 
 
Throughout the early to mid-twentieth century, debates raged between 
politicians, legislators, state agents, and members of the public over how and when 
Indians would be ready to be released from wardship and access the benefits of full 
citizenship. Politicians and state agents recycled nineteenth-century rhetoric of 
“emancipation” and “freedom from wardship” in twentieth century Indian policies. 
The primarily white state apparatus’ consistent use of “ward” to describe Indians 
represents their continual racialization as non-white and therefore “inferior.” Below, I 
discuss three major twentieth century policy shifts which were influenced by wardship 
as a legal category and racial signifier. The persistent use of “wardship” signified state 
agents’ efforts to fit Native people into the developing national discourse surrounding 
race and ethnicity. Namely, due to the development of twentieth-century conceptions 
of race, and the rise of civil rights activism, wardship was associated with racial 
discrimination. Thus, the history of wardship does not only illustrate federal control 
over individual Indians and Congressional limitation of tribal sovereignty. Rather, 
wardship’s persistence well into the mid-twentieth century reflects its intricate ties to 
conceptions of race and identity. Although nineteenth-century actors perceived 
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wardship as the opposite of citizenship, wardship and citizenship coexisted 
ambiguously in the twentieth century.  
  
Indian Citizenship Act (1924) 
As previously mentioned, in the 1884 case, Elk v. Wilkins, the Supreme Court 
ruled that citizenship was incompatible with wardship. In 1916, the Court reversed 
their decision and conferred a more ambiguous, dual status upon Native people. In the 
case US v. Nice, the court determined that “citizenship is not incompatible with tribal 
existence or continued guardianship, and so may be conferred without completely 
emancipating the Indians.”91 The results of the Nice case contradicted much of the 
rhetoric surrounding allotment as a pure path to Indian citizenship. Even if Native 
people were living on allotted land and had received citizenship, they remained legally 
“wards” because the federal government retained power over many aspects of their 
lives.92 In 1924, Congress extended the dual “citizen-ward” status to all Native people 
who had not been declared citizens through allotment, marriage, or as a result of 
military service.93 The Indian Citizenship Act (ICA) universally declared all Indians in 
the United States to be citizens, stating, “that all noncitizen Indians born within the 
territorial limits of the United States be, and they are hereby, declared to be citizens of 
the United States: Provided, that the granting of such citizenship shall not in any 
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manner impair or otherwise affect the right of any Indian to tribal or other property.”94 
Although the act was sweeping and declarative, it was also mediated by the assurance 
that American citizenship would not infringe on Indians’ rights to tribal property. 
Thus, the ICA “neither denied [Indians’] citizenship in tribes nor fully incorporated 
them into the American polity.”95 The act has been commonly referred to in historical 
literature as repayment for Native peoples’ efforts in World War I, but it also reflected 
Progressive legislators’ political efforts to minimize bureaucracy in the federal 
government.96 The timing of this piece of legislation was also significant. In 1924, 
Congress also passed the most restrictive immigration law in the nation’s history, the 
Johnson-Reed Act. Thus, while Indians were universally declared American citizens, 
with the assumption of their eventual assimilation, Congress decided to drastically 
restrict the immigration of Eastern and Southern Europeans and Asians, privileging 
the immigration of those who were associated with common perceptions of whiteness 
in the early twentieth century.97  
Why, when so many were restricted from entry into the United States and a 
path to naturalized citizenship were Indians declared citizens? The ICA retained 
elements of nineteenth- century efforts to impart the validity of the “white man’s 
ways” onto Indians, and racialized understandings of Indians as individual members of 
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one “Indian race.” Citizenship, in this case, was a method of coercive assimilation, 
undermining tribal sovereignty and classifying Indians as individuals rather than 
members of distinct tribal nations.98 At the same time, the ICA further codified 
Indians’ “citizen-ward” status into the law, which enshrined nineteenth-century 
ideology of guardianship into twentieth century politics. The ICA thus created a status 
of “dual citizenship” for Indians (both as Americans and as members of Native 
nations),99 and further served the US state’s goal to “eliminate Indian Country from 
the maps altogether.”100 The ICA has a messy legacy which did not clear up questions 
over where Indians belonged in the American polity. Yes, they were citizens. But, they 
were citizens with rights to tribal property. And crucially, their citizenship did not 
connote whiteness, or equality with those considered to be white. Thus, the persistence 
of wardship precluded full assimilation of Indians into the American polity. 
After the passage of the ICA, most of the public and even many in Congress 
did not realize that Indians were American citizens. For many in the early to mid-
twentieth century, “ward” status trumped Native peoples’ “citizen” status, and 
conversations abounded over how to extend citizenship to Native people, and whether 
they were eligible for the benefits of citizenship. For example, the extension of social 
welfare provisions in the mid-1930s posed problems for state welfare workers who 
questioned whether Indians were citizens and residents of their states, eligible for 
benefits like Old Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind, or Aid to Dependent Children 
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under the 1935 Social Security Act.101 Lawyers working with the Department of the 
Interior and individual states reached similar conclusions—the ICA assured that 
Indians were citizens and eligible for welfare benefits. However, that eligibility did 
nothing to dissolve or clarify wardship status. State agents issued statements like, “All 
Indians, ward or non-ward, who were born within the United States meet the 
citizenship requirements of our social welfare laws, for all are made citizens of the 
United States by the Act of Congress of June 2, 1924.”102 Or, “But an Indian ward, 
whether a ward because of his trust property or the maintenance of tribal relations, as a 
person and a citizen of the State where he resides, has the benefit of and is subject to 
State laws in manifold phases of his life. The necessity of proving abandonment of 
tribal relations in order to show an Indian a citizen and entitled to a citizen’s rights is 
unnecessary in view of the citizenship act of June 2, 1924.”103 Thus, the ICA and 
subsequent interpretations of the act codified Indians’ simultaneous status as “wards" 
and “citizens.” Supposedly, as interpreters of the law at both the federal and the state 
level found, wardship status did not disqualify Indians from some benefits of 
citizenship.104 However, as further chapters of this dissertation will illustrate, the 
                                                            
101 For more on this issue, see Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
102 Webb Opinion on Indian Eligibility 1936, Social Security Legislation Correspondence, Box 168, 
Colorado River Central Classified Files (CRCC Files), Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record 
Group 75 (RG 75), National Archives and Records Administration - Pacific Region (Riverside) (NARA 
– Pacific Region (R)). 
103 Office of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, “The Applicability of the Social Security 
Act to the Indians,” 1936, Social Security Legislation Correspondence, Box 168, CRCC Files, RG 75, 
NARA – Pacific Region (R). 
104 Indeed, wardship was used as a rationale to restrict Indian voting rights, especially in Western states. 
For more, see Daniel McCool, Susan M. Olson, and Jennifer L. Robinson, Native Vote: American 
Indians, the Voting Rights Act, and the Right to Vote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); 
and Willard Hughes Rollings, “Citizenship and Suffrage: The Native American Struggle for Civil 
Rights in the American West, 1830-1965,” Nevada Law Journal 5 (Fall 2004): 126-140. 
 76 
ambiguous status of “citizen-ward” also allowed certain states to claim it was legal to 
restrict Indians from welfare benefits due to wardship. 
The ambiguity of their “citizen-ward” status was also used to engage in 
negotiations about Indians’ duties as American citizens. For example, in 1940, 
Kearney Miller, a resident of the Colorado River Reservation in Arizona, used the 
category of “wardship” to argue that Indians should be exempt from the 1940 
Selective Training and Service Act. Miller asserted that because Indians in Arizona 
were restricted from voting and from receiving Old Age Assistance based on 
wardship, they should not be subject to the draft. Miller addressed his concerns to the 
BIA and received a letter from Assistant to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Fred 
Daiker, in return. Daiker responded to Miller’s argument about the nature of Indian 
citizenship by reiterating Congress’ plenary power over both Indian wardship and 
citizenship: “Wardship is not dependent of itself upon the age of any individual, but 
rather upon his status,” Daiker wrote. “The Indian is a ward not by reason of his age or 
his mentality, but solely because the laws of Congress have so declared. These same 
laws have also made him a citizen with various rights.”105 He conceded that just 
because Arizona had restricted Indians from the franchise and from receiving welfare 
benefits, “that fact in itself does not make the position of the state right.”106 Daiker's 
letter revealed that wardship status did not outweigh Indians’ obligations as American 
citizens.  
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Wardship continued to present confusion for legislators and the public into the 
postwar period. Indeed, their status as wards obscured their status as citizens so much 
so that members of the House Public Lands Indian Affairs Subcommittee proposed 
legislation to “grant full citizenship rights to Indians,” in 1947.107 Under this 
legislation, “Indian war veterans, Indians who have a high school education or its 
equivalent, Indians who have supported themselves off reservations for five years and 
others might apply for citizenship.”108 Of course, legislation like this was completely 
unnecessary, due to the passage of the ICA more than twenty years earlier. In this 
case, the members of the House subcommittee betrayed both their misunderstanding 
of the nature of Indian citizenship and their racialized interpretations of Indian 
wardship. To members of the subcommittee, citizenship served as a “reward” for those 
Indians who had fulfilled requirements associated with assimilation and whiteness: 
military service, high school education, and, most crucially, living off the reservation 
for a substantial period. Furthermore, “If granted citizenship, the Indian would be 
released from government restrictions and he would be allowed to sell his allotted 
property if he desires.”109 Submitted by Republican representative Francis Case of 
South Dakota, this proposed legislation reflected continued desire for valuable Native 
land which had been heretofore protected by trust restrictions and Indians’ wardship 
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status. To these politicians, wardship prevented Indians from accessing full citizenship 
and unfairly restricted the sale of Indian land.  
Thus, the ICA both propelled assimilation efforts and permanently attached 
wardship to Indians’ citizenship status. Its ambiguity left a lasting impression on the 
twentieth century, spurring conflicts over both Native peoples’ rights to the benefits of 
citizenship and their responsibilities to fulfill the duties of citizenship. Citizenship 
(and, in turn, revocation of wardship) continued to function as the proverbial “carrot” 
for Indian assimilation and abdication of land—even when it was not necessary, well 
into the mid-twentieth century.  
 
Indian Reorganization Act (1934)  
 US Indian policy underwent a major change in 1934, with the passage of the 
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). This key piece of legislation, known as the “Indian 
New Deal,” was created by John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs from 1933-
1945. The IRA was undergirded by the argument that Native tribes should be 
recognized by the federal government as culturally distinct entities. Scholars refer to 
the IRA as the “tribal alternative.”110 The IRA abandoned assimilation as an official 
policy, ended the practice of allotment, and encouraged tribes to adopt constitutions 
and exercise self-government.111 Though the IRA represents a significant shift in 
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federal Indian policy, the legislation has been critiqued by scholars who argue that it 
perpetuated the reach of the BIA over Native tribes through the use of suggested 
constitutions prepared by the Indian Office.112 Thus, the IRA further extended Native 
peoples’ ambiguous status in the American polity. Although Collier and his supporters 
halted the process of allotment and instituted protections for Native cultural, religious, 
and artistic expression,113 the IRA did not grant tribes full sovereignty or alter 
Congress’ plenary power over them. Furthermore, BIA officials presumed that federal 
supervision was necessary for those tribes who wished to achieve federal recognition 
as incorporated tribes under the IRA, “as Indians gained more experience” in self-
government, before government officials would “fade away.”114 
 Collier framed the IRA as a bill to reinforce and expand Indians’ experiences of 
American citizenship. The first line of Collier’s bill stated:  
“That it is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to grant those 
Indians living under Federal tutelage and control the freedom to 
organize for the purposes of local self-government and economic 
enterprise, to the end that civil liberty, political responsibility, and 
economic independence shall be achieved among the Indian peoples of 
the United States.”115  
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Collier constructed the IRA as an end to the practice of “Federal tutelage and control.” 
At the same time, he saw the act as an effort to support Indian integration and/or 
assimilation into the democratic ideologies of the United States. Thus, although the 
bill was interpreted by many critics as a “socialist” or “communist” endeavor, Collier 
proposed ending federal guardianship over Indians after they had adopted what he saw 
as the benefits of American “civil liberty, political responsibility, and economic 
independence.”116 Collier’s goal was to alleviate Native poverty and the damage done 
by allotment, but he also wanted to remind state agents and the public that Native 
people were American citizens. A 1933 press release on the IRA from the Department 
of the Interior hails the goals of the act: “conservation and development of Indian 
lands and resources, the establishment of a credit system for the Indians, the 
arrangement of scholarships in institutions of higher education for Indian youths and 
the formation of Indian business organizations.”117 However, the provisions set out in 
the IRA were not proposed as “aid” to a dependent and uncivilized population. 
Instead, the press release reads: “These are certainly elemental privileges to be sought 
for American citizens. However, curious, as it may seem, many Americans do not 
realize that Indians are citizens.”118 By framing federal spending for Native peoples’ 
economic and educational opportunities simply as “elemental privileges” for 
American citizens, Collier emphasized Indian membership in the American polity as 
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citizens and wards. Through the IRA, the federal government fulfilled its 
responsibility to its wards by providing what was due to them as citizens.  
The IRA did not resolve any issues about Indians’ wardship status. Indeed, in 
the same press release where Indians’ citizenship was highlighted, the Department of 
the Interior claimed that “Thousands of copies were called for by Indians who termed 
this their ‘Proclamation of Emancipation.’”119 If the IRA was Indians’ “Emancipation 
Proclamation,” the government was liberating Native Americans who had been 
“enslaved” by the government itself. By creating a racialized vision of freedom from 
bondage, the Department of the Interior equated wardship with slavery—the existing 
relationship between the federal government and individual Indians minimized their 
humanity to exploit their resources. Furthermore, the press release claimed that 
Indians themselves had equated the IRA with the document that would lead to the 
13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the Constitution which had institutionalized the 
full, legal citizenship of freed African American slaves. The IRA was depicted as an 
act that signaled a clear, linear path for Indians, from “wards” to “citizens.”  
Was the IRA as “emancipatory” as the Department of the Interior had claimed? 
Debates between John Collier and Congressmen Theodore Werner (South Dakota) and 
Theodore Christianson (Minnesota) during the 1934 House hearings on Collier’s bill 
reveal persistent ambiguities surrounding the nature of Indian wardship and if the IRA 
officially ended Indian “guardianship.” Collier argued that “The guardianship of the 
Indian is definitely ended by this plan.” Congressman Werner seemed to agree, 
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stating, “A man cannot maintain the right of citizenship and still be subject to 
guardianship.” However, Werner qualified his strict delineation between citizenship 
and guardianship: “He remains a ward nonetheless.” Collier attempted to clarify, 
arguing that Indians would still be under guardianship, but not the type of 
guardianship that “takes away from him his initiative, his self-respect, his power, his 
liberty and self-support.”120 To Collier, this new type of guardianship did not infringe 
upon characteristics of ideal citizenship: liberty, power, self-support. Congressman 
Christianson attempted to establish a distinction between “two classes of guardianship 
which the law recognizes, guardianship of the person and guardianship of the estate.” 
He asked Collier, “Is not the guardianship the Government is exercising here more in 
the nature of the estate of the Indian than the person?” Collier confirmed, stating, “It 
becomes that under this bill.”121 Therefore, Collier asserted that the IRA would retain 
the federal government’s powers of guardianship over Indian land, but would cease to 
serve as a guardian over Indian people. Although this distinction seemed simple, it 
was not easy to separate estate from person, especially considering decades of policy 
doctrine which had specified that Indians must be deemed “competent” by the state to 
take full ownership of their land without restrictions. Indeed, Congressman 
Christianson’s next comment to Collier reveals this complexity:  
“Ordinarily when a guardianship is established over his estate, that 
guardianship terminates whenever the incompetent becomes competent 
to manage his own affairs, and is resumed if he becomes incompetent 
again, but I presume that the policy of the Government in this instance 
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is to assist the Indian until he develops full competency and then 
terminate the guardianship.”122  
 
Christianson’s assumption that Indians lacked the competency to terminate federal 
guardianship and that the government would continue to assist them until they 
developed competency demonstrated that despite Collier’s emphasis that the IRA 
would help Indians establish their citizenship, these politicians continued to 
understand Native people predominantly as wards. Ultimately, Congressman Werner 
was correct: Indians remained wards nonetheless.  
 
Termination Policies (Late 1940s-1960s) 
John Collier left the BIA in 1945, and his departure, coupled with the context 
of post-World War II political discourse about race, ushered in a new era in Indian 
policy, known as the “Termination and Relocation Era.” As Donald Fixico has noted, 
mid-century politicians and state agents ascribed to “an undaunted devotion to 
conforming all segments of society into one unified nation,” and the “dream of 
creating an America of one people.”123 They saw the trust relationship between 
Indians and the federal government as negatively impact this vision of a unified 
nation. With these philosophies in mind, they proposed to “terminate” the relationship 
between Indian tribes and the BIA. “Successful” termination policies included the 
passage of Public Law 280 in 1953, which authorized the states of Alaska, California, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction 
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over reservations without tribal consent;124 and the “relocation” programs of the mid 
1950s, which provided job training and other incentives for Native people to move off 
of reservations and relocate in urban areas.125 Terminationists were motivated by their 
desire to fully assimilate Indians into American society. However, though their 
rhetoric was reminiscent of nineteenth-century assimilation, twentieth-century 
politicians and policymakers couched termination squarely within language of mid-
century celebrations of American liberty, equality, and prosperity. In this way, 
termination was not necessarily abrupt “backtrack” to the policies of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, interrupted by the IRA, but rather one additional stop on 
a long line of policies centered on ambiguous conceptions of Indian citizenship. 
Wardship was an essential part of the practice and rhetoric of termination. 
Terminationists argued that before Indians could fully integrate into the “unified 
nation,” wardship must be eradicated.  
To advocates of termination, ending the relationship between Indians and the 
federal government meant ending the “dependency” implicit in the “ward-guardian” 
relationship. If Indians were no longer “dependent” upon the federal government, they 
would be able to achieve the same levels of prosperity and economic success as other 
American citizens. However, questions lingered over the role of the special 
relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government and racialized tropes 
associated with wardship. In 1948, the Committee on Indian Affairs organized by the 
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Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch issued a report which 
engaged with Native racialization and citizenship. The committee asserted, 
“Assimilation must be the dominant goal of public policy.” They supported this 
strident statement by pointing to the separation between (dependent) Indians and 
“reasonably prosperous non-Indians.” Although the committee assured that Indians 
would “preserve some of their own values and attitudes,” it was clear to them that 
Native people “d[id] not want to be 19th century story-book Indians.”126 In this case, 
the committee did not represent assimilation as a coercive policy backed by the threat 
of extinction. Rather, they asserted that assimilation “must” be the policy goal because 
Indians wanted to “master and benefit from the culture of our times.”127 The 
committee utilized the familiar racial trope of “19th century story-book Indians” to 
highlight the danger of failing to enact assimilation as policy. In their eyes, if the 
government did not do something to bring Indians up to speed, there was a danger that 
this group of American citizens, despite their own desires, would be unable to access 
the benefits of living in the postwar United States.  
Formulated in the language of postwar equality, the committee’s report drew 
upon wardship to support Native peoples’ citizenship status. For example, the 
committee asserted, “Regardless of treaties and agreements with Indian tribes in which 
a good many specific commitments have been made as to both educational and 
economic assistance toward assimilation, the Indian deserves at least a fair break 
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because he is a human being and a citizen of the United States.”128 The Committee 
acknowledged treaties made with Indian tribes only to bring up the duties of the 
federal government as “guardian” to its “wards,” educational and economic assistance 
toward assimilation. However, the committee pitched assimilation as something that 
the US owed Native people, not because of those treaties, but because of their 
humanity and citizenship. Ultimately, the committee reasoned, regardless of their 
status as wards, because Indians were citizens, Congress should promote assimilation 
policies.  
The committee argued that wardship hampered Indian progress. Crucially, the 
committee situated Indians’ failure to break free of the control of the federal 
government within a naturalized narrative of Manifest Destiny. They stated:  
“The thing that has been most lacking and most needed is Indian 
motivation. For 150 years policies have been imposed by the 
government. The policies have been Indian policies, not Indians’ 
policies. If Indian tribes resisted, they could win battles, but they 
always lost the wars. If they retreated and withdrew to the west, they 
were always overtaken by the tide of westward migration.”129 
 
Although the Committee represented “westward migration” as a “tide” taking place 
independent of human action, Indians were both human casualties of this tide and 
humans who did not resist enough to stop that tide. The committee argued that the 
biggest problem (what was “most lacking” and “most needed”) was Indian motivation. 
In the context of federal wardship (and receipt of federal benefits in general), 
“motivation” was a decidedly racialized term. Postwar assimilation—ironically, a 
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government policy—would supposedly allow Indians to gain the strength they had 
needed for the past 150 years to resist the imposition of government policies.  
In the 1940s and 1950s, legislators, reformers, and policymakers asserted that 
Indians needed to be emancipated because as wards whose resources were provided by 
the BIA, they were more likely to “shirk” their duties of citizenship. To be “free” of 
the BIA would mean that a Native person was “free” of wardship. In 1953, the passage 
of House Concurrent Resolution 108 institutionalized these impressions of wardship. 
House Concurrent Resolution 108 mandated that Indians living in the states of 
California, Florida, New York, and Texas, as well as the Flathead Tribe of Montana, 
the Klamath Tribe of Oregon, the Menominee Tribe of Wisconsin, the Potowatamie 
Tribe of Kansas and Nebraska, and the Chippewa Tribe living on the Turtle Mountain 
Reservation in North Dakota would be released from the supervision and control of 
the BIA.130 This legislation drastically affected the relationship between members of 
these Native nations and the states in which they resided.131 This resolution proposed 
“to end [Indians’] status as wards of the United States, and to grant them all of the 
rights and prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship.”132 Notably, in addition, 
the bill also declared that Indians “should assume their full responsibilities as 
American citizens.”133 Thus, Congress proposed that if Native people broke free from 
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the chains of wardship, they could access the rights due to them as citizens. At the 
same time, politicians implied that thus far, wardship had precluded Native people 
from fulfilling their obligations as American citizens.  
If Native people were to live outside of the confines of federal wardship, they 
would become subject to the laws, taxes, and regulations of the individual states where 
they resided. Dillon Myer, Commissioner of Indian Affairs from 1950-1953 and major 
advocate of termination policies, argued that “the Bureau of Indian Affairs has no 
desire to continue providing the Indians with any service which can be rendered just as 
efficiently and cheaply by some other agency or organization.”134 Myer reasoned that 
the Fourteenth Amendment had determined that “all persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” were citizens both of the United 
States and “of the State wherein they reside.”135 Myer used the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a legal excuse to terminate the “ward-guardian” relationship Indians 
had with the federal government. However, in doing so, Myer glossed over the 
historical intricacies of the jurisdictional boundaries of Indian welfare. When Myer 
made these declarations in 1952, Indians’ citizenship in individual states was still in 
flux, the subject of vigorous debates in individual states and localities who saw 
themselves as unfairly burdened with the welfare of a population supposedly under 
federal jurisdiction. Wardship, to many state and local governments, precluded 
Indians’ rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.  
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For example, hearings held in Reno, Nevada by the Subcommittees of the 
Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs in 1954 over the extension of the 
provisions of House Concurrent Resolution 108 to Nevada Indians revealed persistent 
racialized resistance to the incorporation of Native people into county and state 
bureaucracy. Eleanor Myers, the representative for the Lovelock Paiute Indian 
Colony,136 testified before the committee, arguing that “Most of our families are in 
agreement with the plans for termination of Federal service if we can be better 
prepared for this extreme change before the actual termination is accomplished.”137 
Myers went on to request from the committee concrete repairs and services her 
community needed, such as fire protection, police protection, improvement of street 
lighting, installation of indoor toilets, and provision of regular (non-seasonal) work 
opportunities. Myers’ testimony demonstrated the Lovelock Paiutes’ distinct 
understanding of the “ward-guardian” relationship, which will be discussed further in 
the next chapter. First, I will focus on how officials from the surrounding town of 
Lovelock and Pershing County felt about the proposal to terminate Nevada Indians. 
Myers asserted, “The Pershing County commissioners have said the county is 
financially unable to assume any care of Indians because the maximum of $5 tax rate 
has nearly been reached. They cannot meet hospitalization for Indians or assume any 
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other responsibilities.”138 Citing financial burdens that would prevent the county from 
taking on the responsibility for medical resources, law and order, and other aspects of 
public infrastructure, Myers recognized how the town and county rationalized their 
refusal to consider Indians purely as state citizens instead of federal wards. 
Furthermore, Myers also highlighted the role of racial discrimination and racialized 
definitions of wardship which undergirded those refusals. She stated, “The 
commissioners say, too, the county is not prepared to accept the Indians on an equal 
basis with non-Indians. We realize there is a definite social adjustment to be made.”139 
She cited the “looks of the poor houses and dusty roads” of the Lovelock Colony as 
the reason why the county was not prepared to accept Indians as equals.140 Thus, to 
Myers and the Paiutes of Lovelock Colony, wardship’s characteristics (manifested 
through inadequate housing, jobs, and public services on their reservation) 
undergirded Pershing County’s racialized discrimination. Although individual states 
and counties represented their refusal to take financial responsibility for Indian wards 
as a “race-neutral” response based on jurisdiction, authorities’ rationale was 
fundamentally tied to Indians’ racialized identities as “wards.” In the mid-twentieth 
century, as specific rhetoric surrounding assimilation, integration, and race became 
increasingly common among state agents, legislators, and the American public, these 
tensions between jurisdictional responsibility for this racialized population reached 
new heights.  
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Conclusion: Moving Towards a Mid-Century Definition of Wardship  
 
During World War II, the nonprofit organization, the Public Affairs 
Committee, published a pamphlet titled, “The Races of Mankind.” Along with a visual 
display, comic book, and film, this pamphlet traveled throughout the nation’s schools 
to emphasize the importance of American unity and call attention to the differences 
between the United States’ and Hitler’s conceptualizations of race.141 The authors, 
Ruth Benedict and Gene Weltfish, argued that, “This war, for the first time, has 
brought home to Americans the fact that the whole world has been made one 
neighborhood.” Benedict and Weltfish argued the United States was quite familiar 
with the idea of a diverse global “neighborhood”: “In our country men of different 
color, hair texture, and head shape have lived together since the founding of our 
nation. They are citizens of the United States.”142 In the postwar period, the United 
States actively tried to construct an international impression of itself as multicultural, a 
nation made up of disparate parts, but unified in its goals of equality and liberty.143 For 
Indians to fit into this narrative, they were often represented as members of one of 
many racial groups or “nationalities” who had contributed to the creation of an 
“American” identity. For example, when Benedict and Weltfish described the 
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“American diet,” they noted the importance of French and Italian salads, Russian 
soups, chile and tortillas from Mexico, “appetizers” from the Scandinavian countries, 
and from Indians, “turkey, corn, and cranberries.”144 By highlighting the contributions 
Native people had made to American culture, Benedict and Weltfish conceptualized 
Indians as assimilable, but also distinct in their culture. Benedict and Weltfish 
emphasized that the diversity and multiculturalism of the United States demonstrated 
the country’s racial progressivism, equality, and inclusivity. In this ideology, Indians’ 
citizenship outweighed their cultural differences.  
How did state agents, politicians, and members of the public reconcile this 
vision of Indians’ contribution to multicultural American identity with a racialized 
conception of wardship? This chapter has shown that key policies and laws in 
twentieth-century Indian history, the ICA, IRA, and termination, continued to 
perpetuate ambiguous definitions of Indian wardship and citizenship built upon 
nineteenth-century legacies. Wardship’s racialized connotations impacted where 
Indians “fit” into the American polity. This question of “fit” had real consequences for 
determining eligibility for welfare resources, determining how and by whom 
communities would be policed, and which political entity (town, county, state, etc.) 
assumed jurisdiction for Native people. For example, BIA superintendents at a 1940 
meeting in Salt Lake City attempted to define what “wardship” meant. One agent tied 
wardship to the receipt of government benefits, asserting that it was “a fact that any 
Indians who receive gratuity from the Government are wards of the Federal 
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Government.”145 However, the superintendents decided that an individual Indian “can 
be both a ward and citizen of the United States Government. An Indian cannot 
renounce his status as a ward.”146 It did not matter if Indians paid taxes. This 
obligation of citizenship would not impact his or her wardship status. A “certificate of 
competency” would not remove wardship.147 In addition, “degree of blood does not 
enter into wardship.”148 The only way that the wardship category could be removed 
was if Congress enacted legislation to do so.149 However, certain superintendents were 
still unclear on the subject, arguing that although “the courts, in the early days 
particularly, pointed out that all Indians of the United States were theoretically wards 
of the Government,” there were some Indians, particularly those in Maine, Vermont, 
Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, “over whom the Government has exercised no 
protection.”150 The superintendents failed to come to a conclusion about how to 
categorize these populations, who were racially and culturally Indian, but who were 
not under federal guardianship.  
If BIA superintendents were unsure about wardship’s definition, the public was 
even more perplexed. In 1949, the BIA and the Haskell Institute151 published a 
pamphlet entitled, “Answers to Your Questions on American Indians.” Questions 
included “Are Indians citizens?,” “Do Indians receive money from the Government 
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just for being Indians?,” and “Why is there an Indian Service?” The BIA and Haskell’s 
efforts to clarify common questions they received about Indians reflected the public’s 
struggle to reconcile rhetoric about American equality and the distinct “special” 
treatment Indians received from the government. If Indians were like other citizens, 
why was there a branch of the federal government devoted soley to them? Pamphlet 
authors assured readers that the government did not pay Indians “just for being 
Indians,” but issued checks for some Native people based on income associated with 
renting their land. However, they also relied on common, racialized understandings of 
the necessity of government guidance over Indian wards. In response to the question, 
“Why is there an Indian Service?” they reasoned that the government “established and 
expressed repeatedly one consistent policy in dealing with Indians. It bound itself to 
‘civilize’ the redmen; and find for them a continuing, equal and self-supporting place 
with other citizens of the democracy.”152 The BIA and Haskell represented citizenship 
as the culmination of federal efforts to “civilize” Indians, drawing on familiar tropes 
of Indians as uncivilized wards who needed protection and guidance from the 
government. Thus, although they asserted that Indians “were not restricted in person” 
by wardship, and that wardship only applied to Indians’ trust property, Haskell and the 
BIA also reiterated the differentiation between Indians and other American citizens by 
rehashing racialized understandings of “civilization.”153 Wardship disrupted the idea 
that Indians were just one of many minority groups of citizens. Wardship separated 
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Indians from other citizens, whether by bestowing upon them a “special” status or 
revealing their inability to reach American citizenship, the culmination of 
“civilization.”   
Many ordinary people and politicians argued in favor of terminating wardship 
and treating Indians like other “normal Americans.” Even organizations heavily 
involved in Indian affairs, like the Association on American Indian Affairs (AAIA), 
framed the “remov[al] [of] all special statuses” as a prevention against “a tendency in 
the Indian Bureau to prolong a state of dependency.”154 “Special status” was 
simultaneously damaging Indians’ ability to exercise authority and responsibility over 
their own affairs, and exemplified Indians’ lack of responsibility and motivation. In 
language that was strikingly similar to rhetoric surrounding other racialized groups’ 
receipt of welfare, members of the general public questioned the characterization of 
Indians as “responsible citizens.” For example, in 1946, Philleo Nash, BIA official 
(and future BIA Commissioner) and member of the AAIA, sent his sister an AAIA 
pamphlet about to be printed. Nash’s sister, “disagreed with a blanket statement—‘The 
American Indians are responsible citizens.” Nash wrote of his sister’s comments to 
AAIA Executive Secretary Patricia McDermott, noting “You and I know why people 
who have been pushed around do not make responsible citizens, but I can understand 
the resistance which is aroused by the blanket statement.”155 As late as 1959, 
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government officials working with President Eisenhower’s Commission on the Rights, 
Liberties, and Responsibilities of the American Indian made efforts to address 
derogatory assumptions made by the public and politicians that Native people had not 
“assumed their full responsibilities as American citizens,” did not know how to 
manage their money or pay taxes like other citizens.156 In a draft of their official 
report, the Commission argued that Indians had “borne their fair share of the most 
onerous responsibility of all, namely, military service.” They also asserted that Indians 
had the right to vote and many had better voting records than non-Indian 
communities.157 More importantly, the Commission asserted that Indians had provided 
“a very special and unique service to the American people,” in “surrendering most of 
their estate.”158 With this rationalization, the Commission argued that their tax-
exemptions (which, the Commission emphasized, only applied on land held in trust by 
the federal government), made sense, as Indians received them in return for giving up 
their land, as a “service” to the American people. The Commission combatted the 
perception that wardship prevented responsible citizenship by classifying the ward-
guardian relationship as repayment for Native “service.”  
In their efforts to propel Native people into American citizenship, non-Native 
governmental agents and members of non-profit organizations minimized the legal 
and political contours of wardship and made a concentrated effort to consider Indians 
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as a specific minority group within the United States—one which, if given the 
opportunity, could achieve equality and “first-class citizenship” in line with American 
values of democracy. For example, in a 1946 field report on the Navajo commissioned 
by the Home Missions Council of North America, Elizabeth Clark argued that Indian 
policy and legislation and the BIA itself were “drawn on racial lines,” which “makes 
for a system contrary to the principles of American democracy.” For the “Indian 
problem” to be solved, Clark asserted, the United States needed to “work against 
discrimination in all parts of the country,” “give all citizens the vote,” support “the 
development of economic, educational and social opportunity of the poorer states and 
regions,” and “promote equal justice before the law.”159 Clark viewed the BIA as a 
racialized state agency holding Native people back from achieving full citizenship on 
an “equal” playing field as other citizens. This kind of belief privileged Native 
peoples’ citizenship over their legal relationship with the United States as “domestic 
dependent nations.” In a 1956 meeting with White Mountain Apache tribal 
representatives, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Glenn Emmons used a similar 
conceptualization to support his policy goals to integrate Indians into the American 
polity. Emmons expressed exasperation at “people who have never seen an Indian,” 
who assumed that, “they are still savages, or something, that will take a hundred years 
before the Indian can be recognized as a real American citizen.” “It makes me mad 
when I hear those people talk like that,” Emmons continued, asking the group gathered 
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for the meeting, “I don’t think you people want to be museum pieces, do you?”160 To 
Emmons, the situation was clear: those who clung to an outdated, racialized 
impression of Native people as uncivilized “savages” were in the wrong. Emmons, 
who wanted to help Indians reach their potential as twentieth-century American 
citizens, was in the right. However, although both Clark and Emmons may have had 
good intentions, their goals to help Indians achieve “equality” with others downplayed 
wardship’s legal and political complexities.  
In 1961, the United States Commission on Civil Rights published Justice, a 
report which analyzed minority groups’ experiences of racial discrimination in the 
United States. The authors of Justice attempted to establish whether Native people 
should be considered a “minority,” and ultimately issued a rather vague proclamation: 
“If American Indians are a minority, they are a minority with a difference.”161 The 
Commission on Civil Rights qualified this statement further, arguing, “to think of the 
Indian problem solely in terms of bias, discrimination, or civil rights would be a 
mistake. For unlike most minorities, Indians were and still are to some extent a people 
unto themselves, with a culture, land, government, and habits of life all their own.”162 
In this case, Indians’ “special” qualities precluded their inclusion in a conversation of 
discrimination and civil rights. On one hand, the Commission argued that wardship 
limited Native peoples’ access to full citizenship, writing, “For one reason or another, 
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the numerous and dominant people have not been able to make up their minds what to 
do with the ‘colonies of troublesome strangers.’”163 On the other hand, according to 
the Commission, Indians “have not made up their minds to abandon their tribal 
communities and to join white society.”164 Thus, although the Commission recognized 
tribal autonomy of “culture, land, governments, and habits,” ultimately they presented 
a linear interpretation of integration into the American citizenry, stalled by both the 
mindsets of mainstream Americans and the uncertainty of Indian people.  
Throughout the nineteenth century, wardship was presented as a “temporary” 
precursor to full citizenship. The term was enmeshed with the racialized ideology of 
assimilation. Nineteenth-century state officials and judges determined that Indians 
would conform to the “white man’s ways,” even if through violent force. As “wards” 
of the government, Indians required oversight, guidance, and protection from 
governmental officials before their transition from “ward” to “citizen” could be 
completed. However, before adapting a way of life which closely adhered to ideal 
white citizenship, Indian wards needed to surrender their tribal identity. These violent 
and oppressive ideals of assimilation were based upon the assumption that tribal 
nations should be dissolved, Indian land should be relinquished for white settlement, 
and individual Indian “wards” should eventually become “citizens.” Despite non-
Natives’ widespread understanding of the linear trajectory from “ward” to “citizen,” 
this chapter has shown that the two categories were not mutually exclusive. In the 
early twentieth century, despite and because of legal rulings and acts of Congress, 
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Indians did not lose their “wardship status” when they attained American citizenship. 
Racially, Indian “wards” could never access the ideal of white American citizenship, 
because members of the public, the courts, and state agents did not view them as 
white. The bestowal of universal citizenship, although reflective of reformers’ and 
state agents’ persistent efforts to impose the “validity” of the “white man’s ways” onto 
racialized populations, did not transform how Indians experienced race—legally, 
politically, or socially.  
However, Indians’ non-whiteness developed additional dimensions in the 
twentieth century, especially due to the new racial language of multiculturalism, civil 
rights, and integration. Wardship’s development in the twentieth century expanded the 
ways in which Indians were racialized. Wardship’s ambiguous definitions presented 
difficulties for state agents and the public who subscribed to a linear view of progress 
to citizenship for America’s racial minorities. In the next chapter, I will explore how 
differing conceptualizations of wardship introduced complications for those 
attempting to access the benefits of the expansion of the mid-twentieth century welfare 
state.  
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Chapter 2 
A Heritage of Guilt and an Honest Debt: Wardship, Race, and the Welfare State 
 
Introduction 
“Do you think that complete government control and patronage will give you a 
life in which you do not have to lift a hand?” wrote the author of a 1950 editorial in 
the Los Angeles Herald-Express. “You have such an example in the security given the 
American Indians. For more than 100 years they have been wards of the 
government.”1 According to the editorial, Indian wards were unable to access “the 
common rights of citizenship,” evidenced by their extreme poverty, lack of food and 
clothing, poor education, and subpar housing. The author concluded with a warning: 
“There could be no more damning indictment of the so-called welfare state than the 
standard of living to be found among our government-cared for American Indians.”2 
This editorial’s conflation of wardship with an expansive and oppressive welfare state 
capitalized on racialized assumptions about wardship ingrained in the term’s 
ambiguous definitions. Supposedly, wardship prevented Indians from accessing full 
citizenship, kept them in poverty, and made them dependent upon a federal 
government which, despite extensive regulation, did nothing to safeguard their 
welfare.  
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But, was wardship really such an extreme departure from other forms of more 
established welfare benefits? And, was welfare in general as dangerous as the 
editorial’s author implied? Other citizens received “compensation” and “protection” 
from the state—indeed, some came to expect this as fulfillment of the rights of 
citizenship and something deserved in return for service. Especially after World War 
II, and the institutionalization of the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (GI Bill), the 
public understood that veterans deserved benefits and protected status from the federal 
government.3 State officials defended Indians’ “special status,” especially their tax 
exemptions, by comparing Indians to veterans. For example, in the pamphlet, 
“Answers to Your Questions on American Indians,” the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(BIA) and the Haskell Institute asserted that “Indians do not pay taxes on some 
restricted land or on restricted personal property. In this, Indians are in the same class 
as war veterans in many states.”4 Similarly, Felix Cohen, noted lawyer for many 
Indian tribes and organizations devoted to Indian affairs, argued in 1952, “The fact 
that the United States has certain obligations to its Indians citizens no more removes 
their land from the confines of the State than do the special obligations of the Federal 
Government towards Government bond holders, veterans, members of the armed 
forces…”5 When state agents and others conflated Indian wards’ “special” benefits 
                                                            
3 See Glenn C. Altschuler and Stuart M. Blumin, The GI Bill: A New Deal for Veterans (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 61; and Suzanne Mettler, Soldiers to Citizens: The GI Bill and the 
Making of the Greatest Generation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 10. 
4 United States Indian Service, “Answers to Your Questions on American Indians,” Indians – Pamphlets 
and Reports (1 of 3), Box 43, Philleo Nash White House Files (PNWH Files), Harry S. Truman Library 
(HSTL). Emphasis added. 
5 Felix Cohen, Amicus Brief of Association on American Indian Affairs, Hualapai Tribe of Arizona, 
and San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, State of Arizona v. Oscar R. Ewing, Civil Action No. 2008-
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from the government with those benefits received by “deserving” populations, they 
attempted to fit Indians into mid-century definitions of citizenship tied to the 
expansion of the American welfare state. As mid-century welfare programs became 
“entitlements” for American citizens, some state agents and Indian advocates claimed 
that Native peoples’ receipt of protections and benefits from the state were no different 
from the protections and benefits to which all citizens were entitled. In 1961, the 
Commission on the Rights, Liberties, and Responsibilities of the American Indian 
made this comparison even more explicitly in their report, A Program for Indian 
Citizens. The Commission compared New Deal welfare benefits to the “help” Indians 
received from the government: “The United States has supplied comparable relief 
through Social Security, and aid to the old, the blind, and dependent, crippled children, 
and the unemployed as well as by free distribution of surplus commodities. In other 
respects also, it has been extending to the entire population the kind of help formerly 
given only to Indians.”6  
These conflations of wardship with welfare reveal the term’s continuing 
salience into the mid-twentieth century, and Americans’ increasingly complicated 
understandings of Native peoples’ place in the polity. Was wardship synonymous with 
Indian poverty? Was wardship welfare, or welfare wardship? If veterans’ benefits 
were extended in exchange for service to the country, should wardship be understood 
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in a similar way? More broadly, does the introduction of racial and colonial history 
into discussions of the role of the state in ordinary citizens’ lives alter the 
understanding of what the state “owes” its citizens? This chapter explores these 
questions by putting three debates in conversation with one another: the role of 
wardship in the mid-twentieth century welfare state, conflicts over the relationship 
between the state and Indian tribes, and shifting political rhetoric about race, civil 
rights, and multiculturalism.  
Race played a crucial role in defining the relationship between the welfare 
state and Indian wardship. For many politicians, state agents, members of the media, 
and non-Native citizens, Indian membership in the American polity—as one group of 
many “minority” citizens—was threatened by the racial discrimination they saw in 
wardship. When non-Natives defined wardship as federal oppression of Indian 
citizens, they compared it with civil rights violations. However, many policymakers, 
state agents, and Indians themselves attempted to distinguish Indians’ experiences of 
racial discrimination from their experiences of wardship. Because of the expansion of 
the welfare state, racialized assumptions about wardship took on added significance 
for Indians’ daily lives (especially their eligibility for welfare benefits) and place in 
the American polity as citizens.  
To explore the intersections between wardship, race, and welfare, this chapter 
interrogates both Native and non-Native definitions of wardship in the mid-twentieth 
century. First, I explore conversations and debates about wardship and racial 
discrimination. I unpack policymakers’ attempts to relegate wardship to a 
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bureaucratic, legal status. These attempts were not always successful, because the 
public understood wardship as federal oppression of Indian tribes, precluding 
citizenship. For example, wardship was commonly connected to racialized stereotypes 
of reservation residence. In the second section of this chapter, I examine how 
residence on reservations was conflated with the limitations of wardship. Non-Natives 
were confused about the extent to which Indians were trapped within the confines of 
reservations. Additionally, in the context of post-World War II rhetoric of US 
democracy and equality, Americans’ discussions of Indian wardship were also often 
tinged with the concept of national “guilt.” The third section examines persistent 
allusions to American guilt over the United States’ violent and coercive history with 
Indian tribes. Guilt ultimately reinforced wardship as a racialized category, playing off 
the idea that the nation “owes” Indians protection due to their status as a colonized 
race. While seemingly a recognition and acknowledgement of colonialism, ultimately, 
paying “lip service” to the United States’ violent history with Indians did nothing to 
alleviate what people saw as the negative characteristics of wardship. Lastly, the 
chapter concludes with an assessment of Indians’ rhetoric of wardship. To Native 
tribes and activists, the term signified unfulfilled legal agreements between the United 
States and Native nations, and acted as a precursor to Native demands for sovereignty 
and self-determination. When tribal leaders and Indian activists spoke of wardship, 
they did so in conjunction with their demands for the United States to honor its 
obligations to tribes and govern Native nations by consent. Thus, although racialized 
rhetoric about “oppression” or “protection” infused non-Native debates and arguments 
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about wardship’s definition, to Indians, wardship was neither. Indians could be both 
citizens and wards—indeed, those categorizations represented two completely 
different relationships between Native people and the United States. 
 Thus, this chapter explores the impact of the expansion of the welfare state on 
conflicting definitions of wardship. The incorporation of racialized rhetoric into those 
definitions shaped how Indians experienced Indian policy, welfare policy, and civil 
rights in the United States. In turn, this chapter explores the impact of those 
conflicting definitions of wardship on non-Native opinions about the welfare state 
itself. The correlation between “wardship” and “welfare” held significant meaning for 
Indians’ place within the American polity.  
 
“The line between protection and oppression”: Racial Discrimination and 
Wardship 
 As civil rights became increasingly prevalent in postwar political and cultural 
consciousness, politicians and state agents tried to determine if wardship was an 
example of racial discrimination. In their 1947 report for President Truman’s 
Committee on Civil Rights, “Civil Rights of American Indians,” Milton Steward and 
Rachel Sady first asserted that “Indians stand in a special relationship to the federal 
government, which has been somewhat loosely called ‘wardship.’”7 Steward and Sady 
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had trouble explaining how wardship infringed upon Native peoples’ civil rights and 
shaped their experiences of discrimination. They wrote,  
“Part of this discrimination is the result of prejudice, but an 
overwhelming portion results from a misunderstanding of the nature of 
the Office of Indian Affairs’ responsibility for Indians. Many people 
believe that the government supports most Indians by grants of special 
federal benefits. Actually, the majority of Indians support themselves 
and do not receive direct and continuous federal aid.”8 
 
Although Steward and Sady divided discrimination against Indians into the two 
distinct categories of “prejudice” and “misunderstanding,” these two components were 
inextricably linked together. Non-Native racial discrimination against Indians was 
fundamentally tied to their misconceptions over the government’s responsibility for 
Indian welfare. In other words, non-Natives believed that Native people received 
benefits from the government purely because of their racial identity as Indians. 
Therefore, the legal characteristics of wardship were often misconstrued by non-
Indians as an unusual—and unfair—relationship between the United States and a 
group of its racialized citizens.  
 In the civil rights framework of the mid-twentieth century, for discrimination 
against people of color to end, racialized people needed to be integrated into the 
citizenry and have equal access to social, cultural, and political institutions. If civil 
rights activists’ ultimate objective was first-class citizenship, understanding Indians’ 
experiences of discrimination within a civil rights framework was potentially 
dangerous for tribal autonomy and sovereignty. The trust relationship between the 
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federal government and Native tribes should be considered an arrangement between 
two governments, not as a relationship between the state and one group of citizens. 
Stereotypes and misperceptions of wardship were at the root of racial discrimination 
against Indians. But wardship itself was not racial discrimination. This idea was 
particularly difficult to grasp, especially for politicians and policymakers who 
analogized Indians’ experiences of racial prejudice with African Americans’ 
experiences of civil rights violations.  
 For example, when D’Arcy McNickle testified on behalf of the National 
Congress of American Indians (NCAI) in front of Truman’s Committee on Civil 
Rights in 1954, he was asked, “Does the Indian encounter difficulty in the East 
generally, in securing hotel accommodations and securing the same eating facilities in 
Washington?” McNickle replied, “Not as bad as the Negroes must face, but when the 
Indian Service Headquarters was in Washington—it had been in Chicago during the 
war—an Indian-appearing person often found it very difficult to get an apartment.” 
When asked if these instances reflected Indians being mistaken for blacks, he 
explained further, “I would assume that’s a prejudice against color.”9 Though 
McNickle argued that Indians did face “color prejudice,” he also attempted to separate 
out for the committee the impacts of wardship and the impacts of racial 
discrimination. He stated, “I don’t mean to indicate that Indians are not segregated, as 
I said a while ago, because of skin color. That occurs, but the greatest difficulty that 
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Indians face is that they are segregated because their situation is misunderstood.”10 By 
highlighting Indians’ experiences of segregation McNickle provided a familiar way 
for the Committee to understand discrimination against Native people. However, he 
also called attention to how Native people were subject to misunderstandings of 
wardship in addition to racial discrimination. He stated further, “Indians occupy a 
situation which is not understood, and because of that lack of understanding they 
suffer certain disabilities.”11 In response, one member of the Committee replaced the 
“and” in McNickle’s explanation with “or,” arguing that Indians experiences reflected 
“a lack of understanding, not a matter of prejudice.”12 The Committee tried to separate 
their discussions of wardship from the topic of civil rights violations and treat 
instances of racial discrimination against Indians based on skin color purely on an 
individual case-by-case basis. However, in so doing, they misinterpreted McNickle’s 
explanation, and reified a false distinction between prejudice and misunderstanding. In 
reality, racial prejudice against Indians was rooted in the misunderstanding of their 
relationship with the government.  
 Wardship was also tied to racial discrimination in another way. Some non-
Native people viewed Indians as a group “oppressed” by the federal government based 
on their racial identity. This view was based upon an understanding of the BIA as a 
federal institution which, despite their numerous policies designed to “protect” Native 
people, perpetually kept Indians in a state of dependence which restricted their access 
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to the rights and duties of citizenship. For example, in their 1947 report, Steward and 
Sady argued that one of the reasons that Indians had not yet made the “transition from 
wardship” was because, “The administration sometimes fails to distinguish the line 
between protection and oppression.”13 From a civil rights standpoint, “emancipating” 
Indians from wardship would allow them to become full citizens. In the 1948 
pamphlet, “Answers to Your Questions on American Indians,” the Haskell Institute 
and the BIA attempted to convince Americans that as citizens, Indians were not under 
the thumb of the government. In response to the question, “What is meant by ‘Set the 
Indian free’?” the pamphlet stated, “This statement implies that the Indian is in some 
ways restricted in his person, or is not a citizen. Neither of these things is true.” 
However, in the same paragraph, the authors describe the restriction of sale of Indian 
trust property, arguing, “This policy is designed to protect Indian property from 
exploitation by the unscrupulous.”14 Thus, according to this pamphlet, wardship did 
not impede Indian citizenship, but did imply that the government was responsible for 
protecting Indians from those that would usurp their control of tribal land.  
 In 1946, Commissioner of Indian Affairs William Brophy responded to 
terminationists’ calls to “emancipate Indians from wardship,” by asserting that Indians 
did not need to be “set free.” Brophy explained, “The trusteeship which the 
Government exercises over Indian property is an obligation which the Government 
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accepted from the Indians in order to protect their lands from further alienation.”15 
Brophy also asserted that wardship applied “to the property rather than to the person 
of an Indian,” and thus reasoned that the federal government’s “protection” of Indians 
applied only to land.16 To Brophy and many others in the BIA, Indians’ citizenship, 
and “freedom” was not impeded by wardship. Furthermore, Brophy emphasized that 
the government had “accepted from the Indians” the obligation of protecting their 
property. Brophy conceptualized “protection” as something Native people had desired, 
a request that the government was obliged to fulfill. Other important players in Indian 
affairs shared this ideology. For example, in 1951, former Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs John Collier wrote an article responding to a Washington Post story about Sac 
and Fox Olympic athlete Jim Thorpe which claimed that as an Indian ward, Thorpe 
was not an American citizen. Collier distinguished between the “personal status” of 
citizenship and the legal category of wardship. Wardship, he argued, was “really a 
misnomer,” and “refers to the fact that the United States has treaty obligations to 
render certain services to Indians with respect to the administration of Indians’ trust 
and restricted property.”17 Thus, although popular rhetoric pitched wardship as a 
racialized status that prevented Indian access to full American citizenship, both 
Brophy and Collier interpreted mid-century wardship purely as the fulfillment of the 
government’s obligations to protect Indian land.  
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 To Brophy, Collier, and others in the BIA, separating a Native “person” from 
their “property” seemingly resolved the tension between protection and oppression 
and between wardship and racial discrimination. However, in the minds of politicians, 
state agents, and the public, this was nearly impossible. Land ownership was the 
source of nearly all historical problems between the United States and members of 
Native nations. Societal racialization of Native people was based on assumptions 
about Indian property. Was it truly possible to separate “citizenship” status from 
“wardship” status using land as the point of division? As the next section 
demonstrates, reservations were a fundamental method of Indian racialization because 
they called into question the receipt of “special” federal benefits for Indians in an age 
of multicultural equality. The next section will unpack how reservations shaped 
definitions of wardship, and the role of reservations in defining Native peoples’ 
membership within the US polity. 
 
“An anomaly of segregation and dependency”: Indian Wardship and Reservation 
Land 
 From the mid-nineteenth century forward, one of the most common physical, 
visual, and epistemological tropes of “Indianness” was reservation residence. In the 
nineteenth and early- twentieth centuries, reservations acted as bounded spaces within 
which state agents could track and identify each Indian for the purposes of 
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“education,” administrative matters, and legal control.18 After the 1887 Dawes Act, 
Indian policymakers attempted to allot reservations for use by individual nuclear 
family units. However, in their simultaneous efforts to dissolve reservations and 
“protect” Indian land from sale to unscrupulous whites, state agents increased their 
systems of control and management of individual Indians, instituting systems to judge 
when an Indian was “ready” to take control of allotted land and assume the rights and 
responsibilities of American citizenship.19 Thus, nineteenth-century reservations acted 
simultaneously as tools for state agents to “oppress” and “protect” Indians, seemingly 
created as much to keep Indians in as they were to keep others out. As the twentieth 
century progressed, reservations continued to symbolize to non-Natives how different 
Indians were from other citizens, whether that difference demanded increased control 
over their “lack of civilization,” or protection from the outside world. Ultimately, as 
Barbara Welke argues, reservations served to relegate Indians outside of the “borders 
of belonging” in the American polity.20 
 Additionally, reservations represented a demarcation of federal jurisdiction that 
could not be penetrated by individual state governments, preventing Indians from fully 
assuming the responsibilities of the individual state citizenry. For example, during a 
protracted legal battle between Indian tribes in Arizona and the state’s Board of Public 
Welfare over whether Indians were eligible for state welfare funds under the Social 
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Security Act, Arizona newspapers equated wardship with the reservation system. In 
1953, the Phoenix Gazette argued, “The Indian problem is essentially a federal one. It 
can’t be solved at the state level until the reservation system is abandoned.”21 
Similarly, the Arizona Republic published an article that same year which contended, 
“This state’s belief is that the privileges of citizenship must await the responsibilities. 
As long as federal wardship stands in the way of state tax revenue and jurisdiction 
with respect to the reservation, state payments of benefits should at the most be only 
nominal.”22 Thus, to many Arizonans, reservations represented a dividing line between 
federal wardship and state citizenship which needed to be dissolved for Indians to 
assume the benefits of full citizenship, such as receipt of welfare benefits.  
 To state and local governments, the reservation system symbolized Indian 
separation from the rest of the state and demonstrated that Indians were out of the 
reach of state law enforcement and tax collection. As the 1961 United States 
Commission on Civil Rights report, Justice, established, “Some States resent the fact 
that while on a reservation, Indians are beyond the reach of State law; this resentment 
is occasionally expressed in attempts at ‘retaliation.’”23 Certain states reasoned that 
because Indians were removed from the responsibilities of state citizenship in ways 
other citizens were not (through legal jurisdiction and exemption from property taxes) 
a state did not have the obligation to “provide the same measure of care to Indians that 
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it does to its other citizens.”24 Arizona even made a concentrated effort to remove 
certain rights associated with citizenship from Indians living on reservations. In 
response to a 1959 case where the Supreme Court ruled that the state had no 
jurisdiction over a transaction which had occurred on the Navajo reservation, “the 
State sought to remove all polling places from the reservation.”25 In New Mexico, 
state agents argued that since the Navajo Nation was held to be a “separate tribal 
nation and not subject to criminal laws or other laws of our State,” “votes cast by 
Indians within the reservation are invalid because cast outside the State.”26 Thus, to 
particular states, Indians on reservations were the responsibility of the federal 
government, and as a result, restricted from the rights of state citizenship.  
Although individual states like Arizona and New Mexico rationalized that 
Indians’ legal status as wards justified restricting Native peoples’ citizenship within 
the states, state officials also judged Indians on reservations based on race. 
Reservation residence symbolized Indians’ “uncivilized” nature and their supposed 
unassimilability. Dating back to the mid-nineteenth century, many Native people 
periodically left and returned and returned to reservations, taking advantage of 
familial, economic, political, and cultural “opportunities for Indian mobility.”27 As 
Philip Deloria argues, this lead to a new non-Native fear of “outbreak.” “Outbreak was 
more rebellion than war,” Deloria writes, “and more intimately concerned with the 
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extent to which Indians had or had not been assimilated or forcibly incorporated into 
American civil society.”28 If Indians left reservations, and joined non-Native society, 
did they cease to be Indian? As was demonstrated through court cases like Elk v. 
Wilkins, no. Even into the twentieth century, Bethany Berger writes that, “Despite the 
advocacy of assimilation, Indians leaving reservations to join the broader community 
often found themselves shut out of public and social institutions.”29 Thus, because 
reservations were places where large groups of racialized Indians lived, reservations 
themselves became symbols of racialized Indian wardship. For example, in 1961, the 
authors of the Commission on Civil Rights report, Justice, separated the Indian “racial 
minority” into three groups: reservation, nonreservation, and off reservation.30 They 
noted that discrimination affected all these groups, by their racialized identity as 
Indians. Reservations acted as racialized spaces which divided Indians into “degrees” 
of wardship. The racialized implications of former reservation residence followed any 
Indian who left, marking him or her with the status of wardship, even if he or she was 
removed from tribal property.31  
In the mid-twentieth century, state agents frequently referred to reservations as 
barriers to Indians’ assumption of full citizenship. In these conversations and conflicts, 
reservations acted as a symbol of either federal wardship and dependence, or 
dangerous incubators of Indian nationalism and tribal sovereignty. Both dependence 
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on the federal government and assertions of Native nationalism contradicted idealized 
notions of multicultural, democratic postwar American citizenship. Native peoples’ 
American citizenship was seemingly limited by their “dual citizenship” in the United 
States and their respective tribal nations. For example, Thomas Shiya, an Indian 
Affairs consultant in Arizona, delivered a speech to the Phoenix Area Land Operations 
Conference of the BIA in 1955, where he described reservations’ limitations on 
Indians. Shiya argued, “In isolating the Indian on reservations and in protecting his 
land on a tribal basis, we denied him the opportunity to find his rightful place in our 
competitive society.”32 Shiya’s main critique was of the “artificial barriers between 
Indian tribes and the world surrounding them,” which contributed to a “great 
contradiction of dual citizenship.”33 Indians needed to choose: “either a mutual 
working toward full fledged citizenship with his fellow American or else full fledged 
tribal citizenship on his reservation ‘island.’”34 For Shiya, reservations represented 
both physical and ideological isolation from American citizenship.  
 However, despite Shiya’s depiction of reservations as “islands,” reservations 
were not independent, fully functioning, national entities with built-in infrastructures. 
The federal government was still quite enmeshed in reservation life. Furthermore, 
although states were restricted from reservations in some areas, government officials 
understood that “Indians who remain wards of the Federal Government are not in a 
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water-tight compartment into which State laws and functions do not penetrate.”35 
Lawyers arguing on behalf of Arizona Indians who wanted access to Social Security 
benefits claimed that “no Indian reservation in Arizona is self-sufficient and no 
resident of any such reservation can avoid travelling beyond its borders, nor can he 
escape ordinary State cigarette, gasoline, sales or use taxes.”36 Thus, to demand 
Indians separate their tribal membership, federal wardship, and state citizenship was 
unnecessarily complicated. Although Native nations understood themselves to be 
sovereign, it was impossible to dissolve all connections with surrounding state 
governments and live independently on reservations.  
 In legal and policy terms, wardship was linked to reservation land. In 1946, 
William Brophy conceptualized wardship as a status purely relating to tribal property, 
not individual Indian personhood.37 Referencing Chief Justice John Marshall’s 1831 
Supreme Court decision, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Brophy argued, “Note, however 
that it was the various tribes and not the individual Indians which occupied a position 
similar to that of a ward.”38 He stated further that an Indian “is free to live and work 
wherever he may choose, subject only to the restrictions that apply to all of us.”39 
However, common political and media portrayals of reservations as “prisons” which 
                                                            
35 Department of the Interior, Office of the Solicitor, “The Applicability of the Social Security Act to 
the Indians,” 1936, p.4-5, Social Security Legislation Correspondence, Box 168, Colorado River 
Agency, Central Classified Files, RG 75, NARA – Pacific Region (R). 
36 Felix Cohen, Amicus Brief of Association on American Indian Affairs, Hualapai Tribe of Arizona, 
and San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, State of Arizona v. Oscar R. Ewing, Civil Action No. 2008-
52, 11 (United States District Court for District of Columbia 1952), Folder 20: Arizona v. Ewing, Oscar 
R. (Federal Social Security) 1952, Box 328, AAIA Papers, MML. 
37 William Brophy, “Story of the Indian Service,” 1946, p.1, Correspondence with Institutions, 
Organizations, Etc. – National Congress of American Indians, Box 12, RG 220, HSTL. 
38 Ibid., 1. 
39 Ibid., 2. 
 119 
held Indians back from full integration and assimilation into the American polity 
obscured complicated histories of individual tribal treaties and removal. In the 
pamphlet, “Answers to Your Questions on American Indians,” one of the key 
questions listed was “Are Indians still kept on reservations?” The Haskell Institute and 
the BIA’s answer to this question stressed that “The Indians usually own the 
reservation lands, either individually or as tribal groups. They are free to leave or 
return to the reservations whenever they wish.”40 In 1947, Senator Hugh Butler of 
Nebraska proposed a bill to “free” Indians from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, arguing 
that despite the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act, “thousands of Indians, particularly those 
living upon reservations, have never been emancipated.” He explained further, “They 
are restricted in property rights. They live under conditions of racial segregation. 
They are subject to limitation and exemption because they are Indians.”41 Similarly, 
when the Commission on the Rights, Liberties, and Responsibilities of the American 
Indian performed research for their report in 1959, they found that “More than one 
American has asked whether an Indian can leave the reservation at will,” and that 
many members of Congress also believed that “Indians suffered far more restraints 
than they do.”42 Likewise, in a 1950 letter to Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dillon 
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Myer, the American Missionary Association argued that the reservation system was an 
“anomaly of segregation and dependency.”43 In the mid-century, when many 
residential areas, public services, and private businesses were segregated and restricted 
on the basis of race, it is not completely shocking that the public believed reservations 
to be systems of segregation. However, Indians’ experiences of “segregation” were 
viewed differently than segregation in the Jim Crow South. As the American 
Missionary Association argued, Indians were not only supposedly segregated, they 
were also seemingly kept dependent upon the government. Thus, in the minds of non-
Native Americans, reservations meant that Indians were controlled by the federal 
government.  
 To the mid-twentieth century American public, reservations symbolized Indian 
racial difference and inability to integrate. Racial stereotypes of Indian 
“backwardness” and romanticized primitivity were tied to non-Native impressions of 
reservations as spaces of physical and symbolic limitations for Native people. If 
Indians could not “leave” the reservation, both literally and figuratively, they could 
not achieve full citizenship. Reservations were continually positioned as the opposite 
of the civilized space of the “white man’s world.” Moreover, both governmental and 
non-governmental agents argued that as a system, wardship kept Native people 
exclusively on reservations and prevented them from accessing full citizenship. For 
example, in 1943, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs published a partial report of 
a survey of “conditions among the Indians of the United States.” The committee 
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argued that keeping Indian land in trust limited their freedom, asserting that “There is 
no more justice in tying an Indian to a piece of land than there would be in selecting a 
group of whites or other racial group for such forced tenantry and handicap in freedom 
of movement.”44 The understanding that Indians were “tied” to reservation land 
unjustly was also expressed by those outside of Congress. In 1946, the American 
Indian Defense Association (AIDA) submitted a report on “the plight of the Navajo 
Indians” which was included in the record of Senate Committee on Indian Affairs 
hearings on S. J. Res. 79, a bill establishing a commission to study tribal claims 
against the United States and the administration of Indian Affairs. AIDA stressed that 
“50,000 human beings born and reared on this continent from time immemorial” were 
“still segregated, still within the so-called reservations.” AIDA claimed, “No classes 
of other citizens are thus as segregated as are the American Indians,” adding, “This is 
certainly not America.”45 Not only did “reservation life destroy independence,” but, as 
AIDA claimed, “reservation Indians are made dependents and kept so.”46 Thus, Native 
people were viewed as a racial group forcibly set apart from the rest of the American 
citizenry, and as a result, kept dependent upon the government.  
 However, to some critics of wardship in the West, because of their link to the 
federal government, reservations purportedly absolved Indians from performing the 
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duties of full citizenship, and gave them a privileged status as compared to non-Indian 
citizens. For example, in 1953, the Hualapai and San Carlos Apache Tribes of Arizona 
filed a lawsuit against Arizona over the state’s refusal to extend benefits to disabled 
Indian citizens under the Social Security Act. Kent Blake, counsel for the State of 
Arizona, argued that Indians on reservations were not eligible for benefits because 
they were wards. Specifically, he claimed that “reservation Indians” in Arizona had 
enjoyed a “peculiar and privileged status…over the past many years.” He contended, 
“Reservation Indians…are maintained on lands that are held in trust for them by the 
Federal Government. Their hospitals, their schools, and their police protection are all 
provided for them by the Federal Government.”47 Significantly, Blake’s choices of 
“maintained” and “provided” depicted the ward/guardian relationship as special 
treatment, as opposed to framing federal “protection” as something granted in 
exchange for Indian land. Blake continued, “as to such Indians as are living off the 
reservation, as to such Indians as are living in the communities, that are paying taxes, 
that have become emancipated and form part of the regular communities in the State 
of Arizona, if those Indians are permanently and totally disabled, we are not 
attempting to exclude those Indians.”48 However, the “treatment that has been given 
the reservation Indians in the past by the Federal Government” meant that disabled 
Native people living on reservation land would be excluded from welfare benefits in 
the state of Arizona.49 There is a sense in Blake’s argument that by virtue of their 
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relationship with the federal government, Indians had benefited in ways that other 
non-Native citizens of Arizona had not—such as Indians’ trust land being exempt 
from state property taxes. In this sense, reservations were a representation of how 
Indians received “special treatment” from the federal government as a racial group.  
To local county and state officials, reservation land was often understood to be 
a privilege. This impression could prevent needy Indians from accessing welfare 
benefits. For example, in her attempt to determine whether Mae Harris, a resident of 
the Pima Indian Agency, was eligible for public welfare, Esther Koontz of the Yavapai 
County Board of Public Welfare in Prescott, Arizona wrote to Pima Superintendent A. 
E. Robinson, “You advised us that our client has ten acres of irrigable land valued at 
$1000 and held in trust by the Federal Government. We are interested in knowing if 
Mrs. Harris may sell this land if she wishes to do so.”50 Koontz was most likely 
attempting to determine Harris’ total wealth, and was unable to determine whether 
trust land should be included. Robinson responded, “The land of Mae M. Harris is not 
transferrable.” Furthermore, he continued, “This land was evaluated arbitrarily. As 
there is no way to sell the land for the $100 per acre valuation was made by 
comparison to off-reservation land.”51 Reservation land represented a conundrum for 
welfare officials like Koontz. Did Harris “own” those 10 acres if she technically was 
unable to sell them? Were they worth as much as off-reservation land, and did it even 
matter, considering that Harris could not transfer the land to a non-Indian person? 
                                                            
50 Koontz to Robinson, 1951, Welfare – 1949-1951 Correspondence of James A. Helm, Box 149, Pima 
Indian Agency Records Relating to Welfare, RG 75, NARA – Pacific Region (R). 
51 Robinson to Koontz, 1951, Welfare – 1949-1951 Correspondence of James A. Helm, Box 149, Pima 
Indian Agency Records Relating to Welfare, RG 75, NARA – Pacific Region (R). 
 124 
Furthermore, even though she had ten acres of trust land, Harris was clearly in need of 
financial assistance from the state. By casting Harris’ land as an asset that might be 
sold, Koontz recast her situation as less dire because of her racial identity. Harris was 
sitting on a potential $1000, but, of course, that valuable land was only available to her 
because she was an Indian. Even though Harris was poor enough to apply for public 
assistance, to Koontz and others at the Yavapai County Board of Public Welfare, 
Harris’ land must have represented a privilege that disrupted the narrative of racialized 
poverty and welfare dependency.  
 However, the idea that reservations were the only thing standing in the way of 
Indians’ abilities to assume full citizenship benefits was overly simplistic. Racially 
motivated discrimination and prejudice persisted alongside proposals to “terminate” 
federal wardship, which called for the states to integrate Indian people into the 
infrastructure of local communities. In Justice, the United States Commission on Civil 
Rights noted that, “Often when the Federal Government has terminated its supervision 
of an Indian tribe and ceded jurisdiction to a State, the State has been slow to assume 
its responsibilities.”52 For example, “the city commission of Chamberlain, a small 
community in South Dakota 60 miles from a reservation, passed a resolution in 1954 
stating that its citizens were ‘opposed to having the city being made an Indian town 
and are opposed to having Indians in our schools or living in unsanitary conditions 
about the city.’”53 Thus, while the reservation provided a visible marker of delineation 
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between Indian peoples’ needs and state government resources, even when dissolved, 
state and local governments and communities retained their desire to separate 
themselves from Indians. Though it was epitomized and symbolized by reservation 
residence, wardship persisted as a racial ideology outside of reservation boundaries.   
 
Wardship as a “Heritage of Guilt” 
 In 1928, the experts of the Meriam Commission published The Problem of 
Indian Administration, better known as the “Meriam Report.” This study of Indian life 
and welfare publicized widespread poverty on Indian reservations and claimed that 
governmental policies of allotment and rationing had failed to turn Indians into self-
sufficient members of the American polity.54 John Collier drew upon public 
knowledge of the Meriam Report’s findings in a 1939 speech, asserting the 
Commission exposed a level of Native poverty which “brought to the American public 
a profound sense of shock.” To Collier, American democratic efforts to correct the 
economic disparity and health problems associated with poverty on Indian 
reservations were “a matter of national honor and national humanity.”55 Collier’s 
speech represented a commonly held perception about Indians in the mid-twentieth 
century: the US government had failed Native people, and something needed to be 
done to help them. Helping Indians would assuage non-Native guilt over the control 
                                                            
54 Elmer R. Rusco, A Fateful Time: The Background and Legislative History of the Indian 
Reorganization Act (Reno; Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press, 2000), 75. 
55 John Collier, “America's Handling of It's Indigenous Indian Minority,” 1939, Series IV: Addresses 
and Writings, Part II: 1933-1945, John Collier Papers (University Microfilms International, Reel 32), 
Arizona State University Law Library. 
 126 
and violence the federal government used to enforce Indian policies. References to 
national guilt and conscience are speckled throughout state documents in the mid-
twentieth century. For example, in his ruling in the 1953 case, Arizona v. Hobby, US 
District Judge Henry Schweinhaut argued that the state of Arizona should extend 
payment of benefits to disabled Indians under the Social Security Act, because it was a 
matter of “conscience.” Schweinhaut stated, “Sure, my conscience hurts; that is why I 
am doing certain things for them. But yours ought to hurt, too. So we either are in this 
together for them as well as the other people, or we are not in it at all.”56 Judge 
Schweinhaut simultaneously equated Indians with other needy citizens and extended 
benefits to Indians in order to soften his conscience, one that all Americans “ought” to 
have. Guilt and conscience played a part in defining Indians’ relationship, not only 
with state and federal governments, but with the American public.  
 Was the “national humanity” and hurt “conscience” which Collier and 
Schweinhaut referenced motivated by a genuine recognition of US colonialism? 
Scholarship in critical race theory on the United States’ postwar construction of its 
image as a multicultural, multi-racial democracy points to more nuanced motives for 
associating Indians with issues of guilt and conscience. For example, Takashi Fujitani 
has argued that during World War II, leaders in the United States switched from more 
overt displays of racism to a “polite racism.” The United States “needed to act as if it 
did not countenance racism,” because, as Fujitani writes in the context of Japanese 
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internment, “the whole world was watching.”57 Mary Dudziak has made similar claims 
about government officials’ worry that the 1950s Southern civil rights struggle would 
affect United States’ international prestige. She argues that in the postwar period, 
“civil rights reform came to be seen as crucial to U.S. foreign relations.”58 References 
to guilt and conscience and Indians should be considered alongside these other 
developments in United States race relations. Calls to extend benefits to Indians and/or 
recognize poverty on Indian reservations represented a desire to “solve” the “Indian 
problem,” so that the United States’ image could align more effectively with its 
celebratory rhetoric.  
 For example, when he signed the bill creating the 1946 Indian Claims 
Commission (ICC), President Truman stated that through the ICC, the United States 
was “ready…to correct any mistakes we have made.”59 The ICC was depicted as the 
“legal conscience” of the nation, an opportunity to settle outstanding land claims 
Indian nations had with the United States.60 Scholars of Indian law and policy have 
noted that for all the celebratory rhetoric surrounding the ICC, it was challenged by 
Indians and others for “creating additional obstacles for full legal vindication of tribal 
land rights.”61 President Truman hoped that settling Indian claims through the ICC 
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would “encourage Indians to find community in the nation instead of the tribe.”62 
Thus, the ICC functioned as a tool of termination. After the United States resolved 
outstanding disputes and, in many cases, literally “paid back” tribes for the loss of 
their land,63 Indians could supposedly incorporate themselves into the American polity 
and essentially “move on” from their tribe. Politicians and policymakers conceived of 
the ICC as another path for Indians to move from wardship to individual racialized 
citizenship.   
While the ICC purported to right the wrongs of the past at the federal level, 
those feelings and expressions of “conscience” did not necessarily trickle downward 
into local and state governments, especially those who were charged with taking on 
the responsibility of caring for Indian tribes whose relationships with the BIA had 
been terminated. For example, during the 1954 hearings in Reno, Nevada conducted 
by the Subcommittees of the Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs over the 
proposal to terminate Nevada Indians, Congressman John Rhodes (R-Arizona) asked 
Mayor DeKinder of Lovelock, Nevada, “You said they aren’t ready [for termination]. 
When do they become ready? How do we make them ready?” DeKinder responded, 
“That is naturally up to them, whenever they get ready.” When Congressman Rhodes 
pressed him further, asking, “You don’t feel the city of Lovelock has any 
responsibility to get them ready?” DeKinder simply said, “Not at this time.”64 Thus, to 
                                                            
62 Kenneth R. Philp, Termination Revisited: American Indians on the Trail to Self-Determination, 1933-
1953 (Lincoln; London: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 29. 
63 However, Shattuck and Norgren note that the cost of pursuing a claim could be extremely expensive, 
which undermined the amount a tribe received if they won. See Partial Justice, 147. 
64 Termination of Federal Supervision Over Certain Tribes of Indians: Joint Hearing on H.R. 7552, 
Part 10, Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83rd Cong. 1240 
 129 
state and local governments who saw Indian “wards” as added burdens on their 
resources and infrastructure, the rhetoric of conscience and responsibility for Indians 
did not necessarily outweigh racialized resistance to integrating Indians into local 
communities.  
 Indeed, some argued that guilt impeded Indians’ ability to incorporate 
themselves into the polity as full, self-sufficient citizens and kept Indian wards in 
continual “dependency” upon the federal government. In his 1944 article for the 
Association on American Indian Affairs (AAIA) publication, The American Indian, 
“The American Indian as a Minority Group Problem,” Scudder Mekeel wrote, 
“Regardless of class or region, our collective guilt as a Nation because of our past 
treatment of the Indian has seriously prevented an objective attitude toward him. Such 
guilt reinforces a sentimental viewpoint and helps maintain a sizeable budget for the 
Office of Indian Affairs in Congress, but it does not lead to a solution of the 
fundamental problems involved.”65 According to Mekeel, because of collective guilt, 
the federal government continued to spend a considerable amount of money on 
Indians, but failed to solve real problems. To some conservative politicians, Indian 
wardship exemplified the worst use of the expenditure of federal funds, because it 
perpetuated a state of dependence and discourage Indian “responsibility.” For 
example, in 1950, Senator Hugh Butler of Nebraska inserted into the Congressional 
Record the full text of a speech given by Dean Russell at a Montana “convention on 
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individual liberty.” After comparing the “bondage of a welfare state” with the bondage 
of slavery, Russell asserted while individual responsibility had been granted to freed 
slaves, it had never been extended to Indians. He claimed, “Now compare the 
remarkable progress of those former slaves to the lack of progress of the American 
Indians who were made wards of the Government; who were given State-guaranteed 
‘security’ instead of freedom with responsibility.”66 In Russell’s view, the 
government’s extension of benefits had created a total state of dependence for Indian 
wards. “It has been claimed that many thousands of Indians will actually die of 
starvation unless the Government feeds them,” he claimed. “If this is true, why is it 
so?”67  
 Russell’s logic extended past that Montana convention to state governments. In 
1961, the United States Commission on Civil Rights reported in Justice that certain 
states refused to extend general assistance programs to Indians because they contended 
that, since Indians are “Federal ‘wards,’” “the plight of the Indian is largely of the 
Federal Government’s own making.”68 Conservative politicians and policymakers saw 
unchecked dependency on the federal government as dangerous, not only for Indians, 
but for the whole nation. Some policymakers and state officials saw Indians as victims 
of an all-powerful federal welfare state, an example of what could happen if the 
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welfare state continued to expand.69 Russell expressed this viewpoint in his 1950 
speech, stating bluntly: “If we free Americans continue to turn to Government for our 
security, we, too, will surely become dependent wards instead of responsible 
citizens…Instead of calico and blankets, we may be promised a hundred dollars every 
month. But since the principle is the same in both cases, the results will also 
eventually be the same.”70 Similarly, in a 1956 article, Oklahoma teacher Essie 
Skillern wrote, “Some say the present unfortunate plight of the Indian American is 
indicative of what will happen in the United States of tomorrow if present trends 
toward an all-powerful welfare government continue, and each citizen becomes a 
‘ward of the government.’ This reason alone, critics claim, is enough to warrant 
termination of federal supervision and control of the red man.”71 Wardship was 
equated with a large, unwieldy, expensive, and unproductive welfare state, directed by 
feelings of guilt rather than rooted in goals of economic self-sufficiency for Native 
men and women.  
 At the same time, Skillern alluded to the legitimacy of national guilt by urging 
the public to recognize the wrongs committed against Indians. Skillern wrote, “Once 
when an Indian was asked why his people are so willing to join the armed forces of 
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our country, he replied, ‘Why this country was ours before it was yours.’”72 To 
Skillern, it was surprising that Indians were willing to enlist in the armed forces to 
defend a nation which had treated them poorly. Anthropologist L.S. Cressman also 
asserted that the United States government had done Indians harm. In his report of 
“background information” compiled for the 1956 Commission on the Rights and 
Liberties of the American Indian, Cressman asserted that the allotment system had 
“destroyed the economic integrity of the Indian Estate, and deprived the Indian of 
normal economic and human activity.”73 However, Skillern’s and Cressman’s 
recognition of ill-treatment did not mean that either questioned American ownership 
of Indian land. Rather, guilt coexisted uneasily alongside a narrative of the United 
States’ “inheritance” of Indian land. Skillern wrote, “Do we ever stop to think that the 
very land of America was contributed to the white man by the Indian? Even the trails 
and paths which white men have converted into roads and great highways were first 
made by Indians.”74 Skillern simultaneously downplayed the violence inherent in the 
United States’ history with Indian nations—Native people simply “contributed” their 
land to white settlers—and sanctioned a narrative of America’s predestined occupation 
of Indian land. However, in doing so, she tapped into a sense of collective national 
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guilt—the idea that because Indians had contributed their land to the United States, the 
American people owed them something in return.  
 Be that as it may, in the context of mid-century conversations about welfare 
dependency and responsibility, guilt was also viewed as a way of restricting individual 
Indians from breaking free of wardship. For example, Cressman emphasized that the 
BIA had instituted a “standing offer” to “work constructively with any tribe which 
wishes to assume either full control or a greater degree of control over its own 
affairs.”75 Thus, the state of Indian poverty and dependency could not be blamed 
solely on the extensive role of the federal government in Native peoples’ lives. 
Skillern wrote, “many Americans have a kindly attitude toward Indians. They are 
prepared to help him on occasion by appropriations in Congress to avert starvation, by 
gifts to missions, and by approving bills to end federal wardship. As a matter of fact, 
the Indians are helped in almost every way except in a way designed to help them help 
themselves.”76 Skillern claimed that because both Indians and the American people 
had become so accustomed to the federal government “helping” Native people, Native 
people themselves had failed to capitalize on opportunities presented by the 
government to encourage “responsibility” and “self-sufficiency.” Indeed, Skillern 
quoted Commissioner of Indian Affairs Glenn Emmons’ 1956 speech, where he stated 
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that he “wanted to get the government out of the business of playing nursemaid to its 
present Indian wards.”77 Utilizing the same rhetoric other conservative politicians used 
to describe racialized welfare recipients, advocates of termination like Emmons, 
Cressman, and Skillern claimed that guilt impeded the end of Indian wardship. 
Wardship was antithetical to postwar understandings of welfare as a temporary 
rehabilitation of poverty generated by individual problems.78 Because wardship 
appeared to be a federal welfare program with no end in sight, it was viewed as 
particularly dangerous for Indians as well as for other Americans.  
Indians straddled a difficult line between conceptualizations of “deserving” 
and “undeserving” poor. Both Cressman and Skillern grappled with an uncomfortable 
understanding in their articles—Indians were different. They had experienced extreme 
violence, loss of land, disease, and trauma at the hands of the United States. By 
framing their perpetual dependence as the result of federal incompetency, Cressman 
and Skillern acknowledged Indians’ unique experiences and at the same time 
undermined the legal complexities of wardship. In other instances, policymakers 
alluded to Indians’ weight on the conscience of ordinary Americans, but 
simultaneously downplayed that guilt. For example, in his 1954 speech at the annual 
meeting of the AAIA, Glenn Emmons contended that, “Most reservation families are 
grubbing along” below “acceptable American standards,” and “far too many are 
merely subsisting in rural slums under conditions which periodically shock the 
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conscience of the Nation.”79 Emmons pointed to the recurring “shock” of Indian 
poverty to support his goals for Native assimilation. Similarly, in a 1958 policy paper 
on termination, S. Lyman Tyler revealingly asserted, “Always the desire of the United 
States has been that the Indian would become more like us, that is like the 
predominant culture, or, failing this, that he would at least become enough like us so 
that he could live among us without giving us a guilty conscience.”80 Thus, Native 
assimilation into “acceptable American standards” of living would both solve Indian 
dependency and assuage pesky, persistent non-Native guilt.  
Equating wardship with “welfare” introduced an additional host of racialized 
assumptions about welfare dependence and fears of an expansive welfare state into 
conversations about the historical relationship between the United States and Indian 
tribes. While serving as treasurer and consultant to the executive director of the NCAI, 
Ruth Muskrat Bronson illustrated the effects of mixing guilt and assumptions about 
race and dependency quite clearly in an essay entitled “Outreach.” It is worth quoting 
at length: 
“The average American is noted for his sympathy for the underdog. He 
is also apt to have romantic sentiment for the American Indian. These 
two admirable qualities, combined with a vague sense of guilt for 
having ousted the original inhabitant of a naturally rich land because of 
his own need for a new world, a heritage of guilt, too, for the long and 
shameful history of broken treaties with those he dispossessed, conspire 
to foster impulsive action, based on a desire to make amends but 
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founded on superficial or inaccurate knowledge rather than on 
thoughtful study or familiarity with fact and reality. This is serious, 
indeed, for the Indian since it jeopardizes his very existence and 
unquestionably would lead to his eventual—literal—extinction.”81  
 
Terminationist policymakers understood the legal treaties and agreements Indians had 
with the federal government as federal “over-protection” of Indian citizens, motivated 
by a sense of guilt. That guilt, though real, was mistakenly understood to be a poor 
rationale for continuing an expansive welfare policy through wardship. Thus, although 
the American “heritage of guilt” implied at least some “lip service” paid to Indians’ 
experiences of historical violence, it equated neither to a formal acknowledgment of 
settler colonialism, nor to fulfillment of individual treaty stipulations. In fact, to 
terminationists, American guilt and conscience impeded Indian integration and stalled 
the release of federal trust restrictions on Indian land. As Bronson underscored, this 
could have a dire effect on Indian tribes.  
 
 “Governing only by consent”: Native Conceptualizations of Wardship and 
Sovereignty 
To non-Natives, Indians’ American citizenship was constrained by Indians’ 
unassimilability and/or need for protection. However, Indians did not understand their 
place in the US citizenry in binary terms, as either citizens or wards. As Philip Deloria 
argues, in the twentieth century, Indians spent much time “fighting off the colonizing 
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ways the United States sought to include them, and demanding a very particular kind 
of inclusion, one based on unique political status.”82 To articulate the political status 
they sought, Indians made use of the constructs of wardship and citizenship to inhabit 
what Kevin Bruyneel has termed the “third space of sovereignty.” Bruyneel argues 
that indigenous peoples have resisted the imposition of American colonialism by 
carving out a political space “existing on the boundaries,” “not inside or outside of the 
American political system.”83 Thus, the utilization of the rhetoric of wardship and 
citizenship by Indians in the mid-twentieth century does not represent Native 
capitulation to non-Native formulations of Indian racial difference. On the contrary, in 
mid-century political conversations and debates over Indian policy, Native peoples’ 
use of “wardship” preceded articulations of tribal sovereignty and self-determination 
which became more common in the 1960s and 1970s.  
 At the 1961 American Indian Chicago Conference, Indian activists used the 
term “sovereignty” for the first time. Bruyneel argues that this conference marked the 
demand for a “very distinct form of equality,” which was neither explicitly a civil 
rights framework nor a 1960s-1970s third world decolonization framework.84 As 
Bruyneel asserts, “indigenous tribes have expressed, argued for, and fought for their 
inherent sovereignty as independent cultural and political entities for centuries.”85 The 
use of the concepts of wardship and citizenship exemplify those fights for sovereignty, 
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84 Ibid., 128. 
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because they functioned as ways of reminding the federal government of its 
obligations towards Native nations. Dissolving the BIA and integrating Indians into 
the US polity solely as “citizens,” would mean the dissolution of tribal sovereignty. In 
other words, to articulate self-determination and control over their cultural, political, 
and economic affairs, Indians needed to retain the construction of “wardship” in some 
form. Thus, far from symbolizing continued “dependency,” for Indians, wardship was 
a tool to assert ownership over their political place within both the United States and 
their distinct tribal nations. Recognition of the political relationship between the 
federal government and Native tribes did not disqualify Indians’ individual 
citizenship. While termination advocates viewed wardship as an inadequate stepping 
stone to full American citizenship, to many Indians, wardship signaled something 
different: a distinct claim to land, acknowledgment of colonialism, and a promise that 
the government would continue to pay its debt to Indian people.  
 In their work representing Indian interests in legislation and policy, the NCAI 
argued that equating wardship with “special treatment” granted based on race was 
incorrect. In 1949, the NCAI asserted, “Whenever Indian appropriations come before 
Congress the fires of racial antagonism are ignited by complaints that the Indians want 
special treatment. The charge is not true. Indian appropriations are not favoritism. 
They are in payment of an honest debt of our government.”86 The NCAI blamed the 
“considerable amount of existing confusion” on the term “ward,” which, they claimed, 
                                                            
86 Letter from James Curry to Ruth Bronson, 1949, Indian Legislation 1947-49 Proposed Legislation-
Senatorial, Box 28, Senatorial Records, Papers of J. Howard McGrath, HSTL. 
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had been “loosely used.”87 The NCAI argued that because Indians had provided land 
to the US, the government was still indebted to them. Thus, although the NCAI 
acknowledged that the terminology of wardship caused confusion, they emphasized 
that because of the history of American colonialism and agreements made between 
Indians and the US government in the past, Indian appropriations could be considered 
part of the United States’ payment of their “honest debt.” In her essay, “Outreach,” 
Ruth Muskrat Bronson of the NCAI defined this exchange of wardship for land 
further, stating that Indians did indeed have “special privileges,” due to the nature of 
trusteeship: “In the not so distant past the Indians agreed to end wars and cede lands to 
white settlers in exchange for certain defined, inalienable, lands and specified services 
which the Indians could not provide for themselves.”88 Bronson and the NCAI 
affirmed wardship as an ongoing relationship sustained by the debt of the United 
States government to Native tribes.   
 Crucially, the NCAI’s conceptualization of wardship as payment of an honest 
debt was distinct from non-Native understandings of “guilt” and “conscience.” Unlike 
non-Native insistence that the ICC would supposedly “resolve” outstanding Indian 
claims against the US government, Native people viewed wardship as a relationship 
necessitating the continual responsibility of the American government. For example, 
in his 1951 op-ed in The Washington Post, Paiute Avery Winnemucca critiqued 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dillon Myer for arbitrarily intervening in the rights of 
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tribes to pick their own attorneys. Winnemucca echoed the claims of termination 
advocates, stating, “certainly the bureau needs a timetable for the integration of the 
Indians as full American citizens,” but tempered his assertion with a reminder about 
the ongoing dynamics of wardship: “But so long as the Indians are wards of the 
Government, then it is a proper governmental responsibility to protect them.”89 
Although Winnemucca expressed interest in Native peoples’ rights as American 
citizens, he did not his define wardship as a state of dependency which “impeded” 
citizenship. Rather, to Winnemucca, wardship was a legal agreement that was built 
upon an exchange between Indian tribes and the federal government, which the 
government was obligated to uphold.   
 In her “Outreach” essay, Bronson established why non-Native people had 
difficulty understanding wardship as something other than a limitation on full 
citizenship and a way for the federal government to exert control over Native people. 
She wrote, “The casually informed citizen, dedicated to fair play, feels there is 
something definitely insulting in labelling an adult a ward of the government, as 
though he were being branded as too incompetent to function without a guardian.”90 
However, Indian activists and representatives utilized a different definition of 
wardship. As a result, they believed wardship and citizenship could coexist. 
Furthermore, Bronson argued that receipt of resources from the federal government 
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was not something that was exclusive to Indians. She stated, “It is hard to see how 
federal benefits make a ‘second class’ citizen out of an Indian if preferential treatment 
does not jeopardize the status of veterans, farmers, subsidized airlines and steamship 
companies, the manufacturers protected by tariffs or the business men with rapid tax 
write-offs.”91 Thus, wardship should not imply that Indians were “second-class 
citizens.” To Bronson and other activists, wardship was entangled with Indians’ 
assumption of full citizenship. Indians emphasized that if Native people were entitled 
to equal resources as “equal citizens,” wardship required the government to provide 
those resources. At the 1954 NCAI “Emergency Conference of American Indians on 
Legislation,” the NCAI drafted a declaration which laid out the group’s desire that the 
relationship between Indians and the federal government be one of “government by 
consent.” The NCAI corrected stereotypes about the limitations of wardship, asserting 
that, “Reservations do not imprison us. They are ancestral homelands, retained by us 
for our perpetual use and enjoyment. We feel that many of our fellow Americans do 
not know that we are citizens, free to move about the country like everyone else.”92 
The NCAI declared that wardship was structured by legal agreements which had been 
designed between independent nations “on a basis of full equality.”93 Furthermore, the 
NCAI stressed that the relationship between tribal nations and the federal government 
should be one of “governing only by consent.”94 Similarly, in a 1956 meeting with 
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Glenn Emmons, representatives from Nambe Pueblo and Tesuque Pueblo stated 
clearly that they understood the obligations of wardship to be based on specific 
historical experiences Native people had with the United States government: “Federal 
services now provided were given because of all the Indian gave up to the White Man 
when he overran our country.” As a result, they stated further, “we believe it is not 
only a moral but a legal right to obtain the Indians’ consent as well as to consult” on 
changes in policy.95 Native people considered “government by consent” to be their 
right as nations which held legal agreements with the US government. Crucially, as 
the NCAI reasoned, upholding those legal agreements was necessary for Native 
people to be “enabled to take our rightful place in our communities, to discharge our 
full responsibilities as citizens.”96 
 Although state agents deployed “ward” as a racial signifier, Native people did 
not consider “wardship” to be a racial category, but a legal one implying US 
protection of Indian land and treaty rights. The framework of civil rights posed a 
danger for Indian tribes because it was based upon an ideology of integration, which 
could be equated with termination and “emancipation” from wardship. In a 1956 
article in the Arizona Republic inserted into the Congressional Record by Senator 
Barry Goldwater, San Carlos Apache Clarence Wesley, the president of the Arizona 
Inter-Tribal Council, asserted that, “American citizens, including public officials, 
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generally don’t know what the Indian issues really are.” Wesley argued that the issues 
were not “assimilation or integration,” or “civil rights in the usual sense of the 
words.”97 Rather, Wesley stressed the “continuing ownership of land; protection of 
rights solemnly promised by treaty and law; honor in Government dealing with 
conquered peoples,” as well as educational and economic opportunities, and an end to 
unnecessary bureaucracy.98 Similarly, Helen Peterson, Executive Director of the 
NCAI, argued that the rhetoric of civil rights obfuscated the issues that Indians were 
facing. In 1957 she asserted, “We can’t hope to get people to understand the problems 
and all of this truly complicated arrangement unless we can disentangle Indian issues 
from civil rights issues—Indian problems aren’t civil rights problems.”99 Therefore, in 
the context of emerging rhetoric about self-determination and sovereignty, Indians 
could simultaneously demand Indian “independence,” while “preserving a US 
presence on the reservations that upheld past treaties and responsibilities.”100 Indian 
autonomy was not separate from wardship, because Native people understood 
wardship as a legal arrangement which specified the American state’s obligations to 
the tribes, rather than a synonym for racial discrimination. 
 However, state agents positioned wardship as the opposite of American 
citizenship—as a state of irresponsibility and dependence induced by federal policies. 
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In 1954, the Subcommittee of the Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs 
conducted hearings in Reno, Nevada over the proposal to terminate Nevada Indians. 
Eleanor Myers, the representative from Lovelock Indian Colony, faced a barrage of 
pointed questions from members of the committee who utilized the rhetoric of equal 
citizenship to downplay her request that the government fulfill its responsibilities 
under the terms of wardship. Myers testified in front of the committee to ask for 
government investment into her community before her tribe was terminated. She 
framed her request as one “for better preparedness,” because her community was 
“merely existing on a 20-acre piece of Government-owned land.”101 To Myers, for the 
community of Lovelock Indians to be “better prepared” for termination, they deserved 
fulfillment of their basic needs under the terms of wardship, including running water, 
functional toilets, street lighting, and sanitary systems. In addition, she explained that 
because most jobs for Indian men were seasonal, women were bringing home most of 
the family income through regular jobs as housekeepers. For Indians in Lovelock 
Colony to access the basic resources they needed, Myers stressed that they needed 
more opportunities for regular employment. She claimed, “Our people live on this tax-
free land because we cannot earn in 8 months the same as our neighbors earn in 12 
months.”102 In response, the congressmen on the committee returned to the language 
of “equality,” simultaneously downplaying the legitimacy of the requests and creating 
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a perception that what Myers was asking for was some sort of extra, special treatment. 
In the following exchange, George Abbott, Special Counsel to the House Interior 
Committee, disregarded Myers’ requests by asking complicated question about taxes 
and property ownership. 
Mr. Abbott: You appreciate, Mrs. Myers, that as it was indicated by the 
concurrent resolution, it is the sense of Congress that the Indians 
‘should be entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are the 
non-Indians,’ and some of the basic responsibilities of non-Indian 
property owners—and your people would become property owners—is 
that they occasionally find themselves included within what we call 
taxing districts—sewer districts or sanitary districts. There may be 
paving districts, sidewalk districts, whatever you have, and on the basis 
of the improvements or increased value of your property—if curb and 
guttering is placed, for example, and a storm sewer main or sanitary 
sewer main—there is a direct assessment against the property that 
benefits from that in relationship to the benefits received. Now, if a 
district were formed and if the increased value of your property 
resulting from those improvements could be established, would your 
Indian people have any objection to entering into the same kind of 
obligation or finding themselves in the same kind of obligations that 
non-Indians do? 
Mrs. Myers: Well— 
Mr. Abbott: In other words, it is certainly a challenge, of course.”103 
 
By framing Myers’ request in the language of property taxes, Abbott tapped into one 
of the most racialized charges leveled towards Indians—that they did not pay any 
taxes, and therefore were not deserving of any welfare benefits or public services 
provided by state and local governments. Under the guise of equality, and “entitling” 
Indians to the “same privileges and responsibilities as non-Indians,” Abbott asserted 
that as wards, not property-owners, Native people were unable to understand and/or 
not ready to receive those privileges and responsibilities. Abbott’s long-winded 
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technical questions also reveal a sexist refusal to consider Myers’ requests as an 
elected representative from her community that the government govern Nevada 
Indians by consent. Myers could barely respond to Abbott’s questions before he 
continued his dismissive “explanation” of how the Lovelock Paiutes could not 
possibly be entitled to governmental efforts to fix up their colony. Abbott asserted his 
power as a government agent and a man to rehash racialized tropes about Indian 
wardship. Despite this, Myers continued to demand that the colony be “fixed up” by 
the federal government before termination:  
Mr. Abbott: Is your group suggesting a sort of Federal city be created; 
then once it is created, turned over to the city of Lovelock? 
Mrs. Myers: No, they just want to be—well, they want the colony fixed 
up. 
Mr. Abbott: Surely. 
Mrs. Myers: So that they could— 
Mr. Abbott: You understand in our system by cooperative contributions 
directly relating to the benefit you receive, you manage over a period of 
years 10-, 20-, 30-, or 40-year periods, under a bond issue—to borrow 
money secured by lien against the individual property directly 
proportionate to the benefits received. Surely if your people understand 
that, and you know that the load at given periods is not going to be too 
burdensome, then you certainly wouldn’t object to finding yourselves 
in a sanitary district or paving district or lighting district? You 
mentioned street lighting there. Would you, with perhaps a little 
Federal assistance at the outset? 
Mrs. Myers: Maybe.”104 
 
Myers and Abbott clearly operated under two completely different ideologies of 
wardship. To Myers and her community, the request to have the colony fixed up made 
sense under the terms and conditions of wardship. To Abbott, Myers was asking for 
special treatment, and the Lovelock colony was not entitled to such treatment unless 
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they participated in the economic and political infrastructure responsible for public 
services, “just like everyone else.”  
 Like Myers, other Indian activists and representatives used the terminology 
and ideology of wardship in order pressure the government for necessary services and 
to remind the American public that Indians had historical and legal relationships with 
the federal government. In 1949, residents of the Reno-Sparks Indian Colony 
foreshadowed the Lovelock Indian Colony’s requests when they petitioned the federal 
government for “welfare assistance,” including improved housing, modernization of 
water mains, sanitation and plumbing, electricity, and recreational facilities for 
children. The petition stated, “Our Government has been pouring millions of dollars 
into foreign countries for rehabilitation, while right here in our own country, the real 
Americans are being neglected.”105 By directing their petition to the federal 
government, the Reno-Sparks Indian Colony demanded fulfillment of the obligations 
of wardship, yet, they also called themselves the “real Americans.” Clearly, they did 
not view wardship and citizenship as mutually exclusive categories. The Reno-Sparks 
colony reiterated their desires in a 1956 meeting with Commissioner Glenn Emmons. 
Reno-Sparks tribal representative, Hastings Pancho, declared, “it is the obligation of 
the US and the Indian Affairs to raise its subjects to the level of economic well-being 
and enjoyment as others do in the country.”106 Pancho and the other members of the 
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Reno-Sparks colony argued that it was the United States’ responsibility to provide 
Native people with the opportunity and resources that non-Native citizens enjoyed. 
Similarly, in the 1947 report of President Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights, Milton 
Steward and Rachel Sady remarked, “not long ago an Indian complained that the 
‘Indians all over the country today have to sue the government to make them realize 
that the Indians are still wards of the government.’”107 Although different, wardship 
and citizenship were both statuses that conveyed certain rights and protections onto 
Native people. In a 1954 speech, Oliver La Farge, president of the Association on 
American Indian Affairs, quoted the Northwestern Band of Shoshones, who released a 
statement which emphasized the tribe’s dual claims to wardship and citizenship: 
“We desire for the time being to remain as wards of the Government 
and covet our title as Indians for as such we are recognized by other 
Indians elsewhere, and have the full rights as to the treaties made on 
our behalf by our forebears with the proper authorities, statutes made 
for our behalf we covet; constitutional rights given to Indians we covet, 
and to remain and retain these rights we want.”108 
 
By choosing to “remain as wards of the Government,” the Northwestern Band of 
Shoshones retained both their cultural and racial identity as Indians and their legal 
agreements with the United States. However, they also mentioned the “constitutional 
rights given to Indians.” This reveals that they desired the protections and rights due to 
them as citizens, in addition to those due to them as wards. Thus, members of the 
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public and politicians racialized “wardship” this era, to Indians, it was a term that 
signified their “government-to-government” relationship between the United States 
government and tribal nations. In the mid-twentieth century, before the proliferation of 
language of sovereignty and self-determination more commonly associated with the 
late 1960s and 1970s, wardship was a tool for Indians to voice their desires and 
concerns about the protections and rights due to them in the context of expanding 
termination policies.  
 
Conclusion 
Wardship was a crucial legal and racial signifier which contributed to shifting 
determinations of where Native people fit within the confines of the American welfare 
state. To state agents and politicians, “ward” was associated with negative 
assumptions about Indian dependence, poverty, and segregation. These connotations 
were reinforced and buffered by conceptualizations of reservations as bounded prisons 
and/or unearned privileges, and the limitations placed on American political and social 
objectivity toward the “Indian problem,” due to lasting legacies of guilt and shame 
over the nation’s history with Native nations. However, despite its racialized 
connotations, “ward” was a complex and nuanced term for Native people. Throughout 
the mid-twentieth century, Indians employed “ward” alongside the construct of 
“American citizenship” to assert rights or demand the fulfillment of obligations by the 
American state. The term signaled a legitimate, legal relationship between Native 
tribes and the state.    
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 For many, wardship was a restriction of Native peoples’ citizenship, a status 
from which they deserved to be “emancipated.” Dissolving wardship would mean 
Indians could be integrated fully into the infrastructure and welfare safety net of their 
surrounding communities. However, the desire to “emancipate” Native citizens was 
also predicated upon the desire to free Native land from trust restrictions and make it 
available for non-Natives to purchase. Consistent framing of the historical surrender of 
Indian land as an example of their “service” to the American nation was connected to 
the notion that the American state and public “owed” Indians the benefits of American 
citizenship. Coupled with the persistent view of reservations as restrictive prisons, this 
“lip service” paid to the history of violence perpetrated upon Native nations served to 
undermine Native claims to their own ancestral lands and continued to reify their 
separation from the American polity as a racial group.  
 However, wardship also provided a nexus for negotiations around 
responsibility, dependence, and welfare within American citizenship, and 
conversations about the line between “oppression” and “protection” of Indians. 
Retaining the use of “ward” to remind governmental representatives of legal 
agreements between the state and tribes allowed Native people to articulate demands 
for sovereignty and fulfillment of government responsibility, as well as recognition of 
rights both inside and outside the American polity. If Indians understood wardship to 
be a legal arrangement which specified the obligations the state had to Native tribes, 
historians cannot separate wardship status from considerations of the historical 
development of Indian autonomy.  
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 In conclusion, in the mid-twentieth century, wardship disrupted non-Native 
understandings of Indians as one of many groups of racial minority citizens in two 
distinct ways. First, wardship was not easily reconciled with common understandings 
of racial discrimination and civil rights. Indians argued that conflating Native issues 
with civil rights caused confusion and undermined the unique relationship Native 
tribes had with the United States government. “Full citizenship” was not Native 
people’s ultimate goal in the mid-century. Native activists like Ruth Muskrat Bronson 
argued that receipt of federal benefits did not mean that Indians were second-class 
citizens. Second, wardship complicated perceptions of the role of welfare state in the 
lives of American citizens. Although Indians were racialized as the perpetually 
dependent victims of a misguided and expansive welfare state in popular media and 
political rhetoric, they and their representatives pointed out that other groups of 
citizens also received protected status and benefits from the federal government. 
Native people did not understand wardship to be an unwieldy extension of federal 
welfare benefits, but a legal status tied to their specific histories with the United 
States. Wardship was not welfare. However, in the chapters that follow, I will 
demonstrate how wardship and welfare were interconnected. Native people agitated 
for welfare benefits from the states and federal government as citizens, while 
maintaining their right to trust protection of Indian lands and federal resources as 
wards. Indian citizenship was further complicated by the messy and ambiguous 
coexistence of wardship and welfare.  
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Chapter 3 
Indian Entitlement and the State’s Responsibility: The Denial of Social Security 
Benefits to Indians in Arizona and New Mexico 
 
Introduction  
 In January 1948, Frank Mapatis, a 73-year-old Hualapai Indian, applied for Old 
Age Assistance at the Mohave County Office of the Social Security Board in 
Kingman, Arizona. After several weeks, Mapatis was informed that Arizona’s State 
Board of Social Security and Welfare recommended that Mohave County “not take 
any action on the applications from Reservation Indians, and to just hold them in their 
files.” Nevertheless, Mapatis inquired again, and in late February heard that his 
application would be processed by the county office, but the payment would come 
from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). After several more weeks, Mapatis was 
informed that due to staff shortage, his application would not be processed after all. In 
May, a field worker came to the Hualapai Reservation to process his application, but 
told Mapatis that there were no funds available to pay his claim. Finally, in July of 
1948, upon another fruitless visit to the Mohave County office, Mapatis concluded 
that “the State Board of Social Security and Welfare has no intention of acting on his 
application for Old Age Assistance, especially with regard to payments due him under 
said application.”1  
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 Frank Mapatis’ case was not unique. In mid-twentieth century Arizona and New 
Mexico, many Native people ran into similar challenges when they applied for 
benefits under the 1935 Social Security Act. As American citizens, Mapatis and others 
were entitled to these benefits, but state officials in Arizona and New Mexico refused 
to process or pay their claims. Indians did not accept this. Rather, they utilized 
bureaucratic channels to file complaints, repeatedly applied and inquired after their 
benefits, and filed a class action lawsuit, of which Mapatis was the named plaintiff. 
This chapter addresses the rationale behind Arizona and New Mexico’s refusal to 
grant Social Security benefits to Native Americans and Native people’s response to 
that refusal. At the heart of the conflict are questions about the impact of the 
expansion of the American welfare state on both Indian wardship and citizenship.  
 The 1935 Social Security Act ushered in a major change in American 
government and politics. Most notably, the Social Security Act signified formation of 
a more centralized and expansive administrative state, which was increasingly 
interlaced with the lives of ordinary American citizens.2 The Act established 
provisions for maternal and child welfare, public health, and welfare benefits in five 
key categories: Unemployment Insurance; Old Age Insurance (OAI), a contributory 
program for wage-earners in covered occupations financed by a payroll tax; and public 
assistance programs administered by the states and funded through federal grant-in-aid 
to states including Old Age Assistance (OAA), a program to assist needy citizens over 
65 years of age, Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), a program to assist needy parents 
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of minor children, and Aid to the Blind (AB). Historians of welfare have analyzed 
how the Social Security Act and other aspects of the New Deal solidified a “two-
track” system of welfare within the United States. Within this system, mostly white 
male wage-earners were viewed as “entitled” to benefits guaranteed by the national 
government (in the form of OAI), and mostly non-white and/or female needy 
populations were viewed as “dependent” upon benefits administered by the individual 
states.3 Race and gender have fundamentally impacted citizens’ abilities to access 
benefits from federal and state governments.4 For citizens applying for need-based 
programs like OAA, ADC, and AB, local prejudices and discrimination at the hands of 
state officials impacted who was deemed eligible for aid and the amount of assistance 
granted.5 Although many view the Social Security Act as one of the major 
achievements of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, historians have challenged that 
for those who were not able to access the social safety net the Act enshrined for 
American citizens, the Act revealed that “not all citizens are equal, nor are they 
entitled to equal rights and protections.”6 
 This chapter introduces wardship to the discussion of need-based welfare. As 
was demonstrated in the previous chapter, non-Natives consistently characterized 
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wardship as “dependency” which restricted Indians’ full citizenship. However, Native 
people understood wardship as fulfillment of the government’s honest debt to Indian 
tribes, a legal status that could coexist with citizenship. Where did the need-based 
public assistance programs of the Social Security Act fit into this narrative? How did 
non-Native people’s racialized assumptions about Indians as impoverished “wards” of 
the federal government prevent Indians from accessing need-based welfare programs 
as poor citizens? At the heart of these conflicts are larger issues about the impact of 
concepts of dependency and entitlement on the definition of American citizenship 
itself.  
 Except for legal historian Karen Tani, scholars have not analyzed the impact of 
the Social Security Act on Native Americans.7 Instead, historians have focused on the 
1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), which became known as the “Indian New 
Deal.” The IRA did not function like other New Deal programs for public welfare. 
The act stipulated appropriations for Indian education (primarily vocational and trade 
school education) and established a revolving credit fund to lend money to the tribes 
who had elected to adopt constitutions and participate in the IRA. Funds could be lent 
to individual Indians through their respective tribes. The IRA also concentrated on 
increasing the land base of Native people. Although John Collier intended the act to 
improve Indians' economic situation, it did not function as Social Security, where 
individuals applied to bureaucratic agencies for needed funds.8 Moreover, although the 
                                                            
7 Karen M. Tani, "States' Rights, Welfare Rights, and the 'Indian Problem': Negotiating Citizenship and 
Sovereignty, 1935-1954," Law and History Review 33, no. 1 (February 2015): 1-40. 
8 See Vine Deloria and Clifford Lytle, The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian 
Sovereignty (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 144-149. 
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Indian New Deal was undoubtedly important, it was not the only piece of New Deal 
legislation that affected Indians.9 Native people experienced the reach of the mid-
twentieth century expansion of the state through the familiar agency of the BIA, and 
through state and county welfare offices responsible for administering and processing 
claims for Social Security benefits.  
 Like many other racialized citizens, Indians experienced discrimination from 
state welfare workers in charge of doling out benefits. However, Native peoples’ 
experiences of racial discrimination were intertwined with non-Indian assumptions 
about the nature of wardship. For example, in Arizona and New Mexico, large 
populations of Native Americans posed concerns for local politicians and welfare 
administrators, who viewed Indians both as a distinct racial group and as “wards” of 
the federal government. Indians in Arizona and New Mexico were legally citizens. 
However, to the Boards of Public Welfare of Arizona and New Mexico, that did not 
mean they were eligible for welfare benefits administered by the states. State and 
county welfare workers saw a clear delineation between Indians’ citizenship and 
wardship, and argued that as “wards,” Indians needs for OAA, ADC, and AB were the 
federal government’s responsibility, not the responsibility of the states.  
 The ways in which the American welfare state rebuked Native people were 
rebuked complicates common understandings of the dynamics between the federal 
government and state governments. Suzanne Mettler has argued that social citizenship 
                                                            
9 Indians also participated in other well-known New Deal public programs. See, for example, Donald 
Parman, “Indians and the Civilian Conservation Corps,” Pacific Historical Review 40, no. 1 (February 
1971): 39-56. 
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determined by the states “has generally tended to be inferior to social citizenship with 
national standards.”10 While welfare officials working on the state level have more of 
a vested interest in preserving local social order, control, and community values in 
their administration of welfare benefits, federal standards for eligibility are usually 
more egalitarian and far-reaching.11 While the denial of benefits to Native Americans 
at the state level affirms this dichotomy, this chapter also demonstrates the extent to 
which state and federal levels of welfare administration were inextricably intertwined. 
Indeed, Karen Tani has recently argued that Arizona and New Mexico’s denial of 
benefits to Indians reveals more than local racial hierarchy and discrimination at work. 
For these states, Indians’ “citizenship” itself was under fire, as states fought back 
against what they perceived to be unjust restrictions of state power on Indian 
reservations.12 To Arizona and New Mexico, Indian welfare benefits represented a 
racial battleground, but also a battleground for political jurisdiction. 
 Despite many challenges, Native people persisted in their efforts to access Social 
Security benefits. They utilized the “third space of sovereignty” to assert eligibility for 
welfare while maintaining their special trust relationship with the federal government. 
As Kevin Bruyneel argues, American political actors have utilized a “binaristic 
epistemology” to repress indigenous political, cultural, and societal systems.13 Thus, 
either Indians were “wards” of the federal government or “citizens” of individual 
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states. This “worldview of dualisms” presented problems for Indians, who stood on 
both sides of that invisible boundary—as wards and citizens. Rather than accepting 
Arizona and New Mexico’s denial of their benefits, Native people worked in and 
around the constraints wardship and citizenship placed on them, in pursuit of both 
needed financial assistance and recognition of their presence within the mid-twentieth 
century American polity. To Native people, both welfare and wardship were about 
needed resources from the federal government. More broadly, Native people used both 
welfare and wardship as mechanisms to force non-Native people to recognize Indian 
presence and humanity in the mid-twentieth century.  
 This chapter examines Social Security as a collision of opposing ideas about 
wardship, citizenship, and Native peoples’ place in the American citizenry. Indian 
access to Social Security benefits was, on a wide scale, a negotiation between the 
states and the federal government; and on a small scale, a negotiation between county 
and state welfare officials and individual Native people. Although Arizona and New 
Mexico's public welfare officials and state legislators insisted that it was wardship 
which precluded Indians from accessing Social Security from the state, their 
perceptions of wardship were predicated upon racialized understandings of who 
Indians were and what their relationship was with the American state. In their pursuit 
of benefits, Native people asserted of the validity of wardship, and simultaneously 
claimed eligibility for welfare benefits as American citizens. Native people and state 
agents articulated conflicting viewpoints on Indian eligibility and need for Social 
Security, drawing upon competing conceptions of Indians as wards and racialized 
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American citizens. The resulting collisions demonstrate how wardship complicates the 
history of American welfare policy.  
 
Changing Impressions of Indian Poverty and the Denial of Benefits in Arizona 
and New Mexico 
  In the 1930s-1950s, the states of Arizona and New Mexico denied Indians 
access to the need-based aspects of the Social Security Act: OAA, ADC, and AB. The 
Social Security Act was passed by Congress in the summer of 1935.14 By March of 
1936, the Social Security Board (SSB) fielded questions about the applicability of the 
act to Indians. Because the act made no explicit mention of Native people, confusion 
arose among state officials. In response to a BIA inquiry, the SSB asserted that state 
and county officials administering state benefits should be “discouraged from barring 
Indians from participation in the benefits.” However, the SSB also couched this 
language in a qualifying statement which revealed Native peoples’ ambiguous 
positions as citizens of individual states: Indians would not be barred “unless Congress 
should, by passing some act or appropriation for Indians especially, indicate its 
intention to provide for them otherwise.”15 Because politicians and state agents 
assumed Native welfare was the federal government’s responsibility, Indian eligibility 
for Social Security could be impacted by potential legislation passed by Congress.  
                                                            
14 Poole, Segregated Origins, 7. 
15 Letter from SSB to Zimmerman 1936, Social Security Legislation Correspondence, Box 168, 
Colorado River Central Classified Files (CRCC Files), Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record 
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 After a few more weeks of deliberation, the SSB declared more definitively that 
Indians were eligible for the benefits provided under the Social Security Act, including 
OAA, ADC, and AB. John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, asked 
superintendents of all Indian agencies to report whether or not Indians were being 
excluded from accessing these particular benefits, and if they were, on what basis.16 
Collier later assured the superintendents that “Undoubtedly, obstacles will arise, legal 
or other.”17 Soon after Collier’s warning, obstacles did arise, especially in Arizona and 
New Mexico, two states with particularly substantial populations of Native people.18 
In 1936, officials working for the Arizona Board of Public Welfare and the Social 
Service Department met several times for “discussions of the relationship of Indians to 
the benefits of the Social Security Act.”19 Officials were unwilling to agree outright to 
accept any Indian applications for Social Security benefits, and sent multiple requests 
to Indian agents and superintendents for estimates of needy blind, children, and aged 
on each reservation. In this administrative correspondence, Native people were 
described as “ward Indians.”20 State officials claimed that Indian wardship was the 
source of their reluctance to begin to process Native applications. 
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 Arizona and New Mexico were not the only states where officials attempted to 
avoid payment of Social Security benefits to Indians from state funds. In February 
1937, a group of 23 senators from western states lead by Senator Carl Hayden (D-
Arizona) (including Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming) introduced bill 
S. 1260 which would have amended the Social Security Act to alter how Native 
people received aid. The amendment specified that no state plan would be required to 
include “Indians who are wards of the United States,” and prevented the SSB from 
refusing to approve any state’s plan and or withhold payments “because such Indians 
are excluded from the benefits of such plan.”21 The proposed amendment stipulated 
that instead of the states, the SSB would furnish funds for Indian welfare through 
yearly Congressional appropriations. Historian Alison Bernstein has shown that John 
Collier unofficially and confidentially supported the bill, and agreed to “not bring 
pressure upon the state to pay benefits to Indians.”22 Bernstein asserts that Collier 
privately supported Hayden’s efforts because he desired to keep all funds for Indians 
under BIA responsibility and eliminate state involvement in Indian welfare. Collier’s 
correspondence also reveals conversations about potentially utilizing S. 1260 to 
further the political goals of the IRA by returning allotted lands to tribal ownership. A 
memo to Commissioner Collier from BIA official Walter Woehlke suggested an 
informal conversation about potentially amending S. 1260 to include a stipulation 
                                                            
21 Bill to Amend the Social Security Act to Provide for Aid to Indians, S. 1260, 75th Cong. (1937).  
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whereby upon receiving OAA, Native people would be obligated to “return title of 
their allotments or inherited interests to the United States in trust for the tribe, perhaps 
with a clause giving the direct heirs of the recipient the right to an assignment of tribal 
land under certain conditions.”23 Ultimately, the bill did not make it through the 
Senate, and Collier never publicly endorsed it, knowing that Indians were legally 
entitled to Social Security as citizens. Doing so would have also meant that he would 
have publicly disagreed with Native people who asserted their right to those benefits.24 
In the context of conservative political attacks on the IRA, it makes sense that Collier 
would have supported an amendment which would have ultimately given the BIA—
and potentially the IRA—more power. However, despite Collier’s desire to safeguard 
his policies, he could not assert that Social Security benefits should be administered 
fully by the BIA, because Indians were entitled to these benefits as citizens, not as 
wards. Ultimately, the framework of equal rights of citizenship powerfully 
overshadowed any other political rationale for allowing Arizona and other western 
states to withhold Social Security benefits to Indians.  
 In the west, it was OAA, ADC, and AB’s characterization as need-based 
programs which caused state officials to consider Indians ineligible for benefits due to 
their wardship status. In 1936, the California Department of Social Welfare conferred 
with the state's attorney general, U.S. Webb, as to whether “Indians who are wards of 
the Federal government are eligible for aid” under OAA, ADC, and AB. After 
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reviewing the legislation, Webb found that “the language of each of these acts is broad 
enough to include all Indians wherever residing in this state.” However, the issue of 
wardship was not fully resolved. Webb stated that, “We think the test is not whether 
the applicant is an Indian, or, if an Indian, where residing, but rather the test is ‘if in 
need,’ or ‘if needy.’”25 Indians were associated with poverty, and, due to the 1928 
publication of the Meriam Report, the public was well aware of the conditions on 
Indian reservations.26 John Collier worked hard to garner publicity for the IRA, 
claiming that the act had the power to “raise Indians from poverty.”27 Collier’s efforts 
to publicize the IRA undoubtedly influenced state politicians as they debated whether 
or not Native people were eligible for Social Security. For example, Webb asserted, 
“If Indians residing on the reservation, or on lands held in trust, or elsewhere, are 
amply provided for by the Federal government, they may not be classed as ‘needy.’”28 
Ironically, although the IRA was instituted as a solution for dire financial problems on 
reservations, some state officials and members of the public interpreted the legislation 
as evidence of Indians’ financial security, since they were “provided for” by the 
federal government.  
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 Additionally, in the 1930s, many Americans developed new ways of thinking 
about poverty and responsibility in the United States which affected their 
interpretation of Native need. As Lizabeth Cohen has noted in her study of industrial 
workers in Chicago, working-class people started to view the benefits they were 
receiving from the state under the New Deal as entitlements. Essentially, they 
understood that benefits were how the state paid them back for participating in the 
citizenry—by voting, serving in the military, and spending their money in America.29 
In return, they expected the government to enforce a system of “moral capitalism,” 
where “everyone, owner or worker,” would receive “a fair share.” By applying a 
moral evaluation to the benefits being disbursed by the state, workers demonstrated 
their support for the government to “redistribute wealth.”30 Non-Natives could not fit 
Indians into this ideology of moral capitalism, because as wards, they were not viewed 
as poor and in need. There were two reasons for their inability to envision Native 
wards as eligible for entitlement benefits: 1) With the IRA, Indian wards had their 
“own” New Deal, and were thus the responsibility of the federal government; 2) 
Indian citizenship itself was ambiguous and misunderstood. Non-Natives argued that 
isolated on reservations, Indians did not pay property taxes, and therefore should not 
be “paid back” by the state in the same way as non-Indians. Thus, wardship clouded 
public perception of Indian poverty and need, both in the notion that Indians were so 
outside of the “borders of belonging” that they were not entitled to New Deal benefits, 
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and in the notion that Indians had enough already from the state, and receiving more 
welfare payments meant they would exceed their “fair share.”31 
 Webb’s sentiments were also present in the minds of the state and county 
workers responsible for processing Indian applications in Arizona and New Mexico. 
By 1937, although certain counties in Arizona made overtures to Indian agents to 
begin the process of administering aid, they did not follow through on their plans. 
C.H. Gensler, Superintendent of the Colorado River Agency, remarked that he had 
been advised by the Board of Public Welfare in Arizona that “the probable time when 
work might be started on our cases was left rather indefinite.”32 Most counties in 
Arizona managed to delay the processing of any applications under the guise of 
necessary bureaucracy. They claimed that a system needed to be put in place to 
investigate Indian applications, mail checks, and divide responsibility between the 
federal and state Social Security Boards and the BIA. In October 1937, only eleven 
Indians living on the Colorado River Reservation in Yuma County had received Social 
Security checks.33 Gensler’s correspondence with Commissioner Collier and 
representatives from state and county welfare offices reveals that even a year later, 
“this is the only jurisdiction in Arizona that is receiving aid from the Social 
Security.”34 However, soon afterwards, Yuma County made it clear that “no more 
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Indian applications could be approved until further notice.”35 In the late 1930s, other 
counties simply made no effort to take any applications from Native Americans at all, 
while some implemented complicated procedures for Native applicants, requiring 
them to make long journeys to the county welfare office, on specific days and times, 
without guarantees that a state or county worker would actually be present.  
 Native people in Arizona and New Mexico experienced these types of delays 
and refusals of benefits up through the late 1940s. For example, in 1947, Mrs. Charles 
Dietrich, president of the New Mexico Association of Indian Affairs (a non-Native 
organization dedicated to improving the lives of Native people in New Mexico), wrote 
to all members of the Congressional Committees on Indian Affairs to voice her 
concerns about welfare needs on the Navajo reservation, asserting that, “There is one 
welfare worker for the whole reservation, four times the size of Massachusetts.”36 
Officials from the New Mexico State Department of Social Security and Welfare 
countered this type of complaint by claiming that each social worker carried 
“caseloads over the state averaging over 300,” “reservations are large and roads very 
poor,” and there was “no one on our staff who can talk to the Indians in their language 
so interpreters would also be necessary.”37 Citing the prohibitive expense of added 
social workers, interpreters, and other additional staff, Harry Hill, the commissioner 
                                                            
35 Gensler Letter Referencing Circular 1939, Social Security San Bernardino Co. General Welfare 
Program, Box 169, CRCC Files, RG 75, NARA – Pacific Region (R). 
36 Dietrich to Barrett, 1947, Folder 29 – Indian Affairs New Mexico Association of Indian Affairs 1947, 
Box 82, Dennis Chavez Papers, Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico (CSR-
UNM).  
37 Hill to Hayden, 1947, Folder 28 – Rehabilitation of Navajo and Hopi Tribes 1947, Box 82, Dennis 
Chavez Papers, CSR-UNM.  
 167 
for the department, argued that although their “sympathies [were] with the Indians,” 
they felt that it was Congress’ obligation to take care of them, since the department 
had “neither the staff nor the funds to meet this obligation.”38 Both Arizona and New 
Mexico’s public welfare departments asserted their practical inability and ideological 
exemption from the responsibility of providing Indians access to the benefits of the 
Social Security Act.  
 
The Racialization of Indian Social Security Benefits  
 The battle for Social Security benefits was characterized by clashes between 
wardship and citizenship. Both wardship and citizenship were tied to racialized 
assumptions about Indian work ethic and contribution to the larger American society. 
In the eyes of the public, as well as state legislators and state and county welfare 
officials, Native people were not full citizens because they purportedly did not fulfill 
the obligations of citizenship through taxes and therefore could not be eligible to claim 
the rights of citizenship—Social Security benefits—in return. For example, in 1941 
C.H. Gensler remarked that in the view of the “taxpaying public,” Indians do not pay 
taxes, and do not have to buy land and “pay for it from individual effort.”39 Harry Hill, 
Commissioner of New Mexico’s Department of Social Security and Welfare, asserted 
to Senator Carl Hayden in 1947 that, “Since the state cannot tax or require the Indian 
to assume any of the obligations of citizenship, and since he is not required to carry 
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any portion of the burden of taxation, it does not seem reasonable that this state should 
be called upon to support the reservation Indians.”40 Alva Simpson, State Director for 
New Mexico’s Department of Public Welfare echoed Hill’s concerns in a 1951 letter 
to Senator Dennis Chavez, arguing that adding Indians to New Mexico’s caseload 
would create too heavy a burden on the state, given that “very few of them pay taxes 
and the lands are tax free.”41 State officials and members of the public conflated the 
tax-exemption on trust property with exemption from all taxes. States’ supposed lack 
of tax revenue from Indian people was one of the most concrete issues state officials 
pointed to in order to defend their refusal of Native applicants for public welfare 
assistance.  
 Furthermore, as both Gensler’s and Simpson’s remarks demonstrate, 
assumptions about Native exemption from taxation was intertwined with the notion 
that Indians did not put any individual effort into their land, but were “granted” or 
“given” land by the federal government. This viewpoint extended even to Native 
people who were living outside of reservations. For example, two Havasupai Indians 
who lived off-reservation collected benefits from 1936 until 1948, when welfare 
caseworkers discovered they were Indians.42 Public opinion about Indians was that 
wardship was inherently connected to racialization: whether Indians lived on 
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reservations or not, they were “wards” and were not entitled to benefits. These 
racialized assumptions about Indians mashed together stereotypes about wardship to 
claim that Indians were not citizens deserving of public aid. As Joanne Barker has 
noted, the taxation clause of the Constitution connotes that Indian tribes are separate 
sovereigns within the United States, not represented in Congress and therefore exempt 
from taxation by Congress.43 The idea that Indians do not pay taxes and are therefore 
getting more than the average citizen was not rooted in an accurate legal 
understanding of wardship. And, as has been demonstrated in previous chapters, other 
than tax-exemptions for property, Native people were subject to sales, gasoline, and 
other state taxes.44 Rather, this idea was entrenched in racialized definitions of where 
citizens entitled to benefits were supposed to live and how they were supposed to 
behave. Essentially, the non-Native public believed that as wards, Indians could not be 
citizens who deserved welfare benefits.  
 In response, some state agents described the denial of benefits as an example of 
a violation of the civil rights of American citizens. In 1947, President Truman’s 
Committee on Civil Rights wrote in their final report, To Secure These Rights, 
“discrimination against Indians in certain localities” must be further investigated, 
explicitly mentioning Arizona and New Mexico’s policies of denying Social Security. 
Furthermore, the Committee noted that, “It would appear that much of this 
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discrimination is based on the mistaken belief that the Office of Indian Affairs 
provides the Indians with all needed public services. Actually, the Office furnishes 
very limited services which by no means replace those supplied the general public by 
government agencies.”45 The Committee mentioned the denial of Social Security 
benefits to Indians alongside discussion of the discrimination experienced by African 
Americans, Mexican Americans, and Japanese Americans. Thus, although Arizona 
and New Mexico asserted that the denial of Social Security benefits was predicated 
solely on the legal category of wardship, from the perspective of the President’s 
commission, it was an example of racial discrimination, like those faced by other 
citizens of color.  
 Native people also understood that Arizona and New Mexico’s hostilities 
towards them were based on racial stereotypes. For example, the Colorado River 
Reservation stretched over the border between California and Arizona. Those living in 
California could receive benefits, while those in Arizona could not. Colorado River 
Reservation residents saw the denial of benefits to Indians in Arizona as arbitrary. In 
1941, Gensler remarked in a letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, “They 
cannot understand why a Mojave Indian in Needles [California] should be treated 
better, in their way of thinking than an Indian just across the river in Arizona.” To 
members of the Colorado River Reservation, the only barrier to Social Security was 
the state line. Gensler wrote, “From the standpoint of Indians, it is a fact that we have 
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dependents the same as other races.”46 If a Native person from the same tribe and 
similar financial need could obtain benefits in California, there was only one logical 
conclusion: the denial of benefits in Arizona was about race, not federal responsibility. 
The opinions of tribal leadership (as interpreted by Gensler) were that Native people 
needed public assistance, and were entitled to it, as citizens of the United States.  
 Non-Native Arizonans and New Mexicans claimed that Native applicants’ racial 
identity was not the underlying reason for denying Indians benefits. In 1947, the 
author of an article published in the Phoenix newspaper, The Arizona Times, asserted 
that Arizona could not support the “added burden” of Indian welfare. It was not, the 
author declared, “a question of discrimination by Arizona against a racial minority.” 
Rather, “It is a question of which is responsible for the care of the Indians—the federal 
government or the state of Arizona.”47 However, despite the author’s attempt to 
differentiate between issues of legal responsibility and racial discrimination, the article 
epitomized non-Native racialized stereotypes of Indian citizenship. The article read: 
“The fact that thousands of Indians reside in Arizona is not of Arizona’s doing. In the 
westward march of empire, greedy white men uprooted the Indians wherever they 
happened to be and cuffed them across the nation, to dump them finally on 
reservations in the West. They might have been left in Indiana or Ohio.” The federal 
government, the author contended, had “treated the Indians shamefully,” and was 
behind “the greedy white men’s” forced march of Native people to Arizona. It would 
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be “equally shameful,” to “shift responsibility to Arizona for care of their aged, blind 
and dependent.” The author argued that with Arizona’s limited resources, “our own 
citizens are the ones to whom the benefits should go.”48 To the author of this article, 
Indians in Arizona weren’t citizens of the state, or even citizens of the United States. 
Rather, they were depicted as a stateless group which depended upon a federal 
government that had greedily swept them up in the march of empire. Native need was 
outside of the responsibility of the state, because, to the author, the state of Arizona 
existed before Native people were “dumped” there, not the other way around.  
 Significantly, the author of the Arizona Times piece focused on another 
argument which Arizona and New Mexico state officials frequently made to justify 
their assertion that Indian welfare was the responsibility of the federal government. 
The author referred to the “added burden” of Indian welfare, arguing that the 
“legislature’s appropriations for social security are already too limited even for the 
adequate care of our own citizens.”49 This was a key point which others emphasized as 
well—if the state granted aid to Indians, there would not be enough for everyone else. 
For example, in 1947, Harry Hill, Commissioner of New Mexico’s Department of 
Social Security and Welfare argued that, “For us to consider accepting reservation 
Indians on the various programs would mean drastic cuts in practically every category 
of relief.”50 Similarly, Alva Simpson of the New Mexico Department of Public 
Welfare asserted that if the department had not been charged with granting aid to 
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Indians, they “would not have had to reduce standards of assistance for care of the 
blind and the permanently and totally disabled.”51 By separating Native citizens of 
Arizona and New Mexico from all others, the states solidified a racial and legal 
boundary between Indians and non-Native citizens. In the eyes of state officials and 
non-Native commenters, when they applied for relief, Native people attempted to 
cross that boundary and take something away from other needy citizens of Arizona 
and New Mexico.  
 Although public welfare workers in Arizona and New Mexico understood the 
conflict over Native peoples’ eligibility for Social Security benefits as a battle between 
the federal government (specifically the BIA) and the states, on many reservations 
there was also a third constituent involved: the tribe. To provide resources to needy 
elderly, blind, and dependent children, some tribal councils applied funds from their 
own budgets. The Colorado River Tribal Council issued a resolution in 1938 to budget 
$3,000 “in order to provide for the old age among the members of the Colorado River 
Indian tribes who are not on the old age pension list under the Social Security Act.”52 
Within the next ten years, the Pima-Maricopa-Gila, Fort McDowell, and Salt River 
tribal councils also instituted their own relief programs.53 In a 1948 letter to the 
Director of Welfare for the Office of Indian Affairs, A. E. Robinson, Superintendent 
of the Pima Agency, argued that tribal council funds were inadequate, noting that the 
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tribal councils did not have enough available cash to support the relief cases. Robinson 
asserted, “They feel that no other community or group of people are required to carry 
a like burden and neither should they be called upon to do so. I find it difficult to 
disagree with them on this point.”54 Some tribes had no extra resources to grant to 
needy members, instead relying on the family members of those in need to help. For 
example, governor of the Taos Pueblo, Antonio Mirabal, noted in a 1948 letter to Ruth 
Bronson that need in his community was “severe to the extent that the aged and needy 
children receive only what can be supplied by near relatives. The food and clothing 
they receive from the relatives are of the barest necessities.”55  
 Even though some tribal councils could step in and provide a modicum of relief 
payments to needy members of their tribes, they argued that because Indians were 
entitled to Social Security payments, it was not the responsibility of the tribe to 
provide this needs-based aid. Moreover, some tribes argued that the funds they 
expended to aid needy tribal members would be better spent in other ways. In 1948, 
Jicarilla Apache Tribal Council Chairman John Mills Baltazar wrote in a letter to Ruth 
Bronson, that although the “tribe as a whole has not neglected its needy,” and had in 
fact spent “approximately $10,000 per year” for relief, any assistance they could 
obtain in “securing relief aid and benefits from State social security boards will save 
our tribal funds for use in improvement of our reservation, instead of using it for 
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relief.”56 In this way, Indians asserted that their rights as citizens should not be 
undercut by their rights as tribal members. This articulation of “dual citizenship” 
exemplifies Kevin Bruyneel’s framework of the “third space of sovereignty.” As 
members of tribal nations, Indians could apply to tribal councils for loans or relief 
payments. As citizens, they could apply to state and county welfare boards for OAA, 
ADC, and AB. Membership in the tribe did not cancel out membership in the 
American polity, and vice versa.  
 By asserting their right to equal treatment, tribal councils and Indian agents 
compared Indian experiences to those of other minority groups in the United States. 
However, Native members of tribal councils used this technique strategically. Tribal 
councils did not simply assert that Native people should be assimilated into the 
American polity as citizens, abdicating their membership in distinct tribal nations. 
Rather, comparing Indian experiences to those of other minority groups represented 
efforts by tribal councils to fulfill their responsibilities to their members, and 
participate in a government-to-government negotiation with representatives of the 
American state. For example, under the Tohono O'odham (formerly known as the 
Papago) tribe’s constitution, the tribal council held “the responsibility for negotiating 
with state and federal officials in matters affecting the welfare of said Papago 
Indians.”57 In this way, tribal councils did not assert that Indians should assimilate into 
the American citizenry, but articulated the needs of Native citizens and argued that 
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those needs could and should be fulfilled by obtaining Social Security benefits. Local 
welfare officials and many state legislators believed in a strict binary: either Indians 
were “wards” or “citizens,” in an attempt, as Bruyneel argues, to impose order and 
boundaries on indigenous peoples within the United States. However, Native people 
refused to operate within this binary, in the process calling attention to the “colonial 
ambivalence” of the American state.58  
 Native peoples’ persistent attempts to access Social Security benefits reflected 
an understanding of their rights as citizens, but also as human beings in need of aid 
and as national entities who had experienced colonialism, violence, and neglect by the 
United States government. Some tribal leaders emphasized Native men’s military 
service to draw attention to the inequality and discrimination they faced as applicants 
for Social Security and emphasize the inhumanity of denying Native people needed 
resources. For example, Governor of the Gila River Pima-Maricopa Community, 
David Johnson, asserted in a 1949 letter to AAIA President Oliver LaFarge, “I have 
known many others who within the last 12 years have made application, waited and 
died in poverty. It is a shame to be sentenced to starvation and death, when so many of 
our boys marched away proudly not so long ago to defend this country.”59 Johnson 
contended that the people of the Gila River Pima-Maricopa Community were “entitled 
under the law” to benefits.60 As his community’s elected representative, Johnson 
stated that he went with every applicant to apply for benefits, in order to “take action 
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at once to end this shameful betrayal of my people.”61 Similarly, Sam Ahkeah, 
Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council, wrote to Ruth Bronson in 1948 to describe the 
dire situation some Navajos faced without Social Security benefits. Ahkeah put 
Arizona’s and New Mexico’s denial of Social Security to Indians in human terms and 
signaled the government-to-government relationship between Navajos and the United 
States. Emphasizing how common it was for him to be asked about Social Security, 
Ahkeah asserted that, “I do not go out in the out lying parts of the reservation that I am 
not accosted and begged for help by the aged, the blind, the crippled, the sick mothers 
with dependent children, and the helpless.” He argued that “to delay Social Security 
one day longer,” was “to deny life, to these, my people.”62 To humanize those in need 
and call attention to the legal relationship the United States had with their tribes, both 
Johnson and Ahkeah spoke of the damaging impact on their people. 
 
Native Americans Demand Social Security in Court 
 Even though very few applications were granted in Arizona, and none in New 
Mexico, Native people persisted in presenting their claims to county and state welfare 
offices.63 This persistence demonstrated not only Indians’ need for Social Security 
funds to survive, but also Indians’ use of citizenship as a method through which to 
gain recognition of their financial and human needs. In 1948, the conflict over Indian 
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eligibility for Social Security benefits came to a head. Eight Indians from Arizona and 
New Mexico (members of the Pueblo, Tohono O'odham, Hualapai, Jicarilla Apache, 
and San Carlos Apache tribes, and the Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community) 
filed a class action lawsuit against Administrator of Federal Security Oscar Ewing, 
Secretary of the Interior Julius Krug, Secretary of the Treasury John Snyder, and 
Comptroller General Lindsay Warren, in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia (Mapatis v. Ewing). The plaintiffs claimed that denying them 
Social Security benefits deprived Native people of their civil rights, and that as 
citizens of the United States and residents of the states of New Mexico and Arizona, 
Native Americans were entitled to OAA, ADC, and AB. Because the Federal Social 
Security Act stated clearly that all applications for Social Security were to be 
“promptly considered without discrimination because of race or color,” the SSB 
determined that New Mexico and Arizona had violated the conditions of the act and 
threatened the states with a “withholding of Federal aid grants amounting to more than 
10 million dollars per annum.”64  
 Felix Cohen, Royal Marks, and James Curry, lawyers for the plaintiffs, argued 
that unless Native Americans in Arizona and New Mexico were “accorded equality of 
consideration with their white fellow citizens” they would be “facing acute hunger in 
the coming winter.”65 The plaintiffs asserted that a conspiracy between federal 
officials had contributed to a failure of the SSB to force Arizona and New Mexico to 
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make payments to Native people, and that federal funds had been misappropriated 
from the SSB to the Department of the Interior, making it seem as though Indians 
were amply provided for by the federal government. Furthermore, Krug and Ewing 
had agreed to postpone hearings between the welfare boards of Arizona and New 
Mexico and the SSB until after the November 2, 1948 elections.66 The lawyers 
claimed that denying public assistance to Indians was politically motivated, and that 
politicians had promised non-Indian voters that the states would pay out federal Social 
Security grants “exclusively to the non-Indian portion of the population of these two 
states, thus increasing the allotment to each non-Indian beneficiary proportionately.”67 
The lawsuit presented Arizona and New Mexico’s efforts to deny needy Indians public 
assistance as racially motivated by contributing to both the personal gain of politicians 
and non-Native applicants for Social Security in both states.  
 Senators and representatives from New Mexico and Arizona were forthright 
about their refusal to grant aid to Native Americans in their states. In a 1948 letter to 
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, eight senators and 
representatives from both states wrote, “There is very substantial weight to be given to 
the contention of both States that the primary responsibility for Indian welfare, both 
legal and moral, rests upon the Federal Government and not upon the States.”68 While 
couched in legalistic, race-neutral language, their arguments drew from and evoked 
deeply entrenched racialized discourses about Native difference. In the eyes of the 
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politicians, Indian wardship was not just a legal category, but a moral one. The 
“problem which now confronts the Indians who reside on reservations as wards of the 
Government,” they argued, would not be fully solved by the “payment of social 
security benefits.” Rather, “any kind of temporary assistance through State agencies 
will not in any way solve the permanent problem and might conceivably complicate 
it.”69 The vaguely described “problem” on reservations was Indian poverty, exactly 
what OAA, AB, and ADC were designed to combat. The politicians asserted that 
paying Social Security benefits to needy Indians would only “increase the number of 
paupers on the dole,” rather than helping “reservation Indians so that they may 
become qualified to take their part in the economy of the nation.”70 The resistance 
Indians faced is reminiscent of the experiences of other people of color applying for 
welfare benefits. As scholars like Gwendolyn Mink, Marisa Chappell, Linda Gordon, 
and Ira Katznelson have shown, people of color (mainly women) who have applied for 
need-based aid were faced with increased scrutiny and policing by those responsible 
for doling out benefits, supposedly based on the fear that they would defraud the 
government and take more than they “deserved.”71 It is clear that Native Americans 
faced similar racialized judgement, as they were viewed as “unqualified” to take “their 
part” in the nation's economy due to their reliance on “the dole.”  
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 However, Arizonan and New Mexican politicians did not solely understand the 
“problem on Indian reservations” as individual Indians taking more than they 
“deserved” from state and county welfare resources. Additionally, state welfare 
workers denied Native people benefits on the basis that wardship enshrined Native 
irresponsibility in legal and political practice. For example, in 1947, Harry Hill, 
Commissioner of New Mexico’s Department of Social Security and Welfare, wrote to 
Senator Carl Hayden that the state was unable to “require the Indian to assume any of 
the obligations of citizenship,” and because Indians living on reservations were “not 
required to carry any portion of the burden of taxation,” the state should not support 
them.72 Hill implied that because of the tax-exemption on Indian land, Native people 
had somehow side-stepped their responsibility to carry their part of the state tax 
burden. Because, as the author of an Arizona Republic article asserted, “The states 
have no rights, either of taxation or law, on the reservation,” it was the responsibility 
of the federal government to uphold its “economic obligation” for Indians.73 Non-
Native state agents and members of the public assumed that wardship meant Indians 
were purposefully avoiding state taxes, and thus rationalized withholding benefits 
from needy Native citizens.   
  Above all, Indians’ poverty and need demonstrated the extent of Indian 
dependence on the federal government. Arizonan and New Mexican politicians argued 
that the government had failed in its “legal and moral” responsibility for Indian wards, 
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and challenged the presumption that the states should make up for the federal 
government’s failings. The All-Pueblo Council, Mescalero Apache Tribe, Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe and the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) responded to 
this argument in their amicus brief in support of the Mapatis v. Ewing plaintiffs: “No 
white man is excluded from social security assistance in New Mexico because of the 
amount of his uncollectible accounts. He might have a cellar full of Confederate 
money and still receive social security assistance. All the Indian asks is equal 
treatment.”74 In this case, Native Americans did not disagree that the federal 
government had a responsibility to protect them under the confines of wardship. 
Indeed, describing the relationship between the federal government and Native tribes 
as “uncollectible accounts” reiterates Indian conceptualization of wardship as the 
federal government’s “honest debt.”  Furthermore, by comparing a Native person to a 
white man with a “cellar full of Confederate money,” the authors of the amicus brief 
asserted tribal sovereignty and autonomy and claimed citizenship rights at the same 
time. The authors did not see wardship as superseding Indians’ entitlement to Social 
Security benefits as citizens of their respective states. Rather, Indians saw both 
wardship and citizenship as methods to communicate with non-Natives their presence 
in the polity. In a 1950 letter to Ben Avery of the Arizona Republic, San Carlos 
Apache Tribal Council Chairman Clarence Wesley described how Native people 
occupied a dual space of wardship and citizenship, where neither status cancelled out 
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the other. Wesley wrote, “Newspaper writers and some politicians tell us that we 
aren’t entitled to the same rights as other citizens because we do not pay taxes. My 
answer is that we have paid taxes. We paid taxes for 2,000 years in advance. The land 
of ours that we were forced to surrender to the white people was worth many millions 
of dollars. When we are paid a fair price for that land that was taken, we will be happy 
to consider paying taxes just like our white fellow-citizens.”75 In the letter, Wesley 
asserted Native citizenship and right to benefits. However, Wesley also inserted his 
tribe’s history of colonialism into the battle over welfare and taxation, reminding 
Avery that Native people were not “just like” their “white fellow-citizens.”  
 
The Ambiguous February 10th Agreement  
 Mapatis v. Ewing also addressed an agreement reached on February 10, 1948 
between representatives from the BIA, the Social Security Administration, and the 
state welfare departments of Arizona and New Mexico. The so-called “February 10th 
Agreement” accepted a “temporary operating basis for providing public assistance 
payments to eligible reservation Indians.”76 Under these procedures, Native 
applications would be processed by the State Boards of Welfare, and then referred to 
BIA agents for verification. If an agent deemed an application accurate, it would be 
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granted, with “funds available to the Indian agency.”77 Essentially Native applicants 
would receive their OAA, ADC, or AB payments from the BIA, although state welfare 
workers would process their applications and determine the amounts of aid they would 
receive. In the eyes of the representatives from state welfare departments of Arizona 
and New Mexico, this agreement did not “waive legal rights” of the states.78  
 The language of the February 10th Agreement demonstrates how entrenched 
wardship was within state welfare agencies. When caseworkers determined the 
amount of benefits each case could be awarded, they took “into consideration all 
resources of the Indians available for their support and maintenance, including all 
funds appropriated or authorized by acts of Congress.”79 Each Indian applicant would 
be judged not on their actual need, but rather on their perceived need based on their 
status as a “ward Indian.” This ideology was quite dangerous for Native applicants, as 
individual caseworkers might be tempted to reduce benefits or deny eligibility based 
on impressions of Congressional appropriations for Indians, without any real 
guarantee of how and when those funds would be distributed. In other words, Indians 
could be denied for immediate funds, based on future Congressional appropriations for 
the BIA. State welfare workers’ understanding of Congressional appropriations was 
based on a game of bureaucratic “telephone.” In a letter they wrote to the 
Commissioner of Social Security, senators and representatives from Arizona and New 
Mexico relayed their reliance on bureaucratic correspondence to determine the states’ 
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course of action: “In Senator Hayden’s conversation with you, he discussed a letter 
received by Senator McFarland from Assistant Secretary Warne, in which the 
Assistant Secretary definitely states that the Indian Bureau does now have sufficient 
funds.”80 Arizona and New Mexico’s State Boards of Welfare assumed that the BIA 
had enough funds to provide for Native people in their states, without official or 
verified policy in hand.  
 Moreover, although the February 10th Agreement specifically stated that state 
boards would “accept applications for assistance from Indians on the reservation just 
the same as we do all other individuals of our States,” in reality, Native applications 
were subject to special procedures.81 Each application was marked with the 
abbreviation “Ind.” After a county or state welfare worker conducted an intake 
interview, it was transcribed and forwarded to the superintendent of the applicant’s 
reservation with the “request that any errors, omissions, or additions in family 
composition, requirements, or resources be noted.” If the superintendent did not find 
any errors, the BIA would “make a grant, if funds are available,” and “report the 
amount of grant and effective date to the county welfare department.” If need still 
existed after the BIA’s grant, “the application [was] to be held pending.”82 Thus, 
individual counties did not take on any responsibility for granting public assistance to 
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Indians, but conducted interviews and assembled paperwork for applications which 
would be held pending.  
 The February 10th Agreement reified a separation between Indian “wards” and 
“social workers and other representatives of the welfare board,” who were “not well 
equipped to evaluate resources of reservation Indians.” A circular released by the 
Commissioner of Arizona’s State Department of Social Security and Welfare explains:  
“an Indian applying for OAA might tell the social worker that he has a 
small plot of corn and a few sheep and horses. Since the social worker 
might not know the value of these resources to the applicant, he would 
merely note the facts in the summary and allow the standard items in 
the assistance plan. The Indian Service might, however, recognize that 
the corn and stock furnish one-half of the applicant’s food needs. In this 
hypothetical instance, the Indian Service would make a notation to this 
effect on the PA-101 and the social worker would reduce the food 
allowance by the appropriate amount.”83 
 
Welfare caseworkers needed the BIA agents’ “expertise” to translate just how many 
resources were available to Indians. In the scenario described above, the applicant was 
prevented from getting too much aid because of the cultural differences between him 
or her and the caseworker. Native livestock could negatively impact the amount of 
relief granted by state welfare offices. For example, in a 1949 letter to Norman Littell, 
lawyer for the Navajo tribe, a representative from the New Mexico non-profit 
organization, Navajo Assistance, Inc., asserted that the New Mexico State Welfare 
Office had established in October 1947 that one Navajo family’s need—with an 
elderly husband, blind wife, and two small dependent children—should have granted 
them a benefit of $144.09 per month. However, in May 1948, because BIA social 
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workers on the reservation had informed the State Welfare Office that the family 
“owned 21 sheep and 10 goats,” their monthly benefit was drastically reduced: “the 
old man would be given $7.50 and the blind wife $20.00 per month.”84 This procedure 
distinguished Indian cases from other cases for relief. In fact, although the agreement 
was supposedly set up to accept Native applications “just the same" as others, Native 
Americans were clearly viewed differently—not as citizens, but as wards whose 
distinct resources required translation by representatives of the federal government.  
 The procedures laid out in the February 10th Agreement legitimized the denial 
of Social Security benefits to Native populations, and revealed the extent to which 
county and state caseworkers looked suspiciously at Native Americans, assuming they 
would not be eligible for benefits due to the land and resources the federal government 
provided for them. Plaintiffs in Mapatis v. Ewing argued that the administrative back-
and-forth between the state welfare officials and agents of the BIA to verify and 
confirm Native applications was specifically designed to delay payments. In fact, one 
year after the February 10th Agreement, “not a single Indian who made application to 
the State of New Mexico for assistance under this procedure has ever received such 
assistance.”85 In Arizona, a small number of Indians fared better. In May of 1948, 
eighteen applications for OAA were processed by the Pinal County Board of Public 
Welfare, and BIA agents paid those claims after receiving a monetary allotment from 
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the BIA office in July of the same year. However, just after those eighteen Pinal 
County residents received their payments, the BIA agent for their reservation informed 
the Arizona Commissioner of the State Department of Social Security that “further 
allotments are not anticipated.”86 The BIA then informed the state welfare agencies of 
Arizona and New Mexico that “funds at its disposal were exhausted.”87 As a result, 
both Arizona’s and New Mexico’s state welfare boards “informed the Social Security 
Administration that they would no longer operate under the agreement and, further, 
they would not make any public assistance payments requiring the expenditure of state 
funds to reservation Indian applicants.”88  
 Some counties in Arizona also employed delaying tactics and increased the 
administrative steps needed to process Native applications. One such tactic was to 
hold Indian applications “pending,” rather than directly inform Indians their benefits 
had been denied. For example, two women from the Colorado River Reservation had 
been able to receive payments for OAA and ADC from the Indian Service for at least 
one month before the BIA exhausted its funds. The Yuma County Board of Social 
Security and Welfare advised the Colorado River Agency superintendent that “the 
applications should be retained in the suspense file rather than having them canceled.” 
The board instructed the women to resubmit their applications the following month for 
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reconsideration.89 Similarly, Sam Ahkeah, Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council, 
wrote to Ruth Bronson in 1948 describing how the state of New Mexico was “making 
no payments, merely accepting applications.”90 Holding applications in suspense 
advertised to Native applicants and their neighbors and communities that nothing 
would come of their applications for Social Security benefits.  
 Additionally, state welfare workers instituted administrative policies and 
procedures which made it difficult or impossible for needy Native people to even 
submit their applications for benefits. In their letter to Littell, a representative for 
Navajo Assistance Inc. described how “New Mexico welfare workers insist 
that…birth records must be registered in the County before they will accept such proof 
of age.” This posed a problem for many Navajos, because, “There are many isolated 
needy cases whose births have not been properly recorded.”91 Additionally, Ahkeah 
reported that after traveling a long distance from the reservation to apply for benefits 
in person, a group of Navajo applicants had been turned away by welfare workers who 
were “too busy to take the applications that day.”92 When they returned the following 
day, “they were informed that it would be necessary to furnish birth certificates for 
each member of the family, but, at the same time, were advised by the welfare worker 
that it wouldn’t be worth while to go to all that trouble,” because the payments 
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“wouldn’t amount to anything.”93 Ahkeah contended this conversation had 
“discouraged them to such an extent that they went home the second time and dropped 
the matter.”94 Forcing Native people to travel long distances only to be turned away 
because they lacked the proper paperwork broadcasted that needy Indians had very 
little chance of receiving monetary assistance after filing applications. County welfare 
offices also claimed a lack of staff equipped to handle intake and processing of Native 
applications. Alfred Jackson of the Pima-Maricopa Indian Community in Arizona 
noted in a letter to Ruth Bronson that social workers in Pinal County had advised the 
community that “we should not send any more Indians into the county office to apply, 
because there will probably be no one there to take applications.” Pinal County 
decided to send one worker to take applications on the reservation, “to review 10 
applications only and no more.”95 The director of the welfare office of San Juan 
County in New Mexico limited staff to processing “1 application per week.” 
According to Sam Ahkeah, “at this rate it would take approximately seven years to put 
the case load which is around 378 on Social Security here in the Shiprock vicinity.”96 
Ultimately, Native people faced many logistical and administrative difficulties in even 
getting their applications into the hands of state and county welfare workers.  
 As late as September of 1948, seven months after the February 10th Agreement, 
Indian Service employees expressed frustration and confusion over the lack of 
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progress and cooperation with county welfare boards. Mary Woodruff, social worker 
for the Pima Indian Agency, complained that “We have had to wait for months for the 
Welfare county offices to complete the processing of the Indian Applications.” 
Furthermore, she conveyed the hostility that county welfare workers expressed toward 
Indian applicants, stating, “We have also been told by the Pinal county office, that 
these applications, before they could be considered for Social Security, if the program 
ever goes through, would have to be visited once more and reviewed. This would take 
considerable time.”97 Later that month, the Arizona State Board of Social Security 
instituted additional directions for Indian applications. Not only would Native 
applications be marked with the racial signifier, “Ind.,” but would also be marked with 
the sentence, “Determination of eligibility and extent of need here recorded is based 
on information now available and is tentative.”98 This reflected Arizona and New 
Mexico’s assumption that the federal government would step in to provide funds for 
Native American applicants, or, that the issue would be resolved “by Congress or 
through the courts.”99 Stalling tactics by the state welfare boards had potentially 
devastating effects for needy Indians whose applications languished in “suspense 
files,” or who were turned away by caseworkers, who stated that it was “humanly 
impossible” to process Indian cases as well as white cases.100 Norman Littell argued 
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that the February 10th Agreement was “sabotage to a point where these Navajos will 
be marooned for the winter.”101  
 In addition to employing stalling tactics, welfare administrators directly 
articulated their resistance to including Native people on the Social Security rolls in 
Arizona and New Mexico. For example, after the February 10th Agreement was 
reached, board members of the State Board of Social Security and Welfare of Arizona 
issued a resolution to senators and representatives from Arizona and New Mexico 
which they had adopted at a June 1948 meeting. The board resolved that “Reservation 
Indians will not be accepted for categorical aid under the three programs of Old Age 
Assistance, Aid to Dependent Children and Aid to the Blind until final determination 
of the status of Reservation Indians has been made by a court of competent 
jurisdiction or through congressional action.”102 The board stated that they doubted 
that Indians on reservations were eligible for aid under the Social Security Act. They 
based their doubts on racialized assumptions about Indian tax exemption: “Had the 
Indians assumed the obligations of residents, paid their portion of taxes and placed 
their lands, herds and other property on the tax rolls of the state, no question would 
have been raised by the state in providing the benefits of the Social Security programs 
for Reservation Indians.”103 Thus it is no surprise that Indians faced delays and 
bureaucratic hurdles from the county boards of welfare well into 1949. This led to 
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confusion on the part of tribal councils and individual Indians who attempted to apply 
but were continually rebuked. Sam Ahkeah, Navajo Tribal Council Chairman, 
expressed his frustration to Norman Littell, asserting that, “It is very discouraging 
when we see, for instance in a daily newspaper on November 11th, ‘WELFARE 
PAYMENTS TO BE INCREASED FOR NEW MEXICANS’, and then the same 
paper the next day shows: WELFARE PAYMENT TO BE REDUCED FOR 
NAVAJO TRIBE.”104  
 
The Ambivalent Status of Social Security in the Termination Era  
 In January 1949, Senators Ernest McFarland (D-Arizona), Carl Hayden (D-
Arizona), Dennis Chavez (D-New Mexico), and Clinton Anderson (D-New Mexico) 
introduced a bill in the Senate which would have amended the Social Security Act to 
“provide for Federal aid for Indian wards for old age assistance, dependent children 
and aid to the blind.”105 The bill, S. 691, stipulated that the federal government would 
pay Social Security benefits to any “needy individuals residing on lands which are 
exempt from real property taxes by virtue of Federal laws and treaties in the States of 
New Mexico and Arizona.” Under S. 691, the Secretary of the Treasury would have 
disbursed funds to both Arizona and New Mexico to cover 80% of Native people’s 
OAA, ADC, and AB.106 While the states would administer applications, under this 
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amendment to the Social Security Act, funds would be allocated to come directly from 
the federal government. When they introduced the bill, the senators from Arizona and 
New Mexico framed their bill as a solution for the suffering “that seems to have 
existed among the old, the orphan and the blind year after year.” By “embracing our 
Indian wards of the Government into the Social Security plan,” Chavez proclaimed, 
“This bill would provide the means for an immediate response from the Government 
in taking care of the elderly, dependent children and the blind.”107 With this proposed 
bill, McFarland, Hayden, Chavez, and Anderson sidestepped any role their states 
played in continued Native suffering, and abdicated their states’ role in providing aid 
to needy Native people living on reservations.  
 Native people responded to S. 691 with frustration. A common theme woven 
through Native critiques of the bill was that it constituted “special treatment” or a 
“special handout” for Indians, and thus exemplified racial discrimination. For 
example, David Jackson, representative for the Pima-Maricopa Indian Community on 
the Gila River Reservation, wrote to Ruth Bronson in 1949 expressing his 
dissatisfaction with the bill. “We do not want to be handled separately or even set 
apart in separate class the social security as it should be dealt with on equality and not 
on the basis of special treatment,” Jackson wrote. “If the amendment passes, it will be 
another bill passed by Congress without the consent of the governed. JUSTICE?”108 
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Significantly, Jackson emphasized that as citizens, Native people were entitled to 
Social Security benefits on an equal basis with other citizens. To support his argument, 
he cited both the 1936 opinion by the Solicitor of the Interior of the applicability of the 
Social Security Act to Indians and the 1924 Indian Citizenship Act. However, Jackson 
also considered S. 691 as another example of policy being instituted without Native 
consent—and therefore, a violation of wardship as a legal agreement between the 
tribes and the government. In a letter to the Federal Security Agency soon after the bill 
was introduced, Ruth Bronson claimed that the bill meant Indians in New Mexico and 
Arizona would have to “beg special favors from Uncle Sam,” and that Native people 
did not “want to be a party to this raid on the federal treasury. We are against racial 
discrimination of all kinds, either that contained in Senate Bill 691 or that which is 
inherent in the present anti-Indian policies of New Mexico and Arizona.”109 Crucially, 
both Jackson and Bronson did not assert that the federal government was obligated to 
fulfill Social Security benefits under wardship. Rather, Indians were entitled to Social 
Security as citizens. Indeed, when lawyer James Curry analyzed the bill for the NCAI, 
he urged Native people to protest it, as he saw the bill as possibly engendering further 
racial antagonism towards Indians due to the “special handout” they would receive, 
which could potentially exacerbate stereotypes about ward Indians benefiting from 
their relationship with the government in ways other citizens did not.110 Thus, the bill 
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had the potential to undermine both Native peoples’ citizenship status, but also the 
legal arrangement of wardship.  
 In April 1949, representatives from the Federal Security Agency and the BIA 
met with the attorney generals of the states of Arizona and New Mexico, and the State 
Departments of Welfare of Arizona and New Mexico in Santa Fe and came to a 
compromise. Because of these meetings, plaintiffs in Mapatis v. Ewing dropped their 
complaint, and S. 691 did not progress further than the Senate Committee on Finance.  
 The 1949 Santa Fe conference was not a perfect solution to Native peoples’ 
battle for Social Security benefits. The agreement specified that needy Indians would 
receive most of the funds for their Social Security payments from the BIA. Funds 
allocated to the BIA for this purpose would satisfy “two-thirds the total need” of each 
eligible “reservation Indian.”111 Cases would be referred back to county welfare 
offices to satisfy the remaining funds, which “would not exceed 10 percent of the total 
cost incurred by the Federal and State government in aid to needy Indians.”112 
Although the Santa Fe agreement contained more concrete language which specified 
Indians’ entitlement to Social Security, the procedures were still racialized. Welfare 
caseworkers were to obtain information directly from Native applicants concerning 
their circumstances and eligibility, however, “the Indian Service [was] considered as 
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the primary source of information.”113 County departments were instructed to rely on 
Indian agents to facilitate home visits, verify financial data, and “report changes of all 
kinds in family resources and status.”114 In addition, payments would not be made to 
Indians from county welfare departments until they had received the funds from the 
BIA. The Santa Fe procedures did not resolve questions of wardship. Rather, this 
system of application, verification, and disbursement placed Native peoples’ wardship 
status before their citizenship status. Wardship did not protect Indians’ rights as 
citizens, as Native people were not assured they would even receive the entirety of 
their entitled benefits. They were only guaranteed the funds to satisfy two-thirds of 
their needs—and those funds were contingent upon a tenuous administrative 
relationship and Congressional appropriations decisions. 
 Despite the settlement reached in Santa Fe in 1949, legislators from Arizona and 
New Mexico persisted in their efforts to have the federal government assume all 
responsibility for Indian Social Security. In April of 1950, President Harry Truman 
approved Public Law 474, which provided millions of dollars for the “rehabilitation” 
of Navajo and Hopi Indians. The law, also known as the Navajo and Hopi 
Rehabilitation Act, was propelled by widespread media coverage of the poverty on 
Navajo and Hopi reservations in Arizona and New Mexico. Attached to this bill was a 
provision “increasing the Federal share of public assistance payments for needy 
Indians of these tribes who reside on reservations or on allotted trust lands and who 
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are recipients of old-age assistance, aid to dependent children, or aid to the blind.” 
Under the new law, the federal government would pay “80 percent of the state’s 
regular share.”115 Although Truman remarked that he was not “enthusiastic about 
these social security provisions,” he felt that they were “justified under the special 
conditions that prevail in Arizona and New Mexico.” Furthermore, a staffer mused 
that Truman “recognizes that they constitute the sugar which spurred this bill 
along.”116 Thus, as James Curry noted in a report to the NCAI, “Arizona and New 
Mexico have been successful to some extent, in that the Navajo Rehabilitation Bill 
provides for eighty percent contributions by the federal government to social security 
for Navajos.”117 The Social Security provision attached to Public Law 474 
demonstrated an unwillingness on the part of the federal government to take a firm 
stance against state politicians’ entrenched resistance to providing Social Security 
benefits to Indians.118 By absolving Arizona and New Mexico from paying for Navajo 
and Hopi Social Security and at the same time authorizing a bill providing millions of 
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dollars for these tribes, the federal government did little to clarify where exactly 
Native people fit within the American polity.  
 Into the 1950s, Native people’s Social Security benefits continued to be marked 
with confusion, ambiguity, and a tenuous relationship with politics. Indians’ rights to 
Social Security were inscribed in the law, both in the language of the Social Security 
Act, which prohibited discrimination based on race in the administration of benefits to 
citizens, and through exterior agreements like the one reached in Santa Fe. However, 
in 1951, the Hualapai Tribal Council sent a letter to Governor of Arizona, J. Howard 
Pyle, protesting the fact that Arizona had refused once again to issue Social Security 
benefits to Indians. The council noted that “the State’s excuse for not making these 
payments is that the Federal Government has not come forward with their promised 
funds under the Santa Fe agreement.” However, they firmly stated, “this is no excuse 
for the State again to refuse to carry out it’s responsibility toward it’s citizens.”119 
Furthermore, that same year Arizona announced a blanket refusal to issue payments to 
Indians living on reservations for disability insurance, newly added to the Social 
Security Act.120 Clarence Wesley, Chairman of the San Carlos Apache Tribal Council, 
critiqued the decision, arguing that, rather than accepting a program which “the State 
finances with Federal help,” Arizona refused “hundreds of thousands of dollars of 
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Federal aid.” Wesley asserted, “There are some politicians in the State who would 
rather throw away hundreds of thousands of dollars than give help to one crippled 
Indian kid.”121 It was clear to Native people in Arizona that the state’s continued 
resistance to issuing public assistance payments to Indians from state funds was rooted 
in racial discrimination.  
 The conflict over Native eligibility for Social Security benefits did not have a 
clear resolution. Native people in Arizona and New Mexico entered the 1950s unsure 
of whether they would be able to obtain benefits due to fund shortages or 
discrimination at the state or local level. This tension was only heightened as 
politicians from multiple states increased their calls for terminating the BIA.122  If the 
BIA was terminated, states would be responsible for caring for Indians just like other 
citizens and Arizona and New Mexico’s argument that Native people were wards of 
the federal government and thus not under the purview of the states would be moot. 
Although the states would be required to issue benefits to Native people, Indians had 
good reason to be concerned that the racial discrimination they had experienced would 
continue.  
 In 1952, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dillon Myer, a major supporter of 
termination, argued in his address before the Western Governor’s Conference that 
services provided to Indians by the Bureau could be transferred to “other 
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governmental agencies if it is the type of service normally rendered by government to 
citizens generally.” Myer touted Social Security as an example of an area where the 
Bureau’s responsibilities were already limited.123 It is unclear how well this proposal 
went over at this particular conference, given that it was located in Phoenix, Arizona, 
where the BIA’s involvement in Social Security was anything but limited. However, 
Myer’s statement illustrates the extent to which inclusion in the welfare state was a 
contested arena of Native American citizenship in the mid-twentieth century. Like 
other citizens, Native people experienced citizenship through the federal government 
and the states. Like other citizens of color, Native Americans faced resistance and 
racial hostility from local welfare administrators in their attempts to access benefits 
they were entitled to as citizens. However, unlike other citizens, Native people were 
confronted with discrimination that was predicated upon wardship, which muddied 
perceptions of Native entitlement and need for public assistance. 
 
Conclusion 
 The mid-century battle over Native eligibility for welfare under the Social 
Security Act demonstrated how Arizonan and New Mexican state officials and the 
public resisted Indians’ incorporation into the American polity purely as citizens. 
Welfare officials, politicians, and the public saw wardship through a racialized lens, as 
a status that precluded citizenship. As Chapter 2 demonstrated, Native people 
demanded that the United States practice “government by consent” in their dealings 
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with Native tribes. By protesting state politicians’ and welfare workers’ application of 
wardship to deny them the benefits of citizenship, Native people in Arizona and New 
Mexico extended the demand for “government by consent” to apply to state 
governments. If Indians were wards of the federal government, they were also citizens 
of the individual states. Thus, Indians could demand that the federal government fulfill 
its “honest debt” under wardship and claim eligibility for welfare as citizens. 
Resources provided under both wardship and welfare may have gone to the same 
place—medical care, care of dependent children, and other forms of relief. However, 
Native people did not assert claims to both wardship and welfare for the same reasons.  
 Indians worked within and outside of the boundaries of wardship and 
citizenship, claiming their entitlement to benefits, and negotiating with state agents 
over the definitions and dimensions of their citizenship status. They submitted 
countless applications to local welfare offices, inquired after their benefits which 
never materialized, enlisted the assistance of lawyers and BIA agents on their 
reservations, petitioned governors, issued resolutions from tribal councils, provided 
limited benefits to tribal members, and took Arizona and New Mexico to court. These 
efforts were not motivated by a desire to simply integrate into the American polity and 
achieve illusive “first class citizenship.” Rather, Native people saw Social Security 
benefits as part of a broader drive for rights and recognition of their humanity. After 
hearing news of the February 10th Agreement in 1948, Abel Paisano, Chairman of the 
All-Pueblo Council, exalted that “after thirteen years of argument,” New Mexico had 
recognized that Indians were “entitled to social security benefits like other human 
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beings.”124 For Native people in Arizona and New Mexico, the pursuit of benefits 
under the Social Security Act was about obtaining equal treatment under the law, but it 
was also about their fellow citizens recognizing that their needs existed. Paisano 
continued, “We expect that hereafter our white neighbors will respect our land and 
water rights, and cooperate in other ways for our mutual welfare.”125 Paisano used the 
language of citizenship rights, but also called attention to tribal rights, to clarify 
misconceptions of wardship non-Natives used to justify the denial of Indian benefits. 
In other words, both wardship and welfare were ways to draw attention to Native 
need.  
 In the 1953 Arizona v. Hobby case, Arizona attempted to refuse disability 
payments under the Social Security Act to “any person of Indian blood while living on 
a federal Indian reservation.”126 When the Court rejected Arizona’s claims, the AAIA 
issued a press release which proclaimed that because of the case, the state of Arizona 
had announced that beginning that month, “Indians will be treated exactly like their 
black and white neighbors in social security programs for the aged, the blind, and 
dependent children.” Triumphantly, the AAIA asserted, “So far as the courts are 
concerned, these decisions mark the final burial of the doctrine of Indian wardship.”127 
                                                            
124 All Pueblo Council of New Mexico Press Release, Navajo-Hopi Indian File 11 - WH Indians - Veto 
Message of S.1407 October 1949 and Related Documents 2 of 2, Box 32, Harry S. Truman Staff 
Member Office Files, Philleo Nash Files, HSTL. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Karen M. Tani, States of Dependency: Welfare, Rights, and American Governance, 1935-1972 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 174. 
127 “Indians are Citizens, Not Wards,” AAIA Press Release, 1953, Assoc on American Indian Affairs (2 
of 2), Box 8, Supplement Approps. 1952 to Survey Conditions, SEN 83A-F9 (1928-1953), Committee 
on Interior and Insular Affairs Indian Affairs Investigating Subcommittee, RG 46, NAB. This press 
release also cites an influential decision reached by a judge in the Superior Court of California, Acosta 
v. County of San Diego, which asserted that despite being labeled “wards,” Indians were entitled to 
 204 
Historian Karen Tani has noted that this case formally required Arizona, “on paper, at 
least,” to “give Indians the material benefits of citizenship.”128 But was wardship 
completely buried? Did Indians truly secure the right to welfare benefits?  
 In 1957, issues over Native eligibility for state welfare resources resurfaced in 
other states. For example, county and state welfare boards in Montana utilized familiar 
refrains to block Indian access to social security. Caseworkers argued that Native 
people were the sole responsibility of the federal government, and that granting them 
relief would only intensify Indian poverty. For example, a letter written by the Lewis 
and Clark County Welfare Board in 1957 stated, “We are strongly opposed to aid for 
ward Indians, feeling they are the exclusive responsibility of the federal government. 
One of our principal objections is that if the ward Indians know they can leave the 
reservation and obtain relief, too many of them will flock to Montanan cities and 
simply intensify the problem of Indian slums.”129 That same year, the Montana 
Department of Public Welfare also argued that reservations were bounded spaces 
where state laws and resources could not intrude. In a statement on their policy, they 
claimed that since “the Indian reservation and its inhabitants comprise a sovereign unit 
of government; as such they have the right to handle their own affairs. This 
Department does not feel it can impose its services on a sovereign unit of 
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government.”130 In 1958, wardship and welfare again surfaced in a policy declaration 
by the “North Central States,” including North Dakota, South Dakota, and Minnesota. 
Representatives from those states claimed that, “Indian welfare is a Federal 
responsibility. Indians are located where they are as a result of Federal government 
action and for this reason some states do not have an Indian problem.” Quite 
reminiscent of the arguments made by officials in Arizona and New Mexico, the North 
Central states argued that it was “unfair that certain states should be forced to assume 
large financial outlays for proper and necessary Indian Services,” and that the “Federal 
Government is not meeting its total responsibility for Indian people.”131  
 Therefore, states continued to use wardship as a rationale for denying Native 
people the right to state welfare benefits. Paisano’s hope for cooperation and 
recognition from his white neighbors was unfulfilled in many ways. However, as 
subsequent chapters will demonstrate, Native people continued to engage and 
negotiate with bureaucrats, politicians, and the public and asserting their rights under 
both wardship and citizenship throughout the mid-twentieth century.  
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Chapter 4 
Gendered Dependency and the Quotidian Structures of Wardship: Monthly 
Dependency Allowances and Wives and Parents of Native Servicemen During 
World War II 
 
Introduction 
 In October 1943, Don Foster, Superintendent of Nevada’s Carson Indian 
Agency, issued a memo to all Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) field employees and 
tribal councils which described a San Francisco Examiner newspaper article published 
the previous month. The article explained that to obtain a monthly dependency 
allowances for families of servicemen, Private Kee S. Kaibetony, 22, and his wife, 
Nora Griggs, 21 had been married in a Presbyterian church. Though the couple had 
first appealed to the Red Cross, ultimately the “Government had refused to recognize 
their union by traditional tribal rites on a reservation in Arizona.” Foster urged Indian 
men eligible for the draft to “take this information seriously and take the necessary 
steps to protect the welfare of their families.”1 At first glance, this incident reflected a 
clash between tribal customs and state bureaucracy, because civil marriage was 
deemed lawful and tribal marriage was not recognized. However, Kaibetony and 
Griggs’ personal situation also exemplified larger issues of gender, welfare, and 
wardship in the context of World War II.  
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 First, in this memo, we can see how the BIA acted as a bridge between Indian 
communities and other offices of the federal government and the military. Foster 
issued the memo to ensure that Indian servicemen received the same benefits as other 
citizens in the military. In the WWII era, government agents’ commonly used BIA 
agents as go-betweens to communicate with Native people. Second, although Foster 
urged Native men to take the necessary steps to protect their families it was mainly 
Native women who engaged with bureaucrats in the BIA and other federal offices to 
claim dependency benefits. Native women conceptualized these benefits as rights due 
to them as citizens and as soldiers’ dependents. Third, the San Francisco Examiner 
article reveals how Native people proactively agitated for their rights despite the 
challenges they faced as racialized Indian wards. Notably, the article states that before 
agreeing to be married in the Presbyterian Church, Kaibetony and Griggs first 
appealed to the Red Cross, demonstrating how the couple refused to accept the denial 
of beneifts, and their commitment to accessing the benefits to which they were entitled 
as citizens.  
 What do the conflicts over WWII dependency allowances reveal about 
wardship? In conjunction with Chapter 5, on Native male veterans and the GI Bill, this 
chapter interrogates the relationship between wardship and military service. Native 
men’s service to the country introduced a new layer of uncertainty in the conversation 
surrounding wardship.2 Citizens understood that veterans were entitled to federal 
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protection and support—however, that protection and support was different from what 
the US government owed its Indian wards, and conflicts arose when these two 
categories clashed. As wards, Indian women were already viewed as “dependent” 
upon the government. Additionally, their relationship to entitlement benefits was 
defined by their relationships with their servicemen family members. Thus, Native 
women’s specific engagements with state agents over dependency allowances serve as 
a unique lens through which to examine the role of gender in ideas about Indian 
dependency and citizenship. Wardship factored into Native women’s battles for 
dependency allowances quite differently from the battles of Indians who were denied 
Social Security benefits. These differences were based on state agents’ explicitly 
gendered categorization of welfare and wardship.  
 Under the Servicemen’s Dependents Allowance Act of 1942, wives, children, 
and other dependent relatives of men in the lower grades of the military were eligible 
for a monthly allowance consisting of a contribution from the soldier’s paycheck and a 
contribution from the federal government.3 These allowances were also referred to as 
“dependency allotments.” A similar program to provide support for soldiers’ 
dependents had been adopted in World War I. However, during World War I, wives 
                                                            
no. 2 (Fall 1994), 159; Jere’ Bishop Franco, Crossing the Pond: The Native American Effort in World 
War II (Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 1999), 62. Thus, in this chapter, when referring 
to the service of Native Americans, I am referring to Native men’s service, specifically men in the 
seventh, sixth, fifth, and fourth military grades (in the Army: private, private first class, technician fifth 
grade, corporal, technician fourth grade, and sergeant). Monthly Allowances for the Dependents of 
Soldiers Pamphlet, Veteran’s Rehabilitation, Box 165, Colorado River Agency Central Classified Files 
(CRCC Files), Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record Group 75 (RG 75), National Archives 
and Records Administration - Pacific Region (Riverside) (NARA – Pacific Region (R)). 
3 Monthly Allowances for the Dependents of Soldiers Pamphlet, Veteran’s Rehabilitation, Box 165, 
CRCC Files, RG 75, NARA – Pacific Region (R). 
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directly applied for benefits, whereas during WWII the soldiers applied for 
dependency allowances or allotments through their commanding officers. This severed 
the “unmediated relationship between women and the national state” which historian 
K. Walter Hickel has shown provided women with considerable leverage during 
World War I.4 Because the soldier himself was tasked with applying for benefits, 
conflict naturally arose between families, servicemen, and bureaucratic state agents. 
The resulting red tape was not necessarily something unique to Native families. 
However, Native wives and parents did face challenges in claiming benefits due to 
their ambiguous status as both citizens and wards, which often meant that their claims 
were funneled through an additional layer of bureaucracy.  
 Historians of Native Americans’ participation in WWII have argued that the 
war opened the reservation and “introduced thousands of Indians, voluntarily and 
involuntarily, to the world beyond.”5 This scholarly reification of the separation 
between the “reservation” and the “world beyond” builds off mid-century linear 
interpretations of Indians’ trajectory from “wardship” to “citizenship.” Pro-termination 
non-Natives argued that because of Indian men’s military service, Native people had 
“won the right to be treated like all other Americans” and were thus ready to be 
“emancipated” from the yoke of governmental guidance.6 In other words, because 
                                                            
4 K. Walter Hickel, “War, Region, and Social Welfare: Federal Aid to Servicemen’s Dependents in the 
South, 1917-1921,” The Journal of American History 87, no. 4 (March 2001), 1364. 
5 Alison R. Bernstein, American Indians and World War II: Toward a New Era in Indian Affairs 
(Norman; London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 87. For a more thorough critique of this 
argument, see Chapter 5.  
6 Ibid, 159. Bernstein has gone so far as to argue that war played an important role in turning American 
Indians into “Indian Americans.” For more on these terminationist views, see Donald Fixico, 
Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945-1960 (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico, 1986), xiv; 14. 
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Native men had performed the ultimate duty of citizenship—military service—they 
deserved the privileges of citizenship, and should no longer be considered wards. 
However, monthly dependency allowances claimed by the families of soldiers provide 
a lens through which to examine whether WWII was as transformative for Native 
servicemen and their families as has terminationists and some historians have 
proclaimed. A close examination of the specifically racialized experiences of Native 
servicemen’s dependents reveals that formal eligibility did not mean they could easily 
access federal benefits based on military service in the same manner as other 
Americans. Rather, as wards, Native wives and parents who sought dependency 
allowances had to operate within the confines of wardship, a structure of bureaucracy 
which they knew well.  
 Historians have noted that the New Deal led many Americans to view 
citizenship as “a reciprocal relationship” between the federal government and 
constituents.7 World War II was clearly a “critical turning point for the growth of the 
federal government” that built upon and expanded New Deal interventions.8 However, 
under the terms and conditions of wardship, Native men and women were already 
used to the federal government interfering in their lives, right down to the most 
intimate moments of birth, marriage, and death. In fact, one could argue that, while the 
war may have “unlocked” the reservation for some Native people, allowing them to 
experience the wider world, it also exposed other American citizens to the 
                                                            
7 Paul C. Rosier, Serving Their Country: American Indian Politics and Patriotism in the Twentieth 
Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 70. 
8 James T. Sparrow, Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), 6. 
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bureaucratic processes that Indians had been dealing with for years. This statement is 
not to lend credence to the fears of conservative politicians and members of the media 
about the expansion of the welfare state turning all Americans into “wards” described 
in Chapter 2. Rather, I argue that in the sense of day-to-day interactions with state 
agents over the disbursement of resources and benefits, Native people were quite 
familiar with a large government presence in their lives. 
 But this also would be too simple an analysis. For even though Indian men and 
women were used to dealing with bureaucracy, they still faced a level of racial 
hostility that drastically affected the so-called “reciprocal relationship” between their 
families and the federal government. Historian Al Carroll has noted that military 
service has occupied a significant place in Native communities for years, providing a 
means for “cultural preservation, revival, and defense” of warrior traditions. He 
stresses that the impact of the military on Native communities is second to that of only 
one other governmental entity: the BIA. “Certainly,” Carroll writes, “the military 
shows itself to be far more responsive to Native wishes and needs than the BIA.”9 
While this claim may be borne out in the case of Native veterans of World War II, the 
effect of military service on the families of veterans on the home front is not as 
positive. Furthermore, the military and the BIA cannot be so easily separated. 
Throughout the war, the BIA was intimately entwined with servicemen’s families on 
the home front, and Native Americans’ ambiguous racial status as “wards” 
significantly affected how they were treated as recipients of government benefits. 
                                                            
9 Al Carroll, Medicine Bags and Dog Tags: American Indian Veterans from Colonial Times to the 
Second Iraq War (Lincoln; London: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 223. 
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Native men’s service did not negate assumptions associated with Indians’ designation 
as “wards.” State agents working with the Veteran’s Administration, the Red Cross, 
and most importantly, the BIA, struggled to fit Native American contributions to the 
war effort—and their corresponding entitlements due to that service—into familiar 
categories. It was unclear whether Native servicemen and their dependents were to be 
considered citizens like any other, or as wards who still required the guardianship of 
the BIA.  
 In 1944, Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier composed a statement 
on “Indians in the Armed Forces,” to be issued throughout the BIA, most likely for his 
bi-monthly newsletter, Indians at Work. In the statement he expounded on the bravery 
and commitment of Native men serving in the armed forces, as well as the “40,000 
Indians in war industry, and these old folks and women and children who have 
replaced the Indian manpower gone to war and have gone on increasing the food 
production of the Indians.”10 Collier connected Native service in WWII to the “record 
of noble fighting for the Indian homelands.”11 In this statement, he connected the 
“dictatorship” of the US government before the passage of the Indian Reorganization 
Act to the fascism the United States was fighting overseas. With their supposedly 
inherent knowledge of “the spirit of true and profound democracy,” Native Americans 
                                                            
10 John Collier, “Indians in the Armed Forces,” 1944, Series III - Commissioner’s Subject File, Part II 
1933-1945, John Collier Papers (University Microfilms International, Reel 31), Arizona State 
University Law Library. 
11 Ibid. 
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turned their efforts to support “their present country.”12 Collier stressed Native 
selflessness and contribution to the war effort to combat attacks on the Indian 
Reorganization Act by legislators who wished to terminate the BIA. Furthermore, 
Collier’s narrative expressed a natural trajectory for Native people from defending 
their ancestral homelands against the march of westward expansion to fighting for the 
United States against international enemies of democracy, thereby solidifying a place 
for Indians in the American polity. However, Collier’s praise of Native “old folks and 
women and children’s” contribution could have filtered down through BIA 
bureaucracy and been interpreted by wives and elderly parents of Native servicemen 
in a different way: as assurance that people like them were entitled to benefits in return 
for their efforts. These benefits were understood to be in exchange for exercising the 
duty of citizenship, in addition to the government’s obligation to fulfill its “honest 
debt” to Native nations.  
 This chapter extends the analysis of the relationship between wardship and 
welfare by examining the impact of wardship on the WWII-era home front. First, I 
unpack the ways in which Native wives of servicemen engaged with BIA agents, 
social workers, members of the Red Cross, the military, and other state actors to 
access the benefits they were due. I call these negotiations and clashes the “quotidian 
structures of wardship.” Crucially, Indian women engaged with wardship on this day-
to-day level to claim their benefits as citizens. In these cases, Indians’ peoples’ efforts 
                                                            
12 John Collier, “Indians in the Armed Forces,” 1944, Series III - Commissioner’s Subject File, Part II 
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University Law Library. 
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to claim rights and recognition of their needs within the mid-twentieth-century welfare 
state were structured by the interactions between wardship and citizenship. Second, I 
examine the role of racial animosity in battles over receipt of dependency allowances. 
Returning to the state of Arizona, which, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, was 
clearly hostile towards racialized Indians, I examine the difficulties faced by Native 
men and women whose tribal marriages were not recognized as legal within the state. 
The differentiation between tribal custom marriage and civil marriage revealed how 
racial discrimination reified a separation between citizenship and wardship which had 
no real basis. Arizona’s “racial logic” classified tribal marriages as immoral and 
loosely regulated. The Indian men and women who were married by tribal law and, as 
a result, were denied dependency benefits, exemplify a long trajectory of racial 
hostility towards Native practices of marriage which fundamentally influenced how 
they would be integrated into the American polity. Third, I unpack multiple layers of 
racialized and gendered dependency at play in conflicts over dependency allowances. 
These issues of dependency are particularly clear in cases where elderly parents 
attempted to access benefits from their sons serving in the military. In these 
interactions, we can see more examples of the quotidian structures of wardship. 
However, in these cases, recipients’ ages and relationships with their sons exacerbated 
and intensified racial and gender stereotypes associated with dependency and 
wardship. In turn, the layers of dependency at play in these interactions significantly 
impacted elderly Indians’ rights as American citizens. Overall, this chapter 
demonstrates how Native women and elderly parents engaged with wardship in their 
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efforts to obtain the rights due to them as citizens. Conflicts over dependency 
allowances reveal complex interactions between wardship and citizenship in the 
context of welfare benefits.   
 
The Quotidian Structures of Wardship: Native Wives at the Junctures of 
Wardship and Citizenship 
 In Native peoples’ daily lives, wardship as a legal and ideological category 
manifested in through their negotiations with state agents. Although Native people and 
state agents often operated under very different definitions of what wardship was, they 
shared an understanding of the history of the strong role the federal government 
played in Indian lives. In other words, while Native people may not have consented to 
or even agreed with actions taken by agents of the BIA, nevertheless, they were 
familiar with those types of actions. Native women utilized their familiarity with their 
day-to-day interactions with state agents—the “quotidian structures of wardship”—to 
access the benefits due to them as servicemen’s wives. This section unpacks several 
case studies from Nevada and Arizona to explore how wardship was intertwined with 
these efforts to claim the rights of citizenship.  
 Official correspondence from the BIA reveals Native men and women’s 
challenges in obtaining monthly dependency allotments from relatives serving in the 
military. The case of Sarah Moore, a Paiute woman living on the Pyramid Lake 
Reservation in the mid-1940s, demonstrates several unique and significant aspects of 
what it meant to be simultaneously a Native woman, an American citizen, and a ward 
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in the WWII-era of government bureaucracy. Moore’s case illustrates the clash 
between Paiute customs and governmental regulations, the extent to which BIA 
employees were involved in Native families’ affairs, and the lengths that Indian 
women went to ensure that they received the benefits to which they were entitled.  
 Moore’s husband Howard, who was stationed at Fort Bragg in North Carolina, 
was her second husband. Before her marriage to Howard, Moore had been married to 
Martin Lopez from 1929 to 1933. However, her marriage to Lopez had been common-
law, leaving no record “according to tribal custom.”13 Before Moore and her four 
children (two of whom were Lopez’s children) could obtain the monthly assistance to 
which they were entitled under the Servicemen’s Dependents Allowance Act, 
representatives from the Office of Dependency Benefits communicated with officials 
from the Pyramid Lake Tribal Council to prove the “validity” of Sarah’s marriage to 
Howard and to ascertain “whether or not she was divorced from Martin Lopez before 
her marriage to Private Howard Moore.”14 Sarah Moore’s benefits were thus the 
official business not only of herself and her immediate family, but also members of the 
tribal council, military officials, and the superintendent and social worker associated 
with the Carson Indian Agency in Nevada. Letters back and forth from the chairman 
of the tribal council and the Office of Dependency Benefits verifying her marriage to 
Howard Moore were dated in late August of 1945. By mid-October of the same year, 
                                                            
13 Letter from Albert Aleck, Chairman of Tribal Council, NC 16/12/8 – Welfare Case Records Ca-Cl 
late 1930s, Box 9, Series 12 – Tribal Society and Daily Life 1930s-1964, PLPT, UNR. 
14 Letter from Major H.A. Lake, Officer in Charge, Special Inquiries Branch, Records of the Pyramid 
Lake Paiute Tribe, NC16/12/8 – Welfare Case Records Ca-Cl late 1930s, Box 9, Series 12 – Tribal 
Society and Daily Life 1930s-1964, PLPT, UNR. 
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Moore had still not received any payments. A letter from Ralph Gelvin, the 
superintendent of the Carson Agency, to Steve Ryan, a BIA representative in Nixon, 
Nevada, relayed a message from Moore’s mother in reference to her daughter’s 
dependency allowance: Howard had “informed her of his attempts to secure an 
allotment; that deductions have been made from his wages therefore but she has to 
date received none.”15 Gelvin wrote to ask the representative to “visit Mrs. Moore and 
ascertain the full story.”16 Since this letter is the last piece of surviving correspondence 
related to this matter, it is unclear as to how long it took for Moore to finally receive 
her benefits.  
 This story, with its varying cast of official and informal characters, is not 
unique to Sarah and Howard Moore. Rather, it demonstrates several issues Native 
families faced during WWII which reflected the coexistence of wardship and 
citizenship. The extent of the bureaucracy involved in dispensing benefits to Native 
families was tinged with misunderstandings and assumptions associated with 
wardship. Sarah Moore—speaking through her mother’s message to Superintendent 
Gelvin—communicated that her husband Howard had taken the proper steps to secure 
her dependency allotment. Soldiers were expected to apply for family allowances 
through their commanding officers, filling out an application form “following the 
simple directions thereon.”17 From there, the application was sent to the Allowance 
                                                            
15 Letter from Gelvin, Superintendent of Carson Agency, NC16/12/8 – Welfare Case Records Ca-Cl 
late 1930s, Box 9, Series 12 – Tribal Society and Daily Life 1930s-1964, PLPT, UNR. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Monthly Allowances for the Dependents of Soldiers Pamphlet, Veteran’s Rehabilitation, Box 165, 
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and Allotment Branch in Washington DC, where each case would be investigated. If 
approved, dependents could expect to receive benefits in the next month, which would 
continue “up until 6 months after the present war ends.”18 Assuming that all 
application forms had been properly filled out and submitted—and because deductions 
were already being taken from his monthly paycheck, we can assume that they were—
Private Howard Moore would have expected to have $92 sent to Sarah and the four 
children in his household each month, made up from both a contribution from his own 
paycheck and the rest from the government.19 Sarah Moore’s previous common law 
marriage introduced a hiccup in the bureaucratic process, stalling the payments that 
the Moores needed. However, even after the tribal council verified Sarah’s marriage to 
Howard, Sarah was still waiting for payments and had to reach out to both a family 
member and BIA employees to assist her in receiving her benefits. Furthermore, none 
of the surviving documentation contains Sarah’s voice, revealing that she was, for 
some reason, effaced and unable to communicate with the government directly. Both 
her racial and legal status as a Paiute meant that Sarah’s benefits could be significantly 
delayed, whether due to the need to fit the tribal custom of common law marriage into 
the state’s legal requirements, or due to the assumptions of Indian Service personnel 
who attempted “to help her out of this uneasy situation.”20  
                                                            
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. Howard Moore would have been expected to contribute $22 per month, deducted from his 
wages. The governmental contribution for a wife with one child was $40, with $10 for each additional 
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20 Letter from Gelvin, Superintendent of Carson Agency, NC16/12/8 – Welfare Case Records Ca-Cl 
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 Although Gelvin’s letter instructing Steve Ryna, the BIA representative in 
Nixon, Nevada, to visit Moore and “ascertain the full story,” possibly revealed good 
intentions, those intentions were backed by a sense of distrust of Moore and her 
claims. Furthermore, while Moore’s mother had written to Gelvin on August 29, he 
had waited until October 17 to respond to their concerns, and had not communicated 
directly with Moore or her mother, but asked Ryan to visit Mrs. Moore. Sarah Moore’s 
mother noted that Howard had been in the service for four months at the time of her 
letter. Thus, Sarah and her children were waiting on hundreds of dollars of 
dependency benefits. Those funds would have significantly impacted their livelihood.  
 Why did Gelvin ask Ryan to visit Moore and report back? Assumptions about 
the nature of Indian wardship and the role of BIA agents to both protect and supervise 
Indian people certainly played a role in his choice. Gelvin had likely received a BIA 
circular letter distributed to all superintendents in 1943, which stated that the Office of 
Dependency Benefits had advised that “superintendents may be designated to receive 
the allotments for children payable under the provisions of the Servicemen’s 
Dependents Allowance Act of 1942 where we are satisfied that the mother or other 
person receiving such funds is squandering or using such funds to the disadvantage or 
detriment of the children.”21 While Gelvin did not seem to assume that Moore was 
“squandering” her benefits, the fact that he had been invested with the power to 
receive and distribute the benefits on her behalf clearly affected their relationship. BIA 
superintendents’ power to intervene when they discovered that Native women were 
                                                            
21 Circular Letter from Fred A. Daiker, Director of Welfare, March 1943, War Pamphlets, Box 202, 
Sells Indian Agency Files of Community Worker, RG 75, NARA – Pacific Region (R). 
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improperly spending or receiving benefits filtered Native women’s receipt of welfare 
benefits through their status as wards. For example, in 1944, C. H. Gensler, 
superintendent of the Colorado River Indian Agency in Arizona wrote to the Office of 
Dependency Benefits to report that the daughter of Henry Dock, a soldier from the 
Colorado River Reservation, had died in 1943, and her mother, Ione Dock had been 
“receiving dependency payments for her child for almost a year now to which she is 
not entitled.”22 We cannot know why Ione Dock did not report her daughter’s death to 
the Office of Dependency Benefits. However, whether it was an administrative task 
Dock had overlooked because of her grief, or done purposefully, the fact remained that 
Dock’s benefits were subject to Gensler’s oversight and supervision. Gensler 
instructed the office to “advise the amount of refund that [Dock] should make,” and to 
address future correspondence to Dock herself, but to include copies for Gensler’s 
own files.23 While Suzanne Mettler has argued that it was individual states who added 
extra requirements and treated beneficiaries as “dependent persons who required 
supervision and protection,” it is clear in the case of Native dependency allowances 
that orders for supervising and protecting Native beneficiaries also came from the 
federal level, demonstrating Native peoples’ consistent ambiguity between wardship 
and citizenship.24   
 Sarah Moore’s situation reveals that when the history of wardship is factored 
into the history of welfare benefits, the dichotomy between federal and state eligibility 
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23 Ibid.  
24 Mettler, Dividing Citizens, 24. 
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requirements is disrupted. Although Moore and her husband seem to have followed all 
protocols required of other American citizens, in the eyes of the bureaucratic state 
apparatus they were subject to additional scrutiny and supervision solely based on 
their racial and legal status as Indians. The Office of Dependency Benefits’ granted 
authority to BIA agents to receive the funds on behalf of Native wives likely because 
of their racial bias and distrust of Native women to responsibly care for their own 
children. Additionally, the Office of Dependency Benefits’ instructions revealed the 
office’s misconceptions about the nature of wardship. They assumed that Native 
women would not have been able to utilize the funds in a way that would align with 
white societal norms.  
 Sarah and Howard Moore’s difficulties in obtaining Sarah’s dependency 
allotment payments also demonstrate how Native women worked within the quotidian 
structures of wardship, to make the bureaucratic process work for them. When Sarah 
Moore did not receive her benefits, she used the system that had been set up 
previously to supposedly “protect and guide” her—the BIA’s network of social 
workers and superintendents. Just as the Office of Dependency Benefits assumed that 
as an Indian woman, she might be unable to responsibly make use of her benefits and 
would be better off entrusting them to a BIA agent, Sarah Moore might have assumed 
that she was more likely to see the money if official communication came directly 
from a BIA agent. In this way, the experiences of Native women introduce a new 
aspect into the historical consideration of women and government benefits. It is clear, 
as Linda Gordon has shown, that governmental and welfare agencies are not only 
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institutions of “social control,” but are influenced by clients and beneficiaries of aid.25 
Because Native people understood wardship as a legal relationship between tribes and 
the federal government, asking a government representative to file paperwork, inquire 
after benefits, or write official correspondence should not be viewed as Native 
women’s capitulation to a state of dependence upon the federal government. Sarah 
Moore and her mother wrote directly to Superintendent Gelvin, and he took steps to 
solve the problem. However, as will be discussed further below, the relationship that 
Native women had with state agents cannot solely be classified as positive. After all, 
Gelvin’s actions were late, and his letters were tinged with the BIA’s long history of 
paternalism. But, Moore’s familiarity with governmental bureaucracy imbued her with 
the ability to interact with the variety of new organizational units WWII introduced 
into the lives of Native women—the Red Cross, the Veteran’s Administration, and the 
Office of Dependency Benefits. 
 Thus, although Native women faced scrutiny and racialized assumptions about 
their abilities as mothers, they employed superintendents and social workers to 
intervene on their behalves when they were due more money or needed to 
communicate with their husbands. For example, in 1943, Josie French, a Paiute 
woman, discussed the increase she was due on her monthly family allowance from the 
Navy, where her husband, Cornelius French, was serving, with Carson Agency social 
worker Tephia Slater. Cornelius had failed to list all his eligible children on his 
application for a family allowance. Josie discovered this mistake and communicated it 
                                                            
25 See Linda Gordon, Heroes of Their Own Lives: The Politics and History of Family Violence: Boston, 
1880-1960 (New York: Viking, 1988), 6. 
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to Slater, who then wrote to another BIA employee to get the message to Cornelius’ 
Commanding Officer.26 By communicating with BIA employees, Josie directly 
requested that her family allowance be increased. Additionally, Josie had requested 
her husband’s release from the Navy due to the financial hardship she was facing at 
home. Through her correspondence with the BIA, she discovered that her husband 
would be able to receive a higher monthly salary by staying in the service than by 
returning to his previous job, since Slater had communicated with his former 
employers. Slater’s language can be read as paternalistic. She did not expend her 
efforts on Josie’s behalf purely because Josie was entitled to her benefits as a citizen 
and a wife of a servicemen. Rather, Slater’s status as a social worker also endowed her 
with the power to communicate with French’s employers and make judgments about 
how Josie should spend her additional money each month. For example, in regards to 
Cornelius staying with the Navy, Slater took a patronizing tone: “Thus if he remains in 
the Service he will be more able to care for the family.”27 And she wrote that if Josie’s 
allowances were increased, Josie could “keep her accounts straight and care for the 
necessary milk for the baby.”28 Overall though, Josie’s attempts to increase her 
monthly allowances and care for her family by any means possible overshadows 
Slater’s opinions on what was best for the French family. Josie must have been 
familiar with these types of judgments, because they exemplified the quotidian 
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structures of wardship. Josie asked for Slater’s assistance to obtain the benefits to 
which she and her children were entitled—and she received them.  
 Thus, requesting the help of outside, non-Native agencies and institutions 
could also be a double-edged sword—along with social workers and superintendents’ 
good intentions came paternalistic attitudes and opinions about the best way to 
structure families and finances, as illustrated above. When Mrs. George Pete (Paiute) 
went to the Washoe County Chapter of the Red Cross in July of 1942 “asking for 
assistance in supporting herself and her children until November when the government 
contribution will go into effect along with an allowance made by her husband,” Red 
Cross Executive Secretary Celestia Coulson reached out to the BIA to verify Pete’s 
story and inquire further into her family’s situation.29 Pete went to the Red Cross to 
obtain help in paying debts of $60 at her local grocery store. Coulson wrote to E.B. 
Hudson, the BIA representative in Nixon, Nevada,30 asking, “Will you please check 
with Mrs. Pete and see what the whole thing is about since we cannot see how a man 
with a wife and three children dependent on him could have joined the Army without 
saying he was single?”31 From her language in this letter, is clear that Coulson doubted 
Mrs. Pete’s understanding of her own financial and family situation. Coulson asked 
several follow-up questions of Hudson, including whether he thought assistance was 
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necessary, and “what is the least this family can live on a month?”32 Thus, while Pete 
had endeavored to help herself and her family get out of debt by making use of an 
organization explicitly designed to help soldiers and their families, the representative 
from that organization had no qualms about checking on the validity of her financial 
situation by communicating with the BIA. Indeed, BIA personnel conducted 
investigations at the request of the Red Cross on a regular basis. For example, in 
several monthly reports between 1944 and 1946 to the superintendent of the Sells 
Agency, the agency “community worker” described conducting weekly investigations 
for the Red Cross as well as completing “Family Allowance papers,” delivering 
checks, and “keep[ing] up with the ever-changing addresses of over 270 
Servicemen.”33 As a ward, Pete was subject to racialized assumptions about the power 
dynamics between government agents and Indian people. Coulson used the BIA not 
only to verify Pete’s story, but to judge whether Pete was entitled to benefits—
revealing that in her mind, Pete’s wardship outweighed her citizenship. 
 Although families like the Petes were undoubtedly used to the interference of 
state agents into their homes and lives, the impact of the war also introduced new 
frustrations about this involvement. In a letter to Paiute Doris Shaw, who was visiting 
her mother-in-law in California, E.B. Hudson revealed how strongly BIA paternalism 
still resonated. The Red Cross had asked Hudson to check on Shaw’s allotment checks 
and found that Shaw’s mother had been holding the checks for her. Finding this less 
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than desirable, Hudson asked Shaw’s mother to take the checks to the Post Office to 
be forwarded to Shaw in California, but Shaw’ mother was reluctant to do this because 
Shaw “had a bill at the store.”34 Hudson then went to the store to investigate the 
situation and discovered that Shaw had asked the store to hold the checks until she 
returned from her trip, and they had in turn given them to her mother, “thinking that it 
would be better to have her keep them.”35 Hudson ended his letter by assuring Doris 
Shaw that he would send a colleague to make sure that Shaw’s mother returned the 
checks to the Post Office, and admonished Shaw for not paying her bill. “In all 
fairness to Mr. Crosby, who extended credit to you when you needed it,” he wrote, “I 
think that you should pay him as soon as you cash your checks...In this way you will 
feel better because then you will owe no one.”36  
 It is possible that Doris Shaw and her mother were not on the best terms, and 
Shaw herself had originally contacted the Red Cross about the whereabouts of her 
allotment checks. However, even if Shaw had sought to adjudicate a possible family 
disagreement by appealing to outside authorities, the extent to which Hudson 
intervened does deserve critical attention. Not only did Hudson involve himself 
intimately in Shaw’s family business by investigating her and her mother’s accounts 
of what had transpired, he also instructed her as to the best way to resolve her debt and 
spend the money she received from her monthly allotment checks. Hudson apparently 
had no qualms about involving himself in this way, even though Doris Shaw had left 
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the reservation for personal business and had taken precautions to make sure her 
checks were held for her in a safe place—the very store she was indebted to—until she 
returned.  Thus, even as they negotiated the emotional and financial difficulties 
associated with having a husband overseas in the military, Native wives found 
themselves subjected to BIA assumptions associated with perceptions of their inability 
to manage their own affairs as wards. The quotidian structures of wardship manifested 
through BIA agents’ continued racialized and gendered assumptions about Native 
women.  
 
The Racial Logic of Dependency Allowances: Conflicts over Tribal Marriage in 
Arizona 
 The difficulties Native women faced in obtaining dependency allowances 
differed greatly from those elderly and needy Indians faced in obtaining benefits under 
the Social Security Act. Assumptions about wardship played a role in both scenarios. 
However, in the Social Security restrictions, it was the states of Arizona and New 
Mexico which prevented Indians from accessing benefits of citizenship, while in 
dependency allowance battles, it was federal agents who filtered Native women’s 
rights as citizens through their impressions of wardship. In Arizona, the state/federal 
line was blurred for Native families who attempted to access monthly dependency 
allowances. This was due to Arizona’s history of racial discrimination against Indians, 
and the perpetuation of a “racial logic” of Indian inferiority and immorality. In this 
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section, I will analyze how Arizona’s racial logic influenced Native women’s welfare 
benefits, by discussing non-Native assumptions about the dangers of tribal marriage.  
 The case of Rita Gomez Moreno and Julian Moreno, members of the Tohono 
O’odham tribe (formerly known as Papago) from the Sells Agency in Arizona, 
demonstrates the considerable difficulties that Native servicemen and their wives 
faced in a state particularly rife with discrimination towards Indians. Rita Gomez 
Moreno and Julian Moreno had a common-law marriage before Julian left for the 
service. In August 1943, Rita gave birth to a son while living with her sister in Los 
Angeles. In October, she went to the Los Angeles chapter of the Red Cross, where 
workers helped her contact her husband to fill out forms for a family allowance for 
herself and her son. Two months later they received an affidavit from Julian 
acknowledging the paternity of the child. By this time, Rita had returned to Arizona 
“to live with her people.” The Los Angeles Red Cross then forwarded her paperwork 
to the Tucson chapter of the organization.37  
 Although Rita Moreno had taken the initiative to have the Red Cross 
communicate with her husband on her behalf to receive essential paperwork, she heard 
nothing from the Office of Dependency Benefits. Finally, in March 1944, the Office of 
Dependency Benefits communicated to the Red Cross that either a birth certificate or 
baptismal certificate for her child had to be submitted with the application, despite the 
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fact that Julian had signed a sworn statement attesting to his paternity of the child.38 
This communication trail involved many steps: the Office of Dependency Benefits 
contacted the Red Cross, who then contacted the Community Worker associated with 
the Sells Indian Agency, who was then charged with assisting Rita in obtaining the 
proper documentation.  
 Although the Office of Dependency Benefits seems to have initially approved 
her application, Rita received a letter in July of 1944 claiming her eligibility for 
benefits had not been established and demanding that she return $600 of 
“overpayment,” listing out payments of $50 per month starting in September of 1942. 
Undoubtedly this situation was quite confusing and complicated for Rita Moreno, who 
had not received any such payments. She enlisted the assistance of Wade Head, the 
superintendent of the Sells Agency, to help her communicate with the Office of 
Dependency Benefits, who suggested that, “Since Rita Gomez is the common-law 
wife of Pfc. Moreno, there has been difficulty in securing benefits, as our records 
indicate.”39 The process was also quite tedious for Julian Moreno, who wrote to his 
wife at some point in the affair from Prisoner of War Camp Florence in Coolidge, 
Arizona to express his frustration about the bureaucratic process. He explained to Rita 
that he had been called in to the personnel office, first to “show me the amount of 
money I now owe for your allotment and baby’s,” and later that same day, to “sign 
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affidavits at another office.” Since he had no witnesses for the affidavits, he was 
instructed to “write overseas to a couple of boys I know” to obtain assistance in 
formulating his statement. He also assured Rita that the office staff were “fixing up 
some other papers for you to sign and swear, before a notary public.”40 Although 
Julian seemed frustrated with the “trouble” he’d had since returning from overseas, he 
also expressed a strong desire to resolve the issue. Assuring her that he’d be “around 
after pay day,” he also wrote that “the sooner I get this paid, the sooner we’ll be out of 
trouble.”41 It appears that the “trouble” Julian was referring to was the seemingly 
endless string of interference from various offices, involving statements, affidavits, 
and a long and convoluted correspondence trail.  
 Julian and Rita may have faced such difficulties simply because of their status 
as members of the Tohono O’odham tribe residing in Arizona in the mid-1940s. 
Although common-law marriages were accepted as valid by the Office of Dependency 
Benefits, this rule only applied in states where such marriages were recognized. 
Arizona did not recognize such marriages, which was illustrated more clearly in a 
letter concerning another couple sent by the Tucson chapter of the Red Cross to the 
Community Worker at Sells: “Since Arizona does not recognize common-law 
marriages, it is impossible for the wife to receive an allowance.”42 The “trouble” 
Julian and Rita encountered may have been due to Rita’s attempts to initiate benefits 
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while living in California. However, though this explains why the relationship was 
deemed ineligible by the second half of 1944, it does not explain why Rita never 
received any payments before it was designated as such. Whether this was due to the 
isolated place where Rita and her son were living, or the introduction of multiple 
parties into the situation to “assist” her, the Morenos’ case demonstrates the difficulty 
that Native people had fitting into the proper channels to receive the benefits to which 
they were entitled. Although Rita and Julian did their best to comply with the 
regulations to which they were subjected, racialized state legislation, not their inability 
to understand the bureaucratic system, thwarted their efforts. Despite Julian Moreno’s 
service to his country, because his marriage was common-law, and possibly because 
his son had no birth certificate, he was unable to provide for his wife and child in the 
same way as other servicemen when subject to the laws of a state particularly hostile 
to Native customs and traditions.  
 Why was Arizona so resistant to recognizing tribal marriages as valid? As 
Nancy Cott argues, the regulation of Indian marriage in American history is rooted in 
understandings of Christian superiority and perpetual Indian “foreignness.” 
Heterosexual marriage was promoted by nineteenth century reformers as a method of 
“civilizing” Native peoples.43 Indeed, as was stated in Chapter 1, heterosexual 
Christian marriage was a path to citizenship for Native women. Marriage customs 
therefore played a large role in the ideological formation of ideal citizenship, and 
anything that fell outside of the norm would have prevented Indians from full 
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membership in the polity. In Arizona, BIA personnel commented frequently on how 
often Indian men and women “changed” wives or husbands. In their minds, the 
fluidity of marriage in Indian communities was a marker of loose standards of 
morality, which bred problems for the future of Native civilization. For example, in 
1933, Superintendent of the Colorado River Agency, C.H. Gensler, commented in his 
annual report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs: “The changing of wives and 
husbands goes on with little or no more formality than the effort to eat regular meals 
each day.” The informal nature of marriage within the Colorado River Agency 
signaled to Gensler how far away Indians were from “civilized” habits. He wrote, 
“These Indians, through their disregard for any sense of morals whatever, are bringing 
about their extinction at a rapid pace.”44 In 1934, Kate Smith, the school social worker 
for the Colorado River Agency, reported that “the tribal custom of marriage has an 
unwholesome effect on family life,” and that “petty jealousies” occurred during 
organized recreational activities when Indians were “left to themselves.” Smith 
asserted, “The looseness of the marriage bond probably accounts for this jealousy.”45 
At the very least, BIA personnel judged tribal custom marriages with suspicion. More 
broadly, to BIA agents, tribal marriage demonstrated just how far away Indians were 
from white norms.  
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 Arizona BIA personnel scrambled to find some way to regulate tribal marriage. 
In addition, members of tribal councils also instituted resolutions and encouraged their 
members to either marry according to state law or obtain licenses from tribal courts. 
However, the regulation of immorality was not the only reason why BIA personnel 
and tribal councils encouraged Indians to marry according to state law. Both state 
agents and tribal council representatives argued that complying with state laws of 
marriage and divorce was one way Indians could protect themselves and their family 
members in times of crisis. For example, at a 1947 meeting of the Navajo Tribal 
Council, Superintendent Stewart argued that, “there is value in making out their 
license and getting it here to our records,” “if they want to protect themselves and their 
spouses, if one should die, and protect their children.”46 This urging was prompted 
when the council chairman recounted one family’s extreme circumstances from the 
previous summer: “It happened last summer that a man got killed over in Utah on a 
job and his wife tried to get in on the compensation but they found there was no 
marriage license so naturally she was not eligible for compensation.”47 The Tribal 
Council resolved to explain the “conditions regarding marriage” to the Navajos, 
because, they reasoned, “many Navajos are being deprived of the benefits due them 
and their families as a result of military service, social security, railroad retirement, 
etc., because of their inability to provide a marital status.”48 Similarly, in 1942, the 
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Papago Tribal Council resolved that beginning in 1943, “no marriage may be 
contracted by agreement without marriage ceremony, and no marriage contracted 
within this jurisdiction shall be valid unless a license be issued.”49 In the middle of 
WWII, it made sense that the tribal council would issue such a declaration, reflecting 
their desire for their tribal members to take the necessary steps in order to collect 
benefits of citizenship.  
 For state agents and tribal representatives, tribal marriage was a complicated 
issue. Marrying according to state laws could be understood as capitulating to white 
standards of “morality,” but also was a way to secure benefits and protections from the 
state should something drastic happen. To the state of Arizona, there was something 
else that impacted their stance on tribal marriage. The fact that Indians “need not even 
comply with the state marriage and divorce laws,” exemplified Indians’ “peculiar 
status,” and “the special consideration that they have received from the Federal 
Government.”50 In other words, the fact that Indians were not obligated to marry 
according to state law further solidified their status as wards, and excluded them from 
receiving state benefits. Thus, although the federal government recognized common 
law marriage for the purposes of disbursing dependency benefits, to the state of 
Arizona, tribal marriage fell outside of its jurisdictional powers. Without the power to 
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regulate Indian marriage, Arizona reasoned that Indians could not receive any state 
benefits from their marriages. Thus, in the case of dependency allowances, the racial 
logic of the illegitimacy and immorality of Indian custom marriages reinforced the 
binary between Indian wardship and citizenship, preventing Indians from accessing 
benefits they were due as citizens.  
 
Multiple Layers of Dependency: Parents of Servicemen and Dependency 
Allowances  
 This chapter concludes with a discussion of how both the quotidian structures 
of wardship and racial logic were exacerbated and extended when the Indian 
applicants for dependency benefits were elderly. In this section, I will unpack the 
layers of racial and gendered assumptions about Native “dependency,” which 
crystallized in the cases of elderly and illiterate Indians whose younger family 
members were far away from home. Wives and children were not the only family 
members eligible for monthly allowances from soldiers’ paychecks and governmental 
contributions. Parents and siblings of soldiers were also eligible for allowances if they 
could prove they were dependent on the soldier for assistance. Below, I analyze 
several case studies of the efforts of these family members to receive dependency 
benefits, and illustrate how these family dynamics revealed broader issues of 
racialized and gendered citizenship in the WWII-era. 
 Like most soldiers during WWII, Native American men and women in the 
armed services corresponded with their parents through letters. However, dependency 
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allotment checks could also provide assurance that their children, although far away, 
were still alive. One case is that of Paiutes Joe and Bessie Greene, whose two sons, 
Scott and Pike, served in the armed forces. In March of 1944, Joe and Bessie enlisted 
the assistance of the BIA and the Red Cross in obtaining information about the 
whereabouts of their son Pike. They had recently received notice of Scott’s death and 
after Joe had received a notification from the War Department alerting him that his 
family allowance checks from Pike had been discontinued, were “greatly worried” 
about Pike.51 Two months later, the Red Cross received a telegram from Pike Greene, 
expressing that he had cancelled the allowance, “as he felt his family would get along 
without the allowance.”52 Although Pike claimed in the telegram that he had written 
his father to explain the discontinuance of the allowance, it appears as though Joe 
Greene never received such a letter. Therefore, though the bureaucratic chain of 
correspondence delivered unfortunate news, it at least proved useful for Joe and Bessie 
to ascertain Pike’s well-being.  
 Perhaps Pike wished to stop the monthly deduction from his paycheck and 
figured that an allowance from his brother Scott would be sufficient for his parents to 
get by in their absence. Unfortunately, Scott had been killed in January of 1944 “of a 
gunshot wound” while stationed “somewhere in the Pacific area.”53 It is unclear if 
Pike had knowledge of his brother’s death. In any case, the Greene parents were left 
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without a steady stream of financial support, and embarked on an effort to obtain the 
benefits entitled to them due to Scott’s death overseas. Correspondence between the 
BIA and the Veteran’s Administration, Quartermaster General, and General 
Accounting Office reveals that Joe Greene sought to cash out his son’s savings bonds 
and life insurance to support himself and his wife. Unfortunately, the Veteran’s 
Administration disallowed the Greenes’ application for death pension payments as 
dependent parents since “the veteran’s death was not incurred in line of duty but was 
due to injuries received under circumstances that are not pensionable.”54 It is unclear 
as to whether the Greenes ever received more information surrounding the 
circumstances of their son’s death. Rather it appears they pursued alternate avenues 
for accessing some sort of financial support from Scott’s service. By September of 
1944, nine months after Scott’s death, E.B. Hudson, the BIA staff member assisting 
the Greenes with correspondence, received word that Joe Greene would start to 
receive a monthly check from the National Life Insurance Policy for the balance of his 
life.55 The assurance of this payment was not obtained easily, as it took several letters 
back and forth between the Veteran’s Administration’s Insurance Division and the 
BIA to explain why Joe lacked a birth certificate and why he was not sure of his exact 
birth date. Unfortunately, Joe passed away before receiving any payments, and 
Hudson embarked on naming Bessie the beneficiary of Scott’s life insurance policy.56  
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 It is easy to get lost in the administrative and perfunctory language of all of the 
governmental correspondence surrounding the Greenes’ family situation. If one steps 
back and examines their circumstances, what lies under the surface are two significant 
family tragedies within nine months of each other with the deaths of Scott and Joe, 
and the reality of financial hardship facing aging parents whose children were 
thousands of miles away, separated by both oceans and governmental agencies. Bessie 
and Joe were left to deal with the pieces of their lives left from one son’s death, while 
the other had discontinued their monthly allowances. Was Pike able to learn of his 
brother’s death and reinstate his family allowances so that his parents could get by in 
their time of grief? Was Joe’s health failing throughout the process of applying for the 
life insurance benefits? How did Bessie handle the death of her husband so close to 
that of her son?  
 Ironically, the Joe and Bessie’s specific colonial history with the United States 
may have prepared them to perform the administrative tasks necessary to seek benefits 
after their son’s death. Historians have shown that certain servicemen and women who 
had spent time in Indian boarding schools found that the experience increased the ease 
of adapting to military life.57 Perhaps Native people on the home front who had been 
dealing with colonial paternalism and bureaucracy for years were equally as equipped 
with useful knowledge and expectations when they attempted to access their benefits, 
and resolve some aspects of their difficult situations. They were familiar with 
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paternalistic superintendents and social workers intruding into their lives and homes 
and the red tape associated with correspondence between their local agency and higher 
authorities of the BIA. Thus, although the types of resources they were attempting to 
access were new, they engaged with familiar quotidian structures of wardship to 
obtain them.  
 While Pike’s story potentially lends itself to the common narrative of Native 
Americans during WWII, that of young Native men who were “introduced to the 
world beyond”58 the reservation via military service, Joe and Bessie’s story is more 
complicated. They lacked concrete information surrounding their sons’ whereabouts, 
and later, information surrounding the circumstances of Scott’s death. Though they 
took steps to access the life insurance policy set up through the Veteran’s 
Administration, just like “all other Americans”59 would have done, they faced 
difficulties due to their lack of easily accessible birth certificates, as they were Indians 
born in the 1870s. Though difficulties like this must have also arisen for other 
families, especially impoverished people of color living in isolated areas, the Greenes 
and other Native American families maintained a unique, sustained relationship with 
the BIA through this process. Although Joe and Bessie could access the benefits they 
were entitled to, they were only able to do so after they employed state agents to 
advocate for them. As many cases in this chapter demonstrate, this tactic could have 
drawbacks as well as benefits, but it was often the only choice. 
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 Some elderly and illiterate Native people were particularly reliant on BIA 
employees to assist them in obtaining the benefits they were owed. Nina Winnemucca, 
a Paiute living on the Pyramid Lake Reservation, ran into challenges after her son, 
Stanley Winnemucca, was killed in action while serving with the Marine Corps in 
1943. Nina faced considerable difficulty in obtaining the benefits owed her from 
Stanley’s life insurance policy, especially because Stanley’s father, Pete Winnemucca, 
was originally listed as the beneficiary. Nina was left with “no means of support” 
when Pete passed away in 1942, so she enlisted several BIA employees to help her 
write to the Social Security Board and the Veteran’s Administration in order to obtain 
any benefits that Stanley had accrued through his military service.60 After Pete’s and 
prior to Stanley’s death, Nina had attempted to obtain a monthly family allowance 
from Stanley, but was told that the soldier must be the one to file an application for an 
allowance through his commanding officer.61 Before she was able to obtain any 
monthly payments, Stanley was killed in action.62 A large collection of 
correspondence reveals that Nina was required to submit notarized affidavits attesting 
to the fact that she was dependent on Stanley in order to receive “death gratuity 
pay.”63 Obtaining the money from Stanley’s life insurance policy proved to be more 
challenging because Stanley’s father had been listed as the original beneficiary. Nina 
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was required to submit affidavits swearing to her own birth, because she did not have 
a birth certificate. In addition, since she was unable to read nor write, she was required 
to place her mark on official papers and identification materials in the presence of 
others.64 The legal complications of Nina’s case caused her local BIA representative to 
turn it over to the Veteran’s Commission in Reno, who then enlisted the help of the 
American Legion.65 In the end, although it took an additional five months, Nina 
Winnemucca eventually heard word that she would receive $45 per month from 
Stanley’s death pension and a $55.10 monthly payment from Stanley’s life insurance 
policy, which were to continue over the course of her lifetime.66  
 Nina Winnemucca’s attempts to access her benefits illustrate the extensive 
logistical challenges elderly Native people faced during the war. Not only was her son 
killed, but she was also compelled to jump through a series of bureaucratic hoops to 
sustain herself without him and her husband. For Winnemucca, an elderly and 
illiterate Native woman living in relative isolation, it must have taken extreme strength 
and resilience to persist in her struggle to gain access to her monthly checks. This 
shows Winnemucca’s individual persistence, but also represents wider conflicts over 
Native mothers whose access to the benefits of American citizenship were linked to 
their relationship to their soldier sons.  
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 Winnemucca’s role as Stanley’s mother was important to the state and to the 
military. As Takashi Fujitani has shown in his analysis of the state’s attempt to 
appease Japanese American mothers whose sons had been killed in action, mothers 
could be a powerful influence on their sons’ actions.67 Stanley had been killed in 
service to his country, and his mother’s role in that ultimate sacrifice was not to be 
ignored. However, Winnemucca faced considerable difficulty in accessing the benefits 
she was entitled to due to her racial identity as an Indian and legal status as a ward. 
Fujitani demonstrates the state’s efforts to honor and placate mothers of color who 
existed outside the national community in the case of Japanese mothers. However, 
Indian mothers were not necessarily treated with the same caution. Rather, Nina 
Winnemucca seemed to face more challenges due to her racial and legal status as a 
Native person. While she may have felt more empowered to utilize the BIA to access 
certain benefits due to her son’s sacrifice to the country, state agents did not highlight 
Winnemucca’s role as Stanley’s mother as anything particularly out of the ordinary. 
Moreover, Winnemucca’s extreme poverty would have reinforced her racial 
classification as a ward. Thus, Native Americans were not viewed as citizens like any 
other, facing discrimination and inconvenience due to their wardship status. 
 In many cases, it appears that elderly parents and wives with dependent 
children could utilize BIA employees in order to obtain or alter their monthly 
allowances. However, interference of BIA personnel as well as Red Cross 
representatives could also be intrusive, demonstrating how Indians were still 
                                                            
67 Takashi Fujitani, Race for Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Americans During World 
War II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 200-201. 
 243 
consistently viewed as wards by administrative staff members. This shows state agents 
subjected Native soldiers to a heightened level of state interference despite increasing 
calls for termination in this period. Soldiers during WWII were charged with the 
responsibility of applying for dependency allowances, implying a significant level of 
individual freedom that differed from the previous world war. This freedom of choice 
can be connected to the development of a growing separation between individuals and 
their families, encapsulated by a more ambiguous and critical stance against mothers 
of soldiers, which lead to a “more decisive repudiation of the iconic middle-aged 
mother” after the war.68 Rebecca Plant has shown that although mothers of servicemen 
killed in action were lauded for their sacrifices, such sentimentality was increasingly 
linked to the United States’ “political and psychological immaturity.”69 However, 
Indian servicemen were subject to a level of bureaucratic oversight that did not 
necessarily mesh with increased freedom and choice.  
 For example, in June of 1944, E.B. Hudson wrote two letters to two different 
soldiers, Levi and Arthur Dunn, regarding dependency allotments for their mother and 
another family member named Wanda (most likely a sister). The letters reveal 
Hudson’s desire for Levi and Arthur to include both their mother and Wanda as 
dependents. However, this request seems not to have originated from Mrs. Dunn or 
Wanda themselves, but rather from Mrs. Coulson, the Red Cross secretary from Reno 
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who had visited the family and “felt they were entitled to it.”70 Although Hudson told 
Levi that Coulson had interviewed the Dunn family “relative to a letter from Arthur,” 
in his letter he revealed that the “personal study” was conducted at the “request from 
your Commanding Officer.”71 Perhaps Arthur had asked his Commanding Officer to 
communicate with the Red Cross in order to get in touch with his family. However, 
the language in both letters reveals the extent to which outside state agents were 
involved in the Dunn family’s affairs. Hudson asked both Dunn sons to list their 
mother and Wanda as dependents, even though he was unsure as to whether military 
regulations would permit it. In addition, he mentioned that he had also instructed 
Richard Dunn, another member of the family who just recently passed his physical 
examinations for induction into the service, to also claim them as dependents. 
Although Hudson stressed to Arthur that “you may use your own judgment about this 
matter,” and that it was “merely a suggestion on the part of the Red Cross Secretary,” 
the extent of involvement of these outside agents is obvious.72 
 Wanda and Mrs. Dunn may very well have benefitted from an increase in their 
monthly benefit payments. With three members of the family of eligible age serving in 
the military away from the reservation, one can only assume that they were without 
their usual means of financial support. They may have even welcomed the Red Cross 
secretary’s visit to their home. However, the fact that Hudson referred to that visit as a 
                                                            
70 Letter to Arthur Dunn from E.B. Hudson, June 1944, NC 16/12/9 – Welfare Case Records Co-Cu late 
1930s, Box 9, Series 12 – Tribal Society and Daily Life 1930s-1964, PLPT, UNR. 
71 Letters to Levi and Arthur Dunn from E.B. Hudson, June 1944, NC 16/12/9 – Welfare Case Records 
Co-Cu late 1930s, Box 9, Series 12 – Tribal Society and Daily Life 1930s-1964, PLPT, UNR. 
72 Letter to Arthur Dunn from E.B. Hudson, June 1944, NC16/12/9 – Welfare Case Records Co-Cu late 
1930s, Box 9, Series 12 – Tribal Society and Daily Life 1930s-1964, PLPT, UNR. 
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“personal study,” indicates that Wanda and Mrs. Dunn were the objects of 
bureaucratic scrutiny, and that they were judged to be “entitled” to the dependency 
payments only after such an intrusion into their home. This intrusion filtered up to the 
young men serving in the armed forces, and while the addition of dependents was only 
“suggested,” it was suggested through official correspondence from those overseeing 
the financial well-being of the Dunn family, which allows one to assume that it carried 
significant weight. Thus, though the soldier himself was the one responsible for 
applying for dependency allowances, just how much power he had to reject this option 
is unclear. Furthermore, how involved was the Commanding Officer in this case and 
why did the Red Cross interfere? And, perhaps most importantly for this project, 
would the same effort have been made had the Dunns not been ward Indians living on 
a reservation? Thus, for servicemen and their families, wardship’s conflicts spilled 
over into their experiences of citizenship.  
 
Conclusion 
 The wardship status of Indians living on reservations certainly affected how 
they could access the benefits of citizenship. In many of the cases described in this 
chapter, we can see how BIA personnel, Red Cross employees, and other 
governmental representatives understood wardship as a state of dependency, 
necessitating the protection and regulation of Indians. However, Native women and 
elderly parents living on reservations in the mid-twentieth century were far from 
helpless or completely dependent upon government agents. Rather, they engaged and 
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negotiated with the BIA to gain access to the benefits they were entitled to due to the 
military service of their family members. They navigated through the familiar waters 
of the quotidian structures of wardship to unlock new types of benefits. In this way, 
though BIA staff and Red Cross representatives may have viewed them as wards, and 
though they faced extraordinary difficulties in complying with regulations and red tape 
associated with claiming benefits due to tribal customs, they capitalized on the 
benefits of American citizenship to provide for themselves and their children. The 
federal benefits they received through dependency allowances exemplify how 
wardship and citizenship coexisted.  
 Gender factored into the case of dependency allowances more so than the 
Social Security case addressed in the previous chapter. This was not only because it 
was simply more of a female population who attempted to access dependency benefits. 
Additionally, the racial logic of Native women’s dependency and the threat that tribal 
marriage posed to American gender structures intensified the clash between wardship 
and citizenship. Although Native women also participated in the war effort, through 
military service, war industries, and other activities on the home front, it was perhaps 
even harder for state agents to see how they could navigate the bureaucratic process of 
claiming citizenship benefits, as women with husbands stationed so far away.  
 WWII did open many doors for Native people, especially for the young men 
who traveled overseas. However, as this chapter has shown, the narrative surrounding 
WWII’s impact on Native Americans is far more complex, especially for those on the 
home front. While the war certainly provided a new source of income for 
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servicemen’s families, it also brought more of the same paternalistic attitudes and 
intrusions into their lives and livelihoods. The new engagement with the state that 
many American citizens experienced during WWII was something with which Native 
wives and parents were quite familiar. Therefore, WWII does not represent so much of 
a turning point for Native American citizens, but more of a confluence of cracks in the 
glossy rhetoric surrounding Native service to the country. In the next chapter, I will 
explore these cracks further, assessing the impact of wardship on Native veterans who 
returned from the war to assess the impact of wardship on their publicly lauded service 
to the country. The gendered structures of citizenship played a large role in the 
abilities of Native male veterans to access welfare benefits such as GI Bill loans.  
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Chapter 5 
Military Service, Opportunity, and Assimilation: Native Veterans’ Experiences of 
Wardship and the GI Bill 
Introduction 
 The 1944 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, or GI Bill, was a massive veterans’ 
benefit package which provided unemployment benefits, low-interest guaranteed loans 
for the purchase of homes, businesses, or farms, and tuition and stipends for up to four 
years of education or vocational training to those World War II veterans who had 
served at least ninety days, with a discharge other than dishonorable.1 As a result of 
these programs, 4.3 million veterans purchased homes, 200,000 purchased farms or 
businesses, and 7.8 million (51 percent of all WWII veterans) utilized educational and 
training benefits.2 Historians credit the GI Bill for a boom in the construction industry, 
as nearly “one-third of new housing starts nationwide” were backed by the Veterans’ 
Administration (VA) by 1955,3 and substantial changes to American colleges, as 
veterans made up half of the undergraduate population by 1948.4 Historians Glenn 
Altschuler and Stuart Blumin have described the bill as, “without question, one of the 
                                                            
1 Suzanne Mettler, Soldiers to Citizens: The GI Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 6; Glenn C. Altschuler and Stuart M. Blumin, The GI Bill: A 
New Deal for Veterans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 71. 
2 Mettler, Soldiers to Citizens, 6-7. 
3 Mettler, Soldiers to Citizens, 6. Lizabeth Cohen notes that combined with the Korean GI Bill, the 
legislation is responsible for financing of one-fifth of all single-family residences by 1966. See Lizabeth 
Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America (New York: 
Vintage Books, 2003), 141.  
4 Cohen, Consumers’ Republic, 140. 
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largest and most comprehensive government initiatives ever enacted in the United 
States.”5 
 The bill provided the sixteen million people who had served the United States 
in WWII with opportunity for “upward mobility.”6 However, as many historians have 
noted, this was an exclusive opportunity—unavailable to non-veterans, and easier to 
access and more advantageous for some veterans than others. For example, women 
veterans, who made up 2 percent of the total military personnel in WWII, received less 
information about their entitlements, were less likely to take advantage of educational 
training, and were unable to access the same kinds of benefits as men. Unlike male 
veterans, women did not receive living allowances for dependent spouses while in 
school.7 Additionally, although the bill’s language appeared to apply equally to 
veterans across racial and ethnic groups the GI Bill did little to combat 
institutionalized and structural racism within the United States. Many more white 
veterans than black veterans attended institutions of higher learning, in part because 
the bill granted authority in admissions criteria to universities, which adhered to 
existing quotas and segregation policies.8 Suzanne Mettler has further contextualized 
this discrepancy, noting that many African American veterans had less education than 
whites prior to entering military service, and were thus more likely to take advantage 
of vocational training or subcollege programs.9 Mettler asserts that the bill “opened the 
                                                            
5 Altschuler and Blumin, GI Bill, 83. 
6 Cohen, Consumers’ Republic, 137. 
7 Altschuler and Blumin, GI Bill, 121-123; Cohen, Consumers’ Republic, 138-139; Mettler, Soldiers to 
Citizens, 144-150. 
8 Altschuler and Blumin, GI Bill, 134. 
9 Mettler, Soldiers to Citizens, 56. 
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doors to higher education for many from the lower and lower middle classes,” and 
“higher proportions of nonwhites than whites used the education and training 
benefits.”10 However, as Ira Katznelson has noted, because the law “left responsibility 
for implementation mainly to the states and localities, including, of course, those that 
practiced official racism without compromise,” black veterans often faced 
discrimination in their dealings with local VA officers in charge of unemployment 
benefits, job placement, and home loans.11 Thus, though the GI Bill is unmistakably 
one of the largest and most influential government programs in US history, it did not 
challenge American institutions of racism and sexism.  
 Historians of both the GI Bill and Native peoples’ participation in World War 
II have neglected to examine both Native men’s access to GI Bill educational 
programs and loans, and the impact of wardship on Native veterans’ lives.12 Rather, 
scholars have focused on Native men’s motivations for joining the war effort and, 
more broadly, the relationship between Native military service and assimilation. Mid-
twentieth-century terminationist policymakers argued that military service signaled 
Native peoples’ “readiness” to integrate into the “white world.” Historian Al Carroll 
has criticized some non-Native scholars for recapitulating this kind of “assimilationist 
propaganda” in their own work, at the expense of examining “Natives’ own words.”13 
                                                            
10 Ibid., 53; 55. 
11 Ira Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racial Inequality in 
Twentieth-Century America (New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005), 123. 
12 The sources I have consulted almost exclusively discuss male Native veterans. Thus, although 800 
Native women did serve in the armed forces during WWII, due to limitations in my source base, this 
chapter will engage primarily with Native men’s experiences in the postwar period.  
13 Al Carroll, Medicine Bags and Dog Tags: American Indian Veterans from Colonial Times to the 
Second Iraq War (Lincoln; London: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 6. 
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For example, in the first book-length work on Indian participation in WWII, Alison 
Bernstein contended that Native veterans’ “sudden and unprecedented exposure to the 
white world contributed to a new consciousness of what it meant to be an American 
Indian, and a sharpened awareness of the gap between the standard of living on most 
reservations and in the rest of American society.”14 Similarly, Kenneth Townsend 
claimed that many Indian people “perceived their involvement in the nation’s war 
effort as the final step toward full assimilation with white society.”15 These authors 
argued that military service led Native veterans to see the limitations the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA) placed on their lives, and encouraged them to understand 
themselves as a minority group seeking opportunity and rights within the United States 
polity.16 Bernstein, Townsend, and others have ignored the legal and political 
interactions between Indian servicemen’s wardship status and their agitation for rights 
as citizens. In so doing, these authors have under-emphasized Native peoples’ 
identities as members of tribal nations, focusing solely on their military service to the 
United States as an expression of American patriotism and point of entry into 
mainstream American society.  
 Other historians have explored more of the multi-faceted motivations and 
implications of Native military service. For example, Carroll asserts that WWII 
                                                            
14 Alison Bernstein, American Indians and World War II: Toward a New Era in Indian Affairs 
(Norman; London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 171. 
15 Kenneth William Townsend, World War II and the American Indian (Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 2000), 3. 
16 See Townsend, World War II, 215-221, 228; Bernstein, American Indians, 171-173. See also Jere’ 
Bishop Franco, Crossing the Pond: The Native American Effort in World War II (Denton, TX: 
University of North Texas Press, 1999), 198-200. Franco argues that service to the country in WWII 
laid the groundwork for “an increase in civil rights among Native Americans,” including the occupation 
of Alcatraz and BIA buildings in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
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provided an arena for veterans and their communities to create “permanent and far 
more widespread tradition[s]” which “allowed veterans to make military service 
meaningful to them according to traditional dictates.”17 Thus, rather than a pure 
expression of service to the United States, WWII military service expanded existing 
military traditions among tribal nations. Paul Rosier argues that Indian servicemen did 
express American patriotism, but at the same time, fought for recognition of the rights 
of their own Native nations. Rosier defined this dual expression of national loyalty as 
an “ideology of hybrid patriotism—both Indian and American.”18 Noah Riseman has 
also complicated Native peoples’ relationship with the US military by assessing how 
military service perpetuated American colonialism. He argues that the use of 
“indigenous soldiers as weapons in the Second World War was a process rife with 
colonial exploitation, where the colonizers’ interests reigned supreme at the expense 
of indigenous agency and civil rights.”19 All three of these studies have created a 
valuable and nuanced picture of Native service, especially within the confines of war 
itself. However, scholars have not devoted the same attention to veterans’ experiences 
after the war’s end, especially in terms of how Native veterans worked within and 
outside of state programs to readjust to civilian life.  
 Suzanne Mettler has asserted that those male veterans who used the educational 
and training provisions within the GI Bill “became more active citizens in public life 
                                                            
17 Carroll, Medicine Bags, 134. 
18 Paul Rosier, Serving Their Country: American Indian Politics and Patriotism in the Twentieth 
Century (Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press, 2009), 9. 
19 Noah Riseman, Defending Whose Country? Indigenous Soldiers in the Pacific War (Lincoln; 
London: University of Nebraska Press, 2012), 27. 
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in the postwar years than those who did not.”20 Though historians have explored how 
military service affected Native veterans’ understanding of their rights and 
opportunities within the American polity, none have examined whether GI Bill 
provisions encouraged Native veterans to become more active citizens. This chapter 
demonstrates that though politicians and policymakers often touted it as such, military 
service did not provide a linear path from “wardship” to “citizenship.” Instead, 
wardship significantly impacted both the conversations and experiences Native 
veterans had with the so-called “white world,” especially in their attempts to access GI 
Bill benefits to which they were entitled to as citizens who had served their country in 
war. This chapter’s main aim is to situate Native peoples’ multivalent identities as 
citizens of the United States, members of tribal nations, and wards who demanded the 
US fulfill its legal obligations within one large discussion of Native veterans’ 
experiences of the GI Bill, one of the most far-reaching pieces of welfare legislation of 
the mid-twentieth century. Additionally, this chapter challenges the historiographical 
tendency to position the reservations from which Indian veterans originated against the 
“white world” where they first experienced through their participation in the war. This 
chapter shows that binary distinctions between Native and non-Native space, society, 
and politics were not so rigid. Further, this chapter demonstrates that Native veterans, 
tribal councils, BIA agents, and members of organizations devoted to Indian affairs 
maneuvered through the quotidian structures of wardship not only to gain Native 
veterans access to the benefits of the GI Bill, but also to remind the United States 
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government of its obligations to Native people—obligations made more striking once 
Native people drew attention to their military service.  
 This chapter is divided into four sections. First, I explore the context in which 
Native veterans lived in the postwar period. How did they interact with each other, 
with their tribal councils, and with the BIA to advocate for themselves as both citizens 
and wards? Though some Native veterans did agitate for increased citizenship rights 
and argued that the BIA held too much power over them, others called attention to 
their military service to preserve specific appropriations for Indians and to claim 
recognition of tribal rights. Second, I unpack how and why Native veterans had 
difficulty accessing GI Bill benefits. Lending agencies were wary of issuing loans to 
Native veterans because they argued that trust property could not be used as security 
for loans. In addition, lenders and VA officials assumed that as wards, Native 
servicemen would be taken care of by the BIA. Third, I will delve specifically into 
how Native veterans experienced the dynamics of the educational and training 
provisions of the GI Bill. Here, the quotidian structures of wardship affected how and 
where Native people could use educational benefits. The GI Bill’s funding for Native 
training programs revitalized and improved existing BIA training, especially in the 
case of agricultural programs. Fourth, I will analyze Native veterans’ attempts to 
secure GI Bill loans for homes and businesses. Here, Native people were often unable 
to access these types of loans because of the trust restrictions on their property. In 
response, veterans looked to both tribal councils and the government to secure 
financing. Thus, the trust relationship between tribes and the federal government 
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drastically impacted Native veterans’ ability to access the “opportunity” the GI Bill 
promised.  
 By exploring how wardship intersected with the GI Bill, this chapter interrogates 
the argument made by termination policy advocates and some historians—that 
military service “opened up” the reservation for Native veterans and provided a path to 
opportunity and full citizenship rights. In their attempts to access the benefits of the 
welfare state through GI Bill educational provisions and home and business loans, 
Native veterans occupied multiple legal and political identities—citizen, ward, tribal 
member, and family member. This chapter explores how those varying statuses 
worked with and against each other when Native veterans returned home from service.  
 
Native Veterans’ Lives in the Postwar Period 
Economic, Personal, and Tribal Transitions  
 Just like non-Indians, Native Americans benefited economically from serving in 
the military and working in defense industries. In a 1947 article for the Association on 
American Indian Affairs (AAIA) newsletter, The American Indian, John Adair 
asserted that the money Native families in the Southwest earned from allotment 
checks and war industry wages was “considerably more cash than those families had 
ever seen.” Adair went on to describe how these new sources of income allowed many 
female Navajo weavers and Pueblo pottery makers to “[lay] aside” their tools until 
“after the war work and allotment checks ‘dried up.’”21 Adair argued that because the 
                                                            
21 John Adair, “The Navajo and Pueblo Veteran: A Force for Culture Change,” The American Indian, 
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Native serviceman was able to support his family in ways he had not been able to 
before, he “was accepted as an individual, and was judged as an individual, and not as 
one of a minority group.”22 To Adair and other members of the media, the confidence 
and strength individual Native men found through military service significantly 
differed from their lives after the war’s end. In the picture the media painted, the end 
of WWII dried a steady stream of reliable income, and all Native people were once 
again “dependent” upon government support and public aid.  
 Concentrated media coverage around the plight of Navajo families in Arizona 
and New Mexico after the war’s end drove many concerned non-Indian citizens to 
write to President Harry Truman and demand that the government send aid to the “first 
Americans.” “We have sent millions to Europe to feed the destitute and now we 
should send aid to our fellow Americans who are just as hungry and cold as they are in 
Europe,” wrote Mrs. W.C. Bolan of Plains, Kansas in 1947. “Besides, they are our 
responsibility.”23 That same year, King Brooks of Los Angeles, California wrote to 
Truman, “The Navajo Indians are American also. Are they treated as Americans?”24 In 
response to these letters, President Truman vowed in a letter to Secretary of the 
Interior, Oscar Chapman, to “take all necessary and appropriate measures to meet this 
critical situation,” brought on by the “cessation of productive employment and of 
                                                            
On American Indian Affairs, Inc., Box 23, Record Group 220 – Records of the President’s Commission 
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22 Ibid., 7. 
23 Bolan to Truman, 1947, Indians Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Bill S.1407 (Dec 1947), Box 1078, 
Harry S. Truman Official File 296 (HST Official), HSTL. 
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soldiers’ allowances.”25 Chapman replied that “postwar conditions on the Navajo 
Indian Reservation in Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah have brought about a serious 
threat of impending large scale deprivation and suffering for this large group of 
American citizens.” He also recognized that many citizens were pointing to the 
Navajos’ poverty and hunger and asking, “Why help foreigners when our own citizens 
are starving?”26 Navajo poverty seemed especially abhorrent to members of the public 
considering Navajo men’s record of military service and their previous ability of to 
provide for their families during the war.  
 In 1948, the Navajo Tribal Council issued a resolution where they thanked 
members of the public for donating money and goods and doing what they could to 
alleviate Navajo poverty. The tribal council stated that, “the end of the war brought a 
sudden return to dependence upon reservation resources” which were “inadequate for 
the support of the total Navajo population.”27 Although they utilized the term 
“dependence,” the tribal council did not claim that as wards, they were dependent 
upon the federal government. Rather, they contrasted individual Native servicemen’s 
independence during the war and with the federal government’s failure to fulfill its 
obligations under the terms and conditions of wardship. Reservation resources were 
inadequate to support “large numbers of returned Navajo servicemen and former 
                                                            
25 Truman to Chapman, 1947, Indians Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Bill S.1407 (1945-Nov 1947), Box 
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workers in war industries.” Those resources were stipulations of treaties and 
agreements made between the Navajo tribe and the United States. Other Native groups 
also used Indians’ military service to draw attention to the lack of resources on 
reservations and to demand that the United States fulfill its obligations. For example, 
in a 1947 letter to Senator Pat McCarran, N.B. Johnson, president of the National 
Congress of American Indians (NCAI), criticized a severe cut in the appropriations for 
the BIA, by arguing “on behalf of more than 300,000 defenseless wards of the United 
States Government, to provide adequate funds to at least insure minimum health and 
educational facilities for them.”28 By using the term “defenseless wards,” Johnson 
condemned McCarran and other members of the Senate who had cut Indian 
appropriations—a key component in the legal relationship between Native nations and 
the federal government—without obtaining the consent of Indian tribes. To further 
emphasize his point, Johnson asserted, “The Indian people sent more than 30,000 of 
their boys and girls to the Colors in World War II to fight for our institutions and 
American way of life. Let us not deny them the health and educational facilities which 
have been freely accorded our other citizens.”29 Johnson drew upon Native military 
service as the ultimate expression of citizenship and used it to remind McCarran of the 
United States’ obligations to its wards.  
Upon their return from service, Native veterans looked to a variety of 
organizations and institutions for help in readjusting to life outside the military. For 
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example, when a group of Navajo ex-servicemen found that the nearest VA offices 
were in Phoenix and Albuquerque, far away from Navajo veterans living in more 
isolated parts of the reservation, they formed American Legion Post 52 at Fort 
Defiance and Window Rock on the Navajo reservation. “We did not want to become a 
burden on the government, on the Veterans’ Administration, the Red Cross, or on the 
Navajo Tribe,” asserted Mr. Bennett, representative for the “all-Indian Legion post” at 
a 1946 meeting of the Navajo Tribal Council.30 “We decided the best method was to 
form an organization to get the help of groups interested in the Navajo veterans.”31 
These Navajo veterans actively advocated for themselves and their families by 
forming an all-Indian branch of the American Legion, an established veterans 
institution, which represented Navajo veterans in Washington, DC and around the 
country at American Legion conventions.  
In addition to advocating for their rights under both the systems of wardship 
and citizenship, Navajo veterans pitched their efforts as “doing our share to get the 
burdens off our government officials and other social workers.”32 They wanted to 
spread awareness of their efforts among other Navajo veterans by speaking to 
members of the tribal council, filling in a gap they saw between Indian veterans’ 
ability to access resources and assistance and white veterans’ ability. Peter Yazza, an 
ex-marine and Chaplain of the American Legion Post 52, argued that “Indian people 
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have a very different problem than the white people because the white people have 
everything solved and it is down in black and white for them, and the Indian people 
have no knowledge of this work among them.”33 Yazza conceptualized the role of Post 
52 as a resource for Navajo veterans to help each other navigate around the ambiguous 
status Native veterans occupied as both citizens who had performed their duty through 
military service, and wards, who faced uncertainty accessing the benefits to which 
they were entitled in return for that duty.  
Federal governmental officials also saw the utility of having veterans’ 
organizations work on behalf of Native veterans in obtaining their rights. In 1947, 
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Interior Martin White argued that “the support of the 
Veterans of Foreign Wars local posts would be very helpful to the Indians,” because 
the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) could provide support for Native veterans 
restricted from voting and social security benefits in Arizona and New Mexico. 
Additionally, White asserted that “If Navajo veterans are accepted in local VFW posts 
in towns and cities near the reservation and wherever else possible, it will give them a 
sense of belonging.”34 This “sense of belonging” that Native veterans could find when 
they joined veterans’ organizations would have been both emotional and practical. 
Veterans could make social connections with fellow veterans who had similar 
experiences, and these types of organizations could provide legal and official support 
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for Native veterans who faced discrimination and difficulties accessing benefits due to 
wardship.  
Tribal councils faced challenges in their efforts to help veterans adjust to 
reservation life and find new methods and resources to establish their economic 
livelihoods. In December 1945, BIA Superintendent Stewart spoke to members of the 
Navajo Tribal Council about the challenges of reincorporating returned Navajo 
servicemen into reservation life: “Truly you Navajo people and your way of life have 
changed tremendously during the past four years. As I see it, this change has been 
brought about to a large extent because about one-third of the total Navajo people, 
service men and others, have been outside during the war years and as mentioned 
before have acquired new ideas.”35 The differences in ideology borne out of 
participation in the war effort were exacerbated, Stewart explained, “due to worry or a 
feeling of fear as to how your people are going to be furnished the means of obtaining 
a livelihood.”36 It was not only BIA personnel who saw conflict between veterans and 
other tribal members. Tribal leaders asserted that conflicts over veterans’ alcohol use 
exacerbated stresses of securing employment for veterans. For example, at the same 
meeting, Navajo tribal councilman Manuelito Begay expressed pride and support for 
“these boys who have gone to war in our defense,” but raised concerns about the 
increased presence of alcohol on the reservation since their return. Begay stated, “In 
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all our prayers at home we did not ask our Supreme Being that these boys might win 
the war so they can come back and abuse us, which they are doing now. We asked that 
they win the war so we can live in peace, and they should take this in consideration 
now that they are home.”37 Likewise, tribal councilman Carl Mute spoke of 
disagreements he had with returned veterans over the use of liquor. Mute argued, “We 
told them they were going in defense of our country, our people and property. Lo and 
behold, they came back to us and tell us leaders, whatever my instructions were it is 
my business if I want to bring liquor.”38 Mute saw veterans’ pushback over the use of 
alcohol as an extreme assertion of power and authority over previously established 
governance and order, claiming, “What they say is, ‘I have a right to murder you and 
get away with it.’”39 In tense and uncertain economic times, returning veterans did not 
always readjust seamlessly into life among their tribal communities.  
Some scholars have written about these types of conflicts within a binary 
narrative that pits “traditional” tribal leaders against veterans who have returned from 
the “world beyond” with new ideas about their rights. For example, Alison Bernstein 
has claimed that the war forced Native people to “reconsider whether they wished to 
maintain their isolation from the rest of American life,” and “unleashed Indians from 
previous tribal patterns.”40 Similarly, Kenneth Townsend asserts that, “The war placed 
Native Americans at the proverbial crossroads and permitted tribes and individuals the 
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right to choose their own path and their own relationships with white America.”41 
Rather than examining the nuanced and layered relationships between veterans and 
other members of their tribes and communities, this historiography focuses solely on 
an oversimplified relationship between veterans and the outside “white world.” 
However, tribal councils played an integral role in helping Native veterans negotiate 
and navigate their places within the American polity and within reservation 
communities. For example, in 1948, dissatisfied with the current system of tribal 
courts on the Navajo reservation, Navajo veterans petitioned the tribal council to 
“make a thorough review of the Navajo Indian Courts, the system of Administration of 
justice in said Courts, the personnel appointed as Judges of said Courts, and of the 
rules and procedure in said courts.”42 In this case, veterans formally appealed to the 
tribal council to improve Navajo systems of governance. In other cases, veterans 
appealed to governmental authorities to increase the power of tribal councils to grant 
benefits and loans to returned servicemen. For example, a 1946 article published in the 
Great Falls Tribune reported that Native veterans gathered at a conference in 
Montana, “went on record as urging legislation which would authorize tribal councils 
to make loans to Indian veterans,” because, they asserted, “provisions in the GI bill of 
rights for making loans are too cumbersome to be practicable.”43 In still other cases, 
                                                            
41 Townsend, World War II and the American Indian, 205. 
42 Veterans’ Resolution on Law and Order, Proceedings of the Meeting of the Navajo Tribal Council, 
March 18-23, 1948, p. 94, Navajo Tribal Council – Proceedings of Meetings March 18-23, 1948, Box 
408, Phoenix Area Office Division of Extension and Industry Files, Minutes of Navajo Tribal Council, 
RG 75, NARA – Pacific Region (R).  
43 “Indians Seek Changes on Vets’ Loans,” Great Falls Tribune, March 30, 1946, National Congress of 
American Indians (2 of 4), Box 26, McCabe, George, N. to National Cong. Of Amer Indians, SEN 83A-
F9 (1928-1953), Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Indian Affairs Investigating Subcommittee, 
  
264 
Native veterans themselves joined tribal leadership bodies to strengthen reservation 
communities. In a 1951 article on the Ute tribe’s receipt of a land claim settlement 
published in the Washington DC Evening Star, Herbert Gordon described some of the 
plans the tribe had for the new income. The “Tribal Business Council,” had developed 
a plan which “delved into every phase of reservation life.” This, Gordon argued, 
reflected “the rising importance of the younger World War II reservation veterans, and 
the eminent leadership value of Indians willing to put their college educations and 
knowledge to work on their home reservations.”44 Thus, the perceived binary between 
the “tradition” of the tribe and the modern independence of returned servicemen is not 
supported by the variety of ways Native veterans interacted with tribal leadership, and 
agitated for assistance within an understanding of both citizenship and wardship.  
 
Native Veterans Claim Rights as Both Citizens and Wards  
 
 The historiographical distinction between the reservation and the “world 
beyond” is partially due to historians’ focus on how Native veterans themselves drew 
attention to their military service to campaign for rights as American citizens. Like the 
African American “Double Victory” campaign, Native veterans utilized their military 
service records to advocate for civil rights upon their return home. For example, 
Arizona and New Mexico’s state constitutions refused Native people the right to vote 
(in Arizona, Indians were considered “persons under guardianship,” and in New 
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Mexico, “Indians not taxed” were denied suffrage). In his 1946 report to the Secretary 
of the Interior, Commissioner of Indian Affairs William Brophy wrote that Arizona 
and New Mexico’s refusal of suffrage to Native people “has caused many protest from 
Indians and non-Indians alike during this fiscal year. Veterans of World War II 
particularly have objected.”45 That same year, the all-Indian American Legion Post 52 
located on the Navajo reservation issued a resolution to Arizona’s governor and 
members of the state legislature demanding “assistance be given the Indian people in 
obtaining from the various states equal civil rights with all other citizens of those 
states including the right to vote, in all city, county, state and federal elections.” The 
veterans emphasized that not only were Indians “legally citizens of the United States,” 
but also that “Indian people defended our cities, counties, states and federal 
government in their time of need, which cost the lives of many of those people, who 
made a record in the war of which the nation is justly proud.”46 Native veterans 
pointed to their fulfillment of the ultimate obligation to the United States—military 
service, and demanded the right to vote in return.47  
 In addition to voting rights, Native veterans demanded other forms of equal 
treatment after returning from military service. Some veterans agitated for the repeal 
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of the Indian liquor laws, legislation which restricted the sale of alcohol to Native 
people. In his article for the AAIA’s newsletter, John Adair wrote that the ability to 
drink liquor “with no questions asked” was “one thing that was the most important, 
actually and symbolically, in this new way of life” generated by participation in the 
war effort.48 At the 1946 meeting of the Navajo Tribal Council, council member Carl 
Mute noted that, veterans “tell us that they have a right to bring it on the reservation. 
That is one of the benefits of the war as far as they are concerned.”49 To some 
veterans, the restriction on Indian alcohol consumption was especially discriminatory 
in light of their service to the country. Native veterans also spoke out against other 
examples of racial discrimination towards Indians, including restrictive covenants and 
the refusal of cemeteries to bury Native people because they were not white. In 1947, 
after Isabel Crocker was discovered to be a “three-quarter Indian,” she and her three 
daughters were ordered to vacate their home in a West Hollywood neighborhood 
“restricted to Caucasians.” In response, Native people in Los Angeles gathered to 
protest. Tom Humphreys, a Hopi organizer, told the Los Angeles Times, “We want to 
find out where we stand…A lot of us are veterans and we’re beginning to wonder 
what we fought for.”50 In 1951, the Memorial Park Cemetery Association in Sioux 
City, Iowa’s refusal to bury the body of John Rice, a Winnebago Indian killed in 
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action during the Korean War, because he was “not a member of the Caucasian race” 
made national news.51 President Harry Truman responded to protests by arranging for 
Rice to buried in the non-segregated section of Arlington National Cemetery, asserting 
that “national appreciation of patriotic sacrifice should not be limited by race, color or 
creed.”52 Mrs. Rice demanded recognition of both her husband’s military service to 
the country and his Indian identity, refusing to sign an affidavit to “legalize the burial” 
proposed by the Sioux City cemetery which stated her husband was Caucasian, and 
stating that, “John loved the Army and always said if anything happened he wanted to 
be buried in the military section of a cemetery.”53 Native veterans and their families 
argued against discriminatory treatment of Native people by calling attention to their 
military service to the country as an example of their citizenship.  
 Historian Jere’ Bishop Franco has emphasized how participation in the war 
effort opened up Native veterans’ to new experiences and interactions with non-
Natives, which led them to demand equal treatment on par with their fellow 
servicemen.54 Moreover, Alison Bernstein has argued that after fighting alongside 
white soldiers in the war, Native veterans began to agitate for the end of wardship 
itself, because they had “begun to see the ways in which white society controlled their 
lives either through discriminatory legislation or the paternalism of the Indian 
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Bureau.”55 Media coverage from the postwar period reinforced this narrative of 
veterans’ efforts to obtain equality with other citizens and freedom from government 
oversight. In 1946, an article published in the Great Falls Tribune highlighted Crow 
veterans’ objection to the creation a “separate office for Indian veterans” by the BIA, 
“on the grounds that this will merely continue the arbitrary power of the bureau ‘over 
our property and our lives and continue to deny us the right to be citizens of the 
country we gladly fought for.’”56 Similarly, in 1946, Salish veteran Stephen De Mers 
was quoted in a radio feature on Washington DC’s WTOP expressing frustration with 
the reach of the BIA in Indian lives. “We have freed the Philipinos [sic], and we have 
been generous to subjects outside the U.S. But a didactic Indian Bureau, with an 
arbitrary attitude and jammed with red tape, has sought to lead us like children. We 
want rights as citizens, not charges.”57 Clearly, some Native veterans saw wardship 
and the power of the BIA, as impediments to their rights as citizens. Pitting their 
military service against the bureaucratic administration of the BIA, these veterans 
spoke through mainstream media outlets to highlight the hypocrisy they saw in the 
differentiation of Native veterans’ rights compared to other veterans’ rights.  
 However, this was only part of the story. Other Native people utilized their 
own and their family members’ military service to claim specific appropriations for 
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Indians and preserve federal recognition of tribal rights. For example, some of the 
appeals sent to President Truman about aid to Navajos in Arizona and New Mexico 
came from Native veterans who mentioned their own military service in their 
demands. For example, in 1951, a Sioux veteran of World War I named Lone Eagle 
wrote to Truman arguing, “Fifty-five thousand Navajos now living in semi-arid desert 
are practically in a state of starvation at this time. They and their aged people and their 
children are hungry—yet they make no complaints to the outside world.”58 Lone Eagle 
asserted that Indians had shown themselves to be loyal Americans—indeed, he used 
the phrase, “original Americans”—and thus deserving of the same kind of aid “we are 
again sending…to far away countries.” “I am a veteran of World War I,” Lone Eagle 
wrote. “My son served 3 1/2 years in World War II. My son-in-law has recently 
returned from Korea maimed for life—All enlisted volunteers—all good loyal 
Americans.”59 In his efforts to increase support for Indian appropriations in Congress, 
AAIA president Oliver LaFarge utilized similar rhetoric. A newspaper article from the 
early 1950s described La Farge as “astonished” that Navajo “patriotic ardor has 
survived the handicaps that neglect has imposed upon them; yet their young men have 
consistently shown themselves glad and proud to fight for this country.” To reverse 
that neglect, La Farge urged that the Senate restore appropriations cut by the House, 
because allowing them to stand was “a false economy and a grave injustice.”60 In these 
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cases, Native veterans and members of organizations devoted to Indian affairs did not 
demand citizenship rights for Indians, but rather, used military service to emphasize 
the specific benefits and resources Indians were entitled to due to their relationship 
with the federal government.  
 Additionally, Native veterans drew attention to their military service to oppose 
changes in legislation which would alter the legal agreements between the federal 
government and Native nations. For example, in 1952, Joseph Red Cloud, Chief of the 
Oglala Sioux tribe on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota, sent a telegram to 
Harry Truman appealing to the federal government for aid, stating that his 
grandchildren had fought for the country, and three of them had “been killed and one a 
prisoner—yet the fathers at home are in want of food and Congressmen too busy to 
help out.”  Red Cloud connected his request for aid to opposition to “Section 3055 of 
Title 18 U.S. Code entitled crimes and criminal procedure and asks for the sake of the 
Indians that it be vetoed if passed.”61 Red Cloud simultaneously highlighted Oglala 
Sioux service to the United States and reminded Truman that the federal government 
had not lived up to its obligations to the tribe. Additionally, at the 1954 Emergency 
Conference of American Indians on Legislation, hosted by the NCAI, Zuni veterans of 
WWII and the Korean War issued a statement opposing several bills which would 
alter or abolish wardship, including a bill which would bring Zunis under the 
jurisdiction of the state of New Mexico. The Zuni veterans pointed to their military 
service to support their demand that the federal government honor their obligations to 
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the Zuni tribe. “We fully understand that the passage of these bills will effect [sic] us 
individually, our property, our tribal ownership, our protection against our religion, 
our communities, and the things we fought for so dearly.”62 Reminding the federal 
government of their military service, the veterans asserted that, “We have fought for 
democracy and we would like to have you show us this democratic way of life and not 
neglect us.”63 Instead of utilizing military service to demand equal rights as citizens, 
the Zuni veterans emphasized that military service necessitated that the government 
honor Zuni tribal property rights and protections. Thus, when Native veterans called 
upon their military service to demand recognition and support from the government, 
they did not do so solely to insist that their rights be granted in return for fulfilling the 
responsibilities of citizenship. Native veterans also used military service to call for the 
federal government to fulfill the obligations of wardship.  
 
Wardship, Citizenship, and Native Access to the GI Bill  
Wardship and Denial of GI Bill Benefits  
 To Native veterans, military service garnered them access to the rights of 
citizenship and put additional pressure on the federal government to fulfill the 
obligations of wardship. However, Native veterans’ efforts to access certain GI Bill 
benefits were stymied because state agents from the VA, individual bankers, and other 
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officials believed that they were ineligible for benefits under the GI Bill. They 
assumed that under the terms of wardship, the BIA provided Indian veterans with all 
needed resources. This misunderstanding revealed that governmental agents believed 
that Indian wardship superseded individual Native men’s citizenship. Although 
Willard Beatty, Director of Education for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, asserted in 
1944 that, “Indian veterans have exactly the same rights and are entitled to exactly the 
same service as any one else,” he noted that, “There are indications in various parts of 
the country that veteran’s advisory bodies are inclined to assume that the Indian 
Service alone has responsibility for retraining, reemployment, or readjustment of 
Indian veterans.”64 Similarly, in 1947, a Laguna Pueblo veteran met with Senator 
Dennis Chavez of New Mexico and representatives of the NCAI to voice his concerns 
that, “Indians are not informed as to what they are entitled to,” because “the Veterans’ 
Bureau refuses to treat Indians as it does other GI’s, thinking the Indian Service takes 
care of them.”65 In response to these types of assumptions, the Department of the 
Interior insisted that BIA agents should actively “encourage veterans to take advantage 
of the GI credit opportunities open to them wherever possible,” and reached out to 
members of the VFW to help eligible Native people obtain loans.66 Martin White, 
Assistant Secretary of the Interior, argued that the VFW “could also help eligible 
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Navajos obtain GI loans,” because “some veterans find it difficult to obtain a GI loan 
because they are Indians and there is a widespread but erroneous belief that the Indian 
Service can take care of all Indian credit needs.”67 Thus, in the context of veterans’ 
benefits, non-Native state officials and lenders conceptualized Indians as dependent 
“wards,” and the BIA as the only agency responsible for Indian welfare. Moreover, 
non-Natives presumed that Native veterans just did not need assistance like other non-
Native veterans, because they had their “own” resources for obtaining loans.  
 In their 1947 report on the civil rights of American Indians, Milton Steward 
and Rachel Sady asserted that Indians could not obtain loans from federal 
organizations based on “the grounds that they have their own credit funds.” Steward 
and Sady noted that this widespread assumption filtered from government agencies 
like the Farm Security Administration to “commercial credit houses” where Indians 
applied for GI loans. Lending agencies “th[ought] that the Indians are taken care of,” 
and thus denied Native applications.68 This problem persisted throughout the mid-
twentieth century. In 1961, a representative from the Fort Berthold Reservation in 
North Dakota wrote to organizers of the American Indian Chicago Conference to 
assert that, “There should be a loan fund especially set up for the Indian Veteran, as 
there are no credit facilities available for them through any source.”69 Due to the 
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assumption that the BIA provided all the credit funds Native veterans needed, many 
Indians found themselves shut off from the possibility of obtaining loans at all, and 
thus restricted from the economic and civic benefits of obtaining a GI Bill loan.  
 Non-Natives assumed that individual Native people were unable to enter 
contracts without BIA approval. In 1945, Walter Woehlke, Assistant to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, distributed a circular on behalf of Commissioner 
William Brophy to all Indian agents and superintendents which attempted to dispel 
this myth. Woehlke wrote, “An Indian is a citizen. The fact that he is an Indian entails 
no personal disqualification of his right to enter into a contract.” Woehlke 
acknowledged that individual Indians were subject to restrictions “with respect to the 
alienation of property held in trust for him by the United States,” but that apart from 
members of the Osage Tribe,70 Native people faced no legal restrictions in entering 
into contracts.71 The BIA recognized that due to their doubts about the security of 
loans granted to Indians, lenders began to “demand a higher rate of interest than [was] 
permitted,” or, in some cases, were “reluctant to lend money to Indians.”72 As a result, 
the Bureau issued instructions that “liberalize[d] and modernize[d] the regulations on 
the giving of security by Indians,” in an effort to navigate around the doubts of lenders 
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who saw Native people living on reservations as risky investments.73 For example, 
because lenders understood that Indian land was unable to be confiscated if the Native 
borrower was unable to pay back his loan, the in 1945 BIA stipulated that “If the 
lender and the Indian veteran borrower so agree, superintendents [were] hereby 
authorized to permit Indian veterans to assign income from trust land as security for 
the loan partially guaranteed by the Veteran’s Administration,” and superintendents 
were instructed to “give every assistance to sheriffs or other proper officers in entering 
upon Indian lands for the purpose of serving execution or other process.”74 If lenders 
were “unwilling to make loans for buildings to be located on trust allotments,” the 
BIA would consider issuing “a fee patent or removal of restrictions on a small tract of 
land as a homesite, which then could be mortgaged to the lender.”75 These liberalized 
and modernized regulations may have assuaged lenders’ concerns, but also may have 
confirmed their assumptions that Indians were not allowed to make contracts without 
BIA approval or interference. Under these regulations, superintendents had the power 
to act as liaisons between Native veterans and lenders, grant final authority to issue fee 
patents to mortgage land, assure access to Indian lands to law enforcement and other 
officers, and permit Indians to assign income from trust land as security for loans. 
Brophy insisted that “all possible assistance should be rendered Indian veterans in 
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securing loans through the same lenders that serve other veterans.”76 Similarly, in 
1946, Brophy reassured the superintendent of the Sacramento Agency, John Rockwell, 
that “the Indian is entitled under the GI Bill of Rights to the same benefits that any 
veteran gets.”77 However, despite these declarations, Native veterans were not subject 
to the same processes as other veterans. Instead, their ability to access GI Bill loans 
was filtered through the regulation and oversight of the BIA.  
 Notably, Brophy’s 1945 circular stipulated that Indian veterans could assign 
income from trust lands as security for loans only if both the lender and veteran 
borrower agreed to such an agreement, thereby granting Native veterans autonomy 
over their trust land. BIA agents were heavily involved in the administration of GI Bill 
loans because they wanted to protect Native men’s entitlement to these benefits—so 
much so that in special cases, trust restrictions would be lifted and fee patents granted 
for Native veterans to obtain loans.  
 However, despite Brophy’s circular and the Bureau’s “liberalized” regulations, 
Native veterans continued to face difficulty accessing GI Bill loans. The non-Native 
media seized on these denials, and pointed to Native veterans’ situations as proof of 
wardship’s limitations. Some members of the press and non-Native organizations 
wanted to draw attention to racial discrimination and Indian poverty. Others used the 
restrictions as rationale for the termination of the BIA and the integration of Native 
people into the polity. In both cases, media and organizational publicity about Native 
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veterans’ attempts to access the GI Bill emphasized how wardship negatively 
impacted Indians’ assumption of full American citizenship.  
Articles in mainstream media outlets used the denial of GI Bill loans to Native 
veterans to illustrate the hardships all Indians endured due to wardship. For example, 
in a 1947 article for the Christian Science Monitor, Kimmis Hendrick equated 
wardship with enslavement and asserted that few Indian veterans “have opportunity to 
avail themselves of the GI Bill of Rights.”78 In 1948, Will Rogers wrote an extensive 
article for Look Magazine on poverty on the Navajo Reservation. Rogers asserted that 
as “wards,” Navajos were “denied the same rights as other Americans.” For example, 
he wrote, “Although there are over 3,500 Navaho veterans, not one GI home loan or 
business loan has been made to anyone on the Reservation. Under the Navaho’s 
wardship status, it is questionable if one can be made legally.”79 Other sources 
maintained that the denial of GI Bill benefits to Native people exemplified inequality. 
A pamphlet published in the late 1940s by the AAIA asserted, “Every Veteran is 
entitled to the privileges underwritten by the GI Bill of Rights. Yet, American Indians, 
who gallantly served their country find it difficult to get these rights. Why? To a great 
extent because the American public as a whole does not understand or know the 
problems of these 400,000 fellow citizens, descendants of the original Americans.”80 
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The AAIA urged potential members and donors to confront the discrepancy between 
Native peoples’ service to the United States and their denial of rights under the GI 
Bill, contending, “He helped YOU win the war, won’t YOU help him win his 
rights?”81 Some Native veterans welcomed this kind of public exposure of their 
difficulties accessing the GI Bill, and reached out to non-Native organizations for 
help. For example, in 1946, 16 Crow veterans from Montana submitted an appeal to 
the General Federation of Women’s Clubs for “aid in revising the GI bill of rights to 
provide equality for Indian veterans of World War 2.”82 Mainstream media coverage 
in venues like the Christian Science Monitor and Look Magazine, the group of Crow 
veterans, and the AAIA all framed their claims for Native eligibility for GI Bill loans 
in the language of equality and the rights of citizenship.  
Pro-termination politicians also utilized language of equality and citizenship, 
arguing that “special Federal authority over Indians” was to blame for restricting 
Indians from accessing the rights to which they were entitled. To Nevada senator 
George Malone and others in favor of dissolving the BIA, “It [was] time that the 
individual Indians, both men and women, took their places in the community without 
segregation.”83 Claiming that the special federal authority was “hard for the average 
American to comprehend,” Malone argued that the denial of GI Bill loans to Indian 
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veterans exemplified the limitations of the trust relationship between the BIA and 
Native tribes. In a 1949 speech delivered to the Senate, Malone argued that, “If he 
should happen to be a war veteran he cannot, as a rule, obtain a loan under the GI Bill 
of rights because his property is tied up in Indian Bureau trusteeship.”84 Indians’ 
restriction from GI Bill loans proved that wardship was “segregating” them from the 
rest of the polity. In 1945, Pastor Don Klingensmith of the Bredhead, Wisconsin 
Methodist Church wrote to Albert Grorud, Special Investigator for the Senate 
Committee on Indian Affairs expressing similar views. Klingensmith asserted that 
“Indian wardship causes segregation from the general American culture, with harmful 
results to the Indian.” One of those harmful results was restricting Indians from 
accessing “the GI Bill of Rights, Social Security legislation, the old age and 
unemployment benefits, and other laws affecting the general social welfare,” which, 
Klingensmith argued, “apply equally to Indians.”85 Those in favor of dissolving the 
BIA believed that Indians were prevented from accessing the GI Bill because the BIA 
perpetuated Native peoples’ wardship status and kept them in a state of inequality.  
 Thus, widespread understanding that wardship status precluded their eligibility 
for the GI Bill meant that the BIA’s effort to establish a protocol for Native veterans to 
access the benefits of the GI Bill was largely ineffective, and Indian veterans 
continued to face difficulties obtaining benefits. Non-Native members of the media, 
organizations devoted to Indian affairs, and Indians themselves assumed that Indians 
                                                            
84 Ibid.  
85 Klingensmith to Grorud, 1945, Indian Policy (2 of 4), Box 16, Isolated Indian Allotments to Indian 
Policy, SEN 83A-F9 (1928-1953), Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Indian Affairs 
Investigating Subcommittee, RG 46, NAB. 
  
280 
could not access these benefits. Just as in battles over Native eligibility for need-based 
benefits under the Social Security Act, misperceptions and rumors restricted Indians 
from benefits. Rumors potentially lessened the likelihood that Indian veterans would 
even apply for GI Bill loans, especially for those Native people who lived in isolated 
areas far removed from VA offices. During a meeting of the Navajo Tribal Council in 
December 1945, Roger Davis, a member of the council, asked a question of a 
representative from the Phoenix office of the VA, Mr. Thompson, which reflected the 
impact of rumors: “I heard a rumor somewhere, down in Phoenix, one time, those 
Indians in the south of the state, the Pimas and Papagos, had a meeting in Phoenix 
somewhere and tried to get that grant through and the state denied that since these 
Indians were wards of the government, under the GI Bill of Rights.”86 Thompson 
attempted to clear up the misunderstanding, arguing that “the state has no figure in 
that. That is the Veteran’s Administration. The law says any veteran of World War 
II.”87 It is understandable that Davis was confused about the role of the state in 
administering GI Bill loans, because Arizona had vigorously denied responsibility for 
providing welfare benefits to Indian wards. In this case, Navajos may have assumed 
that accessing GI Bill loans would have been no different from accessing Old Age 
Assistance, Aid to Dependent Children, or Aid to the Blind, in such a hostile state.  
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The lack of coordination between the BIA and other government agencies 
further fueled misinformation about Indian eligibility for GI Bill loans. For example, 
William Brophy worried that Indians would be overlooked in the formation of 
Community Advisory Centers, which were established in 1945 as facilities where 
veterans could obtain information and resources. Brophy urged all superintendents to 
“take steps to find out whether such a center is being established or has been 
established, and make plans to participate in the operations of the center.” If Indian 
agents did not reach out to the Community Advisory Centers, Brophy reasoned, 
“Indians may get inadequate information with respect to their status as citizens and 
their rights as veterans.”88 In other cases, this lack of coordination was due to 
inadequate planning. In a 1947 AAIA newsletter, the John Adair noted that because 
the Navajo reservation straddled Arizona and New Mexico, Navajo veterans were 
required to deal with two different VA offices depending on the state in which they 
lived, producing “an administrative chaos which reflects lack of coordination between 
Indian Service and Veterans’ Administration in Washington.”89 Both the BIA’s 
scrambling to coordinate with outside agencies and those agencies’ assumptions about 
wardship and the extent to which Indians were already “taken care of” led to 
confusion in the implementation of bureaucratic processes through which Native 
veterans could obtain loans and resources.  
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The BIA’s Role in Veterans’ Readjustment   
Non-Natives conceptualized Native veterans’ readjustment to life after military 
service in contradictory ways. On one hand, military service represented the ultimate 
expression of the responsibilities of citizenship. On the other hand, those veterans who 
failed to adapt to postwar life represented Indians’ inability exercise the duties of 
citizenship as wards. For example, in her article, “A New Era for Indian Americans,” 
published in the 1956 report prepared for the Commission on the Rights and Liberties 
of the American Indian, Essie Skillern argued that the death of WWII veteran Ira 
Hayes, a Pima Indian who had become quite well known for his participation in the 
raising of the flag on Iwo Jima, was a graphic illustration of the inability of Indians to 
successfully leave the reservation and find “a place in the white man’s peacetime 
world.” Hayes, who suffered from alcoholism, died of exposure and alcohol poisoning 
in 1955.90 Skillern wrote, “His fate is a reminder that not all Indians on reservations 
are prepared as yet to face the struggle which awaits them if and when Congress wills 
to deprive them of their tribal status.”91 For Skillern, the “reservation” was a racialized 
marker of backwardness that preempted even Hayes, a famous war hero, from 
integrating into white American society. The “tragic” figure of Ira Hayes, 
memorialized in music and movies since his death, represented enduring stereotypes 
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about Indian wardship.92 In popular culture, Hayes’ alcoholism symbolized his 
inability to cope with the pressures of citizenship, and the insufficiency of even 
decorated military service to impel Native people to leave the confines of wardship.  
 BIA agents strained to reconcile these two opposing conceptions of Native 
veterans. Were they ready to assimilate? Or did they need continued guidance? Some 
BIA officials assumed that upon their return from WWII, Native veterans would 
possess a “new sense of power,” “impatience with existing institutions,” “increased 
self-assurance,” and “potentially, at least, capab[ility] of assuming greater 
responsibility.”93 State agents believed that the GI Bill would be a crucial tool for 
veterans to speedily transition from wardship to citizenship. However, BIA personnel 
did not clearly understand how this transition would occur. For example, BIA agents 
were unsure whether it was their responsibility as “guardians” of Indian wards to make 
veterans aware of their eligibility for GI Bill benefits, or whether Native veterans were 
expected to take the initiative and apply for benefits purely of their own volition. In 
1944, John Evans, general superintendent of the United Pueblos Agency, planned to 
implement an administrative system, where agency employees and tribal officials 
could track the progress of each returning veteran. However, Evans also asserted that, 
“It is important that the Indian should become aware of the benefits to which he, as a 
veteran, is entitled. And he should also take full advantage of the opportunities which 
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are offered him.”94 To Evans, it was not only the responsibility of the BIA and the 
tribal government to help individual veterans seek out benefits, but also the veteran’s 
own duty. 
Although military service symbolized a great commitment of citizenship, and 
most likely did bring increased “self-assurance” and “power” to individual Native 
men, the path to GI Bill benefits was unclear. In 1944, Commissioner John Collier 
issued a memo to all BIA superintendents urging them to keep track of and inform 
tribal councils of any laws passed by individual states which would affect Indian war 
veterans: “Veterans of Indian blood from your jurisdiction should also be advised of 
such benefits and services available to them through the state so that, if desired, they 
may take advantage of the same.”95 Collier impressed upon BIA agents the importance 
of keeping themselves apprised of any state legislation, because he may have 
contended that it was highly unlikely that states would extend extra outreach to Indian 
reservations. Indeed, many Native veterans were unaware of available benefits. For 
example, at a 1945 meeting of the Navajo Tribal Council, council member Paul Jones 
posed a question to a representative from the US Employment Service Office which 
revealed the gap between Native veterans’ knowledge of benefits and their eligibility 
for resources. Jones stated, “We have a number of veterans who are unaware of their 
rights and have not investigated the matter of readjustment pay. Without their 
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knowledge of this they are now unemployed.”96 Because the ward/guardian 
relationship demanded that BIA officials “guide” individual Native people to full 
citizenship, BIA officials understood that it was their responsibility to establish access 
and knowledge of GI Bill benefits to Indian veterans.  
 The relationship between BIA officials and Native veterans was undergirded 
by a gendered view of citizenship which significantly differed from the ways in which 
officials interacted with Native wives of servicemen entitled to dependency 
allowances. The Office of Dependency Benefits had entrusted a certain level of 
paternalistic authority to superintendents when it empowered them to accept 
dependency allowances on behalf of those Native women who were supposedly 
“squandering” their benefits. In the case of veterans, more superintendents and field 
agents developed systems to assist returned veterans in obtaining employment and 
benefits due to them under new legislation, and fought against instances of racial 
discrimination based on Native peoples’ status as wards. In other words, for veterans, 
BIA officials worked more actively to assert Indians’ rights to welfare as citizens, 
rather than utilizing the quotidian structures of wardship to control and monitor the 
welfare payments Native people received. For example, in the 1946 Annual Report of 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior, William Brophy 
asserted that, “In localities where Indian veterans have found difficulty in obtaining 
funds from commercial lenders, efforts are made by Indian Service personnel to get 
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for them the same kind of treatment that is accorded to other veterans.” Further, he 
noted, “Personnel in all branches and components of the Indian Service has given 
assistance to veterans.”97 The types of benefits at stake certainly made a difference 
here. GI Bill benefits and loans were not characterized—in name or in practice—as 
“dependency” benefits. Veterans were entitled to these benefits in return for their 
service. Native peoples’ military service impacted how BIA personnel understood 
their roles in assisting Indians access the benefits of citizenship.  
Additionally, the VA’s interaction with the BIA was quite different than the 
BIA’s interactions with other welfare agencies. In 1944, Thomas Nickerson, 
administrative assistant for the United Pueblos Agency, wrote that he was “impressed 
with the fact that the local organization of the Veterans Administration appeared to be 
very anxious to cooperate with the Indian Service in doing everything possible to 
make sure that the Indian veterans secure all the benefits to which they are entitled.”98 
In 1946, the Arizona representative for the Veterans Employment Service wrote to the 
superintendent of the Sells Indian Agency regarding the requests they had received 
from the Navajo and San Carlos Agencies to provide veterans with information, 
noting, “It has been our pleasure to make trips to these agencies to furnish them with 
the information desired.”99 This kind of enthusiasm from the VA was not universal. 
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However, these instances represented a significant difference from how other Indian 
citizens were treated when they inquired about welfare eligibility. Specifically, 
representatives from the Bureaus of Public Welfare in Arizona and New Mexico had 
actively resisted visiting Indian reservations to provide information and take 
applications for the need-based programs of the Social Security Act. The difference 
reflects how military service impacted perceived entitlement for benefits, even if the 
applicants were also considered to be “wards.”  
However, despite BIA agents’ keenness to work with other agencies and 
secure benefits for Indian veterans, high-ranking BIA officials contended that the BIA 
was not the only administrative body responsible for Indian veterans. In 1945, 
Assistant Commissioner William Zimmerman sent a memo to all superintendents 
which declared, “The Indian Service can perform an invaluable service to our Indian 
veterans if at each agency some employee or unit is charged with the responsibility of 
keeping informed on all legislation and on all agencies dealing with veterans’ 
matters.”100 Though Zimmerman urged BIA personnel to be “patient and helpful,” and 
to “have regard for what the individual has gone through and how it has left him,” he 
also cautioned against Indian Service employees taking on too much responsibility for 
which they were not equipped. “We do not want to get in the position of overloading 
ourselves with work for which we have neither the funds nor personnel, and in the end 
have the Indian veterans accuse us of doing an inadequate job for them.”101 Here, 
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Zimmerman exposed the scope and confines of wardship—he encouraged BIA agents 
to be of service to Indian veterans, but recognized that Indian veterans would hold the 
BIA accountable for their postwar readjustment. 
 The BIA’s efforts to assist veterans to secure loans and spread information 
disrupts a common historiographical narrative about Native military service. Donald 
Fixico has revealed that because of their exposure to the “outside world,” non-Native 
politicians and members of the public saw Indian veterans as the population most 
“ready” to be freed from wardship and most likely to benefit from leaving reservations 
and disbanding from tribal society.102 The dichotomy between “wards” on reservations 
and individuals whose military service had prepared them to enter mainstream society 
is a false one. Wardship prevented Native veterans from obtaining GI Bill loans, and 
the BIA was very much involved in the lives of Indian veterans. Wardship followed 
Native veterans, through administrative practices, racial assumptions, and legal 
ambiguity. For example, in 1950, a VA official wrote to the superintendent of the 
Pima Indian Agency for help in determining the circumstances of the death of John 
Williams to disburse payments to his heirs under his life insurance policy. Williams 
was a veteran, and, in the words of the VA, “a ward of the government.103 To 
determine “to whom payment of the monies held can be made,” the VA reached out to 
the BIA, demonstrating that in the VA officials’ minds, Williams’ status as a “ward” 
necessitated the BIA’s involvement in determining how to distribute the money which 
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Williams had designated. Thus, although military service was understood to contribute 
to Native veteran’s eventual assimilation, it did not automatically release Indians from 
the label of ward.  
 While some superintendents and agents cooperated with public welfare boards 
and urged caseworkers to simplify and speed the process for applicants for Old Age 
Assistance, Aid to the Blind, and Aid to Dependent Children, other BIA officials 
exercised paternalistic oversight over Native women who received monthly 
dependency allowance benefits. Towards veterans, BIA agents’ attitudes were 
somewhere in the middle. Internal BIA communication reveals that Bureau leaders 
issued distinct instructions to agency employees to help veterans secure employment 
and communicate with VA representatives. These efforts show the extent to which the 
quotidian structures of wardship were integrated into BIA efforts to aid veterans. For 
example, the Committee on Veterans’ Adjustment, a group of four BIA employees 
from the United Pueblos Agency in New Mexico, compiled a handbook for agents 
helping Native veterans. “You are not asked to consider yourself as a spy, a clinician 
or case worker,” the handbook read. “Do not make your interest or observation so 
obvious as to be obnoxious. Care should be taken, too, to avoid raising the veteran’s 
hopes unduly as to conditions of employment, or as to special considerations, rights or 
privileges. Be frank, honest, and practical.”104 The handbook instructed employees to 
be helpful, but also reflected the BIA’s reluctance to express any guarantees 
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concerning the benefits veterans might expect in return for military service. This 
uneasiness may have stemmed from difficulties Native veterans’ experienced 
accessing benefits to which the BIA had assured them they were entitled. In the 
“Returned Veterans” section of their newsletter published in 1945 or 1946, the NCAI 
stated, “We understand that to date the Indian Bureau will try only to give referral 
service and factual information to its field service concerning benefits and assistance 
for returning service personnel. The assumption being that Indians should receive 
benefits exactly the same as any other individual.”105 This announcement demonstrates 
that BIA agents had been confused about the extent of their role in assisting returned 
veterans to maneuver through the system to access benefits.  
In some agencies, BIA officials exercised administrative oversight over 
returned veterans, purportedly to help them access the benefits to which they were 
entitled. For example, BIA officials at many different reservations set up index 
systems to keep track of each returned veteran and their need for employment and 
benefits. In 1944, employees of the United Pueblos Agency met to discuss how to set 
up “a card system in which there was a record of each returning veteran, and that such 
a system should be handled either by the day school teachers or the area supervisors in 
cooperation with the tribal governments.”106 The superintendent of the agency, John 
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Evans, instituted a card system to “keep track of Indian veterans and to make certain 
that they are given all the assistance that they are entitled to as veterans.” Evans also 
considered setting up a similar system for returned war workers, in an effort to secure 
employment for them.107 Superintendent C. H. Gensler of the Colorado River Agency 
also oversaw the creation of “an individual file on each Indian veteran,” which he 
offered to the Director of the Unemployment Compensation Division of the 
Employment Security Commission of Arizona to assist their work “regarding 
readjustment of allowance claims for all veterans in this area.”108 Gensler noted that 
because of the “isolated location of this reservation, it is extremely difficult for the 
veterans to contact any of your offices.”109 In addition to the individual veterans’ files, 
Gensler noted that various BIA personnel, including social workers and extension 
workers, could act as liaisons between Indian families and the Employment Security 
Commission. Similarly, Doris Weston, community worker for the Sells Agency in 
Arizona, arranged for a VA representative to come to Sells “every second Wednesday 
of each month” to take applications for benefits from veterans and discuss other 
issues.110 Thus, some BIA officials worked actively to implement systems which 
would have ostensibly made it easier for Indian veterans to obtain benefits, or at least 
become aware of the bureaucratic channels they needed to go through outside of the 
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BIA itself. However, the use of card index systems and the tracking of individual 
veterans could also be perceived as extraneous or paternalistic oversight of Indian 
veterans on the part of the BIA.  
Rather than viewing Native veterans as dependent wards, BIA officials may 
have actively worked to ensure that veterans received the benefits to which they were 
entitled because they, like most of the American polity, understood veterans to be 
citizens who had done their duty for the country. However, their perceptions of Native 
veterans’ citizenship coexisted uneasily with a teleological understanding of veterans’ 
assimilation into the “white world” because of Indians’ wartime experiences. BIA 
agents believed was their responsibility to help Native people succeed in that world. 
For example, in 1945, Doris Weston reported to her supervisor that she had “assisted 
many of the 134 discharged Veterans with their social, economic, and health 
problems.” In addition to submitting claims for disability, providing assistance to 
those veterans seeking employment off reservation, and setting up a weekly 
“Veteran’s Readjustment Allowance program,” Weston also “cooperated with Draft 
Boards and Army Recruiting Station in securing men for Military Service,” and 
conducted weekly investigations “at request of Red Cross.”111 Much like other social 
workers working with marginalized populations eligible for welfare relief, Weston 
both provided resources and acted as a supervisor or investigator making sure that 
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Native people within the Sells Agency complied with state stipulations for military 
service and receipt of aid.  
Other BIA agents, such as John Evans, Superintendent of the United Pueblos 
Agency, saw it as their “responsibility…to contribute our utmost, each in our own 
fashion, and as an organization, to the adjustment of the Pueblo war veteran.”112 Evans 
stressed that whether Pueblo veterans chose to “fit themselves into the economic and 
social pattern of the community at large,” or “resume their familiar niche in the pueblo 
pattern from which they went to war,” it was the duty and obligation of BIA agents to 
help the veteran through the transition. “No clearer example ever existed,” Evans 
wrote, “of a specific need to ‘help the Indian help themselves.’”113 In this case, Evans 
understood the BIA’s mission of guiding Native people towards citizenship and self-
sufficiency to be even more crucial because of Indian veterans’ military service. In his 
1947 story about Navajo and Pueblo veterans for the AAIA publication, John Adair 
echoed this understanding of the BIA’s responsibility to help Native veterans adjust to 
life after service. Adair warned that, “Indian Service should build for a future with this 
veteran population. If it does not do so, if the veteran is left to shift for himself, a new 
era of disillusionment will set in.”114 Adair worried that if the BIA did not step in and 
help guide Native veterans into appropriate employment, that the “whole acculturating 
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process,” which had been “greatly accelerated by the war,” would have been for 
nothing. He wrote, “In a certain sense it is a race against time, for a great many of 
these veterans, possibly the majority of them will slip back into their old ways after a 
period of years.”115 Adair understood the BIA’s role in the lives of Native veterans 
explicitly as guides to proper citizenship, even more so than Evans, who asserted that 
BIA officials should help with readjustment even if the individual veteran decided to 
“resume their familiar niche.” Nevertheless, both men conceptualized the war as a 
process of acculturation, the beginning of a transition from “wardship” to full 
citizenship. 
 
Termination and the GI Bill  
Native veterans may also have faced difficulty accessing GI Bill loans due to 
increased political rhetoric about terminating the BIA altogether. In Zimmerman’s 
1945 memo to superintendents, he emphasized that “we need to distinguish clearly 
between the tasks which we are fitted to do and for which we have the personnel and 
facilities and those tasks which belong to other agencies created to help the 
veteran.”116 Zimmerman’s concerns about Bureau personnel overloading themselves 
and promising too much to Native veterans reflected an overall effort by the BIA and 
other policymakers to encourage Indians to look elsewhere for services and loans 
before turning to the BIA. For example, in his 1946 annual report to the Secretary of 
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the Interior, William Brophy stated, “It was realized early that special action should be 
taken to encourage qualified Indian veterans to take advantage of the guaranty loan 
provisions of the GI Bill of Rights before seeking loans from tribal funds or the 
Federal revolving credit funds.”117 Similarly, Brophy released a circular to all 
superintendents in order to “urge upon the Indian who seeks assistance from you to 
file his application with the proper authorities,” in order to receive unemployment 
compensation after returning to the reservation from work in war industries.118 These 
BIA protocols reflect not only an effort to help Native veterans secure the benefits to 
which they were entitled, but also a desire to funnel Native requests outside of the 
BIA, an organization which many politicians wanted to dissolve in the postwar period.  
 To advocates of termination policy, wardship was especially limiting to those 
Native men and women who had served in the military in both World War I and 
World War II. To these legislators and state agents, military service symbolized both 
Native “readiness” to leave behind tribal life and incorporate themselves in to the 
American polity, as well as Native servicemen’s entitlement to equal treatment 
alongside veterans of other races and ethnicities. For example, in 1944, a group of 
seven congressmen formed the Select Committee to Investigate Indian Affairs and 
Conditions, which was tasked with investigating living conditions of Indians in 
Nebraska, South Dakota, North Dakota, Montana, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Arizona, 
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New Mexico, Washington, Idaho and Alaska. In their report to Congress, the 
committee asked, “Will the Indian who has recently doffed the uniform of Uncle Sam 
be willing to don the blanket of his forebears?” The committee “most vehemently 
denie[d] that he should.”119 The committee conceptualized Indian veterans’ return to 
tribal life as a step backwards, and demanded that “The Indian who has fought to save 
freedom for humanity throughout the world should not be expected to subsist in an 
atmosphere which denies him freedom here at home.”120 Further, they asserted that 
any legislation which would benefit returned veterans “should be so drawn that it will 
operate as effectively for the Indian veteran as for the veteran of any other 
nationality.”121 To non-Natives, military service was a marker of Native competency, 
and it was the federal government’s responsibility to ensure that Indian veterans 
received equal opportunity and treatment like non-Native veterans. Some advocates of 
termination pushed this type of argument further to justify the complete dissolution of 
the BIA. For example, in a 1947 article for the Washington Times-Herald, Frank 
Waldrop argued, “the Indians in 1947 are capable of looking after themselves. More 
than 22,000 Indians served with our fighting forces in the recent war. About 45,000 
more worked in war industries.”122 If Native people could serve their country, 
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Waldrop reasoned, “There is no excuse for the Indian bureau. Let ‘em go.”123 Non-
Native terminationists argued that Native veterans who had fought for freedom abroad 
should not be denied the rights of citizenship at home. Some believed that Indian 
veterans should be “freed” from wardship and the BIA should be abolished.  
Non-Natives’ eagerness to secure Native veterans’ equal access to citizenship 
revealed their mistaken beliefs that Native people did not possess US citizenship. For 
example, soon after WWII, a group of non-Indian citizens from Illinois petitioned 
their senator, Scott Lucas, to demand that because 22,000 Native men had served in 
World War II, “full citizenship be granted all such veterans, all Indians born hereafter, 
all high school graduates, and all others judged by their tribal councils to be competent 
to manage their own affairs.”124 To this group, as wards, Native people were not 
citizens. By achieving a certain level of assimilation, demonstrated by military service, 
high school diplomas, or other characteristics of “competency,” Native people should 
receive “full citizenship.”125 This petition did not define what “full citizenship” 
entailed, but other proposals from the era were more specific. For example, in 1947, 
Senator James Murray (D-Montana), introduced a bill “To confer civil rights upon 
Indian veterans of World Wars I and II, to remove restrictions on the property of such 
Indians, and for other purposes.”126 In addition to protecting Indians’ access to the 
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“civil rights and liberties conferred by the Constitution and laws of the United States 
upon citizens” and their right to receive veterans’ benefits, Murray’s bill would have 
terminated Native veterans’ “wardship” status, bestowing upon them the “right” to sell 
personal property.127 Murray purportedly proposed the bill in order to ensure equal 
treatment for those Native men who had served in the military by “lifting” wardship’s 
“restrictions.” However, Murray’s goal was to dissolve Native claims to land. As 
United States citizens, Native veterans were already entitled to their share in the 
benefits of veterans’ legislation as well as civil rights and liberties. Whether Murray 
was unclear about the nature of Native citizenship or not, he utilized public desire for 
equal citizenship rights for Native veterans to propose a system by which the trust 
restrictions on Native land would be lifted.  
 
Native Veterans’ Access to the GI Bill’s Educational Provisions  
 
 The final version of the GI Bill, passed in 1945, declared that the VA would 
provide to veterans the actual cost of up to four years of education and training—up to 
$500 a year—on top of monthly stipends ($65 a month for unmarried veterans and 
from $75 to $90 a month for those with dependents).128 GIs used their benefits to pay 
for education at four-year colleges and universities, correspondence courses, and 
agricultural and manual training programs. Notably, the legislation granted discretion 
in determining admissions criteria to the educational institutions. Glenn Altschuler and 
Stuart Blumin argue that this practice meant that structurally, “the GI Bill perpetuated 
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existing patterns of racial preference,” because admissions criteria included 
“segregation in the South and racial quotas in the North.”129 Thus, despite the 
inclusive language of the bill itself, the GI Bill “did not reduce racial disparities in the 
United States.”130 Wardship’s impact on their educational backgrounds and options 
meant that Native veterans faced specific challenges in accessing the educational 
provisions of the GI Bill.  
For example, some Native veterans pointed out that because they had not 
finished high school, they could not access the benefits of the GI Bill for higher 
education. During the 1947 meeting with Senator Dennis Chavez and Congresswoman 
Georgia Lee Lusk of New Mexico, an ex-soldier from Laguna Pueblo voiced concerns 
about Native veterans’ access to the educational opportunities in the GI Bill. The 
veteran argued that “it is hard for Indians to take advantage of training offered under 
the GI Bill because they do not have high school educations.” In response, Lusk 
mentioned that “boys who do not have high school educations can go to trade schools 
or be apprenticed to shops under the GI Bill and learn a trade, and at the same time 
study school subjects without having to meet entrance requirements.”131 Although the 
trade school option may have appealed to certain returned Native servicemen, the 
Laguna Pueblo veteran’s concerns point to how the educational benefits of the bill 
reinforced societal class and racial stratifications rather than challenged them. 
Historians Altschuler and Blumin and Ira Katznelson have pointed to similar 
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limitations on African American veterans, noting that even those who had completed 
high school were often funneled into “agricultural and manual training programs 
instead of the liberal arts.”132 Some Native groups highlighted Indian veterans’ 
ineligibility for university education to petition the United States government for more 
resources for Indian education. For example, in 1946, the Navajo Veterans of Foreign 
Wars issued a resolution to immediately remedy the “deplorable state of existing 
educational conditions among our Navajo people,” because “almost all of the returned 
veterans are unable to avail themselves of the privileges granted in the GI Bill of rights 
because of an inadequate elementary schooling.”133 Thus, the Navajo Veterans of 
Foreign Wars highlighted their contributions as citizens of the United States, “for 
whose continuance we fought,” in order to demand that the US fulfill its obligation 
under wardship to provide education to the Navajo people.134  
 In its original drafts, the GI Bill specified that federal officials and agencies 
were prohibited from “directing or dictating in any way the servicemen’s 
education.”135 This provision would have made it impossible for Native veterans to 
utilize GI Bill benefits to attend schools and participate in training programs operated 
by the BIA. Members of Congress later amended the provision to provide that, “Indian 
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schools operated or supervised by the United States, shall not be ineligible to supply 
education or training under this title by reason of such Federal operation or 
supervision.”136 In order for Indian schools to be eligible to receive tuition payments 
from the VA, they had to obtain approval from the state Department of Education.137 
This provision and its amendment seem straightforward. However, there were some 
larger issues at stake. When Indian schools were permitted to receive tuition payments 
from the VA, Native veterans’ educational choices were filtered through their status as 
wards. On the positive side, if a reservation school was approved as a veterans’ 
training program, Native veterans would not have to travel far from home to receive 
education and/or training. This must have been an appealing option for many returned 
servicemen who wanted to retain close ties to their tribal communities and families. 
However, to what extent did members of Congress justify the inclusion of Indian 
schools in eligibility for VA tuition because they believed that these schools were the 
only suitable options for Native veterans? To what extent did the inclusion of Indian 
schools bolster existing societal class and racial divisions by steering eligible veterans 
away from other institutions of higher education?  
We can see how some of these assumptions played out in 1944 conversations 
about the bill on the floor of the House of Representatives. Arizona Representative 
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John Murdock asserted that he wanted to “see to it that the State educational 
authorities have control over all educational facilities within their borders and not the 
bureaucrats in Washington.” But, he wondered, how would this affect “Indians and 
their schools?” Would the section of the bill “debar Indian veterans from making use 
of an Indian school, for instance, at Phoenix, Ariz., where there is a good school 
operated entirely by the Federal Government?”138 By phrasing his query about Indians 
and their schools, Murdock betrayed his assumption that Native veterans would prefer 
only to attend Indian schools. John Rankin, representative from Mississippi, expressed 
his belief more clearly. He argued that, “If the State did recognize the Indian school 
the Veterans’ Administration would, because those Indians would rather go to that 
Indian school that to try to go to the University of Minnesota. We are trying to bring 
this down to a practical level.”139 Was this consideration for Indian schools purely 
exercised for “practical” reasons, or did the congressmen assume both that Native 
veterans would prefer to attend Indian schools over other institutions, and that they 
would not have been able to attend institutions like the University of Minnesota due to 
their educational limitations?  
 BIA agents tried to identify the educational needs of returned servicemen by 
sending out questionnaires and surveys to gauge veterans’ in further education or 
vocational training. For example, in 1945, Superintendent John Evans of the United 
Pueblos Agency sent a letter to Pueblos currently serving in the armed services which 
asked, “Just want kind of training will you want after the war? Will you want to finish 
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a high school course, to have advanced vocational training, or to go on to college?”140 
In addition, perhaps hoping to prompt further assimilation, Evans asked, “Will you 
prefer to attend Indian schools which may qualify for this purpose, or would you 
rather take your training in the same schools as other returning veterans with whom 
you have lived and fought?”141 Similarly, staff at the Colorado River Agency sent out 
a survey to returned veterans soliciting specific information about the type of training 
programs veterans wanted to utilize, “in order that we may help you get into the kind 
of training you want under the GI Educational Law.” Veterans were offered to choose 
between “on the job training,” “high school,” “business college,” or “college,” and a 
variety of skills and trades, including cattle production, farming, roads, irrigation, 
carpentry, and electric work.142 BIA personnel clearly did make an effort to help 
Native veterans take advantage of training programs and educational opportunities, but 
significantly, the vast majority of opportunities offered were vocational training 
programs, rather than liberal arts colleges or universities. In compliance with a BIA 
circular requesting data on returned servicemen and women, BIA staff overseeing the 
Gila Bend, Papago, and San Xavier Reservations in Arizona reported that of the 172 
members of the Tohono O’odham tribe who had served abroad, “23 have expressed 
their interest in the educational opportunities under the GI Bill of Rights.” Only one 
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was enrolled at a four-year institution, the University of Arizona. BIA staff expected 
that “the majority of these 23 will enter various High Schools, Trade Schools, and 
Business Colleges,” as well as “take advantage of the Correspondence Courses.”143 
Indian veterans’ choices of vocational training most likely stemmed from necessity—
if they had not completed the requisite high school education to attend college—
preference to remain close to family members, and/or desires to translate new skills 
they had learned while in the service to careers.  
 Just as Native women utilized the networks of social workers, superintendents, 
and field agents to assist them in receiving dependency allowance benefits, Native 
veterans also reached out to BIA personnel to access the educational benefits of the GI 
Bill. BIA agents acted as intermediaries between the VA and Native veterans 
themselves. For example, in 1945, Austin Ladd, chief clerk for the Colorado River 
Agency, forwarded forms to the VA office in Tucson, Arizona on behalf of Ray Buck, 
a veteran who wished to apply for further training under the GI Bill, “to continue with 
an electrical training course that was interrupted by his enlistment in the Armed 
Forces.”144 Although Ladd had requested that any further forms needed for Buck to 
complete his application be sent directly to Buck himself, the VA responded to Ladd 
with additional instructions. Not only were BIA agents explicitly instructed to assist 
veterans, but VA staff might have assumed that the best way to communicate with 
returned Native servicemen was through the BIA. Native servicemen, like their wives 
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during the war, might have also assumed that requests were more likely to be 
answered if the correspondence came from BIA agents. Social workers and field 
agents on reservations put effort into obtaining records of “each veteran’s location, 
employment or vocational training plans.”145 Thus, veterans must have logically 
assumed that the BIA was equipped to help them access the educational and training 
benefits of the GI Bill. For example, BIA agents were required to submit reports 
detailing how many Native people had requested assistance in obtaining employment, 
education, and other GI Bill loans, suggesting that it was common practice for 
veterans to directly ask for assistance in these matters.146 Because they understood 
wardship to be a relationship of legal obligation, logically, Native people reached out 
to the BIA for assistance in securing the benefits of the GI Bill.  
 The quotidian structures of wardship impacted the types of education Native 
veterans could access, and shaped BIA agents’ motivations for encouraging Native 
people to utilize the GI Bill’s educational opportunities. For example, the GI Bill 
revitalized one of the BIA’s longtime goals, to guide and improve Indian agriculture 
on reservations. A 1945 summary report of Indian irrigation projects written by staff at 
the Colorado River Agency in Arizona emphasized how important agriculture and 
irrigation were to BIA agents as they worked to guide Indian wards towards 
                                                            
145 Monthly Report to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Navajo Agency, April-May 1946, Monthly 
Report to Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1946, Box 14, Colorado River Agency Central Classified 
Files, RG 75, NARA – Pacific Region (R).  
146 Fort Yuma Sub-Agency, Quarterly Report of Indian Men and Women Returning from Military 
Service and War Employment, 1945, Corres Re Loans World War II – Indians in United States Army – 
Monthly Military Service Report, Box 165, Colorado River Agency Central Classified Files, RG 75, 
NARA – Pacific Region (R). 
  
306 
citizenship. “In carrying out its obligations to establish these Indians on a firm 
economic base,” the report read, “the first step of the government should be to develop 
fully their present resources and educate them in the utilization and protection 
thereof.” The authors of the report asserted that after the war’s end, most Indians “will 
continue to rely upon reservation resources for a livelihood. It is, therefore, urgent that 
all feasible Indian Irrigation Projects be developed fully at an early date.”147 By 
channeling GI Bill resources into existing programs designed to help Native people 
develop “their present resources,” the BIA built up their own established agricultural 
training programs. For example, in a 1946 letter to Senator John Chandler Gurney of 
South Dakota, Commissioner William Brophy acknowledged that although Indian 
veterans were “experiencing some difficulty” obtaining loans from banks and lending 
agencies, some reservations had found great success working with the VA to establish 
training programs. Under these programs, “a returned Indian veteran will work on his 
own farm two days a week under supervised instruction in good farming practices, and 
the Veterans’ Administration allows him subsistence for the time spent in this 
activity.”148 In his 1946 annual report to the Secretary of the Interior, Brophy 
continued to laud the “on-the-farm training” programs which had been implemented 
“in cooperation with the Veterans’ Administration and the Indian schools or, where 
possible, with the public schools.” These agricultural training programs allowed 
Indians to “receive classroom instruction, and supervision and on-the-farm instruction 
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by agricultural experts,” as well as VA subsistence allowances under the GI Bill.149 
Native people were encouraged both by BIA programs and by their eligibility for 
certain GI Bill programs to acquire further agricultural skills. The opportunities Native 
veterans could access under the GI Bill were thus folded into the quotidian structures 
of wardship.  
 In some cases, the educational benefits of the GI Bill obviously boosted existing 
BIA agricultural programs. For example, in 1947, Omer Davis, the agricultural 
extension agent working with the Pima Agency, noted that the 60 members of the 
veterans’ farm project were “doing a very good job of planting fall gardens. In many 
cases, the veteran must clear and level the land necessary to put in these gardens, as 
they are taking up land that has not been farmed for many years and is now covered 
with mesquite.”150 With the help of the added GI Bill benefits, veterans were doing 
more to farm the land than they had done in the past. In 1955, Robert Hackenberg, a 
research associate with the Bureau of Ethnic Research, compiled a report for the John 
Hay Whitney Foundation about economic and political change among Pima Indians on 
the Gila River Reservation. Hackenberg’s report revealed that veterans’ farm training 
programs had improved upon the BIA’s agricultural extension services’ previous 
efforts. “The percentage of younger men who completed this program and actually 
attempted serious farming was encouraging,” Hackenberg wrote. “The agency 
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superintendent compared this program with the extension service, attributing the 
success of the GI training to be the presence of one instructor for every twenty 
students, where there was only one extension man for nearly 10,000 Indians in the 
Pima jurisdiction.”151 Hackenberg highlighted the key differences in previous BIA 
programs and the veterans’ training program, noting that the “instruction was carried 
on by Indians,” and that veterans were paid to participate. He asked, “What extension 
program could compete with this?”152 However, Hackenberg also indicated that 
despite completing this type of training, Indians continued to face difficulties due to 
their status as wards. He wrote, “An inhibitory feature was that, though they could 
qualify for GI education, few of them could qualify for GI loans with which to get a 
good start in the farming business.”153 Thus, though agricultural skills training 
programs were popular both with the BIA and with veterans themselves, after the 
training had been finished, Indians faced specific limitations in their access to other GI 
Bill benefits, such as business loans.  
 Native veterans’ options were more limited if they did not wish to enter an 
agricultural training program or one was not available. Vocational training in trades 
including carpentry, masonry, silversmithing, engineering, automotive mechanics, 
road construction, and power plant operation were offered on some reservations 
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through existing Indians schools.154 However, many returned veterans wanted to 
continue training in skills they had learned during their service, such as Colorado 
River resident Philip Draper, who expressed desires for further training in welding.155 
Others focused on trades which would “enable them to obtain gainful employment.”156 
However, because of the BIA’s strong focus on agricultural skills, vocational training 
and trades programs were not as well established as farm training programs. In 1948, 
industrial consultant Max Drefkoff compiled a report on an industrial program for the 
Navajo reservation which revealed that many Navajo veterans “do not now find 
sufficient opportunity for ‘on-the-job’ training on the reservation, for the reason that 
no industries currently exist where such training can be had.”157 Navajo leadership had 
made efforts to get information to veterans about opportunities for training in trades. 
In 1945, a representative from the Veterans’ Service office in Phoenix spoke to a tribal 
council meeting and emphasized, “The thing to remember is that these veterans under 
this bill get that living expense account in addition to any pension they may be 
drawing, and they don’t have to necessarily be in a school such as the college at 
Flagstaff. They may be working for a trader, silversmith, or taking some trade, but that 
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trade must be part of the apprentice training program.”158 These types of programs 
were not as established within existing structures, and thus, harder to find. Moreover, 
the difficulties Navajos—and other Native veterans—had in obtaining vocational 
training outside of agriculture were compounded with the fact that “banks in the 
vicinity of the reservation are reluctant to make loans to Navajos for the purpose of 
engaging in business.”159 Lending institutions’ assumptions about wardship negatively 
impacted the ability of Native veterans to obtain business loans. This phenomenon is 
the subject of the next and final section of this chapter.  
 
Native Veterans’ Access to GI Bill Loans for Homes and Businesses 
 In the postwar period, tribal leaders and political organizations devoted to 
Indian affairs frequently highlighted the poor quality of housing on Indian 
reservations. Ina 1950 newsletter, the AAIA characterized reservations as “neglected 
slum areas,” and “a disgrace to the nation.”160 Part of the reason why such “slums” 
were so widespread, the AAIA argued, was because Indians had been denied benefits 
under the Federal Housing Act of 1949, and thus, “neither the State nor the Federal 
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Government has or has had authority or funds for Indian housing.”161 Similar to battles 
between states and the federal government over Social Security benefits, this 
“jurisdictional no-man’s-land” reflected the impact of wardship on Native peoples’ 
receipt of much needed benefits.162 Acting as lawyer for the All-Pueblo Council, Felix 
Cohen protested the absence of any loans to Indians within the “some 80 million 
dollars or more for repairing and rebuilding rural housing” appropriated by Congress 
in 1949, but the Farmers’ Home Administration “turned down [his] protest and refused 
to alter its discriminatory policy.”163 Tribal leaders argued that in order for Native 
people to interact with other races on an equal basis, Indians badly needed home repair 
and building. For example, in a 1956 meeting with Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
Glenn Emmons and representatives of the San Carlos Apache Tribe, Tribal Council 
Chairman Jess Stevens asserted that San Carlos Apaches “need to live in better 
homes.” “Our children of today are getting to the point where they are intermingling a 
lot with other races of people,” Stevens argued. “They are afraid to bring their friends 
home because of deplorable homes,” and that, “is the biggest draw back that they 
have.”164 Thus, after WWII, wardship meant Native people occupied an ambiguous 
position and faced difficulties accessing federal housing programs. As this section will 
demonstrate, the GI Bill’s provisions for home loans did not remedy these problems.  
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 The GI Bill furnished low-cost loans to veterans to aid in the purchase of 
property, including homes, farms, and businesses. In the postwar period, 
homeownership became a realizable dream for a significant majority of American 
families.165 By 1956, thanks to the GI Bill, 42 percent of World War II veterans were 
homeowners.166 However, the bill’s effects were not equally distributed to all 
racialized veterans. Banks and VA loan officers had the power to deny loans to black 
applicants purely based on race, and higher level administrators of the VA’s loan 
program reinforced racialized institutions about where money from the national 
treasury could be spent. As Glenn Altschuler and Stuart Blumin note, in addition to 
localized instances of bigotry, VA loan officers and bankers contributed to the 
structural racism of the bill by defining applicants’ worthiness based on redlining, 
which ultimately “denied mortgage loan guarantees to most African Americans and 
actively promoting the continuing segregation of all-white neighborhoods.”167 These 
practices were understood to protect the nation’s “public purse” by refusing loans to 
“perceived high-risk borrowers.”168 Thus, although in theory VA-backed mortgages 
and loans for small businesses were non-discriminatory, in practice, these loan 
programs reinforced structural racism.  
Native veterans were also perceived to be “high-risk,” but for different reasons. 
Most significantly, Native veterans who lived on reservations were unable to secure 
loans for housing, farming, or businesses because of lenders understood that Indian 
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property was not owned by individual Native people, but either by the tribe or the 
government. For example, in 1946, W.C. Sawyer, a representative for the Veterans 
Employment Service of Arizona, wrote to the superintendent of the Sells Indian 
Agency to offer support and services to Native veterans seeking educational and 
employment benefits. However, Sawyer also asserted that though they could “also 
discuss the matter of loan provisions of the GI Bill…there is not much opportunity for 
veterans living on the reservation where property is Government owned to take 
advantage of the loan provisions.”169 In their compilation of statistics concerning 
returned Tohno O’odham servicemen and servicewomen, BIA staff at the Gila Bend, 
Papago, and San Xavier Reservations found that although “one Veteran attempted to 
secure a loan to carry on his cattle industry,” the loan was not granted because the 
veteran was “living on Tribal land.”170 Lenders turned down Indian veterans for VA-
backed mortgages because their land was held in trust by the federal government, or 
was owned by the tribe.  
Reservation land epitomized Indian dependence upon the federal government. 
In 1947, Kimmis Hendrick wrote in the Christian Science Monitor, “The only way a 
reservation Indian can gain independence is to leave the reservation.” Native veterans 
could not obtain GI loans to build homes, because, Hendrick noted, “the Government 
holds title to his land.”171 In the eyes of lenders, reservation land was more than just a 
                                                            
169 Sawyer to Burge, 1946, Veterans Administration, Box 202, Sells Indian Agency Files of Community 
Worker, RG 75, NARA – Pacific Region (R). 
170 Statistics Pertaining to Papago Servicemen and Servicewomen, 1946, Indians at Work, Box 201, 
Sells Indian Agency Files of Community Worker, RG 75, NARA – Pacific Region (R). 
171 Kimmis Hendrick, “Bureaucracy Hit; Near-Famine Cited,” Christian Science Monitor, December 3, 
1947, NCAI, Series 4 – Tribal Files, Box 113, Navajo Tribe (Arizona) 1946-1947; NMAI. 
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symbol of governmental control, it was a poor source of loan security. A 1945 article 
published in the Great Falls Tribune described a NCAI meeting where members had 
discussed the “question of whether trust-status land offered by Indians could be 
accepted as collateral for loans under the GI bill of rights.” Stephen De Mers, Salish 
veteran and chairman of the Flathead Tribal Council was quoted, asserting, “money 
lenders questioned the land as security for loans because it cannot be sold.”172 Native 
veterans continued to face these issues into the 1950s. For example, the 1952 report on 
the effects of the Navajo and Hopi Long-Range Rehabilitation Program revealed that 
“Navajos and Hopis are usually unable to obtain loans from commercial banks 
because they lack the necessary security. They cannot mortgage their land because it is 
held in trust by the United States.”173 Similarly, in 1956 meetings with Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs Glenn Emmons, many tribal representatives expressed their concerns 
about the difficulty tribal members faced in obtaining loans for housing and 
equipment. For example, Mrs. Art Hooper, representative for the Yomba Shoshone 
Tribe on Nevada’s Reese River Reservation, spoke of the difficulties her son had in 
getting a loan, “because he lives on the reservation.” While the BIA superintendent of 
Reese River’s agency offered that, “The Reese River people are good people, but are 
so far away that a bank couldn’t supervise their loans,” Emmons’ deputy 
                                                            
172 “Amendment to GI Bill Asked to Aid Indian Vets,” Great Falls Tribune, October 23, 1945, National 
Congress of American Indians (2 of 4), Box 26, McCabe, George, N. to National Cong. Of Amer 
Indians, SEN 83A-F9 (1928-1953), Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Indian Affairs 
Investigating Subcommittee, RG 46, NAB.  
173 Planning in Action on the Navajo-Hopi Indian Reservations: A Progress Report on the Land and Its 
People, The Long-Range Program for Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation as of March 31, 1952, p.30, Navajo, 
Box 93, Rio Grande Federal Irri. Project to Navajo Current, SEN 83A-F9 (1928-1953), Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs Indian Affairs Investigating Subcommittee, RG 46, NAB. 
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commissioner W. Barton Greenwood asserted that, “The problem on a GI loan is that 
they would be using tribal land and would not have anything to offer as security.”174 
Charlie Malotte of the Te-Moak Tribe of Western Shoshone asserted that “We would 
sure like to get loans for the boys…They want to get loans. My son is one. He has got 
three kids. He has got an assignment and no machinery. He asked for a loan and 
couldn’t get it.”175 As was mentioned above, the BIA had provided in 1945 that 
“Indian agency superintendents may authorize the use of income from [trust] lands as 
security for loans partially guaranteed by the Veteran’s Administration,” as well as 
“other liberal provisions.”176 However, despite these provisions, lending agencies 
remained wary of granting loans to Native applicants. In the early 1950s, BIA officials 
changed Bureau regulations to “permit mortgaging of such lands under certain 
conditions.”177 However, many lenders were still reluctant to extend loans to Native 
applicants because they “feared that the Secretary [of the Interior], under existing 
statutes, had no right to permit the execution of mortgages on restricted lands by a 
regulation.”178 Without “specific legislative authority,” banks and lenders “refused to 
accept Indian lands as security for loans,” until President Dwight Eisenhower signed a 
                                                            
174 Commissioner’s Meeting, Reese River, 1956, Folder 3 – Indian Affairs Commissioner’s Conferences 
Phoenix Area, Box 3, Glenn Emmons Papers, UNM-CSR.  
175 Commissioner’s Meeting, Te-Moak, 1956, Folder 3 – Indian Affairs Commissioner’s Conferences 
Phoenix Area, Box 3, Glenn Emmons Papers, UNM-CSR. 
176 Annual Report of the Commissioner, Office of Indian Affairs, to the Secretary of the Interior, Fiscal 
Year Ended June 30, 1946, p.355, Correspondence with Institutions, Organizations, Etc. – National 
Congress of American Indians, Box 12, RG 220, HSTL.   
177 BIA Press Release, “Indian Bureau Moves to Transfer Functions,” 1953, Myer Dillon S 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Box 26, McCabe, George, N. to National Cong. Of Amer Indians, SEN 
83A-F9 (1928-1953), Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Indian Affairs Investigating 
Subcommittee, RG 46, NAB.  
178 Felix Cohen Memo to Clients, Public Law 450, 1956, Folder 8 – Correspondence Regarding Various 
Tribal Legal Matters 1952-1961, Box 3, William Zimmerman Papers, UNM-CSR. 
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law authorizing mortgages and deeds of trust on individual Indian trust or restricted 
lands in 1956.179 
 Returned Native servicemen believed that the difficulties they faced in 
obtaining loans for housing, businesses, and farming demonstrated larger issues of 
racial discrimination. Their restriction from access to GI Bill loans shows that 
wardship overshadowed Native veterans’ ability to access the “opportunity” promised 
by the GI Bill in exchange for their military service. For example, in his 1947 article 
for the AAIA newsletter, John Adair argued that “Many Indians while they were in the 
Service were planning on opening garages, service stations, and small businesses, and 
now that they are unable to secure loans they feel that access to the dominantly white 
economy is denied them.”180 Adair argued that Navajo and Pueblo veterans saw the 
difficulty they had in securing loans under the GI Bill as “points of difference and 
discrimination between themselves and the white man.”181 In a monthly report to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs from 1946, the superintendent of the Truxton Canon 
Agency in Arizona wrote that “Indian GI veterans are still undecided as to what they 
want to do.” However, the superintendent went on to remark, “Many of them want to 
borrow money for the purpose of building homes and extremely few want to go into 
business other than cattle.” The veterans’ “indecision” was most likely the result of the 
                                                            
179 Ibid. Under this new law, trust status was not removed, but “trust was lifted to the extent of the debt 
and the lender may levy upon the land as if it were owned in fee simple.” Although Indian advocates 
argued that this law would make it easier for Indians to obtain credit, because “restrictions on alienation 
are removed in cases of foreclosure,” there was a risk that borrowers could lose their land entirely. 
180 John Adair, “The Navajo and Pueblo Veteran: A Force for Culture Change,” The American Indian, 
Vol. IV No. 1, 1947, 8-9. Association on American Indian Affairs publication. Reference File – Assoc. 
On American Indian Affairs, Inc., Box 23, RG 220, HSTL. 
181 Ibid., p.8.  
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fact that “banks are very cautious in extending loans to them.”182 Native veterans 
wanted and needed to access GI Bill benefits. Indeed, the 1952 Navajo and Hopi 
Long-Range Rehabilitation Program Report stated pointedly, “The Indians need cash 
to establish themselves in income-producing enterprises.”183 However, when lending 
agencies’ assumptions about wardship coupled with BIA regulations against 
permitting mortgages on trust land, Native veterans were shut out of GI Bill loans and 
the government’s stated goal of providing “opportunity” to veterans.184 
 Native GIs looked to both the BIA and tribal leadership to provide alternative 
methods of securing loans. During a 1945 meeting of the Navajo Tribal Council, 
Kizzie Yazzie relayed the concerns of a Navajo veteran: “I have been in battle and 
places of danger and I have returned and need to live on. I need assistance. I want you 
and the Councilmen to be for us veterans, with the Superintendent and others, that 
something be done with acquiring land or something from which we can make a 
living.”185 At the same meeting, the Navajo Tribal Council issued a resolution urging 
that because “discharged Navajo veterans need lands on which they can develop farms 
and establish homes,” the federal government should “give every assistance to these 
                                                            
182 Monthly Report to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Truxton Canon Agency, August 1946, Mo 
Reports to Comm – Truxton, Box 2, Phoenix Area Office District Director’s Classified Files, RG 75, 
NARA – Pacific Region (R).  
183 Planning in Action on the Navajo-Hopi Indian Reservations: A Progress Report on the Land and Its 
People, The Long-Range Program for Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation as of March 31, 1952, p.30, Navajo, 
Box 93, Rio Grande Federal Irri. Project to Navajo Current, SEN 83A-F9 (1928-1953), Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs Indian Affairs Investigating Subcommittee, RG 46, NAB.  
184 For more on the GI Bill as an “opportunity” bill see Altschuler and Blumin, GI Bill, 82. 
185 Statement of Kizzie Yazzie, Minutes of Navajo Tribal Council, December 18-20, 1945, p. 31, 
Navajo Tribal Council – Organization – Minutes of Meetings 12-18-45 6-23-46 1-7-47, Box 408, 
Phoenix Area Office Division of Extension and Industry Files, Minutes of Navajo Tribal Council, RG 
75, NARA – Pacific Region (R). 
  
318 
veterans in acquiring farm lands wherever such Federally owned or controlled lands 
are available for settlement.”186 Other tribal groups looked directly to the federal 
government to provide alternative loan programs in order to alleviate general tribal 
dissatisfaction with local banks. The Navajo veterans of American Legion Post 52 
issued a resolution in 1946 which officially requested that the BIA work around 
lending agencies’ assumptions about wardship and find a way for Native veterans to 
obtain loans for housing. The resolution read, “Whereas, lending agencies under the 
GI Loan Program will not make loans for housing on the reservation because of tribal 
ownership of the realty…Be it resolved…that we lend our assistance to Indian 
veterans in a housing program by urging the federal government to create a lending 
agency within the Indian Service for the purpose of making loans for Indian veteran 
housing on the reservation.”187 Bodie Graham, Fallon Paiute-Shoshone, told 
Commissioner Emmons in 1956 that, “we want some kind of loan program. We 
wondered whether some kind of a loan could be made by the Indian Service.” Graham 
noted that his people would “rather have credit loan in some way from the 
government,” to “improve our condition.”188 Similarly, that same year John Rainer, 
Chairman of the All-Pueblo Council, voiced to Emmons that “one important concern 
is housing in the Pueblos. We would need Federal help to find ways and means to 
                                                            
186 Ibid., Resolution, “Loans to Individual Veterans,” p. 33.  
187 Veterans’ Resolution on GI Bill, Proceedings of the Meeting of the Navajo Tribal Council, July 23-
26, 1946, p. 48-49, Navajo Tribal Council – Organization – Minutes of Meetings 12-18-45 6-23-46 1-7-
47, Box 408, Phoenix Area Office Division of Extension and Industry Files, Minutes of Navajo Tribal 
Council, RG 75, NARA – Pacific Region (R). 
188 Commissioner’s Meeting, Fallon, 1956, Folder 3 – Indian Affairs Commissioner’s Conferences 
Phoenix Area, Box 3, Glenn Emmons Papers, UNM-CSR. 
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obtain credit…We want to get together with the Bureau to see if something can be 
worked out.”189 Native groups looked to their relationship with the federal government 
as a way of accessing resources which could improve their homes and economic 
conditions, when they were faced with the reluctance of lending agencies to grant 
loans.  
 
Conclusion 
After WWII’s end, the non-Native public, including many legislators and 
politicians, championed a narrative of Native assimilation into the American polity, 
accelerated by military service. Because of their purportedly increased familiarity with 
the “white world” outside of reservations, veterans were the subjects of some of the 
first iterations of new policies designed to BIA.190 However, despite the belief that 
Native veterans were primed for assimilation, military service did not absolve them 
from assumptions about wardship. Namely, non-Native conceptualizations of 
wardship drastically impaired their ability to fully access the benefits of the GI Bill, 
which would have further expanded economic opportunities and improved living 
conditions in Indian country. Wardship impacted Native veterans’ use of the 
educational and training provisions of the GI Bill. Like other non-white veterans, 
because many Native servicemen did not possess high school educations, they were 
unable to utilize the educational provisions of the GI Bill for institutions of higher 
                                                            
189 Bureau-Tribal Conference, 1956, All-Pueblo Council, Folder 5 – Indian Affairs Commissioner’s 
Conferences Gallup Area First Session, Box 3, Glenn Emmons Papers, UNM-CSR.  
190 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 15; 19. 
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learning. Native veterans took advantage of educational training programs, most 
successfully in agriculture. But these curricula often built off or incorporated existing 
BIA programs, or were housed within existing Indian schools. Assumptions about 
wardship directly impaired Native eligibility for home and business loans, as lending 
agencies were wary of granting loans to Native veterans who had only trust property 
to offer as security. Lack of knowledge of Native peoples’ status in the American 
polity and ambiguous BIA protocols made it difficult for Indians to receive loans. 
Ultimately, wardship fundamentally shaped the ways in which returned Native 
servicemen could utilize the benefits of the GI Bill to which they were entitled as 
citizens.  
Thus, the GI Bill failed to undermine non-Native conceptualizations of 
wardship, just as it failed to challenge existing racialized institutions like residential 
segregation and economic inequality. Although Native people could access certain 
aspects of the GI bill, the bill did not provide the same measure of “opportunity” for 
Indian veterans as it did for white veterans. However, Native veterans utilized their 
records of military service to demand both entitlement to equal rights of citizenship, 
and fulfillment of the United States’ legal obligations to tribal nations. When they 
were turned down for loans under the GI Bill by lending agencies, they turned to the 
federal government to implement an alternative process so they too could access these 
types of benefits. They also formed all-Indian veterans’ organizations, petitioned their 
tribal councils and reached out to state and local politicians for assistance. Throughout 
Native veterans’ readjustment to civilian life, BIA agents worked within the quotidian 
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structures of wardship to assist them in accessing GI Bill benefits. Although BIA 
leaders encouraged superintendents and social workers to direct Native veterans to 
apply for benefits through outside channels, many BIA employees attempted to do as 
much as they could to ensure Indians received assistance when Native veterans faced 
difficulties. Notably, the gendered act of military service seems to have changed the 
way BIA agents viewed their relationships with Native people. For veterans, they 
offered assistance rather than simply exercising direct oversight. Veterans’ entitlement 
to GI Bill benefits also lead the VA to more actively reach out to the BIA, as 
compared to welfare caseworkers who resisted extending their services to needy 
Native people applying for Social Security benefits.  
For many non-Native veterans, the GI Bill represented an enormous 
opportunity for upward mobility, through education and home ownership. However, 
Native veterans could not access those same opportunities, because wardship’s 
ambiguity prevented them from obtaining full benefits. Native peoples’ experiences 
should be incorporated into GI Bill historiography to add more to our understanding of 
how the bill did little to challenge existing racial hierarchies. Wardship played a large 
role in how Native men navigated the increasing rhetoric of assimilation and “full 
citizenship” in the postwar world. When we consider the difficulties Indian veterans 
had in accessing the GI Bill, we can further disrupt the dichotomy of “reservation” 
versus the “white world.” Wardship introduces multivalent avenues for exploring the 
role of military service in shaping the dynamics of Native peoples’ citizenship. In 
other words, military service did not simply signify Indian veterans’ path to 
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assimilation. Rather, it introduced new conflicts and opportunities into Native 
veterans’ interactions with tribal leadership, the BIA, and other state agencies. 	
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Chapter 6 
Full Citizenship for “Competent” Indians: Race and Gender in Indian 
Emancipation Bills, 1944-1954 
 
Introduction 
  Since the 1887 Dawes Act, politicians have touted plans to abolish the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs (BIA) and “emancipate” “competent” Native people from wardship. 
Historians have described how “competency boards,” commissioners charged with 
allotting Indian land, evaluated Native people based on their perceptions of their 
intellectual abilities, blood quantum, and potential to integrate into the American 
polity. If Native people were deemed “competent,” they would receive an allotment, 
and embark on a path from “wardship” to “citizenship.”1 In the early twentieth 
century, members of Congress continued to introduce bills aimed at “emancipating” 
Indians from the control of the United States government. Before the passage of the 
Indian Citizenship Act (ICA) in 1924, Senator Harry Lane (D-Oregon) proposed two 
bills in 1916 and 1917 which would have bestowed citizenship upon Indians who had 
already received or would receive allotments, and reorganized the BIA “with a view to 
its speedy abolition and the complete emancipation of the American Indian from the 
                                                            
1 See for example, Rose Stremlau, Sustaining the Cherokee Family: Kinship and the Allotment of an 
Indigenous Nation (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011); David A. Chang, The 
Color of the Land: Race, Nation, and the Politics of Landownership in Oklahoma, 1832-1929 (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010); and Joanne Barker, Native Acts: Law, Recognition, 
and Cultural Authenticity (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011).  
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control, supervision, and management of the United States Government.”2 After the 
passage of the ICA, Representative John McGroarty (D-California) proposed two joint 
resolutions in the House of Representatives in 1936 and 1937 which would have 
created an “Indian Emancipation Commission.” The commission would have 
abolished the BIA, examined existing treaties to recommend the earliest date they 
could be annulled, and transfered all assets and property to Indians.3 These 
unsuccessful bills would have enacted sweeping changes to the status of both 
individual Native people and the BIA itself.  
Beginning in 1944, members of Congress proposed a new process which 
would “emancipate” “competent” Native people from wardship and abolish the BIA. 
Between 1944 and 1954, Republican congressmen Francis Case of South Dakota, 
Hugh Butler of Nebraska, and Wesley D’Ewart of Montana proposed eleven bills in 
the House and Senate which would implement a system whereby individual Indians 
would apply directly for “certificates of competency.”4 Once declared competent by a 
                                                            
2 Bill for the Abolishment of the Indian Bureau, the Closing Out of Indian Tribal Organizations, and for 
Other Purposes, S. 4452, 64th Cong. (1916); and Bill for the Abolishment of the Indian Bureau, the 
Closing Out of Indian Tribal Organizations, and for Other Purposes, S. 415, 65th Cong. (1917).  
3 Bill to Abolish the Bureau of Indian Affairs, to Abolish the Office of Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 
to Create an Indian Emancipation Commission, and for Other Purposes, H.J. Res. 506, 74th Cong. 
(1936); and Bill to Abolish the Bureau of Indian Affairs, to Abolish the Office of Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, to Create an Indian Emancipation Commission, and for Other Purposes, H.J. Res. 114, 
75th Cong. (1937).  
4 The bills included Bill to Emancipate the Indians of the United States, H.R. 5115, 78th Cong. (1944); 
Bill to Provide for Removal of Restrictions on Property of Indians Who Serve in the Armed Forces, 
H.R. 3681, 79th Cong. (1945); Bill to Emancipate Certain Indians of the United States Who Served in 
the Armed Forces During World War I and World War II, H.R. 2165, 80th Cong. (1947); Bill to 
Emancipate the Indians of the United States and to Establish Certain Rights for Indians and Indian 
Tribes, H.R. 2958, 80th Cong. (1947); Act to Emancipate United States Indians in Certain Cases, H.R. 
1113, 80th Cong. (1947); Bill to Emancipate United States Indians in Certain Cases, S. 186, 81st Cong. 
(1949); Bill to Provide a Decree of Competency for United States Indians in Certain Cases, H.R. 2724, 
81st Cong. (1949); Bill to Provide a Decree of Competency for United States Indians in Certain Cases, 
H.R. 457, 82nd Cong. (1951); Bill to Provide a Decree of Competency for United States Indians in 
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judge or the Secretary of the Interior, Native people would be “emancipated” from 
wardship and able to sell their property if they so desired.  
 Historian Kenneth Philp has argued that the latter half of the 1940s represented 
“a turning point in Indian history comparable to the end of treaty making, land 
allotment, and tribal organization under the Indian Reorganization Act.”5 Scholars 
have only briefly considered competency bills as part of the widespread effort by 
Republicans in Congress to terminate the BIA and extend citizenship rights to Indians 
in the postwar period. Competency legislation provides a heretofore under-examined 
lens through which to view larger efforts to terminate the trust relationship between 
Native nations and the United States government. More broadly, the motivations 
behind competency legislation illustrate how non-Natives’ racialized and gendered 
definitions of wardship, citizenship, and Indian identity served to undermine tribal 
communities, families, and sovereignty.  
 This chapter examines how competency was conceptualized as a gendered and 
racialized category by the lawmakers who proposed and supported these bills. 
Although there were slight procedural variations within the bills, all eleven generally 
followed the same format. First, an individual Native person interested in 
“emancipating” him or herself from wardship would apply for a “certificate of 
competency” from an authority (depending on the bill, either the Secretary of the 
                                                            
Certain Cases, S. 485, 82nd Cong. (1951); Bill to Provide a Decree of Competency for United States 
Indians in Certain Cases, S. 335, 83rd Cong. (1953); and Bill to Provide a Decree of Competency for 
United States Indians in Certain Cases, H.R. 4985, 83rd Cong. (1954).  
5 Kenneth R. Philp, Termination Revisited: American Indians on the Trail to Self-Determination, 1933-
1953 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 68. 
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Interior or a naturalization court judge). The adjudicator would examine the 
applicant’s “moral and intellectual qualifications” and ability to manage their business 
affairs to determine whether the decree or certificate of competency could be granted. 
If judged to be “competent,” he or she would be freed of the “disabilities” caused by 
wardship, and no longer eligible to receive any of the “gratuitous” services extended 
to Indians by the BIA, including, most importantly, the trust restrictions on property. 
Many of these proposed bills stipulated that spouses and minor children would also be 
declared competent when an applicant received his or her decree. Lawmakers 
understood competency as a catch-all term that signaled individual Native peoples’ 
deserving achievement of “first-class citizenship” due to their demonstrable 
“responsibility,” “self-sufficiency,” and ability to manage their own affairs. Crucially, 
“competent” Indians were judged on their likelihood to become a “drain” on state 
welfare resources. Indeed, many competency bills required that representatives from 
local welfare departments be present at competency hearings to weigh in on whether 
an individual applicant should be granted his or her certificate. Thus, competency 
legislation reveals another way wardship intersected with postwar ideologies of 
welfare dependency.  
 This chapter contains two central arguments. The first revolves around three 
mutually reinforcing key definitions: “competency,” “citizenship,” and “Indianness,” 
which taken together, reveal conflicts between how non-Natives and Indians 
understood Native peoples’ place in the mid-twentieth-century American polity. Non-
Natives’ defined “real” Native people as incompetent wards who were a potential 
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drain on public resources. Competency reflected a distinct racialized and gendered 
understanding of what “proper” citizenship meant. Some mid-twentieth century 
definitions of competency were reminiscent of allotment policies which defined 
“competent” Indians as moral, intelligent, and members of nuclear family units. 
However, in the mid-twentieth century, competency also signaled that one would be 
able to hold onto property in a responsible manner, and would be unlikely to utilize 
welfare benefits. Politicians who supported competency legislation discussed the 
dangers of Indian wardship in the same ways as they discussed how poor welfare 
recipients needed to learn to “value” work and desire to not be “dependent.” 
Competency thus contributes to historical understandings of “proper” citizenship in 
the mid-twentieth century, a term also defined by gendered responsibility and self-
sufficiency. Through conversations and conflicts over competency legislation, the 
ideology of “first-class citizenship” was deployed as a method to restore Native 
peoples’ abilities to be self-sufficient individuals. Politicians used “first-class” or 
“full” citizenship to deprive Native people of their land and political relationship with 
the United States. Lastly, Indian, as a racial and legal term, was further defined by 
both competency and citizenship. Legislators who drafted competency bills assumed 
that Indians were incompetent until proven otherwise. Likewise, they understood the 
BIA’s oversight and control over Native people to be the reason why Native people 
could not access “full” citizenship. Therefore, “Indianness” itself was defined by 
Bureau oversight, and “competent” Native people were not “Indian” enough to remain 
under the confines of wardship.  
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 This chapter’s second argument is that competency legislation proposed a 
bureaucratic process which would not only have terminated the BIA, but would have 
also “exterminated” Native people. In addition to a mandatory age limit on 
wardship—21 years—competency bills also stipulated that children with at least one 
competent parent would also be “emancipated” from wardship. The imposition of 
competency onto children and spouses of applicants undermined the sovereignty of 
Native nations by depriving tribes of the authority to regulate membership, and 
denying “competent” tribal members trust restrictions which protected their land from 
sale. Native critics argued that the goal of competency legislation was to ultimately 
deprive tribes of land. Thus, competency represents an understudied illustration of the 
process of the “elimination of the native,” described by Patrick Wolfe. Rather than a 
“one-off occurrence,” Wolfe argues that we should understand “elimination as an 
organizing principal of settler-colonial society.”6 Although pitched as “emancipatory” 
bills which would free Indians from specific “disabilities,” competency legislation was 
designed to eliminate Native societies, one family at a time. Although these bills were 
unsuccessful,7 persistent proposals of this type of legislation, hearings on the topic, 
and copious amounts of correspondence about the bills reveal the importance of the 
imagined category of competency in determining the nature and status of Indians’ 
place in the postwar American polity.  
                                                            
6 Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” Journal of Genocide Research 
8, no. 4 (December 2006), 88. 
7 The only bill to pass the House was H.R. 1113 in 1947. See Philp, Termination Revisited, 76.  
  
329 
 The following chapter is divided into five sections. In the first section, I 
describe how legislators adjudicated competency. Politicians’ definitions of 
competency, citizenship, and Indianness demonstrated how similarly legislators and 
policymakers thought about the process of ending wardship and the problem of 
welfare dependency. The second section explores how Indian racialization was linked 
to competency. Non-Native racialized assumptions of “Indian incompetence” 
reinforced ideas about “real” Indians needing BIA guidance while “competent” Native 
people benefited from wardship in ways they did not deserve. The third section is 
devoted to gender, which politicians institutionalized as a main component of 
competency legislation in two ways. First, as legislators assumed that all applicants for 
competency decrees would be male, they defined competency as the applicant’s ability 
to provide for his family unit. Second, competency acted as an “extermination” bill 
through the automatic bestowal of competency onto the spouses and children of 
individual Native applicants. I assess how gender and family components of the bills 
were a key point of contention for Native people, who saw competency legislation as 
depriving existing and future Native children of their rights as members of tribal 
nations and as wards. The fourth section unpacks Native critiques of competency 
legislation further by analyzing the ways in which the bills threatened systems of 
community governance and tribal sovereignty because the bills interfered with tribes’ 
authority to determine rights and benefits of tribal membership, and granted federal 
officials the right to partition Native land. Lastly, in the fifth section, I analyze Native 
critiques of how competency legislation would leave “competent” Indians vulnerable 
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to increased hostility and discrimination from state and local governments. Tribal 
leaders questioned whether “competent” Indians would be able to receive welfare 
assistance and be safeguarded from extreme poverty. In this section I analyze the ways 
in which Native people saw competency as a path to poverty and landlessness, and 
criticized legislators who attempted to pass these bills without Native peoples’ 
consent.  
 Overall, this chapter analyzes and examines an understudied component of the 
termination era to reveal how racialized and gendered definitions of “competency,” 
“citizenship,” and “Indianness” served an ongoing project of “eliminating” Native 
people through assimilation into the American polity. Crucially, these bills instituted 
specific stipulations which identified which Indians would be able to leave the 
confines of wardship and enter “full citizenship.” Indians who met the “moral and 
intellectual” requirements of competency would be “emancipated” from wardship, and 
ultimately cease to be Indian at all. Competency reinforced wardship’s definition as a 
state of racialized dependency. Native critics of competency legislation argued that it 
undermined Indian land rights, tribal sovereignty, and, in a broader sense, Native 
humanity.  
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Table 6.1 Proposed Competency Bills, 1944-1954 
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Adjudication of Competency 
The Moral and Intellectual Qualifications for “Full” Citizenship 
 How did administrators and judges determine a Native applicant’s 
“competency”? In the four bills he proposed in the House between 1944 and 1947, 
Representative Francis Case (R - South Dakota) offered specific criteria. Two of 
Case’s bills, H.R. 3681 (1945) and H.R. 2165 (1947) would have only “emancipated” 
Native veterans of World War I and World War II. The other two bills, H.R. 5115 
(1944) and H.R. 2958 (1947), also proposed emancipating those with high school 
diplomas, certificates of competency from the superintendent of their reservations, or 
documentation that they had lived off-reservation for a period of five years. In a 
significant shift, Senator Hugh Butler’s (R-Nebraska) 1948 bill, H.R. 1113, altered 
criteria for competency. In this and five subsequent bills,8 judges and officials tasked 
with determining Indian “competency” were instructed to “consider significant factors 
bearing upon the applicant’s moral and intellectual qualifications and his ability to 
manage his own affairs.”9 The racialized phrase “moral and intellectual qualifications” 
harkened back to nineteenth-century interpretations of Indian wardship, when 
policymakers argued that Native people needed white education and guidance in order 
to advance to the next level of “civilization.” Additionally, the language shares 
similarities with reformers’ implementation of standards of “morality” in welfare 
policies, due to their assumptions that welfare “dependence” was rooted the recipients’ 
                                                            
8 These bills included S. 186 (1949), H.R. 2724 (1949), H.R. 457 (1951), S. 485 (1951), and S. 335 
(1953).  
9 Act to Emancipate United States Indians in Certain Cases, H.R. 1113, 80th Cong. (1947).  
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individual moral failings.10 Proponents of competency legislation recapitulated 
standards of “morality” and “intelligence” to judge whether Native people had 
sufficiently embraced the standards necessary to be “emancipated” from wardship.  
 In 1954, some politicians questioned the use of the vague phrase, “moral and 
intellectual qualifications.” For example, in his report to accompany H.R. 4985, 
Representative Arthur Miller of Nebraska asserted that the phrase “may give the 
Secretary or the courts too great a latitude in ruling against competency.”11 Miller 
proposed that judges evaluate whether the applicant had enough experience and ability 
to “manage his or her business affairs, including the administration, use, investment, 
and disposition of any property turned over to such person and the income or proceeds 
therefrom, with such a reasonable degree of prudence and wisdom as will be apt to 
prevent him or her from losing such property or the benefits thereof.”12 Thus, Miller 
connected competency not only to the applicant’s ability to manage their finances and 
real estate holdings effectively, but also the adjudicators’ impression of whether or not 
the applicant would be likely to “lose” his or her property. A later draft of H.R. 4985 
directed adjudicators to assess whether the applicant was “a person of sound mind,” 
who “understood the consequence of his act.”13 Miller’s suggestions implied that if an 
                                                            
10 See Linda Gordon, Pitied but Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare, 1890-1935 
(New York: The Free Press, 1994), 45; 61; 304.  
11 Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Report to Accompany H.R. 4985, Providing a Certificate 
or Decree of Competency for United States Indians in Certain Cases, H.R. Rep. No. 836, at 9 (1953). 
National Congress of American Indians Records (NCAI), Series 6 - Committees and Special Issues 
Files, Box 256, Federal Indian Policy and Legislation Files, Competency Bill (HR 4985); National 
Museum of the American Indian Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution (NMAI).  
12 Ibid.  
13 Confidential Draft of H.R. 4985, February 1, 1954, Association on American Indian Affairs File – 
Correspondence 1953-1954, Box 75, Philleo Nash White House/Association on American Indian 
Affairs Files, Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL).  
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Indian person lost their land after receiving a certificate of competency, it would be 
due to his or her lack of “prudence and wisdom,” rather than non-Native land-
grabbing. Thus, competency decrees also represented a bestowal of “moral” 
citizenship, an understanding that when measured by white standards, “competent” 
Native people would show responsibility and prudence managing their assets, 
including land.   
 
Competency and Responsibility vs. Wardship and Welfare Dependency  
 Proponents of competency legislation defined American citizenship as 
responsibility and self-sufficiency. In Francis Cases’ earlier bills, competency would 
only be granted to those who had demonstrated their self-sufficiency through military 
service, high school education, or living off reservations. Starting in 1947, competency 
bills explicitly addressed the assumption that Native people could become drains on 
public resources if they were no longer “wards” of the federal government. After 1947, 
the bills specified that the court was responsible for notifying any relevant officials to 
attend competency hearings and testify in favor or against the applicant. Those 
relevant officials included governmental heads of towns and counties, superintendents 
from applicants’ reservations, heads of tribal councils, and representatives from “the 
local welfare department of the State, county, and city government.”14 Wesley 
D’Ewart, chairman of the House Committee on Public Lands, asserted in 1947 
hearings over H.R. 1113, “We felt the county commissioner should have an 
                                                            
14 This clause was included in H.R. 1113, S. 186, H.R. 2724, H.R. 457, S. 485, S. 335, and H.R. 4985.  
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opportunity to be heard because in the event the Indian is not competent he might 
become a county charge, and therefore a lien on the welfare funds of that county.”15 
Later, D’Ewart argued that judges who rashly bestowed competency certificates upon 
Indians who did not deserve them would face dire consequences: “If he loads the tax 
rolls of the welfare funds of that county with undue charges, those circumstances will 
be known, and if it is because of releasing Indians who should not have been released, 
he will not long remain Judge of that county.”16 Politicians reasoned that if they were 
to receive welfare benefits, Native people should not truly have been declared 
“competent,” equating wardship with dependency upon federal support. Doing so, 
they ignored Native peoples’ entitlement to welfare benefits as American citizens.  
 The association between dependency and incompetency reveals larger 
assumptions about the nature of postwar “full” citizenship. Even members of 
organizations committed to assisting Native people, such as the Association on 
American Indian Affairs (AAIA), assumed Native people were not full citizens 
because of their relationship with the federal government. For example, in a letter to 
other members concerning H.R. 1113, AAIA member Charles Elkus asserted, “There 
must be a time when Indian citizens will be presumed competent unless the contrary is 
shown.” Until that time, “It is up to the Office [of Indian Affairs] to see that they are 
sufficiently equipped to take their place as citizens or for the Office to turn its job over 
                                                            
15 Unpublished Hearing, “Emancipation of Indians,” House of Representatives Subcommittee on Indian 
Affairs of the Committee on Public Lands, June 20, 1947, 80th Cong., at 9, HRG-1947-PLH-0317, 
http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t29.d30.hrg-1947-plh-
0317?accountid=14524. 
16 Ibid., at 29. 
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to someone else.”17 Elkus portrayed Indian citizenship as constrained and managed by 
the BIA. Non-Natives assumed that if “competent” Indians were to take their place as 
full citizens, they would participate in American citizens’ “value obligation to work” 
instead of becoming a drain on public resources.18 Until Native people sufficiently 
proved their ability to work, manage their financial affairs, and support their families 
without government assistance, non-Natives would presume that Indians people would 
be perpetually dependent on government resources. The rationale behind competency 
legislation mirrored similar efforts in the late 1940s and 1950s to “rehabilitate” poor 
women welfare recipients’ families and finances through work, teaching the “value of 
not being ‘dependent.’”19    
Beginning with the 1947 bills, one phrase specified key differences between 
the citizenship of “competent” Indians versus the wardship of “incompetent” Indians. 
If an individual Native applicant was granted a decree of competency, he or she would 
“no longer be entitled to share in any of the benefits or gratuitous service extended to 
Indians as such by the United States.”20 This language reflected widespread 
understanding that any resources or protections Native people received from the 
federal government were “gratuitous”—supposedly unearned services. According to 
                                                            
17 Elkus to Lesser, 1948, Association on American Indian Affairs File – Correspondence 1947-1948, 
Box 75, Philleo Nash White House/Association on American Indian Affairs Files, HSTL. Emphasis 
added.  
18 Linda K. Kerber, No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 80. 
19 Jennifer Mittelstadt, From Welfare to Workfare: The Unintended Consequences of Liberal Reform, 
1945-1965 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 59. 
20 Act to Emancipate United States Indians in Certain Cases, H.R. 1113, 80th Cong. (1947). This phrase 
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this logic, wardship impeded Native peoples’ ability to fully engage in the “reciprocal 
relationship” between the state and its citizens, because Native people were not 
fulfilling the duties which merited such benefits. As stated in previous chapters, Indian 
“privilege” drew racialized ire from non-Natives who accused Indians of profiting 
from state welfare resources without paying their fair share of taxes. Competency 
legislation reveals how consistently non-Native state agents recast Native peoples’ 
legal relationship with the United States—one based on treaties and formal 
agreements—as a relationship between a group of minority citizens who were unfairly 
privileged because they received benefits they did not earn. Wardship was equated 
with the system of old poor laws which “understood relief as charity or a gratuity,” 
rather than with New Deal programs of public assistance, which were understood to be 
a right of citizenship.21 Native peoples’ “privileged” position as “protected” wards 
worked to deprive them of their right to public assistance, as citizens.  
 
Competency Legislation and the Mischaracterization of Indian Citizenship 
 Not only did competency bills misrepresent wardship as “gratuitous,” but 
competency procedures also mischaracterized Indian citizenship. In 1947, Francis 
Case’s bill, H.R. 2165 stipulated that Native applicants could apply for their decree 
either from the superintendent of the agency which had jurisdiction over their 
reservation or tribe, or through a judge in a naturalization court. Hugh Butler’s bills, 
H.R. 1113 (1947) and S. 186 (1949) stipulated that Native applicants should apply to 
                                                            
21 Karen M. Tani, States of Dependency: Welfare, Rights, and American Governance, 1935-1972 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 10. Emphasis added.  
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naturalization courts directly for their certificates of competency. The five bills 
proposed by Butler and Wesley D’Ewart from 1949 to 1954 specified that applicants 
should apply to the Secretary of the Interior, but if their application was disapproved, 
they could appeal to a naturalization court judge. By inserting naturalization courts 
into competency proceedings, proponents of the legislation divulged their belief that 
Native people were “less” than full citizens because of their wardship status. However, 
the bills did not equivocate “decrees of competency” with naturalized citizenship. 
Rather, H.R. 1113 specified that, “any Indian who is a citizen of the United States,” 
may apply to “any naturalization court for the area in which he resides for a ‘writ of 
competency,’” upon reaching the age of 21.22 Therefore, to obtain competency 
certificates, applicants first needed to be citizens.  
 In their bi-monthly newsletter, The Washington Bulletin, the National Congress 
of American Indians (NCAI) highlighted competency legislation’s contradictions and 
confusions about Indian citizenship. About H.R. 1113, the NCAI asserted, “Under the 
guise of a bill to ‘emancipate’ Indians, a bill passed by the House and now before the 
Senate would place Indians of the United States in the same position as foreigners 
before a Naturalization Court.”23 The NCAI interpreted the naturalization court 
specification as a devaluation of Indians’ legal status—from citizens to “foreigners” 
with less rights. Furthermore, they emphasized that the bill was “based on 
                                                            
22 Act to Emancipate United States Indians in Certain Cases, H.R. 1113, 80th Cong. (1947). 
23 “Phony Emancipation,” National Congress of American Indians, Washington Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 2, 
March-April 1948, National Congress of American Indians (1 of 4), Box 26, McCabe, George, N. to 
National Cong. Of Amer Indians, SEN 83A-F9 (1928-1953), Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs 
Indian Affairs Investigating Subcommittee, Records of the US Senate, Record Group 46 (RG 46), 
National Archives Building, Washington, DC (NAB). 
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misunderstandings and misconceptions about the legal position of Indians,” 
specifically, “the false idea that Indians are aliens, subject to special character 
investigations, when in fact Indians have been citizens of the United States since 
1924.”24 The “misunderstandings and misconceptions” about Native peoples’ status 
could have been clarified, the NCAI asserted, if only Congress had been “willing to 
hold hearings and hear from Indians and others who wished to testify.”25 The NCAI 
argued that competency legislation reflected another example of the US government’s 
failure to “govern by consent,” imposing unnecessary bureaucratic process onto 
Indians in order to “emancipate” them and turn them into full citizens.   
 Foreshadowing proposed competency bills, the 1944 House Select Committee to 
Investigate Indian Affairs and Conditions argued that BIA regulations and procedures 
impeded “Indians who have the capacity to lead competent, independent lives,” and 
recommended a change in procedure whereby competent Native people would “at 
their own volition be certified as full-fledged citizens.”26 These procedures rested on 
vague definitions of “competency,” which would signal which Native applicants could 
be granted the “rights and responsibilities of citizenship.”27 But how exactly would 
“full” or “first-class” citizenship affect Native peoples’ lives? In 1947, newspaper 
coverage of Francis’ Case’s proposed competency bill, H.R. 2958, drew a firm line 
                                                            
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Select Committee to Investigate Indian Affairs and Conditions in the United States, An Investigation 
to Determine Whether the Changed Status of the Indian Requires a Revision of the Laws and 
Regulations Affecting the American Indian (H.R. 166), H.R. Rep. No. 2091 at 2 (1944), Folder 19 – 
Congressional Report Addressing Changed Status of American Indian 1944, Box 16, William 
Zimmerman Papers, CSR-UNM.  
27 Ibid.  
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between “full citizenship” and residence on a reservation. For example, “If granted 
citizenship, the Indian would be released from government restrictions and he would 
be allowed to sell his allotted property if he desires.” If a Native person “le[ft] a 
reservation,” that would signal that they had “accept[ed] full citizenship rights.”28 
Further, in the 1953 House report to accompany H.R. 4985, the Committee on Interior 
and Insular Affairs reasoned that if an Indian person obtained a declaration of 
competency, it would be so they could eventually “withdraw completely from the 
tribe, obtain his share of tribal property, and go his way—as a truly ‘first-class 
citizen.’”29 Thus, legislators and the non-Native public understood that if individual 
“competent” Native people left reservations and separated from tribal communities, 
they would be “full” citizens. The classification of “full” or “first-class” was 
irrelevant—Indians already were citizens. However, by asserting that Native 
citizenship was less than “first-class,” proponents of competency legislation justified 
implementing a system which judged whether Native peoples’ “moral and intellectual 
qualifications” would prevent them from becoming drains on public resources. In the 
name of lifting Native people into “first-class” citizenship, lawmakers attempted to 
assimilate Native people into the American polity.  
                                                            
28 “Indian Citizenship Occupies Indian Affairs Subcommittee,” Newspaper Unknown, Selective Service 
Miscellaneous, Box 201, Sells Indian Agency Files of Community Worker, Records of the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, Record Group 75 (RG 75), National Archives and Records Administration – Pacific 
Region (Riverside) (NARA – Pacific Region (R)). 
29 Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Report to Accompany H.R. 4985, Providing a Certificate 
or Decree of Competency for United States Indians in Certain Cases, H.R. Rep. No. 836, at 7 (1953). 
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 The effort to ensure Native people had access to “first-class” or “full” 
citizenship reflected common intellectual and political understandings of American 
race relations in the era. In 1944, Swedish social scientist Gunnar Myrdal published 
his study of race, The American Dilemma. Myrdal highlighted the discrepancy 
between the “American Creed,” a moral ideology of equality, freedom, and fair 
opportunity, and African American experiences of prejudice, poverty, and segregation. 
The Creed included the understanding that all Americans deserved the right to “a 
decent living standard and a measure of economic security.”30 In order to reconcile 
African American poverty with the Creed, whites rationalized that blacks were by 
nature, “inferior and should be kept inferior.”31 Myrdal included several examples of 
how whites expressed this rationalization of black poverty: “‘Actually, they live on us 
white people;’ ‘They couldn’t sustain themselves a day if we gave them up’; ‘The 
whites pay all the taxes anyway.’”32 On a smaller scale, competency legislation 
represented similar efforts to reconcile Native poverty and lack of assimilablity with 
the American Creed. If competent Indians were given the rights of first-class 
citizenship, they would be expected to compete for their share of fair economic 
opportunity in the same manner as whites. If they were considered incompetent, their 
poverty could be explained the same way black poverty was—their inferior moral and 
intellectual qualifications necessitated continued dependence upon responsible, tax-
paying, independent white Americans.  
                                                            
30 Arnold Rose, The Negro in America: The Condensed Version of Gunnar Myrdal’s An American 
Dilemma (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1948), 72. 
31 Ibid., 76. 
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 Proponents of competency legislation considered a Native applicant’s desire to 
be declared competent as a marker in and of itself of his or her “readiness” to leave 
wardship behind. In their report on H.R. 4985, the House Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs asserted that the general purpose of the bill was to establish a 
procedure where ward Indians would be able to “on their own initiative, bring about 
termination of the operation of Federal laws applicable to Indians as such.”33 The 
ideology of the American Creed was embedded into competency legislation. Myrdal 
argued that the Creed emphasized the “essential dignity of the individual,” and the 
demand for “fair opportunity and free scope for individual effort.”34 When a Native 
applicant applied for a decree of competency, it would supposedly signal his or her 
readiness to assimilate into a society which valued individual effort. Earlier 
Congressional reports also rewarded Native people for individual effort and choice. 
For example, the 1944 House committee which investigated Indian living conditions 
recommended that the Seventy-ninth Congress pass legislation “which will permit the 
individual Indian, upon his own petition, to graduate into full citizenship status when 
he is able to present evidence showing that he has the capacity to live his life as a free 
and independent citizen.”35 These types of proposals echoed nineteenth-century 
                                                            
33 Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Report to Accompany H.R. 4985, Providing a Certificate 
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allotment policies in their institutionalization of an individual processes of 
assimilation. They also reveal a deep-rooted racialization of wardship which pitted 
wardship against “full” citizenship, defined by severance of tribal membership and 
acceptance of Americanized ideals of individualism.    
 Noted expert on tribal law, Felix Cohen, took issue with how legislators 
understood the individual’s role in the competency process. He asserted that there was 
no need for a complicated legal procedure which left even “competent” Native people 
“still subject to Bureau authority,” and “subject to all Federal laws and Bureau 
regulations and limitations that apply to tribal affairs and tax-exempt tribal property.”36 
Further, Cohen claimed that “expatriation is a natural right of every human being,” 
and competency legislation would “take that precious right away from the individual 
Indian and put it into the Interior Department, with a possible appeal to the courts.”37 
Under competency legislation, individual Native applicants would be required to 
prove their competence, something no other American citizen was required to do.38 
Cohen’s critiques thus illustrate that at their core, legislators’ racialized assumptions of 
wardship meant Indians needed outside adjudicators to determine whether they were 
able to live as self-sufficient, “responsible” citizens.  
 
Competency and the Definition of “Indian” 
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Wardship’s Limitation of Indian Racial Equality  
 Proponents of competency legislation believed that “competent” Indians were 
being held back by wardship. Additionally, they asserted that wardship led non-
Indians to presume Native people were by nature “incompetent.” AAIA member 
Charles Elkus opposed H.R. 1113’s bureaucratization of competency. In 1948, he 
asserted, “Competency should not be obtained by either going to the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs or to a court.” Rather, the public would take Native competency as read 
“when [Indians] are no longer living in tribal relationship and on a reservation.”39 
Though he protested H.R. 1113’s procedures, Elkus and the authors of competency 
bills shared an assumption—Indians were set apart from the rest of the citizenry, 
whether by their residence on reservations or because of their relationship with the 
federal government. Many non-Natives, Elkus included, saw the BIA’s supervision 
and protection of Indian land and people as something that was holding Indians back 
from proper fulfillment of citizenship. Some purported that competency legislation 
would remedy this problem and answer the pleas of competent Native people who felt 
oppressed by the BIA. In 1947, Hugh Butler argued before Congress that the BIA 
should be terminated because Indians “from every tribe, in every state and in every 
community where Indians reside, have beseeched their representatives in the Senate 
and the House to pass legislation granting them equal rights of citizenship with their 
white neighbors.”40 Further, in the 1953 House report on H.R. 4985, the Committee on 
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Interior and Insular Affairs asserted that in order to free Native people from the 
disabilities of wardship, legislation should be enacted to repeal “existing statutory 
provisions which set Indians apart from other citizens, thereby abolishing certain 
restrictions deemed discriminatory.”41 The provisions that “set Indians apart” included 
the restrictions on property transactions, restrictions on the sale and use of liquor, and 
questions of state civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians. The Committee depicted 
these restrictions as antiquated stipulations which did not align with American values 
of equality for all citizens.  
 In a lengthy letter to AAIA president Oliver LaFarge in 1955, Secretary of the 
Interior Douglas McKay asserted that competency legislation would give Indians the 
opportunity to live as responsible citizens, no longer held back because of race. 
McKay wrote, “We do not believe that a man who has demonstrated his competence 
and seeks control of his property should be denied that privilege merely because he 
happens to be Indian.”42 McKay’s assertions echo claims dating back decades, that the 
BIA continued to exercise discriminatory oversight over competent Indians when it 
had no real reason to do so. In 1935, Oklahoma senator Elmer Thomas wrote to 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier arguing that competent Indians’ land 
should not be restricted. “The fact that the Government retains supervision over the 
                                                            
Allotments, SEN 83A-F9 (1928-1953), Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Indian Affairs 
Investigating Subcommittee, RG 46, NAB.  
41 Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Report to Accompany H.R. 4985, Providing a Certificate 
or Decree of Competency for United States Indians in Certain Cases, H.R. Rep. No. 836, at 5 (1953). 
NCAI, Series 6 - Committees and Special Issues Files, Box 256, Federal Indian Policy and Legislation 
Files, Competency Bill (HR 4985); NMAI. 
42 McKay to LaFarge, 1955, NC16/4/1 Correspondence on Various Subjects, Box 2, Series 4 - US 
Bureau of Indian Affairs 1934-1959, Collection No. 16 – Records of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe 
(PLPT), University of Nevada, Reno, Special Collections (UNR).  
  
346 
lands of competent Indians and supervision over the funds and securities of competent 
Indians says to the entire population—Indians and white—that it is immaterial what 
progress the Indians make. They and their descendants are to be held as perpetual 
wards of the Federal Government.”43 Thomas understood wardship to mean that 
Native peoples’ racial identities outweighed their individual abilities to manage their 
land and finances. This argument resurfaced in the 1950s. In 1953, the Department of 
the Interior requested a survey of the BIA and recommendations for improving 
organization and operating procedures. The survey team found that “the problem of 
determining ‘competency’ of individual Indians needs further study. The Bureau is 
handling the affairs of many completely competent and oftentimes financially 
independent Indians.”44 Similarly, in 1954, the House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs 
issued a report on terminating the federal government’s relationship with Indian tribes, 
which asserted, “No further Indian Bureau handling of such matters [leases of Indian 
lands and contract negotiations] in the case of competent Indians is desirable or 
necessary.”45 Terminationist politicians consistently returned to the idea that the BIA’s 
oversight of competent Indians forced them to live, as Hugh Butler claimed, in 
conditions of “racial segregation,” “inferior status,” and subject to “control by race 
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legislation.”46 They argued that Indian identity’s association with incompetency held 
Native people back from living their lives unencumbered by federal oversight.   
 While some proponents of competency bills argued that the United States 
needed to lift its racialized burden on Native people who themselves wanted to be 
emancipated from wardship, others tapped into racialized fears about competent 
Indians taking advantage of the trust relationship between tribes and the federal 
government. Often, this argument discounted Indian identity itself. For example, in 
their 1944 report to the House of Representatives, the Select Committee to Investigate 
Indian Affairs and Conditions in the United States argued that, “It is apparent that a 
clear-cut definition of ‘What is an Indian?’ is necessary if only for the purpose of 
measuring Bureau requirements and efficiency. It is believed that of the total figure of 
401,819 only from one-half to two-thirds of those listed are actually Indians for whom 
the Indian Bureau has the direct responsibility of assisting in anything more 
substantial than bookkeeping processes.”47 In claiming that up to one-half of all Native 
people in the United States were only “Indian” for the purposes of “bookkeeping”—
essentially that BIA officials had inflated the population of Native people to keep 
themselves employed—the committee defined “real” Indians as wards in need of 
governmental guidance. In 1945, Don Klingensmith, pastor of the Bredhead, 
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Wisconsin Methodist Church, wrote to special investigator of the Senate Committee 
on Indian Affairs, Albert Grorud, with his concerns about the damaging effects of 
Indian wardship on Native people. “There is no adequate way to determine just who is 
an Indian,” Klingensmith wrote. “Do not many wards come to expect special 
protection and assistance, and resist efforts toward competency?”48 Klingensmith 
implied that not only did Native people resist competency, but they also overinflated 
their Indian identities to reap the benefits of wardship. Both the House committee and 
Klingensmith believed that many of those classified as Indian were only claiming that 
identity for the special “privileges” it brought.  
 High-ranking BIA officials also shared the understanding that certain 
“competent” Native people were hiding behind an ambiguous Indian racial identity 
only to take advantage of government resources. In 1953, Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs Dillon Myer wrote a memo to the Secretary of the Interior where he expressed 
his fears about continued BIA responsibility for “competent” Indians. Myer argued 
that many of the individually allotted trust lands were owned by “highly competent 
Indians who insist on maintaining their lands in trust,” because they had “certain 
advantages,” including “being free from property taxes,” “priorities in the purchase of 
other Indian lands, borrowing tribal and Indian Bureau loan funds, and using other 
tribal resources without adequate payment.”49 Myer accused “alleged tribal leaders 
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with a modicum of Indian blood” of exploiting “other tribal members (who are less 
competent than they are) through shady real estate deals.”50 By asserting that the 
“competent” Native people possessed only a “modicum of Indian blood,” Myer 
defined “real” Indians as incompetent. Those Native people who insisted on 
maintaining the trust relationship to reap the advantages of tax exemption and access 
to tribal loan funds, were, in Myer’s eyes, too competent to be wards and too 
competent to be Indian. Myer argued that competent Native people were responsible 
for instigating Indian opposition to his termination policies. He asserted that, “a great 
majority of the Indians are opposed to having the Bureau get out of business. This is 
particularly true of those Indians who are profiting through the exploitation of their 
less competent neighbors.”51 Myer reasoned that “competent” Indians were opposed to 
termination because they were benefitting from wardship at the expense of others.  
 
Inherent Incompetence, Dependency, and Indian Race 
 In the mid-1950s, defining Indianness was a popular conversation topic. 
Politicians and members of nonprofit organizations struggled to agree on whether 
“Indian” was purely a legal status—essentially defined by wardship—or if the 
characteristics of Indianness, incompetency included, were constituted by blood. In a 
letter to AAIA Executive Director Alexander Lesser in 1954, Oliver La Farge 
proposed that the AAIA draft its own competency bill. One of the issues La Farge 
wanted to resolve in the AAIA’s version of the bill was the problem of defining Indian 
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identity. He wrote, “I have real sympathy with the desires of [Barry] Goldwater and 
many others to cut off the free list those persons who are Indians only by legal 
definition and who have no true claim upon the federal government. Perhaps we 
should give some consideration to this problem in working up a competency bill.”52 
La Farge’s use of the term “free list” implied that he believed one could become a 
“legal” Indian with no trace of Native ancestry, purely for the benefits of wardship. 
Others proposed solutions to the question of Indian identity more explicitly linked to 
blood quantum criteria. For example, the Department of the Interior’s 1954 survey 
team claimed that, “A legislative definition of who is an Indian in the legal sense is 
needed.” While no one could “answer precisely” who an Indian was, they found that, 
“Various limited definitions exist, such as the legal limitation that the Bureau can pay 
school tuition only for Indians possessing a minimum of one-quarter degree of Indian 
blood.”53 The association of blood quantum with Indian dependence upon BIA 
resources reinforced the understanding that “true” Indians were those who were taken 
care of by the government. The easiest way to define Indianness was to assess Native 
levels of dependence and incompetency, so that those who were taking advantage of 
wardship could be “cut off the free list.”   
 Policymakers and members of the public found it very difficult to separate 
“dependency” from racialized Indianness, no matter what the circumstances were. For 
example, in 1955, Charles Jones, a scout for a nonprofit which provided academic 
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scholarships, wrote to Oliver La Farge of the AAIA after taking a tour through the 
Midwest in search of black and Indian applicants. Jones wrote to La Farge to report 
his observations on termination policies, tribal government, and employment in North 
Dakota. He included commentary of several non-Natives who he had asked about 
“what they thought of industry coming into reservations.” One responded, “‘[Indians] 
would become dependent on it from eight to five just the way they are on the 
government.’” Jones was surprised at the response, noting that, “This is nearly like 
saying that Ford is bad for Detroit because people are dependent on it.”54 However, he 
understood the argument, noting that, “[The plant] remains apart from the Turtle 
Mountain people, and they don’t identify with it. Because the plant holds all the cards, 
it becomes a case of dependency.”55 Jones and his interviewees contended that even if 
the industrial plant on the reservation provided employment for tribal members, due to 
the nature of Indian behavior, it would only become a substitute for the BIA itself. 
Similarly, David Delorme, a social scientist who had conducted field research on the 
Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation, wrote to Commissioner of Indian Affairs Glenn 
Emmons in 1953 in opposition of termination policies. He wrote that although “It is 
believed that 70 or 80 per cent of the Turtle Mountain people are competent to handle 
both their personal and tribal affairs,” “the tribe, during recent years has engaged in 
three major economic activities, none of which has been noted for its success.”56 
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While Delorme does not claim that residents on the Turtle Mountain reservation were 
incompetent, he justified retaining wardship by pointing out the failures of recent 
economic ventures. Both Jones and Delorme highlighted Native peoples’ seeming 
inability to succeed in the “white” economic world.   
 The stigma of inherent Native dependence also followed Indians off 
reservations. For example, in 1955, Mrs. Dean Albertson wrote a letter to the editor of 
the Washington Evening Star where she argued that the BIA’s relocation program, 
which encouraged Native people to relocate from reservations to urban areas, had 
“resulted in serious welfare and slum problems in cities like Chicago and Los 
Angeles.” The problems within these newly formed urban Native communities, “can 
be quite simply be traced through concerned agencies in these cities as stemming from 
the lack of education, skills, necessary training of the Indian citizen.”57 Albertson 
argued that Indians were improperly equipped to exist in a world outside reservation 
boundaries, and that the BIA had not properly trained them to be self-sufficient 
citizens. This kind of racialized critique of Indian poverty stemming from BIA failure 
was nothing new. In 1947, for example, Wisconsin citizen J.W. Norris wrote to his 
congressman John Byrnes with his concerns about Indian affairs. “I don’t know what 
the general policy of the Indian Service is in the manner of providing help for the 
Indians,” Norris wrote. “Many of them don’t make much of an effort to help 
themselves.” Norris repeatedly described the Native people he interacted with as 
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“simple children” who did not know what to expect from “the great White Father or 
his minor agents.”58 Competency legislation arose out of this contradictory racialized 
context. On the one hand, politicians and the public believed that Native people were 
perpetually dependent upon the government, inherently unable to function as citizens. 
On the other hand, many also believed that competent Indians were hiding behind 
their racial identity to benefit from wardship. In both cases, wardship defined Indian 
identity itself.   
 Those who championed competency legislation argued that it would simplify 
and clarify the process for defining who Indians were, and more specifically, who the 
federal government was required to protect. However, those who opposed competency 
legislation pointed out that decrees of competency would further complicate Native 
peoples’ already ambiguous legal status. In their petition to Congress and the President 
requesting disapproval of H.R. 1113, the AAIA argued that “the procedures authorized 
by the Bill creates a new class of persons—Indians for tribal purposes, non-Indians for 
Indian Bureau purposes.” The “new,” class of persons would create a “nuisance,” and 
“endless litigation” as state authorities and tribal leaders attempted to discern who was 
eligible to benefit from tribal resources such as timber, oil, and water, and federal 
responsibilities such as irrigation, credit, health, and education.59 Felix Cohen 
contended that holding a decree of competency would mean that a successful Native 
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applicant would become “an Indian and a non-Indian, a ward and not a ward, a 
competent incompetent.”60 Native groups also opposed the creation of a more 
ambiguous status. At the 1954 Emergency Conference of American Indians on 
Legislation hosted by the NCAI, representatives from the Council of the Pueblo of Zia 
declared that “the Competency Bill would create classes of Indians which we do not 
now have and do not want.”61 Similarly, in 1953, the All Pueblo Council resolved that 
competency legislation “is ambiguous with regard to the rights and responsibilities of 
the ‘competent’ Indian.”62 Rather than crystallizing “full” citizenship, decrees of 
competency would have created an additional ambiguous status for Indians which 
hovered somewhere between wardship and citizenship.  
 
Gender and Indian Extermination  
Husbands’ Competency and Wives’ Dependency   
 Gender ideologies significantly influenced proponents of competency 
legislation. The definition of “competency” itself was shaped by gendered 
assumptions about male responsibility and female dependency. Some bills also 
explicitly stipulated how competency would affect marriage and family relationships, 
including the indigenous identity of Native children. This section unpacks specific 
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legislative language and points out key points in political discussions about 
competency legislation where gender was institutionalized as a main criterion for 
competency.  
Politicians utilized gendered constructs to adjudicate competency. In the four 
bills he proposed from 1944 to 1947, Francis Case suggested criteria, which if met, 
would automatically bestow competency upon Native applicants. These criteria were 
rooted in a gendered understanding of the fulfillment of citizenship duties. The most 
recognizable was military service. Politicians and the public believed that if a Native 
veteran had been honorably discharged from the armed services, he should be eligible 
for “full citizenship rights.”63 Case’s 1944 bill H.R. 5115 and 1947 bill H.R. 2958 also 
specified that those applicants who possessed a high school education, a 
recommendation from an agency superintendent or tribal council leadership, or had 
lived away from a reservation for a period of five years should also receive 
competency decrees automatically. Although these three criteria applied equally to 
men and women, veterans were the focus of all four of Case’s bills. To Case, military 
service was such a clear fulfillment of the duties of citizenship that it merited direct 
conferral of competency onto a Native applicant. There was no such equivalent for 
Native women to demonstrate fulfillment of their duties of American citizenship. Most 
likely, proponents of competency legislation assumed that it would be men who would 
be applying for competency.  
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 This assumption was made clear at the 1947 House Subcommittee of Indian 
Affairs of the Committee of Public Lands hearings on Indian emancipation.64 In those 
hearings, legislators raised questions about the relationships between “competent” 
Native men and their wives.65 Frank Barrett, Republican Representative from 
Wyoming, asked if wives should automatically receive decrees of competency when 
their husbands were deemed competent. Barrett argued that just as the United States 
owed “an obligation to the man and the wife as wards of the government and also an 
obligation to the children,” “the man owes an obligation to his wife and to the children 
to provide for their support. He is the natural guardian of his own children.”66 Barrett 
continued, “It seems to me that if a man is competent that the whole family should be 
released.”67 Barrett understood that male heads of nuclear family households were the 
“guardians” of their wives and children. Other congressmen agreed with Barrett. 
Francis Case argued that before granting competency, the court needed to determine 
“whether this man is competent not only to manage his own affairs, but competent to 
take the place of government in looking after his family and children.”68 Thus, if they 
received a declaration of competency, Native men would be recognized as responsible 
patriarchs of their nuclear family units. If Native men were “taking the place of the 
government” as guardians of their wives and children’s financial welfare, then, by 
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definition, wives and children should also receive competency decrees. Barrett’s and 
Case’s language in these hearings demonstrate that politicians assumed all 
competency applicants would be men.   
 Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs William Zimmerman also argued that 
wives should receive automatic declarations of competency with their husbands. 
However, Zimmerman rooted his contention in more practical and logistical terms. 
Zimmerman asserted that if spouses did not automatically receive competency, “you 
will have a man who, let us say, is competent, and he gets a certificate and he disposes 
of the family property which is in his name, and his wife and his children will still be 
federal responsibility. His wife might disagree, and she might have been a member of 
the tribe and have property in her own right, but not sufficient to support the family.”69 
Zimmerman, a high-ranking BIA official, saw the likely administrative mess which 
would result if family property, stake in tribal assets and resources, and guardianship 
of children was divided between “competent” and “incompetent” spouses. He also 
pointed to the marital disputes which might arise if wives preferred not to divest of 
their tribal property. The committee did not answer Zimmerman’s concerns, choosing 
instead to assert that competency determinations should progress on an individualized 
basis, and that within 21 years the “problem would resolve itself.”70 Members of the 
committee were most likely unfamiliar with the bureaucratic processes involved in 
administrating and dividing property and tribal resources. Additionally, they simply 
assumed that if a man received a declaration of competency, it would not matter if his 
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wife formally applied—as guardian of the family, the man was responsible for making 
decisions concerning finances, property, and even the family’s relationship with the 
larger tribal community.  
 Members of the House Subcommittee on Interior and Insular Affairs continued 
to debate automatic conferral of spousal competency. In July 1953, the subcommittee 
issued a report which highlighted the practical problems which would arise if one 
member of the family was declared competent and released from wardship, but the 
rest of the family’s land continued to be held in trust. Some saw this convoluted 
division of family competency as counter to the central goal of termination policies—
to abolish the BIA. Assistant Secretary of the Interior Orme Lewis argued that “It 
would not be practicable to terminate the rights of the head of a family to special 
Federal benefits while leaving the spouse and minor children eligible for such 
benefits.”71 Thus, the subcommittee proposed that “applications by married persons 
for certificates of competency should be considered only on a family basis.” They 
argued that applications of married people would be considered “only if the spouse 
also files an application.” This signaled legislators’ desires to prevent possible familial 
disputes about tribal property. However, the subcommittee specified that “if one of 
them is determined to be a competent person, patents in fee should be issued to all the 
trust land of the applicants, their minor children, and any other minor children in the 
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custody of the applicants.”72 Therefore, although husbands and wives would apply for 
competency together, both spouses did not need to be judged competent for all 
members of the family to receive decrees. This stipulation further reflects the 
subcommittee’s belief in patriarchal family structures. It was unlikely that a court or 
the Secretary of the Interior would find a Native wife competent and her husband 
incompetent, and bestow her with the power of guardianship over the rest of the 
family.  
 In May 1954, the subcommittee was still discussing proper procedures for 
family applications. George Abbott, Special Counsel to the House Interior Committee, 
attempted to parse out whether the specifications about married couples meant that the 
bill “involuntarily” declared competency. Abbott stated, “To that extent in so far as a 
declaration of competency would reach the other spouse, that is in a sense, I suppose 
involuntary; but there it would be a case of common interest, presumably, and that 
would be considered with other factors.”73 He clarified further that, “In any case the 
application would be made on behalf of the applicant, the spouse, children, so we can 
clear the record on that point that it is not involuntary because the application in the 
first instance is voluntary.”74 From the committee’s perspective, the adjudicating 
authorities should presume that all members of the family were voluntarily submitting 
applications. This point of view further reified their assumption that Native families 
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would conform to patriarchal structures where the head of the household’s decision 
would stand for all other household members.  
 Notably, the simultaneous spousal application requirement did not make it into 
the final version of the bill. The question of divided competency within families was 
not formally resolved until Wesley D’Ewart’s 1954 bill, H.R. 4985. That bill specified 
that if one spouse was declared competent, competency would be automatically 
bestowed upon the other spouse and any minor children under either the applicant’s or 
spouse’s custody. The exact language stipulated, “In the event an applicant is married 
and living with his or her spouse, such application shall be made by the applicants and 
spouse and on behalf of any minor children over whom the applicant or the spouse has 
custody under tribal or State law.”75 If “one of the adult applicants” was found 
competent, all members of the family would be “no longer subject to Federal laws 
applicable to Indians as such…and the recipient or recipients and heirs thereof shall no 
longer be entitled to share any of the benefits or gratuitous service extended to Indians 
as such by the United States.”76 H.R. 4985 explicitly proposed to end wardship by 
family unit rather than by individual.  
 Even members of the AAIA, an organization committed to Indian issues, 
presumed that most applicants for competency would be men. For example, in 1954, 
AAIA members drafted their own version of competency legislation which proposed 
three distinct criteria to judge which individual Native people were “eligible for 
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termination of his special status under Federal law.” The first two criteria were that an 
applicant must show that “he has been graduated from an accredited high school,” or 
that “he has, in each of the three years immediately preceding the date of application, 
earned more than $3600.00 from wages, salaries, fees for services, or net profits on a 
business operated by him without supervision by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.”77 
These stipulations demonstrate that the AAIA also assumed “competency” to be the 
gendered responsibility of male applicants to generate enough income to provide for 
his family’s future. The AAIA took the “$3600 figure…from the social security law, 
that figure being the maximum amount from which social security deductions are 
made.” However, AAIA members noted that the legislation should “make allowances” 
for “Indians who farm their own land,” because “their food and housing budget needs 
will be considerably lower than those of Indians living in the city.”78 The AAIA 
assumed that if a Native applicant had earned enough to live independently from the 
BIA, he would also have earned enough to prevent him from relying on needs-based 
welfare programs.  
 The AAIA’s version of the competency bill also tapped into long-standing 
gendered and racialized assumptions about marriage as a path to citizenship. In order 
to extend competency eligibility to “housewives who do not have the opportunity to 
earn the required amount of money,” the third criteria proposed that, “in the case of a 
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married woman, that her husband, to whom she shall have been married for five years 
immediately preceding the date of application and with whom she has shared a 
household during such period, is, on the date of application, a person other than an 
Indian having special status under the law.”79 In this proposal, Native women—
specifically, those who had demonstrated that they were in a long-term marriage and 
were currently sharing a house with their husbands—were able to achieve competency 
only if their husband had already done so. The language of “a person other than an 
Indian having special status” in this stipulation was vague enough to include both non-
Native men and those Native men who had already applied and been granted decrees 
of competency. In either case, if their husbands had demonstrated through their racial 
identity or their financial earnings that they would not be dependent upon the federal 
government, the AAIA assumed that their wives would also not be dependent. Though 
this proposed language did not end up in the final versions of H.R. 4985, it 
demonstrates how deeply patriarchal assumptions about responsibility and 
independence were woven into debates about Native competency and eligibility for 
“emancipation.”  
 
 
Native Children’s Competency 
 
 Beginning with H.R. 1113 in 1947, legislators included a specific clause which 
proposed an end to federal wardship by adjusting Native children’s legal status. The 
clause, which was inserted into every subsequent competency bill, read: “Any Indian 
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born after the date of the enactment of this Act, who is a citizen of the United States, 
and any child of parents, either of whom has been issued a ‘decree of competency’ 
shall, upon reaching the age of twenty-one years, be free of all disabilities and 
limitations specially applicable to Indians.”80 By granting competency at the age of 21 
for any Native child born to one competent parent, and to any Native child born after 
the bill passed into law, the bill proposed to eliminate Indians’ relationship with the 
federal government within a specific period of time. Age became the only requirement 
for receiving a decree of competency, with the assumption that “competent” parents 
would pass on the skills needed for such a decree to their children. This stipulation 
would have imposed an involuntary change in legal status after childhood, and, within 
21 years after the bill’s passage, eliminated the relationship between the federal 
government and Native tribes.  
 Native people and activists were strongly opposed to the automatic declaration 
of competency onto children. For example, in 1953, NCAI president Joseph Garry 
issued a statement on H.R. 4985 which criticized its compulsive aspects. Garry 
asserted that if an Indian received a certificate of competency, “his spouse and minor 
children would automatically be granted this same certificate without request. Patent 
in fee would be issued to them for all their property, thus losing their rights of federal 
protection on their lands and property as well as their privileges of tax freedom.”81 
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Similarly, at the 1954 Emergency Conference of American Indians on Legislation, the 
NCAI issued a statement outlining the aspects of the bill which conference attendees 
found most objectionable. The first objection was that, “The spouse and children of an 
Indian declared competent automatically become competent and thus lose their rights 
to federal services for Indians; all their trust lands became subject to taxation and 
alienation with the consequent danger of loss.”82 Both Garry and NCAI members at 
the 1954 conference pointed out that the spouse and children of Indians declared 
competent had no choice of whether or not they wanted to have their lands removed 
from trust restrictions. This involuntary removal meant that Native women and 
children would lose tax exemption and be subject to increased danger of losing their 
land altogether. In 1954, the All-Pueblo Council argued that H.R. 4985 “would impose 
upon the spouse and children of an Indian declared competent the status of non-Indian, 
irrespective of their desires and in violation of the rights guaranteed them by the 
Federal Government.”83 Native objections to the bill were that one member of the 
family’s actions could drastically impact the others’ rights as wards without their 
permission. This compulsive imposition of competency posed a danger to Indian land 
holdings.   
 Native groups especially disapproved of the automatic conferral of competency 
onto Native children because it would deprive children of their own choice. For 
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example, Garry’s statement pointed to the fact that the bill would terminate wardship 
for all Native babies born after the bill’s enactment if either parent had a certificate of 
competency, which “deprives the unborn of the freedom of choice.”84 At the 1954 
New Mexico Conference of Social Welfare, Pueblo, Navajo, and Apache leaders 
publicly condemned competency legislation in a resolution which asserted that “the 
bill was unfair to Indian children.”85 Additionally, the All-Pueblo Council’s 1954 
resolution specifically highlighted that many tribes would “suffer hardship and 
injustice,” with the bill’s passage, “particularly the children of such tribes.”86 Native 
groups objected to the fact that parents’ choices to separate from wardship would be 
imposed upon their children, before those children were able to voice their own 
opinions.  
 Frank Ducheneaux, Chairman of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, offered 
insight as to why Native people found the provisions in the bill about children so 
objectionable. At a 1954 meeting of the House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Ducheneaux asserted that if parents applied 
for competency, they would be “committing their children to something that they 
know nothing about, taking rights and privileges away from that group that do not 
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know anything about it.”87 Members of the subcommittee did not understand 
Ducheneaux’s objections to what they saw as a legitimate exercise of parental 
authority. Congressman Wayne Aspinall of Colorado pressed Ducheneaux, asking, “Is 
it not your feeling that a parent has been by his own motion made competent, or if he 
desires by his own motion to have his incompetency removed, the parent has more 
right than any other individual or segment of society to determine what shall happen to 
the children, to his children?”88 To Aspinall, if a Native head of household had been 
declared competent, he alone should have the right and responsibility to decide what 
was best for his family’s future. Ducheneaux responded, “Congressman, but we all 
think we are competent; that is, I believe everybody thinks he is competent to handle 
his own affairs, but when it comes to waiving the rights of somebody other than 
yourself, I do not think they should have a right to do that.”89 Rather than granting 
ultimate decision making authority to “competent” Indian fathers, Ducheneaux 
conceptualized Native children as individuals with their own stakes in their tribal 
communities. He continued, “I do not think that the parent should have the right to 
waive any privileges that their children might have before they are competent to speak 
for themselves.”90 In his assertion that Native children should be entitled to make their 
own decisions whether to apply for competency, Ducheneaux challenged 
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Americanized assumptions about parental responsibility and the goal of termination 
itself. Increasingly exasperated, Aspinall challenged, “How will we ever be able to 
remove the status of incompetency? Who is going to speak for the child? Are you 
going to permit the child of all incompetent people to reach the age of maturity as 
incompetents?”91 Eager to speed along Indian integration into the polity as nuclear 
family units headed by “competent” men, Aspinall was unwilling to consider Native 
peoples’ unique history with the United States or cultural differences in childrearing 
and family management. Ducheneaux saw competency as a threat to all members of 
Native families as well as a threat to the financial well-being and land base of Indian 
tribes.  
 
Competency as Extermination  
 One of the main critiques Native people and their supporters leveled at 
competency legislation was that Native children would be excluded from access to the 
resources and benefits from the federal government as wards, the “rights promised to 
them by treaties, agreements, and statutes of the United States.”92 For example, in 
1951, the Southwest Indian Newsletter published a critique of H.R. 457 and S. 485, 
which argued that the bills “would exclude Indian children born after the bill becomes 
law, as well as children of so-called ‘competent’ Indians, from accessing Indian 
hospitals, credit facilities, education and other benefits including tax-exemption on 
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lands.”93 Similarly, in his 1953 testimony before the House Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs representing the San Carlos Apache, Hualapai, Blackfeet, Winnebago, 
Laguna Pueblo, and All-Pueblo Council, lawyer Felix Cohen argued that HR 4985 
would “put an end to such services and subsidies” as “hospital services, education, 
road maintenance, and various other public services to Indians on Indian 
reservations.”94 Native groups especially feared Native children’s loss of such 
resources because there was no guarantee that these benefits and services would be 
replaced by other sources. For example, in 1953 the All-Pueblo Council issued a 
resolution opposing competency legislation because, they argued, “the proposed 
legislation would deprive our Pueblo Indians of many protections, benefits, and 
services they now receive from the Federal Government without providing for transfer 
of these to state or local government.”95 Southwestern tribes like the Pueblos were 
especially wary of proposals to terminate the federal government’s responsibility for 
Indian welfare due to their previous experiences with Arizona and New Mexico’s 
public welfare offices who refused to process Native applications for Social Security 
benefits.  
 Competency legislation exemplified attempted assimilation, and as such, 
should be situated within the long history of Native people’s legal extermination. 
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Competency bills set a fixed date for the “end” of Indian wardship. When children 
born after the bill’s enactment turned 21, they would automatically be declared 
“competent,” and, as the AAIA argued in 1948, deprived of “rights guaranteed to the 
Indians in perpetuity.”96 Children with at least one competent parent would be no 
longer “Indian” in a legal sense, after their parent received his or her decree. These 
aspects of competency legislation which “set a date and a time when wardship will 
eventually end,” was, according to Wesley D’Ewart, sponsor of  H.R. 2724, H.R. 457, 
and H.R. 4985, “done deliberately.”97 Critics argued that this “degree of compulsion,” 
as another member of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs classified 
it, could have damaging effects, not just on Native children’s individual choices, but 
also on Native communities as a whole.98 For example, in 1948, Vice President of the 
New Mexico Association on Indian Affairs, Catherine Farrelly, sent a letter to Senator 
Dennis Chavez of New Mexico to voice her opposition to HR 1113, a bill for which 
Chavez had declared his support. Farrelly argued that “this bill is not voluntary but 
mandatory,” and that it would be “as great a threat to the welfare of the Indians as any 
piece of legislation in the past 25 years.”99 In 1953, New Mexico citizen Peter 
Kunstadter wrote to Chavez asserting that HR 4985 “provides for the ultimate 
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destruction of these communities, by providing that each Indian born after the law was 
enacted would automatically be declared competent on reaching the age of 21.”100 
That same year, John Collier declared in a letter to the editor of the New York Times, 
“Rather than eliminating the Indian Bureau, in whole or in part, as so many past 
‘emancipation’ bills have proposed to do, H.R. 4985 takes the approach of solving the 
‘Indian problem’ by eliminating the Indians.”101 What Farrelly, Kunstadter, and Collier 
all articulated was that without wardship, Indians would cease to exist as Indians. By 
legally ending wardship, competency legislation recast “Indianness” as a vaguely 
defined racial, ethnic or ancestral identity, rather than a legal status of members of 
sovereign nations with historical agreements with the US government. Ultimately, if 
Native people lost their rights to that continued legal relationship with the United 
States, it would damage the structure and autonomy of Native tribes.  
If all Native people were eventually declared “competent,” would tribes be 
able to retain sovereignty, power over determination of membership, and/or 
administration of land or other assets? In her analysis of Canada’s Indian Act, 
Mohawk scholar Audra Simpson has addressed the extent to which state citizenship 
has impacted social and community practices of indigenous nations in Canada. 
Simpson argues that in the case of the Mohawk people of Kahnawà:ke, the tribe 
adopted aspects of the Indian Act, including a patrilineal model of descent, which 
                                                            
100 Kunstadter to Chavez, 1953, Folder 38 – Legislation Indian Affairs 1953-1954, Box 30, Dennis 
Chavez Papers, CSR-UNM.  
101 John Collier, Letter to Editor, New York Times, July 16, 1953, Competency Decree (HR 4985) Bills 
Letters Notes Statements Clippings, Series II - Programs and Projects, Part III 1945-1956, John Collier 
Papers (University Microfilms International, Reel 45), Arizona State University Law Library.  
  
371 
effectively disenfranchised Indian women from their Indian status when they married 
non-Native men.102 After Canada amended the law in 1985 to address the gender bias 
in this patrilineal system, Simpson writes that the community of Kahnawà:ke 
continued to debate about how membership within the tribe should be determined. 
Simpson argues that clashes between the people of Kahnawà:ke and the state over 
issues of citizenship and membership revealed larger conflicts within the community 
over developing “what would be the means for determining who we were—and who 
was not eligible to be recognized by us as being who we are.”103 Simpson’s work 
demonstrates that multi-faceted and overlapping discourses of sovereignty and 
belonging are encoded within state laws which govern citizenship and membership. 
What proponents of competency legislation presented as a straightforward, 
administrative process of “freeing” individual Native people from governmental 
oversight, would have had similarly deep implications for larger issues of tribal 
community and family formation.  
 Canada’s Indian policies were not entirely foreign to US advocates of 
termination. In the early 1950s, policymakers looked to Canada’s legal process of 
“enfranchisement” as a guide for possible American termination policies. In his work 
paper on termination, S. Lyman Tyler explained how individual Indians in Canada 
became “enfranchised.” Tyler found that, “after an Indian has applied to the Minister 
of Citizenship and Immigration for enfranchisement, the Governor in Council may, on 
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the Minister’s recommendation, declare the Indian, his wife and their minor children 
enfranchised, provided that: 1) the Indian is 21; 2) he is capable of assuming the duties 
and responsibilities of citizenship; and 3) he is capable of supporting himself and his 
dependents.”104 Competency bills in the United States bore much resemblance to the 
Canadian process of enfranchisement, including the patriarchal assumption that Native 
men would only be able to assume the responsibilities and duties of full citizenship if 
they could demonstrate their ability to provide for their families.  
In the eyes of both the state and the tribes who assimilated the policy, Canada’s 
Indian Act legally “exterminated” the Indian identities of women who married non-
Native men, and the children of those unions. This gendered “path to citizenship,” 
reminiscent of both nineteenth-century assimilation policies and mid-twentieth-
century competency proposals in the United States, reinforced, as Simpson calls it, a 
sign of “colonialism’s ongoing existence and simultaneous failure.” State agents’ 
efforts to “eliminate Indigenous people” and assimilate them into “a white, property-
owning body politic” survive. But so too, does Native resistance.105   
 
Competency and Tribal Sovereignty  
The Ambiguous Relationship between Tribes and “Competent” Indians 
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 Competency bills undermined systems of tribal sovereignty and community 
governance. The legislative language created an ambiguous “dual status” for Native 
people, echoing the language of the Indian Citizenship Act. Significantly, nearly all 
competency bills contained a phrase which protected “competent” Indians from losing 
any of the rights “to which he would otherwise be entitled as a member of any Indian 
tribe.”106 Beginning with H.R. 1113 in 1947, the language became more specific. The 
following phrase was inserted into every subsequent competency bill: 
“After receiving a ‘decree or judgment of competency,’ the applicant, if 
a member of a tribe, may continue on the tribal rolls, as a member of 
the tribe. Any Indian who has been adjudged competent as herein 
provided shall in no manner be deprived of his or her tribal rights or 
treaty benefits; and in no way shall he or she be alienated from any 
benefits or payments of funds which may accrue to the tribe, band, 
group, or ward of the Federal Government through settlement of claims 
as provided in section 12, Public Law 726, approved August 13, 1946, 
by reason of a decree of competency obtained under the provisions of 
this Act.”107 
 
This kind of language allowed “competent” Indians to remain on tribal rolls as 
members in tribes and ensured that they would receive their portion of any claims their 
tribe received because of the Indian Claims Commission. In their 1953 report on HR 
4985, the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs further clarified their intent, 
asserting that, “H.R. 4985 does not operate to deprive Indians declared competent 
vested interest or interests which might accrue in tribal assets or resources; it does not 
deprive the individual declared competent of future benefits or payments which might 
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accrue by reason of claim settlement, award or judgment.”108 Thus, a Native person 
with a declaration of competency would not have been financially divorced from his 
or her tribe, but allowed to maintain a stake in tribal assets and resources. 
Additionally, competency legislation did not necessarily “emancipate” Native people 
from wardship. For some tribes, the protection of “tribal rights or treaty benefits” 
would have safeguarded continued provisions for healthcare and education by the 
federal government. Indeed, in a 1949 letter to Senator Joseph O’Mahoney opposing 
H.R. 2724, Oliver La Farge of the AAIA pointed out that “To the extent that 
educational services, for example, are called for in treaties, these provisions are clearly 
mutually contradictory and would lead to utter confusion.”109 However, although 
competency bills safeguarded “tribal rights and treaty benefits,” they also specified 
procedures and goals for removing trust restrictions on Indian land and other property, 
which will be discussed further below.  
 Native organizations, tribes, and non-Native advocates argued that competency 
legislation damaged existing tribal governance and negatively impacted communities 
by allowing “competent” Native people to maintain vested financial interests in tribes 
they had left. For example, in his 1953 statement on competency, NCAI president 
Joseph Garry asserted that this aspect of the legislation would “lessen an individual 
Indian’s regard for the conservation of property of his tribesmen, knowing that this 
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competency would in no way jeopardize his standing with the tribe in financial 
benefits or otherwise.”110 Similarly, in their 1954 Emergency Conference of American 
Indians on Legislation, the NCAI protested that one of the “principal objectionable 
features” of H.R. 4985, was that, “An Indian declared competent on his own 
application or otherwise, continues on the tribal rolls and shares in tribal assets and 
income.”111 Other tribal groups also pointed to how competency legislation would pit 
“competent” Indians against those without decrees of competency and split up Native 
families. At a 1953 Laguna Pueblo tribal council meeting, the tribe issued a resolution 
asking Congress to reject H.R. 4985, because the bill “encourages anti-tribal Indians to 
undermine the property and tribal organization and disrupts enterprises of 
communities and families who want to remain together.”112 In a 1954 resolution, tribal 
representatives from Arizona and New Mexico argued that “allowing an Indian 
declared competent to continue on the tribal rolls even though he desires to be 
considered a non-Indian,” essentially allows him to “continue to enjoy the rights and 
privileges he has rejected.”113 Native critics pointed to the discord which competency 
legislation would sow within Native communities, potentially allowing “competent” 
Indians to benefit from tribal resources after having “rejected” their Native identity.  
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 Non-Native advocates for Indians, including members of the AAIA and lawyer 
Felix Cohen, also opposed these stipulations within competency bills. To them, the 
legislation seemed to allow “competent” Indians to continue to influence tribal matters 
but share no real responsibility with other tribal members. The AAIA issued a press 
release in 1948 opposing H.R. 1113, where they argued that one of the “worst features 
of the bill” was the provision that invited “Indians who secede from tribal groups to 
assert claims against tribal assets,” which gave “dissident individuals power to attach 
and veto tribal arrangements established democratically by majority decision.”114 In 
his testimony against H.R. 4985 before the House Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs in 1953, Cohen asserted that “individuals who do not want to be Indians” will 
continue “to have all the rights but none of the responsibilities of tribal 
membership.”115 Critics contended that “competent” Indians could influence tribal 
politics and financial resources, potentially impacting other tribal members’ assets 
without any repercussions.  
 Other critics of competency bills pointed out that despite their continued 
connection with tribes, “competent” Indians would not be allowed to receive any of 
the services and resources to which tribal members were entitled. For example, a 1951 
issue of the Southwest Indian Newsletter argued that H.R. 457 and S. 485 allowed 
competent Indians to “participate in Tribal affairs, thus giving them a voice in tribal 
                                                            
114 “So-Called Emancipation Bill Threatens American Indian Rights,” AAIA Press Release, 1948, 
Association on American Indian Affairs File – Correspondence 1947-1948, Box 75, Philleo Nash White 
House/Association on American Indian Affairs Files, HSTL. 
115 Testimony of Felix S. Cohen on H.R. 4985, House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, July 7, 
1953, Folder 8 – Correspondence Regarding Various Tribal Legal Matters 1952-1961, Box 3, William 
Zimmerman Papers, CSR-UNM. 
  
377 
actions and programs from which they will not be allowed to benefit.”116 Similarly, in 
a 1953 letter to the editor of the New York Times, John Collier asserted that HR 4985 
and S 335 would “prevent those Indians now living who wish to remain as fully 
participating members of an Indian tribe or community from reaping the full benefits 
of such participation. This is done by the provision in the bill which gives the Indian 
who has resigned from the tribal property rights and interests in tribal affairs 
notwithstanding his complete severance from the tribal organization.”117 In his 1953 
testimony, Felix Cohen also emphasized that although they would retain the rights of 
tribal membership, “competent” Indians would no longer be eligible to “participate in 
any of the benefits of such public services.”118 Competency legislation failed to fully 
separate “competent” tribal members from their tribes, allowing them to have a voice 
in tribal affairs, but, at the same time, leaving them unable to benefit from programs 
and services.   
 By proposing a legal procedure to determine the rights of individual members 
within tribes, competency legislation also usurped tribes’ authority to establish their 
own protocols for membership. In a statement printed in an AAIA and American 
Indian Fund newsletter, the San Carlos Apache Tribal Council and the Inter-Tribal 
Council of Arizona asserted that “An ‘emancipation’ bill, if enacted on the lines of 
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H.R. 4985 would severely disrupt the operation of tribal government and shatter the 
foundation on which tribal economic and social organization is based.”119 
Furthermore, they asserted that competency legislation was unnecessary because, “an 
Indian who wants to sever all relations with his tribe and with the Federal 
Government, as an Indian, can do so without special legislation. We had a case of this 
nature last year where an enrolled member of the Tribe disaffiliated himself from the 
Tribe. Such action should be optional, and not mandatory.”120 Similarly, at the NCAI 
Emergency Conference, Diego Abeita, spokesperson for the All-Pueblo Council and 
the Isleta, Domingo, Tesuque, and San Felipe Pueblos, and Jicarilla Apache, 
demanded, “Indians should not be subjected to humiliation of securing a piece of 
paper from the Secretary of the Interior to prove competency.”121 In their 
correspondence, AAIA members suggested that the rights of “competent” Indians 
within tribal affairs should be left up to the tribes. For example, in 1954, Oliver La 
Farge wrote to Alexander Lesser, “Could it be put up to the tribes themselves to 
determine whether such persons, having been declared non-Indian, should or should 
not continue to have rights in the government or business management of the tribe?”122 
In their own version of a competency bill, the AAIA directed that a person who had 
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received a decree of competency “shall lose his right to vote in tribal affairs. However, 
the tribe may, at its discretion, restore the right to vote to him.”123 Both Native 
criticisms of competency legislation’s subversion of tribal autonomy and the AAIA’s 
efforts to restore (limited) tribal authority over membership reflected larger political 
issues of defining Indian identity and membership in tribal nations.  
 Joanne Barker has noted how Indian tribes, the federal government, and the 
non-Native public continue to battle over jurisdiction over membership criteria. Barker 
asserts that being excluded from tribal membership does not mean that one is “merely 
excluded from its associated legal rights.” Exclusion also reflects one’s “lack of 
cultural authenticity.”124 The United States has a history of using individual Native 
people’s “authenticity” to determine their eligibility for citizenship. Barker notes that 
during the administration of allotment policy, BIA officials would adjudge individual 
Native people’s “competency” to determine if they were “ready” to manage the 
“demands of private property ownership.” Individuals with less “Native blood” were 
more likely to be considered competent.125 Thus, as Native people moved farther away 
from the perception of the “authentic” Indian, whether that was through biology or 
behavior, they were in more danger of losing their rights as tribal members. In turn, 
tribes themselves were stripped of the power to determine who was eligible for 
membership. Mid-twentieth-century competency proposals demonstrate the endurance 
of these assumptions about authenticity and citizenship. These bills had the power to 
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potentially impact the dynamics of tribal membership as well as Native peoples’ 
attainment of “full” citizenship. 
 Native and non-Native critics of competency legislation also pointed to how the 
bills threatened the relationship between tribal nations and the United States 
constituted through treaties. In 1954, Martin Vigil, chairman of the All-Pueblo 
Council, wrote to President Eisenhower to argue that competency legislation would 
enlarge the power of the BIA, increase confusion, and perpetuate a series of hearings 
and investigations which “would never end.” “Pending Indian legislation is the most 
ruinous in the black record of one hundred and fifty years of broken promises by the 
Federal Government,” Vigil wrote. “You swore to protect our rights.”126 Vigil 
reminded Eisenhower that according to the Declaration of Independence, “government 
is derived from the consent of the governed,” and that not only had Native people not 
consented to competency legislation, “we have not even been consulted.”127 By 
emphasizing the “promises” the federal government made, Vigil pointed to the legal 
relationship between tribes and the United States. However, he also reminded 
Eisenhower of the American political promise of citizens’ rights to be “governed by 
consent.”  
 Non-Natives also pointed competency legislation’s threats to existing treaties. 
For example, in 1953, concerned constituents wrote to Senator Dennis Chavez of New 
Mexico about Chavez’s support for competency legislation. “Recently there has been 
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a trend which would effectively eliminate the provision of these treaties which were 
entered into with good faith of all parties concerned,” wrote Peter Kunstadter. “The 
‘Indian Emancipation Bill’ is representative of this trend.”128 Lauri and Walter Keller 
asserted that, “Perhaps it would not be amiss to state here that, if such legislative 
action should be taken, there could be no escape from a sense of personal shame and 
guilt with regard to the destruction of Indian rights as established by treaty and 
agreement.”129 Similarly, Florence Hawley Ellis wrote to Chavez, “This bill, if passed, 
would simply be one more chapter in the already disgraceful record of the United 
States Government in its treaty relations with the Indians.” Ellis continued, “In a word, 
the Butler-D’Ewart Bill would make scraps of paper out of hundreds of years of treaty 
obligations solemnly ratified by the tribes and the United States Senate.”130 To 
Chavez’s constituents and to many Native people, competency legislation ignored 
treaty stipulations and undercut tribes’ ability to determine their own governmental 
processes and membership requirements. 
 
Competency Legislation and Native Land 
 
 Through competency bills, legislators wanted to free Indian land from trust 
restrictions. With a certificate of competency, a Native applicant would receive a 
patent in fee for their land, and trust restrictions would be removed on his or her land 
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and other financial property. Some bills offered more details about how competency 
decrees would affect tribal land. For example, H.R. 2958, Francis Case’s 1947 bill, 
stipulated that “nothing in this Act shall be construed to require the division or sale of 
tribal property, real or personal,” and that the Secretary of the Interior would be unable 
to permit the sale of any tribal lands “except when approved by a two-thirds vote of all 
adult members of the tribe to which the land belongs.” Furthermore, H.R. 2958 stated 
that “It is hereby declared to be the intent of Congress that the tribal lands of all Indian 
tribes shall be preserved as a homeland for the members of their respective tribes and 
shall not be diminished except by approval of the tribe as herein provided.”131 In 1947, 
these safeguards of tribal approval disappeared. The bills proposed between 1947 and 
1954 authorized the Secretary of the Interior, if he deemed it practicable, to partition 
tribal land to release the “competent” person’s physical property or the financial share 
of the property. For example, in H.R. 1113 (1947) the Secretary of the Interior was 
instructed to make every effort to divide land “held jointly or in common with other 
heirs.” However, if it was “impracticable to divide same according to their inherited 
interests he shall sell the interest or interests of the individual Indian applicant who has 
been adjudged competent and pay to him or her the net proceeds of such sale.”132 
Hugh Butler’s 1949 bill, S. 186 imbued the Secretary of the Interior with even more 
power, stating, “If the individual Indian who has been adjudged competent holds 
jointly or in common with other heirs an undivided interest in land the Secretary may 
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in his discretion partition such land.”133 All subsequent bills contained the same 
language. In H.R. 457 (1951), Wesley D’Ewart introduced language which also 
protected the rights of non-Native lessees of tribal land: “Provided further, that the 
Secretary may make such provisions as he deems necessary to protect the rights, 
interests, and investments of lessees and permittees in any such land.”134 Legislators 
extended these protections further in H.R. 4958 (1954), directly stipulating that 
nothing in the bill would “abrogate the interest of any lessee or permittee.”135 If 
passed, competency legislation would not only have affected the applicant and his or 
her family, but many more tribal members. Critics of competency bills argued that the 
legislation invested the Secretary of the Interior with the power to divide land among 
individuals or even to sell land altogether.  
  Native critics of competency legislation contended that freeing land from 
restrictions increased the likelihood that it would be sold. For example, in 1953, the 
Council of the Pueblo of Laguna issued a resolution against H.R. 4985, asserting that 
“The main motive power behind this new drive to remove federal protection of Indian 
rights comes from selfish interest who want the lands that are still left us.”136 That 
same year the All-Pueblo Council issued their own resolution, stating that “The 
provision for removal of restrictions on Indian property threatens the loss to Indians of 
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individual land holdings, which, for many of our Pueblo Indians, is their chief base of 
economic security.”137 Similarly, in 1954, Moses Twobulls, President of the Oglala 
Sioux Tribal Council, wrote to Chairman of the House Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs, Arthur Miller to protest H.R. 4985. Twobulls argued that, “Enactment 
of this bill would give more Indians the idea they could get patent fees easily, and even 
more Indians than already do would feel forced to try to sell their land to meet current 
emergencies. Wholesale issuance of ‘competency decrees’ would surely follow and 
then wholesale selling off of Indian land.”138 At the NCAI emergency conference in 
1954, Diego Abeita, spokesperson for the All Pueblo Council, explicitly connected 
competency and loss of Native land and resources, asserting that “In order to get our 
lands, they are going to declare us competent. How do we know the Secretary of the 
Interior is competent to declare us competent? We discovered a while ago that we had 
found oil, and that disturbed a lot of people. Now we have discovered we’re sitting on 
a pile of uranium, and that is driving them crazy.”139 Native critics looked back on the 
history of allotment policies and saw the result of releasing trust restrictions—massive 
loss of Indian land. Therefore, they understood that competency legislation would 
surely “jeopardize the safety of ownership.”140  
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 Critics also disapproved of how bills after 1947 allowed the Secretary of the 
Interior to partition land which was held jointly by more than one person. In 1954, 
when the NCAI gathered for their emergency conference, they claimed that under 
H.R. 4985, “The Secretary of the Interior may sell or divide, without Indian consent, 
Indian trust heirship land whenever any one of the heirs is declared competent.”141 At 
the same conference, the group issued a resolution which proclaimed that because the 
Secretary was imbued with the power to “partition such land, or, if he deems partition 
impracticable, may sell the land or any part thereof,” the legislation “authorize[d] the 
Secretary to sell the land without the Indian’s consent, which we deem is contrary to 
all laws of equity.”142 Non-Natives also critiqued the provision which allowed the 
Secretary to partition and/or sell jointly held land. For example, in his 1953 testimony 
against HR 4985, Felix Cohen asserted, “if a dozen Indians are co-owners of a trust 
allotment, and one of them wants the land sold while the other 11 want to have the 
land continued in its trust status, the Secretary can follow the wishes of the minority of 
1 and disregard the wishes of the other 11 owners if he deems partition 
impracticable.”143 In a 1954 article published in The New Leader, W. V. Eckardt 
contended that, “The real gimmick in this bill is the provision allowing any 
‘competent’ Indian to request that his land be sold for his benefit. If he owns the land 
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jointly with other members of the tribe, as he usually does, he can still get the 
Secretary of the Interior to sell out the joint holdings for his share.”144 Native and non-
Native people interpreted the Secretary’s power to partition land as a threat to the 
property interests of all tribal members which would contributed to a weakening of 
community unity. To many, the land issue stood out as one of the most egregious 
aspects of proposed competency legislation. Indeed, in their meeting to establish their 
platform for the 1960 election, the Democratic National Committee associated the 
Republican Party with competency legislation, noting that “The Republicans also tried 
to pass a so-called ‘competency bill’ which would have forced sale of jointly held 
Indian land.”145   
 Competency bills were based upon the racialized idea that as wards, Indian 
men and women irresponsibly avoided taxation. Some critics argued that competency 
legislation was a blatant attempt to tax Indian property. For example, in 1951, lawyer 
James Curry sent a memo to Ruth Bronson of the NCAI, asserting, “We have a day to 
day fight with respect to the taxation of Indian lands. Most of the so-called 
emancipation bills are for the purpose of bringing Indian lands under taxation.”146 
Later that same year, Curry distributed a report of the annual meeting of the 
Governors’ Interstate Indian Council, a group of governors, Indian agents, and tribal 
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representatives from states with large Native populations. Curry described how when 
Senator Charles Eaton “urged the elimination of so-called ‘wardship,’” representatives 
of the NCAI and the tribes in attendance “questioned whether this would lead to 
taxation of Indians and whether wardship could be lifted without their consent.” Eaton 
replied that, “no such legislation should be adopted without ‘at least consulting’ the 
Indians as to their views.”147 To Eaton and others, emancipation was a voluntary 
process. Only Indians who no longer wanted to be wards would apply for decrees of 
competency. Moreover, since competency was understood to be a judicable category, 
only those Native people who could take on the responsibilities of citizenship—
including paying taxes—would be successfully “emancipated.” In his 1953 statement 
opposing competency, NCAI president Joseph Garry warned that taxes posed 
additional threats of land loss. He predicted, “that this bill, if enacted, would 
immediately take away the greater per cent of individual allotted Indian lands by 
forced sales of inherited lands through partition or for non-payment of taxes, thus 
paralyzing any plan of economic development which would insure the Indian’s future 
security.”148 State officials continued to conceive of competency as a pathway to 
“responsible” citizenship, even after the last bill had failed to pass. In a 1955 speech at 
the annual NCAI convention, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Glenn Emmons spoke 
of his plans to institute a method by which Native people could obtain fee patents for 
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land. He claimed, “We believe most deeply that if the Indian wants a fee patent and he 
is competent, then we have no moral or legal right to deny his application.”149 
Emmons assured the audience that fee patents would only be issued, “to persons who 
would be considered, by all reasonable standards, as fully competent to make the 
necessary decisions concerning their own personal property.”150 Emmons and others 
believed that “competent” Native people should bear the burdens of citizenship, 
including making their own financial decisions and paying taxes.  
 
Further Oppositions to Competency Legislation 
Competency, Racial Discrimination, and Poverty 
Native groups opposed competency legislation because of the threat of land 
loss, the automatic conferral of competency onto children and spouses, and the 
subversion of tribal sovereignty. Additionally, Native people feared that if Indians 
were “emancipated” from wardship, they would face hostility and discrimination from 
state and local governments. Native people worried that they would lose a measure of 
protection from poverty without the trust relationship with the federal government and 
restrictions on the sale of Indian property. If, a “competent” family fell on hard 
economic times, would they be able to access welfare benefits as other citizens or be 
followed by the racial stigma of their former wardship? Would “competent” Native 
                                                            
149 Emmons Address to NCAI Convention, 1955, Folder 14 – Indian Affairs Speeches 1955-1957, Box 
2, Glenn Emmons Papers, CSR-UNM. 
150 Ibid.  
  
389 
families profit from receiving fee patents for their land or would the land pass into 
non-Native ownership?  
 Before competency legislation was enacted, Native people wanted assurance 
that they would be able to access local welfare programs and other public services if 
needed. In his 1953 testimony before the House Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, Felix Cohen contended that, “Indians all over the country are worried at the 
prospect of a sudden cut-off of Federal services before arrangements have been made 
with the states for a taking over of the school, health, and other public services that are 
now rendered by the Federal Government.”151 Controversies in Arizona and New 
Mexico over their denial of voting rights and Social Security benefits to Indians led 
Native people and their advocates to ask if a decree of competency would shield 
Indians from racial discrimination and restriction from needed benefits. For example, 
in an 1948 issue of their newsletter, Indian Truth, the Indian Rights Association 
argued that “existing injustices,” such as Arizona and New Mexico’s refusal to grant 
Social Security benefits to Indians, “would not be corrected by such legislation as 
H.R. 1113.”152 In their 1953 resolution against H.R. 4985, the All Pueblo Council 
claimed that competency legislation “does not offer any practical remedy for 
discrimination attitudes to which Indians may be subjected by their neighbors.”153 
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Rather, as the Oglala Sioux Tribal Council asserted, competency legislation could lead 
to Native landlessness, which meant that “far too many [Indians] become a burden on 
white communities and this breeds ill-will, contempt, prejudice, and discrimination. 
These feelings are not good either for Indians or the communities into which they 
go.”154 Proponents of competency legislation offered Native people no protection from 
racial discrimination and denial of welfare benefits once they were “freed” from 
wardship. 
 Native people feared that racialized stereotypes about Indian dependency 
would only grow if Indian land passed into white ownership. During the 1954 meeting 
of the House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, Cheyenne River Sioux Chairman Frank 
Ducheneaux voiced his concerns that competency legislation would lead to increased 
poverty. “If I wanted to get a patent in fee for my land to get the restrictions removed,” 
Ducheneaux stated, “I could go out there and have the court declare me competent 
whether I was competent or not, and I could spend my family poor and my children 
poor.”155 In preparation for their emergency conference in 1954, the NCAI sent 
surveys to tribes across the country asking for their opinions on pending legislation. 
The Omaha Tribe of Nebraska stated that they were opposed to H.R. 4985, because 
they had experienced similar legislation 35 years prior: “Some Omahas came to 
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Washington and told the Indian Commissioner that they were competent and could 
handle their own business and it wasn’t long that those thought, they were issued 
patent free to their land holdings and even to those some didn’t want it. Those sold 
their lands.” The Omaha statement continued, “So we lost 3/4 of our good agricultural 
land to the white man. So we’re afraid if this bill come to be a law, we’d lose the rest 
of our land. So therefore we are opposed to this bill.”156 Other tribes also expressed 
concern about potential land loss and increased poverty and dependence upon state 
programs. In their survey response, the Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community 
of Arizona stated that H.R. 4985 would, “cause a rapid annihilation of our culture; 
make our people the prey of avaricious land grabbers and place thousands of our 
people on the charity of the State of Arizona.”157 Similarly, in their 1954 letter to 
Congressman Miller opposing H.R. 4985, the Oglala Sioux Tribal Council asserted 
that, “We do not want our people to be, or to become, public burdens.”158 Native 
groups did not trust that competency legislation would free them from disabilities. 
Rather they saw competency legislation as a path to poverty and landlessness. 
Additionally, their complex history with welfare benefits led them to question whether 
needy Native people could survive on state and local welfare programs.  
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Competency and Native Consent  
 Indians opposed competency legislation because they did not consent to it. In 
many cases, tribal groups and organizations argued that not only had Native people 
not consented, but that legislators failed to even consult them about the proposed 
legislation. As a result, they were wary of the bills which proposed to “emancipate” 
them. In a 1953 edition of their monthly newsletter, the San Carlos Apache Tribal 
Council criticized a speech given by Assistant Secretary of the Interior Orme Lewis, 
which “sounded familiar and reminded us of speeches made years ago.” When, during 
the question and answer period Lewis was asked about H.R. 4985, “Mr. Lewis’ 
answers did not convince us that our interests are being safeguarded.”159 In their 1954 
letter to Congressman Miller, Oglala Sioux Tribal Council President Moses Twobulls 
plainly stated, “The Competency Bill and many others are being acted upon without 
our consent, and even without our knowledge or understanding in most cases.”160 Pat 
Toya, governor of the Jemez Pueblo wrote to the NCAI in 1954 to express his 
council’s concerns about HR 4985. “This is just another way of trying to get our lands 
broken up and our people divided and our governments ruined,” Toya wrote. “The 
least that should be done is to change the law so that they cannot apply it to us without 
our consent.”161 President of the NCAI Joseph Garry directly expressed how 
competency legislation contradicted legals agreement between Native tribes and the 
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United States government. In his 1953 statement opposing HR 4985, Garry argued, 
“The only ‘freeing’ feature in this ‘Competency’ bill is to free the Indian of the trust 
status of his land which has been his sole protection against further exploitation of his 
land and property by selfish interests.” Critiquing the assumption that wardship 
induced dependence, Garry asserted that, “His tax freedom, which he will in time lose 
completely through the enactment of this ‘Competency’ bill, should not ever be and 
should never have been looked upon as a good-will handout to the Indian. This 
privilege of tax freedom for property is part of the price the US Government has given 
the Indian for the valuable land that was taken from him.”162 Garry, and leaders from 
the San Carlos Apache, Oglala Sioux, and Jemez Pueblo tribes all emphasized that 
under the guise of “emancipation,” competency legislation would only deprive Native 
people of land and protections which they earned as a result of their historical 
relationship with the United States.  
 At the 1954 NCAI emergency conference, Joseph Garry asserted that, “Indians 
consider themselves first-class citizens; they do not want or need ‘emancipation.’”163 
With this statement, Garry denounced the rhetoric of full citizenship behind 
competency bills. “There are no ‘classes’ of citizenship in America,” resolved the 
Council of the Pueblo of Laguna in 1953. “Indians already are citizens and have 
political equality.” The Laguna Pueblos proclaimed that “emancipation” masked the 
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United States’ abdication of legal responsibilities to Native tribes: “We ask that 
Congress not abandon its legal responsibilities under the guise of ‘freeing’ Indians 
from so-called ‘restrictions and disabilities.’”164 In a petition to the president and 
Congress against H.R. 1113, the AAIA asserted that “although many of the 
Congressmen who voted for HR 1113 thought they were voting citizenship to 
Indians,” in fact, Native people were not “legally slaves or serfs; they are citizens and 
have been citizens for many years.”165 Similarly, Oliver La Farge of the AAIA deemed 
the term “emancipation” to be “deceptive,” arguing in a 1949 letter to Senator Joseph 
O’Mahoney that “Indians do not need to be emancipated; they are all free citizens of 
the United States.”166 Native and non-Native critics of competency argued that 
legislators’ seemingly lofty desires to enhance Native people’s lives with “full” 
citizenship were a facade. In his 1953 statement on competency, Joseph Garry plainly 
explained why he perceived this type of language to be dangerous for Indians. “Why 
this sudden over-enthusiasm for freeing an alleged subjugated minority group, 
numbering only 400,000 in population, unless other motives are involved?” Garry 
questioned. “Who is to gain? The Indians feel it will be the exploiters and land hungry 
citizens who will gain by this bill at the Indians’ expense.”167 With this strong 
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response, Garry exposed the underlying motives behind competency legislation—to 
further deny Native people’s distinct claim to land and a legal arrangement with the 
US government.  
 
Conclusion  
 None of the eleven competency bills introduced in the House or Senate from 
1944 to 1954 ever became law. However, the political conversations surrounding these 
bills, Native communities’ responses to them, and the way they constantly resurfaced 
over this ten year period reveal how racialized and gendered conceptions of Indian 
dependence were woven into the post-World War II political and social landscape. 
Competency legislation crystallized assumptions about Native peoples’ lack of “full” 
citizenship. However, in their efforts to “emancipate” Native people from wardship 
and bestow upon them so-called “first-class” citizenship rights, politicians and state 
agents who supported competency legislation attempted to force Native people to 
assimilate into the American polity. This process of assimilation was cast as the 
removal of “disabilities,” and the bestowal of individual rights of property and 
financial management. In reality, competency undermined tribal sovereignty, 
community, and family structures.  
 In addition to revealing more about how conflicting ideologies of competency, 
citizenship, and Indianness undergirded termination policies, the 11 competency bills 
proposed between 1944 and 1954 also reveal further historical challenges Native 
people made to the idea of “full citizenship.” In Black is a Country, Nikhil Pal Singh 
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argued that black freedom struggles have “not only been about obtaining market 
access, equal citizenship, or integrating black people into common national 
subjectivity.” Instead, Singh asserts, these struggles should be viewed as the efforts of 
certain political actors to “widen the circle of common humanity.”168 Singh describes 
the ways in which black liberation politics reconceptualized racially stigmatized 
spaces provided a defiant counterpoint to the “reassuring teleological narrative of 
black uplift through citizenship.”169 Native people also defied this teleological 
narrative, which undergirded all proposed competency bills. Competency legislators 
proposed to “uplift” Native people, but only if they could prove their worthiness of 
“full citizenship.” In their definition of citizenship, legislators institutionalized the 
“ideal” self-sufficient nuclear family headed by a man who provided for his spouse 
and children, managed his land and finances responsibly, and never relied on public 
assistance. This version of citizenship denied Native people recognition of their legal 
agreements with the United States as tribal nations, their distinct histories as members 
of tribal communities, and in a broader sense, their humanity.  
 Historiographically, competency bills provide an unexamined way to explore 
rationales behind termination policies. Designed as individualized, case-by-case 
evaluations, the process of granting competency decrees would have subjected Native 
applicants to judgment of their abilities to be “responsible” and “self-sufficient” 
citizens. Competency criteria, including Native peoples’ service to the country, ability 
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to demonstrate they would not become “drains” on public resources, and willingness 
to obtain fee patents for their land (even if that meant partitioning jointly held 
property), help historians fully unpack what legislators and state agents meant when 
they touted the benefits of assimilation. By analyzing competency protocols, we can 
also understand how closely wardship was linked to ideologies of welfare dependency. 
Legislators believed that individual Native applicants—mainly assumed to be men—
who could prove to a judge or to a high-ranking federal official that they could 
manage their affairs with “prudence” and “wisdom,” take ownership of their financial 
resources and possible future financial failures, and provide for their families were no 
longer “Indian” enough to continue to be wards. These procedures, if enacted, would 
have eroded tribal land bases and other assets, challenged tribal authority to regulate 
their own membership criteria, and potentially separated children from extended 
family by depriving them of federal recognition and resources.  
 To some, Indian wardship symbolized the dangers of the expansion of the 
welfare state in the mid-twentieth century. In many ways, competency legislation was 
the political response to welfare dependence. Legislators asserted that the application 
process for “competency” would have “weeded out” those Native people who were 
benefitting from wardship in ways they did not deserve or need—very similar to 
conservative politicians’ arguments about poor, nonwhite single mothers receiving Aid 
to Dependent Children in this same period.170 By focusing on competency as an 
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individualized process, politicians tapped into the welfare policy rhetoric of the mid-
1940s to mid-1960s: poverty and/or dependence was the result not of widespread 
economic or societal issues, but of “an individual’s inadequacy.”171 If Indians—who as 
a group, were defined by dependence upon an overprotective and bumbling federal 
government—could be evaluated one-by-one, those individuals (and, by extension, 
their dependent family members) could be “rehabilitated” from dependence and 
“Indianness” and succeed as American individuals.172 Only “real” Indians, 
incompetent by definition and in need of perpetual governmental oversight and 
protection would remain wards. As Native and non-Native critics in the post-WWII 
period argued, this definition of competency threatened existing treaties and 
agreements, posing especial danger to Native children who would be deprived of 
resources and services without their consent. Moreover, it reinforced a non-Native 
conceptualization of wardship which equated Indian identity with racialized 
dependence and special treatment, rather than recognizing and safeguarding Native 
sovereignty and humanity.  
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Conclusion 
 In his 1950 letter to Ben Avery at the Arizona Republic, San Carlos Apache 
Tribal Council Chairman Clarence Wesley roundly criticized Avery’s claim that 
Apaches and other Native groups paid no taxes, and thus were not entitled to public 
services from the state of Arizona. Wesley simultaneously asserted his tribe’s right to 
welfare and defended tax exemptions on Indian land, arguing that the denial of public 
services represented both racial discrimination and a battle between white settlers and 
Native people. His contention was clear: “We Apaches understand empty bellies and 
old age and blindness.”1 These were Apaches’ lived realities, circumstances which 
they were prepared to fight to change. “We are fighting now to end discrimination,” 
Wesley declared. “We hope this will be the last Apache war in Arizona.”2 
 This dissertation has argued that to combat issues of poverty, strengthen their 
communities, and take care of their families, Native people agitated for both welfare 
rights and for the United States to uphold its obligations under wardship. Non-Native 
politicians, state agents, members of the media, and ordinary citizens operated under 
racialized assumptions about wardship which prevented Native people from gaining 
access to benefits they needed and were entitled to as citizens. In response, Native 
people made use of both constructs of wardship and citizenship to fight for their 
survival as tribal nations and recognition of their distinct place within the American 
polity.   
																																																						
1 Wesley to Avery, 1950, National Congress of American Indian Records, Series 4 – Tribal Files, Box 
94, Tribal Files San Carlos Apache (Arizona) 1947-1955; National Museum of the American Indian 
Archive Center, Smithsonian Institution.  
2 Ibid.  
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 Citizens with Reservations concludes in the early 1960s, as organized agitation 
for welfare rights and civil rights was increasing. In a “symbolic shift in indigenous 
political discourse,” after 1961, Native people began to frame their struggles for rights 
and recognition in the explicit language of “sovereignty” and “self-determination” 
rather than “wardship.”3 The 1960s thus represent a historical point of departure from 
early mid-century conceptualizations of rights and citizenship. Historians have 
debated the extent to which Native peoples’ increasingly public activism in this era 
have contributed to non-Native recognition of tribal sovereignty. Robert Porter has 
claimed that because social movements for Indian rights such Red Power shifted away 
from “the government-to-government relationship between the Indian nations and the 
United States,” and “shifted toward the individual rights orientation of the civil rights 
movement,” these movements “contributed greatly to the assimilation of Indians into 
American society.”4 Porter maintains that continually fixating on racial discrimination 
against Indians in contemporary society masks the fact that many discussions about 
Indian “race” actually concern sovereignty and self-government.5 Similarly, Vine 
Deloria and Clifford Lytle have asserted that the progress Native people made under 
new federal self-determination policies of the 1960s and 1970s “was purchased at an 
enormous price.” They also assert that to benefit from national welfare programs 
																																																						
3 Kevin Bruyneel, The Third Space of Sovereignty: The Postcolonial Politics of US-Indigenous 
Relations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 127. Bruyneel points to the 1961 
American Indian Chicago Conference as this point of departure.  
4 Robert B. Porter, “The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing 
the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship Upon Indigenous Peoples” Harvard BlackLetter 
Law Journal 15 (1999), 145.   
5 Ibid., 156.  
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which emerged in this era under the War on Poverty, “Indians had to pose as another 
American domestic racial minority.”6 Thus, both Porter and Deloria and Lytle claim 
that in significant ways, the activism and political achievements of the 1960s and 
1970s served to reinforce non-Native to conceive of Indians as just one of many racial 
minorities in the United States.  
 Other scholars have argued that Indian activism in the 1960s and 1970s 
represented more nuanced efforts to claim recognition of colonialism, and that 
utilizing new social welfare programs did not necessarily signal the collapse of tribal 
sovereignty into racial “minoritization.” Daniel Cobb writes that when Native people 
joined the 1968 Poor People’s Campaign, they did so “to express their concerns about 
poverty and hunger, employment and housing, health and education. They also went to 
demand that the federal government honor its obligations and respect tribal 
sovereignty.”7 Similarly, Alyosha Goldstein argues that “American Indians forcefully 
asserted that their political and cultural self-determination were essential to any 
program for economic development.”8 Goldstein asserts that Red Power activists 
argued that their concerns could not be addressed as if they were “another minority 
group,” and that they continued to press for resources and goods tribes were promised 
in their treaties and agreements with the United States.9 Kevin Bruyneel argues that in 
																																																						
6 Vine Deloria Jr. and Clifford M. Lytle, The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian 
Sovereignty (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 216.  
7 Daniel M. Cobb, Native Activism in Cold War America: The Struggle for Sovereignty (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2008), 172.  
8 Alyosha Goldstein, Poverty in Common: The Politics of Community Action During the American 
Century (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012), 87.  
9 Ibid., 149-150.  
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his 1969 book, Custer Died For Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto, Vine Deloria 
rejected the tactics of civil rights activism and articulated a political claim for 
indigenous power within the United States “via a tribal nationalism that pushed for 
self-determination.”10 Thus, although Native tribes did actively participate in welfare 
programs under the War on Poverty and in larger social movements for racial and 
economic justice within the United States, they did so from a distinct vantage point, 
maintaining their membership in tribal nations and the obligations still owed them by 
the United States government.  
 This dissertation provides the contextual framework necessary for examining 
the contentious relationships between civil rights discourse, Indian self-determination, 
and Native participation in federal social welfare programs in the 1960s-1970s by 
tracing the interactions between citizenship and wardship back to the mid-twentieth 
century. Although Native people claimed welfare benefits as citizens, they also 
maintained their distinct relationship to the United States government. This tension 
between Native peoples’ articulation of citizenship and wardship was magnified by 
terminationists’ efforts to abolish the BIA. Native people applied for welfare benefits 
under the Social Security Act, Servicemen’s Dependents Allowance Act, and the GI 
Bill, and at the same time, opposed termination policies such as competency 
legislation. These simultaneous claims upon the federal government reveal the unique 
nature of Indians’ relationship with the state, and represented Natives’ challenge to the 
racialized definition of wardship as Indian dependency.  
																																																						
10 Bruyneel, Third Space of Sovereignty, 151; 160.  
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 By placing Indian policies in conversation with welfare policies, this 
dissertation demonstrates that Native peoples’ experiences of wardship transcended 
their interactions with the BIA. Rather, the quotidian structures of wardship 
manifested in Native peoples’ dealings with state and local welfare boards, other 
federal agencies, and lending institutions. Widespread mischaracterizations of 
wardship meant that Native people could be shut out from the benefits of American 
citizenship under the expanded mid-century federal welfare state. However, Native 
people were persistent in their claims. As such, historians should consider wardship as 
part of the narrative of Native demands for tribal sovereignty. When Native peoples’ 
agitation for acknowledgement of historical legal agreements between the US and 
Native nations as wards foreshadows more direct articulations of tribal sovereignty. 
Under the Frequently Asked Questions section of the BIA’s current website, 
there is a familiar question: “Are American Indians and Alaska Natives wards of the 
Federal Government?”11 The BIA’s answer is unequivocal: “No. The Federal 
Government is a trustee of Indian property, not a guardian of all American Indians and 
Alaska Natives. Although the Secretary of the Interior is authorized by law to protect, 
where necessary, the interests of minors and adult persons deemed incompetent to 
handle their affairs, this protection does not confer a guardian-ward relationship.”12 
The BIA attempts to distance itself from the charged language of wardship. However, 
they emphasize enduring trust restrictions on Indian property, as well as continued 
																																																						
11 “Frequently Asked Questions,” Bureau of Indian Affairs, last modified April 26, 2017, 
https://www.bia.gov/FAQs/.  
12 Ibid. Emphasis added.		
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authorization to protect those adults “deemed incompetent.” This dissertation has 
demonstrated that the relationship between the federal government as trustee of Native 
property has been undergirded by racialized definitions of “competency.” To what 
extent do those assumptions linger in current policy? Is wardship truly “over”?  
 Today, the non-Native public retains impressions of Indian dependence upon 
the federal government. The contemporary articles cited in earlier portions of this 
dissertation demonstrate how conservative commentators still utilize the trust 
relationship between the federal government and tribes as a scare-tactic about the 
consequences of big government, and wardship has been recently deployed as an 
excuse for ignoring the concerns of tribal leaders about the impact of private enterprise 
on Native sovereignty and land rights. Thus, even though the BIA asserts emphatically 
that Native people are no longer wards, and there is no “guardian-ward relationship,” 
non-Native commentators and politicians continue to conceptualize the relationship 
between the federal government and Indian tribes as one of extreme oversight and 
dependence. This enduring mischaracterization serves to undermine the complicated 
historical ambiguities of wardship, and obscure the experiences of Native people who 
have continually asserted that the United States must fulfill its obligations to tribes 
under the confines of the “ward-guardian” system. Instead of continuing to employ 
racialized definitions of wardship to castigate Native people as perpetually 
impoverished and suffering, we need to rethink our understandings of wardship and 
recognize the ways in which Native people defined it in the mid-twentieth century. If 
we recognize the United States’ unfulfilled obligations and unpaid debts to Native 
	 405 
communities, we can change common narratives of Indian deprivation and 
impoverishment, and acknowledge the history of the extent to which Native men and 
women were able to work within the confines of a familiar system weighted with 
racialized and gendered assumptions about their own abilities. 
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